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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation studies nuclear crisis behavior. Specifically, it theorizes behavior 
between middle powers with nuclear weapons that are nested within a world with larger 
hegemonic states. The situation represents a paradigm shift from the bipolar context of 
the Cold War where all nuclear crises involved one or both superpowers, thereby 
implying an absence of stronger third parties that could fundamentally alter their crisis 
behavior.  
 We have focused on the India-Pakistan rivalry, and specifically on their three 
nuclear crises since South Asia’s overt nuclearization: the 1999 Kargil crisis; the 2001-02 
standoff; and the 2008 Mumbai crisis. These three case studies form the universe of crises 
between two middle power nuclear states with stronger third parties present to influence 
their behavior. Using the structured focused comparison method and relying on existing 
empirical analyses of these crises, interviews with relevant officials and experts, and 
newspaper archival research, we have process-traced the key developments in each crisis 
to identify the processes and mechanisms underpinning behavior. 
 v 
 The dissertation argues that middle power nuclear crises ought to be seen as 
trilateral engagements that accord a key crisis management role to stronger third parties. 
Crisis behavior can be best understood through “brokered bargaining” – defined as a 
three-cornered bargaining exercise between the two principal antagonists and a third 
party which is primarily seeking crisis de-escalation. Brokered bargaining theory predicts 
that this three-cornered engagement will play out in the expected manner each time a 
middle power nuclear crisis occurs as long as the outside actors do not intervene as 
competitor third parties. We reject theories that posit the dynamics of bilateral nuclear 
deterrence as the principal drivers of de-escalation, and equally, analyses that see third 
parties as standalone explanations for peaceful outcomes. We contend that it is the 
process of trilateral interaction encompassed by the brokered bargaining model and 
marked by a recursive interplay of  perceptions, expectations, incentives, and strategies of 
the three actors that shapes crisis behavior, and in turn, trajectories and outcomes. The 
research is generalizable to potential nuclear rivalries in the Middle East and remains 
relevant to the Sino-Indian dyad and rivalries on the Korean peninsula. 
  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xii 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................... xiii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... xiv 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
SECTION I: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES .................................... 8 
CHAPTER 1: TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR CRISIS 
BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY OF LITERATURE ................................. 9 
I. WHAT ARE NUCLEAR CRISES? ........................................................... 9 
II. CRISIS BEHAVIOR DURING THE COLD WAR ................................. 22 
III. BACK TO THEORY: THIRD PARTY ROLES IN NUCLEAR CRISES
................................................................................................................... 27 
IV. THIRD PARTIES AS DE-ESCALATORS: POST-COLD WAR 
TREATMENT .......................................................................................... 32 
CHAPTER 2: SETTING UP THE INQUIRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BROKERED BARGAINING .......................................................... 40 
I. PROPOSITIONS FOR CRISIS BEHAVIOR .......................................... 42 
1. The ‘Third Party’ Factor ..................................................................................... 42 
2. The Conflicting Parties ....................................................................................... 57 
3. Implications for the Posited Trilateral Engagement in Successive Crisis 
Iterations .............................................................................................................. 62 
 vii 
II. THE MODEL ............................................................................................ 66 
III. HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, AND MEASUREMENTS .................... 73 
1. Hypothesis ........................................................................................................... 73 
2. Variables ............................................................................................................. 75 
3. Measurements ..................................................................................................... 76 
IV. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 78 
1. Research Questions .......................................................................................... 79 
2. Cases ................................................................................................................... 82 
3. Data ..................................................................................................................... 86 
SECTION II: INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND NUCLEAR CRISES ................................. 88 
CHAPTER 3: INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY AND THE THIRD PARTY 
FACTOR: A LOOK BACK AT THE COLD WAR YEARS AND 
BEYOND ......................................................................................... 91 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY .......................... 92 
II. INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE THIRD PARTY ................................. 102 
1. Crises, Crisis Behavior, and the Role of Third Parties ................................... 109 
III. SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT ................................... 120 
CHAPTER 4: THE KARGIL CRISIS .................................................................. 133 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE KARGIL CRISIS ........................................ 134 
II. THE ROAD TO KARGIL: STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC 
OUTLOOK OF THE THREE ACTORS ................................................ 137 
1. India ................................................................................................................... 137 
 viii 
2. Pakistan ............................................................................................................. 141 
3. The Third Party ................................................................................................. 144 
III. AS THE KARGIL CONFLICT UNFOLDED: CLASSIC NUCLEAR 
CRISIS BEHAVIOR VERSUS BROKERED BARGAINING ............. 147 
1. Kargil: A Classic Limited War? ...................................................................... 148 
2. Enter the Third Party: Brokered Bargaining at Play ....................................... 168 
IV. BROKERED BARGAINING IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE KARGIL CRISIS ........................................................................... 213 
1. The Advent of Brokered Bargaining ............................................................... 214 
2. Brokered Bargaining and the Escalation-De-escalation Dynamic ................. 217 
3. Competing Explanations for Crisis Behavior and Outcomes ......................... 225 
CHAPTER 5: THE 2001-02 STANDOFF ............................................................ 231 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE 2001-02 STANDOFF ................................. 232 
II. FROM KARGIL TO TWIN PEAKS:  STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC 
OUTLOOK OF THE THREE ACTORS ................................................ 233 
1. India ................................................................................................................... 234 
2. Pakistan ............................................................................................................. 238 
3. The Third Party: U.S.’s Crisis Outlook ........................................................... 244 
III. AS THE CRISIS UNFOLDED: CLASSIC NUCLEAR CRISIS 
BEHAVIOR VERSUS BROKERED BARGAINING ........................... 248 
1. Was it Classic Brinkmanship? ......................................................................... 248 
2. Enter the Third Party: Brokered Bargaining at Play ....................................... 272 
 ix 
IV. SOUTH ASIA’S SECOND ATTEMPT AT BROKERED BARGAINING: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2001-02 STANDOFF .................................. 318 
1. Inter-Crisis Developments and their Impact on the 2001-02 Standoff .......... 318 
2. Brokered Bargaining and the Escalation-De-escalation Dynamic ................. 320 
3. Competing Explanations for Crisis Behavior and Outcomes ......................... 327 
CHAPTER 6: INDIA’S 9/11: THE MUMBAI CRISIS 2008 .............................. 333 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE MUMBAI CRISIS ...................................... 334 
II. FROM TWINS PEAKS TO MUMBAI:  STRATEGIC AND 
DIPLOMATIC OUTLOOK OF THE THREE ACTORS ...................... 337 
1. India ................................................................................................................... 337 
2. Pakistan ............................................................................................................. 344 
3. The Third Party: U.S.’s Crisis Outlook ........................................................... 349 
III. AS THE MUMBAI CRISIS UNFOLDED: CLASSIC NUCLEAR CRISIS 
BEHAVIOR VERSUS BROKERED BARGAINING ........................... 352 
1. Mumbai through a Classic Bilateral Lens ....................................................... 353 
2. Enter the Third Party: Brokered Bargaining at Play ....................................... 375 
IV. BROKERED BARGAINING IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE MUMBAI CRISIS ......................................................................... 418 
1. The Use of Brokered Bargaining in the Mumbai Crisis ................................. 419 
2. Brokered Bargaining and the Escalation-De-escalation Dynamic ................. 422 
3. Competing Explanations for Crisis Behavior and Outcomes ......................... 430 
SECTION III: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS .................................................... 435 
 x 
CHAPTER 7: BROKERED BARGAINING: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS 
FOR SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND ............................................ 436 
I. THE SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE WITH BROKERED 
BARGAINING ....................................................................................... 437 
1. The Quest for De-Escalation: Brokered Bargaining and Crisis Stability ...... 444 
II. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ‘CONFOUNDING VARIABLES’ ............ 453 
III. THE FUTURE OF BROKERED BARGAINING:  SOUTH ASIA AND 
BEYOND ................................................................................................ 468 
1. The Next India-Pakistan Crisis: Will Brokered Bargaining Hold? ................ 468 
2. Conventional and Nuclear Modernization and the Future of Brokered 
Bargaining in South Asia ................................................................................. 473 
3. Looking Beyond South Asia ............................................................................ 476 
CHAPTER 8: BROKERED BARGAINING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
AND PRAXIS ................................................................................ 495 
I. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS ........................................................ 495 
II. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................... 512 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 527 
CURRICULUM VITAE............................................................................................. 592 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Drivers of Crisis Behavior in Classic Versus Brokered Bargaining Contexts ... 73 
Table 2: Possible Combinations of Sensitivity of the Third Party to the Escalatory 
Potential and of the Antagonists to Third Party Preferences .............................. 76 
Table 3: India’s Nuclear Upgradation 1998-2013 .......................................................... 122 
Table 4: Pakistan’s Nuclear Upgradation 1998-2013 ..................................................... 128 
Table 5: Variance in Situational Factors: From Kargil to Mumbai ................................ 456 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Map of Pakistan ................................................................................................. 89 
Figure 2: Map of India ...................................................................................................... 90 
Figure 3: Map of Jammu and Kashmir ............................................................................. 94 
Figure 4: GDP and Military Expenditure Differentials between India and Pakistan ..... 127 
Figure 5: Map of Key Conflict Locations at Kargil ........................................................ 135 
 
  
 xiii 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Illustration 1: Conceptual Framework for Crisis Progression Under the Classic Rational 
Deterrence Model ........................................................................................71 
Illustration 2: Conceptual Framework for Crisis Progression Under Brokered  
Bargaining ...................................................................................................72 
 
  
 xiv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BJP  Bharatiya Janata Party  
BMD  Ballistic Missile Defense 
BSF  Border Security Force 
CBMs  Confidence Building Measures  
CCS  Cabinet Committee on Security 
CENTCOM  Central Command 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
DGMO Director General Military Operations  
FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas  
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation  
G-8  Group of Eight 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HM  Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen  
HuM  Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen  
IAF  Indian Air Force  
IBGs  Integrated Battle Groups  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
ISI  Inter-Services Intelligence  
JeM  Jaish-e-Muhammad  
JuD  Jama’at-ud-Dawa  
LeT  Lashkar-e-Taiba 
 xv 
LoC  Line of Control  
MAD  Mutually Assured Destruction 
MNCs  Multi-National Corporations  
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement  
NFU  No-First Use  
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty  
NSA  National Security Advisor 
OIC  Organization of Islamic Countries  
PAF  Pakistan Air Force  
RAW  Research and Analysis Wing  
UNMOGIP U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan  
UNSC  U.N. Security Council  
 
 
  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The impetus for this research comes from the paradigm shift the world underwent 
at the end of the Cold War. Not only did the bipolar international structure give way to a 
singular global hegemon1 but the types of challenges in a world with nuclear weapons 
changed dramatically. One of these changes was the advent of crisis-prone second age 
nuclear dyads that are not under any formal security guarantees from an external patron. 
The irrelevance of such a context to the superpower-centric nature of the Cold War meant 
that there was virtually no examination of crisis behavior in such dyads. Specifically, ‘de 
facto’ intervention of stronger third party actors2 in crises between two nuclear rivals 
significantly weaker than the global hegemons was never a subject of investigation. The 
present day context demands focus on this aspect of nuclear crises. 
India and Pakistan constitute the first pair of second age nuclear powers to have 
been embroiled in crises deemed to have serious escalatory potential. Since the onset of 
the overt nuclear phase of their relationship, marked as it was by their May 1998 nuclear 
tests, there have been three high-profile crises: the Kargil crisis of 1999; the 2001-02 
standoff; and the Mumbai crisis of 2008. Indian and Pakistani crisis behavior has 
generated much interest among scholars who have adapted Cold War-centric arguments 
to this new dyad operative in a unipolar global context. There has already been keen 
                                              
1 The concept of hegemony has received extensive attention in social science literature. While its 
use is varied and often inconsistent, the concept is typically associated with states that have a 
dominant position by virtue of the large advantage they have over competitors in terms of their 
military, economic, and political resources. The presumption is that hegemons will be able to 
wield commensurate influence and power over non-hegemons and thereby force changes in their 
stances and policies. The term is used in this traditional conception in this manuscript.  
2 Throughout this manuscript, the term ‘third party’ refers exclusively to external state or 
multilateral actors who are not direct party to a crisis. We refer to the primary adversaries as 
‘principal antagonists’ or ‘conflicting parties.’  
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interest in the question central to this undertaking: do nuclear crises play out the same 
way between these South Asian powers as they did between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union? Those who believe so attribute the absence of uncontrolled escalation in India-
Pakistan crises to classic rational nuclear deterrence theory.3 Deterrence pessimists 
however argue that non-nuclear factors have been more important in preventing major 
wars. Among other reasons for successful de-escalation, they note the presence of the U.S. 
as a pacifying force. However, the works that identify the ‘third party’s’ role still tend to 
anchor their arguments in classic deterrence literature and present external third party 
actors as exogenous to the bilateral equation between India and Pakistan. These analyses 
also lack any systematic theory development or examination of the mechanisms 
underpinning crisis behavior (as opposed to crisis outcomes) in the presence of the third 
party actors and the implications of this dynamic for our traditional understanding of 
nuclear crises within South Asia and beyond.  
This dissertation studies crisis behavior. Specifically, we are interested in 
theorizing behavior between middle powers with nuclear weapons (hereafter ‘middle 
power nuclear states’) that are nested within a world with larger hegemonic states but 
lack formal extended deterrence guarantees from external patrons.4 The situation 
                                              
3 Rational deterrence theory argues that nuclear weapons would successfully ‘deter’ a nuclear 
adversary as long as both sides have deliverable first strike and assured second strike capabilities, 
their threat of employing the capability is perceived to be credible by the adversary, preventive or 
preemptive strikes against the nuclear capability are not viable, and the arsenal is secure against 
accidental or unauthorized use, or accidents involving nuclear weapons. See Scott D. Sagan and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2003), 20, 50. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political 
Realities,” The American Political Science Review 84, 3 (September 1990): 731-745. 
4 This group of states is also referred to as the “new nuclear states” given that the ones that fall 
within this category have emerged in the second nuclear age. Paul (2009) divides deterrence 
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represents a paradigm shift from the bipolar context of the Cold War where all nuclear 
crises involved one or both superpowers and were therefore shaped by their competition. 
The preponderant nature of the superpowers implied an absence of external third parties 
that could fundamentally alter their crisis behavior.  
We posit that two middle power nuclear states will face a fundamentally different 
set of compulsions and pressures than the two Cold War hegemons and that this would 
affect their strategic motivations and behavior in crises.  By middle power, we mean a 
state that exhibits more attributes of weak rather than great powers but is also not so weak 
that excessive third party pressure can bring its very existence and independence into 
question.5 Middle powers tend be able to play a political role within their region but lack 
influence required to cause systemic impact by themselves.6 Nuclear crises between two 
such actors in the post-Cold War context will inevitably accord stronger third party states 
an intrinsic role in molding crisis expectations, behavior, and in turn, outcomes. Our 
formulation most obviously forces attention on today’s unipolar world – and therefore on 
the U.S. as the principal external actor – although the application of our model extends to 
any international structure where hegemonic third parties can conceivably influence crisis 
                                                                                                                                      
relationships into five ideal types: deterrence among great powers; deterrence among new nuclear 
states [emphasis added]; deterrence and extended deterrence including nuclear great powers and 
regional powers with weapons of mass destruction capabilities; deterrence between nuclear and 
non-nuclear states; and deterrence by collective actors. T. V. Paul “Complex Deterrence: An 
Introduction,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, eds. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. 
Morgan and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 9. 
5 We derive this definition from Arthur Andrew, Defense by Other Means: Diplomacy for the 
Underdog (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1970), 29. Quoted in Michael 
Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 23. For a 
discussion of various definitions of ‘middle powers’ and the inherent subjectivity in such 
categorization, see Handel, Weak States, 23-30. 
6 Derived from Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International 
Politics,” International Organization 23 (1969): 296; and Handel, Weak States, 29. 
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behavior  by virtue of their preponderance over the conflicting parties. The limitation is 
that their intervention objectives cannot be colored by their hegemonic rivalries: a rival 
state’s potential to intervene (or actual intervention) cannot dictate the choices made by 
the third party intervener in a middle power crisis situation. This was typical for 
superpower intervention in regional crises during the Cold War.  
This research argues that middle power nuclear crises ought to be seen as a 
trilateral engagement rather than in the bilateral framework that dominated all classic 
literature on nuclear crisis behavior. Our core argument is that middle power nuclear 
crisis behavior can be best understood as a “brokered bargaining” exercise, defined as a 
three-cornered bargaining framework between the two principal antagonists and the third 
party – singular or plural –, which does not offer formal extended deterrence guarantees 
to either of the antagonists, but seeks to affect de-escalation as its primary goal. Each of 
three actors seeks to influence the other two to behave in line with its respective crisis 
objectives and in so doing, all three affect each other’s expectations, incentives, strategies, 
and overall behavior. This trilateral bargaining model leads us to a theory of crisis 
behavior of middle power nuclear states. Brokered bargaining theory predicts the precise 
processes and mechanisms of this trilateral interaction, its frequency, and its implications 
for manifest crisis behavior.  It does not see classic rational nuclear deterrence as 
mutually exclusive but maintains that brokered bargaining will be the primary 
mechanism explaining crisis behavior.  
This research is especially relevant to the current global environment that is 
marked by pervasive concerns about the ability of second age nuclear states to manage 
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their relationships and capability but where little has been done to understand nuclear 
contests between them. Despite the widely recognized fact that the end of the Cold war 
has significantly reduced the risk of great power wars, much of the focus of relevant post-
Cold War literature has remained on understanding the new deterrent challenges for 
countries like the U.S. and its requirements to ensure robust deterrence, on preventing 
further vertical and horizontal proliferation, and linked to both, increasingly on the threat 
of ‘rogue’ leaders and terrorists acquiring nuclear material or capability.7  
                                              
7 For a summary of the content of some of this literature, see Moeed Yusuf, “Predicting 
Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Policy Paper 9, Brookings 
Institution, January 2009, 31-54. For examples, see Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second 
Nuclear Age (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Patrick J. Garrity and Steven 
A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, 
and North America (New York: Plenum Press, 1992); Committee on International Security and 
Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997); Glenn C. Buchan et al., Future Roles of U.S. 
Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003); Kurt M. Campbell, 
Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); L. 
Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds., Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. 
Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and 
Richard W. Fieldhouse, The Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol. V: British, French, and Chinese 
Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Harold A. Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear 
Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam 
Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002); Committee on International Security and 
Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-
Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The 
National Academies Press, 2005); James A. Russell, “Peering into the Abyss: Non-State Actors 
and the 2016 Proliferation Environment,” Nonproliferation Review 13, 3 (November 2006): 645-
57; Victor A. Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and the 
World Order (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Robin M. Frost, Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11 
(London: Routledge, 2005); William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear 
Poor (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007); and Kevin O’Neill, “The Nuclear Terrorist 
Threat,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 1997,  http://www.isis-
online.org/publications/terrorism/threat.pdf.  
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 The dissertation focuses on the South Asian nuclear dynamic. This is driven by 
the fact that India-Pakistan crises constitute the universe of historical cases between 
middle power nuclear states with stronger third parties present to influence the crisis. 
That said, the findings from our analysis will be applicable to a number of diverse nuclear 
rivalries. Potential nuclear dyads in the Middle East will fall within our scope limitation. 
Iran-Israel is considered to be the most imminent one. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and 
even Syria have been tipped as the other potential aspirants for a nuclear capability. 8 Our 
findings will be valid for any pairing among these states.  Moreover, even though China’s 
global rise and stature have propelled it closer to great power status than that of a middle 
power, our analysis will also be instructive for behavior in a Sino-Indian crisis. 
Furthermore, in the final chapter, we relax our condition of absence of formal extended 
deterrence guarantees to examine the implications of our analysis for cases where such 
security umbrellas are in place for one of the antagonists. This will make our findings 
relevant, even if only partially applicable, to East Asian rivalries as well.  
 The conclusions we draw from the analysis in this undertaking will be highly 
policy relevant, not only for policy makers of the nuclear dyads the findings are 
generalizable to but also to the policy enclaves of countries like the U.S. and others who 
could potentially play the third party role. This dissertation will also add significant value 
to existing literature by engaging works on three-actor models, third party interventions 
in nuclear crises, the debate on hegemonic behavior under a unipolar international 
                                              
8 Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation,” 39-41. 
7 
 
structure, and the body of work on crisis behavior, deterrence theory, and the deterrence 
optimism-pessimism debate.  
 This manuscript is divided into three sections. The first section consists of two 
chapters and introduces the conceptual puzzle and the model of brokered bargaining. 
Chapter one will introduce the theoretical foundations of nuclear crises and survey the 
traditional understanding of and empirical evidence from nuclear crisis behavior during 
the Cold War and beyond. Chapter two will introduce the brokered bargaining model and 
present the propositions, hypotheses, research questions, and methods underpinning this 
research. Section II forms the core of our analysis. It begins by introducing the India-
Pakistan rivalry and the history of third party engagement in South Asian crises. Chapters 
four, five, and six are dedicated to our three case studies. We examine crisis behavior 
during the Kargil crisis, the 2001-02 standoff, and the Mumbai crisis in successive 
chapters. Section III draws lessons from the case studies. Chapter seven observes the 
common themes from the three cases and generalizes the findings to other wholly or 
partially relevant contexts. Chapter eight draws theoretical and policy implications of the 
key findings of this research. 
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SECTION I: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 
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CHAPTER 1: TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR CRISIS 
BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
This chapter surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on nuclear crises and 
third party roles therein. In doing so, we highlight the traditional bias towards two-actor 
models in understanding nuclear crisis behavior, driven in large part by the U.S.-Soviet 
superpower rivalry during the Cold War. We also examine the post-Cold War literature 
and identify elements that most directly inform our model and theory development 
exercise. We begin by introducing nuclear crises. Next, we turn to a brief recounting of 
the key attributes of crises during the Cold War. This is followed by a review of the 
existing literature on third party roles in relevant contexts. Finally, we discuss the post-
Cold War recognition of third parties as de-escalators.    
I. WHAT ARE NUCLEAR CRISES? 
Crises are anomalies in the conduct of international relations. At their heart, they 
are distinguished as situations carrying a real threat of the outbreak of war. Snyder and 
Diesing (1977) define an international crisis as “a sequence of interactions between the 
governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but 
involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.”1 Crisis management 
                                              
1 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and 
System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 6. For a 
discussion on definitional issues regarding crises, see P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen 
P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 4-8; Charles F. Hermann, “International Crisis as a 
Situational Variable,” in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and 
Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: Free Press, 1969), 411-16; and Oran R. Young, The 
Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), 6-15. 
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is the business of avoiding war.2 Successful crisis management requires forcing 
accommodation on the opponent or mutually backing down without giving up on one’s 
objectives or having to fight the adversary with full force.3   
Crises occur when non-coercive means to achieve one’s objectives have failed 
and where normal assumptions and processes that guide decision making – the normal 
flow of politics – have broken down.4 Crisis situations lend themselves to “strategic” or 
“non-cooperative” bargaining whereby manipulation of the situation to one’s advantage is 
prized over persuading the adversary. 5 As conflicting parties seek to enhance their 
relative bargaining strength in a crisis, they can be expected to employ one or more 
‘functions of force’; 6 most relevant to this undertaking, they could deter, compel, or 
undertake coercive diplomacy.  
The force function that elicited most attention during the Cold War was 
deterrence.  It involves threatening the adversary with prohibitive costs to prevent an 
                                              
2 The U.S. Institute of Peace’s glossary of peace terms defines ‘crisis management’ as “the 
attempt to control events during a crisis to prevent significant and systematic violence from 
occurring or escalating.” Dan Snodderly, ed. Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict 
Management and Peacebuilding (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 17.  
3 Accommodation often entails face saving for the side that has agreed to accommodate while 
mutual backing down is often a function of further escalation being seen as risking intolerable 
costs by both sides. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 14, 18. 
4 Young, The Politics of Force, 15. 
5 Ibid., 36-39; Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review 
Political Science 5 (2002): 2. 
6 Art identifies four functions of force available to bargainers: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, 
compellence, and swaggering. The first three are discussed here. Swaggering does not entail 
specific threats and is often employed outside a crisis environment by weapon acquisitions and 
demonstrations of capabilities. Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power,” International 
Security 4, 4 (Spring 1980): 4-14.  
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unwanted action.7 Apart from the need to deter particular moves, crisis situations also 
lend themselves to the need to force the adversary to take certain desirable actions. Cold 
War literature accorded importance to two closely related concepts that operated under 
the overarching deterrence context: compellence and coercive diplomacy. Compellence 
entails initiating an action to get the target to act in a desirable manner or undo a course 
of action it is already pursuing. It is inherently offensive in nature and involves a firm 
commitment to use force or actual employment of force in case of non-compliance.8 
Coercive diplomacy differs from compellence in that it does not only depend on 
aggressive threats to use brute force. The distinction is best made by Alex George (1991) 
who highlights the defensive aspects of coercion that allow for flexible diplomacy and 
even non-coercive threats including positive inducements for desirable behavioral change 
                                              
7 Two forms of deterrence dominated Cold War thinking: deterrence by punishment, the most 
common form of deterrence, involved threats suggesting that the benefits to be gained from 
taking a particular unwanted action will be outweighed by the punishment inflicted; and 
deterrence by denial which is the promise that a given action will not succeed. See Glenn H. 
Snyder, “Deterrence by Denial and Punishment,” Research Monograph No.1, Center of 
International Studies, Princeton University, January 2, 1959. 
For classic writings on nuclear deterrence, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: 
Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); William W. 
Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” in Military Policy and National Security, ed. 
William W. Kaufmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 12-38; Herman Kahn, On 
Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas C. Schelling, 
Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). For more recent perspectives, see 
T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the 
Global Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Payne, Deterrence in the Second 
Nuclear Age; and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 172-202. 
8 On the distinction between deterrence and compellence and for a discussion about compellence 
and its application to the Cold War period, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 69-91. 
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and accommodation.9 Nonetheless, at their core, both concepts seek to pressure the 
adversary to alter its behavior patterns while keeping the threat of use of force potent and 
real. 
A nuclear crisis is unlike a conventional one in crucial respects. The quantum and 
speed of destruction associated with nuclear weapons, the lack of defense against them, 
and their inherently punitive nature revolutionized pre-nuclear era thinking about 
possibilities of use of force.10  A universally recognized attribute of a crisis is the tension 
conflicting parties feel between ‘winning’ and war avoidance.11 While coercion forces 
one to raise the costs of non-compliance for the adversary, an actor’s behavior must also 
leave open opportunities for functions of accommodation to play out, lest the mutual risk 
is heightened to intolerable levels and ends up causing a major conflict. The presence of 
nuclear weapons accentuates these polar tendencies of crisis behavior.  
The prohibitive costs imposed by nuclear weapons use imply that deliberate all-
out war to attain crisis objectives becomes rationally unthinkable. Nuclear weapons are 
                                              
9 Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War 
(Washington, D.C.: United States institute of Peace Press, 1991), 4-7. 
10 For the seminal work on how the advent of nuclear weapons revolutionized thinking about 
crises and war, see Bernard Brodie, “War in the Atomic Age,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic 
Power and World Order, ed., Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 
21-69; and Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic 
Power and World Order, ed., Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 
70-107. For the influence of nuclear weapons on world politics and relations between the pioneer 
states of the atomic age, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft 
and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Arnold Wolfers, “The 
Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and 
World Order, ed., Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 111-147; 
and Percy E. Corbett, “Effect on International Organization,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic 
Power and World Order, ed., Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 
148-165. 
11 For a detailed discussion of these opposing pulls in any crisis situation, see Young, The Politics 
of Force, 244-283. 
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therefore believed to have an inherent caution-inducing effect that should lead both 
antagonists embroiled in a crisis to exercise greater prudence to avoid uncontrolled 
escalation.12 This reflects the classic position of deterrence optimists, a group of theorists 
who bank on this special nature of nuclear weapons to argue that their mutual possession 
by adversaries will reduce the possibility of conventional wars; the fear generated by the 
danger of crisis escalation is believed to be too great for any state to risk it.13   
Ironically, this dynamic is not necessarily expected to eliminate crises between 
nuclear powers. In fact, according to Glenn Snyder’s “stability-instability” paradox, 
stability at the strategic (nuclear) level – attained by a belief on both sides that their 
nuclear weapons capabilities will make any nuclear use by the opponent cost prohibitive 
– actually encourages violence at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.14 This line of 
                                              
12 The caution-inducing attribute (war avoidance) of nuclear weapons represents the most cardinal 
principal of nuclear deterrence theory. It is best captured by Bernard Brodie’s observation about 
the  U.S. military early in the atomic age: “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment 
has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no 
other useful purpose.” Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” 76. 
13 In its most deterministic form, the view leads to the concept of “existential deterrence.” Coined 
by McGeorge Bundy during the Cold War, it sees the mere presence of survivable nuclear 
arsenals as enough to ensure that deterrence is upheld. See McGeorge Bundy, “Existential 
Deterrence and Its Consequences,” in The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear 
Age, ed. Douglas MacLean (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 3-13. For an 
authoritative view of deterrence optimism, see Kenneth Waltz’s writings in Scott D. Sagan and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2003), 3-45, 125-55. 
14 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Balance of Power, ed. 
Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1965), 198-199. While Snyder is most often 
credited for noticing the dynamic, the essence of the paradox was first presented by British 
solider and military historian Liddel Hart in 1954. Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability 
Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” in  Escalation Control and the 
Nuclear Option in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider 
(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 1. For Hart’s observation at the time, see B. 
H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 23. The concept 
has been further crystallized since Snyder’s writing and is most aptly presented by Jervis: “to the 
extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less 
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thinking contains an inherent paradox that potentially raises the specter of 
provocativeness and belligerence by the conflicting parties in nuclear crises. Since the 
option for states to deliberately fight escalated wars in pursuit of their interests available 
in a non-nuclear context no longer applies, a nuclear crisis is often seen to be competition 
in heightening the fear of the consequences of war for the opponent rather than actually 
inflicting maximum damage through war-fighting: crisis behavior is more about issuing 
threats of use of force than about actual employment of force.15 This is where force 
functions like deterrence and compellence that envision such threats or only limited use 
of force become central to nuclear crises.  
Nuclear crises lend primacy to a player’s interests, intent, resolve, and nerves over 
relative capabilities which are central to conventional contexts.16 At the heart of crisis 
strategizing lies the need to ensure that the adversary recognizes the challenger’s ability 
to employ the threats it is making and perceives its resolve to do so to be credible.17 
Deterrent threats aimed at conveying one’s ability to employ the nuclear option in pursuit 
of deterrence objectives and offensive threats suggesting the possibility of initiation of 
hostilities aimed at furthering aggressive strategies such as compellence must be credible 
for the opponent to be affected and alter its behavior in the desired fashion. Interestingly 
                                                                                                                                      
stable at lower levels of violence.” Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31. 
15 Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 239; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 33 (and more generally, 
18-34). 
16 Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 239-40. 
17 The ‘credibility-of-commitment issue’ is considered so central that it received more attention in 
classic literature than perhaps any other theoretical issue relevant to the nuclear deterrence 
enterprise. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 18. For seminal works on this subject, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Schelling, The Strategy of 
Conflict; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 35-91. 
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then, caution about all-out war actually implies greater leeway and a protracted escalation 
ladder from its lowest rung to the nuclear level and thus expands the space available for 
fear creation by both sides.18  
Establishing credibility in nuclear contexts is extremely difficult given that the 
threats being made are inherently costly to the party making them. No state can be 
oblivious to the risks of provoking a nuclear capable opponent into retaliation. This 
problem was central to the superpower rivalry during the Cold War where both the U.S. 
and Soviet Union operated under the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).19 
Nuclear theorists came up with two solutions to the problem; these provided vivid images 
of what behavior involving nuclear dyads was supposed to look like in crisis situations. 
Both solutions entail manipulation of risk of war to affect favorable outcomes. Nuclear 
weapons and the threat of their use remain central in each case.  
The first solution entailed playing on the “autonomous risk” of a nuclear launch 
despite an actor’s desire to avoid such an outcome. The challenger essentially leaves the 
risk of escalation to nature rather than deliberate strategy, a believable proposition given 
that crises are, by definition, situations where  actors do not have full control over 
                                              
18 Geller argues that nuclear rivals are likely to exhibit provocativeness as a means of establishing 
credibility. Therefore, nuclear crises can be expected to exhibit extreme coercion and escalate, but 
short of war. See Daniel S. Geller, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, 2 (1990): 291-310. 
19 MAD became the dominant strategic doctrine of the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold 
War once the latter had attained nuclear parity with Washington. It essentially amounts to each 
side acknowledging its vulnerability to unbearable levels of destruction if both sides get involved 
in a full-scale nuclear exchange. For MAD’s origins and use in practice during the Cold War, see 
Henry D. Sokolski, ed. Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, its Origins and 
Practice (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2004). 
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developments:  “force of events” are recognized to create a dynamic of their own.20 The 
concept is embodied in Thomas Schelling’s (1960; 1962) “threats that leave something to 
chance”21 whereby states up the ante to raise the prospect of an unintended nuclear 
launch – sometimes this may even require seeming irrational to create enough fear –22 
and in the process hope to convince the opponent of the high costs of continuing the crisis. 
Perhaps the most studied behavior pattern playing on autonomous risk in nuclear crises is 
‘brinkmanship’.23 Envisioned as a compellence strategy by Thomas Schelling,24 a 
brinkmanship game involves playing “chicken” in an environment when both sides are 
uncertain of the other’s credibility of resolve and each believes that it is more resolute 
than the adversary.25 Although the formulation does not envision outright recklessness, 
an element of provocative and tit-for-tat moves – possibly including limited amounts of 
                                              
20 Young, The Politics of Force, 96-97; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 27.  
21 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187-203. Also see T. C. Schelling, “Nuclear Strategy in 
Europe,” World Politics 14, 3 (April 1962): 421-25. 
22 Richard N. Lebow, The Art of Bargaining (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 96. The incentive to create an impression of irrationality was empirically put to test by 
former U.S. President Richard Nixon through his “madman theory” whereby his pretense of 
recklessness to the point of irrationality was used to create fear among the Soviet leadership. 
Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, “The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in 
October 1969,” International Security 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 156. For a more elaborate discussion 
of Nixon’s madman theory, see Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1998), 63-86. 
23 On brinkmanship, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 91, 99-105. Also see Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict, 199-201; Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political 
Science Quarterly 94, 4 (Winter 1979-80): 617-33; Robert Powell, “The Theoretical Foundation 
of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence,” Political Science Quarterly 100 (1985): 75-96; Robert Powell, 
“Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-sided Incomplete Information,” The American Political 
Science Review 82, 1, (March 1988): 155-78; and Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 
Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” International Security 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 
91-97. 
24 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 91. 
25 Much of the existing crisis modeling aimed at understanding escalation and crisis stability 
dynamics has been premised on playing “chicken.” See for example, Steven J. Brams and D. 
Mark Kilgour, “Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” The 
American Political Science Review 81, 3 (1987): 833-50.  
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violence – is built into the dynamic. The conflicting parties intentionally up the ante to 
suggest that things may escalate to the nuclear level inadvertently or through a desperate 
action. The goal is to get the ‘target’ to blink and accept accommodation on terms 
favorable to the ‘challenger.’  
The second solution was the resort to a “war of endurance”26 where less than total 
destruction was inflicted on the opponent. “Limited war” theory envisioned use of force 
beyond the conventional realm to actual employment of nuclear weapons to raise the 
costs for the opponent – enough to force it to back down but not so high that it would 
deem an all-out nuclear retaliation necessary.27   
The problem with these solutions was the possibility of ‘overcooking’ 
provocativeness – of too much risk being taken – and actually forcing the autonomous 
risk to cause undesired escalation.28 As deterrence pessimists have pointed out, the 
inclination to see nuclear crises as a test of the strength of resolve may be the best 
explanation for pursuing ‘victory’ in a nuclear crisis but it is not without its perils as far 
as potential deterrence failure is concerned. Pessimists accept the caution-inducing 
attribute of nuclear weapons in principle but highlight the multiple possibilities for 
deterrence failure created by provocative behavior central to these approaches.  They 
                                              
26 Schelling, “Nuclear Strategy in Europe,” 429.  
27 For a brief discussion of Limited War and its theorists, see Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in 
Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), 82-93. For the 
most noticed works on Limited War Theory, see Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge 
to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957); Robert E. Osgood, 
Limited War Revisited (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); Klaus Knorr, “Limited Strategic War,” 
in Limited Strategic War, eds., Klaus Knorr and Thorton Read (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1962), 3-31; Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation,” The 
American Political Science Review 83, 2 (June 1989): 503-19; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 
105-116.  
28 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 397. 
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point to psychological and perceptual, organizational, political, and technical deficiencies 
that can drastically lower crisis stability – the likelihood that an actor would see an 
incentive to launch a first strike –29 in the fog of war and that make miscalculated, 
inadvertent, unauthorized, or accidental use of nuclear weapons a realistic possibility.30  
Unexpected behavior can also be a function of “reputational” concerns whereby actions 
and signals are determined not only by current realities but by past experiences against 
the same or other adversaries.31 Since decision makers routinely seek to establish and 
enhance their reputation as resolute bargainers to extract future benefits,32 their own 
behavior and their expectations about the opponent can lead to decisions that may not 
                                              
29 Most simply put, crisis stability is “a measure of countries’ incentives not to preempt in a crisis.” 
James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” in The 
Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, eds., T. V. 
Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
1998), 143. Also see Robert Powell, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” The American Political 
Science Review, 83, 1 (March 1989): 61-76.  
30 For seminal writings on these dangers in nuclear contexts, see Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Robert 
Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985); Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization 
Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, 4 
(Spring 1994): 66-107; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 52-91, 118-136; and 
Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 1-27. 
31 Press calls the tendency for actors to believe that their present behavior will impact their 
reputation in a future crisis “Past Actions Theory.” He finds that evidence does not support this 
belief but acknowledges that real world leaders consider this conventional wisdom. Daryl G. 
Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 1,5,8, 11-20.  For a discussion of the role of reputation in deterrence contexts, see 
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 
14-43. For a more general discussion of reputation in bargaining, see Fred C. Iklé, How Nations 
Negotiate (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 76-86. 
32 Statesmen are believed to be overly concerned about their reputation for resolve. Snyder and 
Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 188. The concept of ‘Realpolitik Experimental Learning’ holds 
that actors are likely to see resolve as a ‘winning’ strategy and attribute failure to lack of it. They 
thereby tend to exhibit greater resolve with each passing crisis. Russell J. Leng, “Realpolitik and 
Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. 
T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 108-09.  
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seem entirely rational – and thus would be susceptible to misjudgment – in a particular 
context. In the final outcome, pessimists stress upon the unpredictable nature of crises to 
highlight the ever-present danger of unwanted escalation.  
Finally, since nuclear crises are essentially about creating desirable images of 
one’s resolve in the opponent’s mind,33 they put a premium on ‘communication.’ Both 
on-ground actions and verbal signals, whether offensive or defensive, constitute 
communication.34 Declaratory policy and actual on-ground actions like force 
demonstrations – conventional and nuclear deployments, alerting, movement of delivery 
vehicles, and the like – are a potent form of communication aimed at enhancing one’s 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the adversary. 35 On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
standing down certain aggressive force demonstrations or other provocative actions can 
be used to convey prudence and lower tensions. 
                                              
33 Snyder and Diesing (1977) argue that the inability to willingly fight an all-out conflict in a 
nuclear context makes reputation for resolve that much more important as an element of 
bargaining power in nuclear crises. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 194 (and more 
generally 185-89). Also see Robert Jervis, “Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics,” in Coercion, eds. 
James R. Pennock and John W. Chapman (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 272-88. 
34 Communication can entail costly moves and commitments or ‘cheap’ threats. Costly 
communication provides strong indices of resolve; cheap communication is usually mere rhetoric. 
See Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” The 
American Political Science Review 92, 4 (December 1998): 829-44; James D. Fearon, “Domestic 
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science 
Review 88, 3 (September 1994): 577-92; James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: 
Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1 (February 1997): 68-90. 
For a discussion of the link between types of states and communication of benign and malign 
intent, see Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition 
and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 64-72. 
We distinguish between ‘actions’ and ‘signals’ here, respectively, to signify on-ground moves 
and verbal pronouncements even though much of the literature often lumps both these together as 
‘signals.’ Making this distinction allows us to separate the impact of each of these tools in our 
analysis.  
35 See Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 239-258.  
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Verbal ‘signals’ can establish credibility [we will use the term “resolve signal” to 
refer to these] or transmit calm [we will use the term “prudence signal” to refer to these] 
in other ways. They are more explicit but their content can entail a firm commitment to a 
threat (or defensive behavior) or a vaguely defined threat (or defensive behavior) that 
leaves room open for retraction for the challenger. The clearer and more specific a 
commitment, the more credible it is likely to be but it also shrinks the space for the 
challenger to retract without causing reputational damage to its credibility.36 In the same 
vein, commitments made in public are believed to be more credible than those 
communicated privately given the higher ‘audience costs’ associated with public 
pronouncements.37  Private communication on the other hand leaves greater flexibility 
and room for maneuver but makes it more difficult for one to raise the bargaining price 
sufficiently enough to force the desired change in the target’s behavior.38  
 Nuclear theorizing and the debate around possibilities of use of functions of force 
end up creating certain expectations in terms of nuclear crisis behavior. A crisis between 
a nuclear dyad accentuates both the caution-inducing and threat-maximizing attributes 
common to all crisis behavior. Possessors of nuclear weapons need to ensure that they 
have the requisite capability and convince the adversary of their resolve to employ it in 
an eventuality. At the same time, they ought to be fixated on avoiding the destructive 
                                              
36 Ibid., 246-49. 
37 According to Sartori, literature on crisis bargaining leads to the conclusion that to convey 
information “threats must be costly, and verbal threats work only when leaders publicize them 
before domestic audiences that may remove them from office.” Anne E. Sartori, “The Might of 
the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” International 
Organization 56, 1 (Winter 2002): 121. For more discussion of audience costs and their relative 
importance in various political contexts, see Schultz, “Domestic Opposition;” Fearon, “Domestic 
Political Audiences.”  
38 Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 251-52.  
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outcome associated with use of nuclear weapons. This should instill caution in their 
behavior and lead them to consciously avoid crossing the nuclear Rubicon. They can 
simultaneously be expected to exploit the space below the nuclear threshold and employ 
credible threats – these may include limited use of force – to push the adversary into 
accommodation. Provocativeness associated with this aim would also have to be kept 
short of undermining crisis stability. Crisis behavior could entail both public and private 
communication – both through actions and verbal signals – and firm and vague 
commitments all aimed at establishing credibility of the threats while avoiding 
overcooking fear-creation. The constant tension between the coercive and 
accommodative poles may well make crisis behavior go through unpredictable and erratic 
oscillations.39  
 In the final outcome, if nuclear crises in the real world are to play out as depicted 
by classic deterrence theory, one would witness a tussle between exhibiting resolute 
behavior and remaining prudent enough to stay below the nuclear threshold. The risk 
associated with the competition in threat-making between adversaries should eventually 
prevent them from fighting major wars unless inadvertence leads to such an outcome, and 
possibly to a nuclear catastrophe. This last attribute makes nuclear crises fundamentally 
different from their conventional counterparts in the opportunities and constraints they 
offer, and the crisis behavior choices the antagonists can afford to make.  
                                              
39 This basic tension is present in any crisis situation but the pressures on the conflicting parties in 
a nuclear crisis can accentuate it and thereby make non-linear progression of crises more likely. 
For discussion on this tension in any crisis and its potential impact on crisis trajectories, see 
Young, The Politics of Force, 177-78. For empirical evidence of this tension and how it played 
out during Cold War crises, see Young, The Politics of Force, 179-216. 
22 
 
II. CRISIS BEHAVIOR DURING THE COLD WAR 
 The markers of this expected behavior were identifiable in the major Cold War 
crises involving nuclear possessor states. Incidentally, each of these crises saw a direct or 
indirect role of one or both superpowers. The conflicting parties retained provocative 
nuclear postures, functions of force were widely applied, they undertook tit-for-tat 
escalatory steps, the autonomous risk of escalation was regularly communicated through 
force demonstrations and verbal deterrent and offensive threats, and prudence and caution 
aimed at steering clear of the possibility of a nuclear launch was on display.40 The 
predominant verdict on Cold War crisis behavior holds that despite significant display of 
coercion and resolve in these periods of heightened tensions, the caution-inducing aspects 
of nuclear weapons reigned supreme; ultimately deterrence held and is believed to have 
been responsible for preventing major wars between the Cold War rivals.41 This however 
did not mute the pessimists’ take that the fog of war almost led to unwarranted escalation 
on a number of occasions across these crisis situations.42 
The most high profile crisis during the Cold War was the Cuban missile affair of 
1962. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union communicated resolve through force 
demonstrations and resolve signals. Conventional and nuclear forces were put on alert 
                                              
40 For a discussion of the most significant Cold War nuclear crises, see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear 
Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987); Kurt 
Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair, Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988),161-225. 
41 Patrick M. Morgan and T. V. Paul, “Deterrence Among Great Powers in an Era of 
Globalization,” in T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz, eds. Complex Deterrence: 
Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 261; Lebow, The 
Art of Bargaining, 96.  
42 For a cataloguing and analysis of some of the near misses in terms of accidents involving 
nuclear weapons during the Cold War, see Scott. D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, 
Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
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and at one point the Soviets even pre-delegated launch authority for its tactical weapons 
to the field command. Audience costs were also invoked as the U.S. President John F. 
Kennedy issued public ultimatums to force accommodation upon Moscow. Ultimately, 
backchannel negotiations and ‘letter diplomacy’ between the two leaders led to mutual 
compromise and de-escalation.43  Previous episodes like the Berlin Deadline crisis of 
1958-59 did not reach such epic proportions but nonetheless carried significant risks. The 
Soviet ultimatum to effectively revoke the rights of the World War II occupiers in Berlin 
in late-1958 triggered the crisis that saw repeated tit-for-tat threats of all-out nuclear 
attacks in a situation where conventional and nuclear forces were already deployed. De-
escalation occurred as the Soviets shied away from acting upon their ultimatum even as 
they continued to threaten use of force to achieve their objectives.44 The Berlin Wall 
blockade of 1961 repeated much the same pattern with aggressive nuclear rhetoric and 
threats from both sides. U.S. strategy was to threaten nuclear war if West Berlin residents 
were absorbed into East Germany. The Soviet Union, on its part, continued to play on the 
autonomous risk by suggesting the likelihood of rapid escalation. Ultimately, the crisis 
ended without any hostilities; the Soviets failed to compel the U.S. to give into their 
demands.45  
                                              
43 For an authoritative first-hand account of the Cuban missile crisis, see Robert F. Kennedy, 
Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969). For a 
summary of the key developments and elements of behavior, see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and 
Nuclear Balance, 109-23; and Honoré M. Catudal, Nuclear Deterrence- Does it Deter? (Berlin: 
Berlin Verlag, 1985), 462-84.  
44 Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 83-92. 
45 Ibid., 92-109. 
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Other major crises involved the superpowers indirectly, as guarantors of an ally’s 
security, often in the “periphery.”46 They inevitably saw these crises as opportunities to 
outmaneuver the rival superpower in their intense positional competition. Perhaps the 
most obvious cases were the 1956 Suez crisis, the conflict in Vietnam in the 1960s, and 
the 1973 crisis in the Middle East. Here too, the behavior pattern was similar. At Suez, 
the Soviet Union threatened use of nuclear weapons if France and Britain did not pull out 
of the area while the U.S. responded with full alerting of its nuclear forces and 
commitment to respond in kind.47 The U.S. nuclear forces also went on alert during the 
1973 Middle East crisis as Washington threatened Moscow to deter its intervention on 
Egypt’s behalf.48 In Vietnam, the U.S. hinted at potential nuclear weapon use – later 
determined to be a bluff – if the Soviet Union failed to force Hanoi to accept a U.S.-
dictated outcome.49  
In virtually all crises, show of resolve was matched by arduous efforts by the 
superpowers to avoid getting embroiled in a direct confrontation. Their sensitivity to the 
dangers involved at times even led them to coerce their own allies into accommodation.50 
                                              
46 The term “periphery” was most commonly used during the Cold War to distinguish the 
European theater which formed the “core” of the conflict between the superpowers and their 
allies, and the rest of the world.   
47 Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan 
Davidson, 2005), 76-77. 
48 The 1973 episode was a ‘demonstration crisis’ created by Egypt to force superpower 
involvement, and in turn pressure on Israel to vacate Egypt’s Sanai peninsula that it was 
occupying at the time. For superpower crisis diplomacy in the episode, see Betts, Nuclear 
Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 123-29; Gottfried and Blair, Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, 
198-206. 
49 Sagan and Suri, “The Madman Nuclear Alert,” 152-153. 
50 Incidentally, the propensity of the Cold War rivals to fight for control and influence in the 
periphery was partly a function of the “nuclear learning” that took place during the first fifteen 
crisis-prone years of their relationship. As they comprehended the unbearable costs of conflict in 
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The U.S. experience in Laos in 1961-62 where it avoided use of military force partly to 
evade a confrontation with the Soviet Union and in Vietnam where it sought to exploit 
the Soviet-Chinese split but still constrained itself due to fear of Chinese intervention in 
the conflict are cases in point.51 Much earlier, the Soviet Union had also exercised 
restraint during the Korean war of 1950-51 whereby its reaction to the U.S. military 
action was limited to positioning border forces and standing back as the then non-nuclear 
China intervened against the U.S.52 As will be discussed in the next chapter, all Cold War 
era crises in South Asia involving India and Pakistan bore these trademarks as well. In 
this sense, the role of superpowers as conflict de-escalators was well recognized during 
the Cold War. 
The only crisis involving two nuclear powers that escalated to significant armed 
clashes was the 1969 Sino-Soviet Ussuri River conflict over the disputed island of 
Chenpao.53 This was a unique situation where one of the superpowers was not directly 
involved in the episode and thus could potentially have played an influencing ‘third party’ 
                                                                                                                                      
the “core” regions of Europe (and in East Asia), they accepted the status quo there and moved to 
compete for influence in the peripheral regions. Michael Krepon, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is 
Cold War Experience Applicable to Southern Asia,” in The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear 
Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (Washington, 
D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 38, June 2001), 1-3.  
51 Sharad Joshi, “The Practice of Coercive Diplomacy in the Post 9/11 Period,” (PhD diss., 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 26-27. For detailed discussions of the Laotian crisis and Vietnam 
intervention, see, respectively, David K. Hall, “The Laos Crisis, 1960-61,” in The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. 
Simons (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 36-85; and William E. Simons, “The 
Vietnam Intervention, 1964-65,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, 
Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971), 144-210. 
52 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1997), 204.  
53 ‘Chenpao’ is the Chinese name for the island. The Soviets call it ‘Damansky.’ 
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role. In reality however, the fact that the Soviet Union was a conflicting party meant that 
there was still no undisputed hegemon available to use its preponderance to force a 
decision on the antagonists. Therefore, even as China and the Soviet Union exhibited 
brinkmanship and a shooting war ensued, the U.S. held back from playing any major 
role.54 Its crisis outlook was deeply colored by its rivalry with Moscow and the potential 
for China to be used as a counterweight.55 As then U.S. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger (1979) recalled: “As for the Soviets we considered the Chinese option useful to 
induce restraint; but we had to take care not to pursue it so impetuously as to provoke a 
Soviet preemptive attack on China.”56 Therefore, when Moscow reached out to Kissinger 
to decipher Washington’s possible response to a Soviet preemptive strike against China, 
the U.S. made its opposition known. However, it also conveyed that it treated the crisis as 
a bilateral Sino-Soviet affair.57 The other U.S.-Soviet exchanges that took place during 
the crisis were largely based on long-term considerations about the superpowers’ 
relations.58 The superpower rivalry had dictated the third party’s thinking; the U.S. seems 
to have decided to let its counterpart fulfill its role as the shared custodian of upholding 
global peace while avoiding any signal that may have provided the Soviets justification to 
                                              
54 Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia, 46-47. 
55 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 171-82. 
56 Ibid., 178. 
57 Henry Kissinger was approached by Moscow to seek support but he conveyed his 
government’s aloofness. He recalls a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, 
Anatoly Dobrynin where he suggested “that it [the conflict] was a Sino-Soviet problem” even as 
the Ambassador insisted otherwise. Ibid., 172. Interestingly, in an apparent contradiction to this 
stance, President Nixon claimed in 1985 that he had contemplated the nuclear option against the 
Soviet Union in light of its consideration of preempting the Chinese arsenal in 1969. This 
however was a false claim. The nuclear alert was ordered due to the impending situation in 
Vietnam in keeping with the trend of superpower competition in third world conflicts. For a brief 
discussion of Nixon’s ‘nuclear bluff,’ see Sagan and Suri, “The Madman Nuclear Alert,” 156-58. 
58 Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia, 46; Kissinger, White House Years, 173.  
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carry out their threat of preemption against China.59 Ultimately, the uncertainty of 
success in attempting a first strike is believed to have deterred the Soviets. The crisis 
ended with direct talks and the Chinese rescinding on their original stance but not before 
the combined casualty count had reached 100.60  
III. BACK TO THEORY: THIRD PARTY ROLES IN NUCLEAR CRISES 
The foregoing discussion represents the most important debates on nuclear crisis 
behavior during the Cold War. Relevant literature produced in the first four decades of 
the atomic age had two unmistakable characteristics: overriding focus on the superpower 
rivalry and an almost ironclad assumption of bilateral contexts when examining crises. 
Since global security during the Cold War was centered on the U.S.-Soviet Union rivalry 
and all regional tensions and asymmetric conflicts were subsumed under it, there was 
little interest in extending strategic thought beyond this principal case.61 Virtually all 
modeling and empirical examination of nuclear crises and crisis stability – in fact, this is 
true for most non-cooperative bargaining theory per se –62 therefore tended to 
approximate two-actor models. Third parties featured as mere extensions of the 
                                              
59 Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) conclude from their analysis of a vast set of crisis data that 
whenever one of the superpowers was heavily involved in a crisis, the other’s involvement tended 
to be low. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, 204. The Ussuri river conflict stands out as 
an excellent example of this tendency. 
60 For a discussion of the conflict, see Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 
in Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Stephen S. Kaplan (with 
Michel Tatu et al.) (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1981), 265-313; and Thomas 
W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 
Border Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, 4 (December 1972): 1175-1202.  
61  Muthiah Alagappa, “Asia’s Security Environment: From Subordinate to Region Dominant 
System,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. Muthiah 
Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 4-5; Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, not 
Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly 26, 2 (Spring 2003): 110. 
62 Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” 14. 
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superpower rivalry. Such an inclination was only natural as these two actors were the 
“standard setters” in the global arena. There were no other states or international 
organizations that could reasonably be expected to force a behavioral change upon them 
during crises. The U.N., the main body that could forge a collective opinion and apply 
pressure on these hegemons was also chiefly used as an instrument of superpower 
competition at the height of the Cold War.63 Even British, French, and Chinese – the 
other three first age nuclear powers – nuclear capabilities were seen as appendages to the 
central bipolar structure.64 It is hardly surprising then that the literature produced at the 
end of the Cold War that looked at “learning” from the four decades of bipolarity was 
conspicuous in its focus on the nuclear deterrence relationship between the two U.S. and 
the Soviet Union.65  
                                              
63 Dilek Latif, “United Nations’ Changing Role in the Post-Cold War Era,” The Turkish Year 
Book, XXX (2000), 27-32. The one notable exception to this obvious trend was the Cuban missile 
crisis where the U.N. Secretary General U. Thant was allowed to play a mediatory role. He 
operated as the go-between for the U.S. and Soviet leaderships, also employing shuttle 
diplomacy, and suggesting potential compromise outcomes. Both sides ended up using him as the 
conduit to transmit proposals and communication. This notwithstanding, and even though some 
recent evidence accords Thant’s role greater importance, Young’s earlier observation remains 
true: “it is important not to overemphasize the impact of these circumspect efforts on the part of 
U Thant to exert pressure for moderation.” Young, The Politics of Force, 166-167. For a recent 
take that puts Thant’s role as much more central to crisis management, see A. Walter Dorn and 
Robert Pauk, “The Closest Brush: How a UN Secretary-General Averted Doomsday,” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists 68, 6 (November 1, 2012),  79-84, 
http://www.thebulletin.org/2012/november/closest-brush-how-un-secretary-general-averted-
doomsday.  
64 Britain, France, China saw their nuclear weapons as according greater stability to the central 
structure of bipolarity. Moreover, the nuclear capability was a vehicle for prestige and status. 
Morgan and Paul, “Deterrence Among Great Powers,” 261. Never were these first age nuclear 
powers seen as independent centers of power outside the frame of the U.S.-Soviet Union 
competition. 
65 For a broad and comprehensive analysis of “learning” during the Cold War, see George W. 
Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991).  
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Nuclear theorizing including studies of crisis behavior matured with this specific 
superpower rivalry in mind. This explains the almost exclusive focus on bilateral calculi 
in relevant theoretical literature. This was even true for formulations where third party 
roles were inherent. Theoretically, third party roles can be of two types: impartial 
whereby they enter the crisis principally to affect crisis termination; or partisan whereby 
the third party intervenes to back a particular antagonist.66 The Cold War context leaned 
heavily towards the latter; the typical examination of third parties was in the context of 
formal alliance politics. The principal channel of relevance for third parties was the 
“extended deterrence” guarantees both superpowers provided their allies in critical 
regions against the rival blocs. These guarantees implied that the superpower was willing 
to commit to defend the ally (protégé) against conventional or nuclear aggression by the 
adversary (challenger) using all means at its disposal.67 Almost reflexively, literature 
examining extended deterrence equations modeled only two players, the third party 
(defender) and the challenger, leaving out the protégé or pawn as a strategic actor.68  
                                              
66 Young, The Politics of Force, 10. 
67 U.S. extended deterrence guarantees were one of the central debates during the Cold War, 
especially when it came to its security umbrella in Europe. Once the Soviet Union had developed 
the capability of inflicting “assured destruction” on the U.S., its commitments to its Western 
allies remained a matter of perpetual and extreme controversy. See Christoph Bluth, “Reconciling 
the Irreconcilable: Alliance Politics and the Paradox of Extended Deterrence in the 1960s,” Cold 
War History 1, 2 (January 2001): 73-102; and John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 165-66. For a more general discussion of extended deterrence specifically in crisis 
situations, see Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988).  
68 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Not Only Whether but Whom: Three-Party Extended Deterrence,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, 4 (August 2006): 563. Also see Huth, Extended Deterrence, 
28-55. 
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 Interestingly, the earlier-discussed involvement of the superpowers in regional 
crises positioned them as the ‘third parties.’ Here again however, crisis behavior, 
expectations, and perceptions of the regional adversaries were presumed to be driven by 
the firmness of commitment of superpower allies and the likelihood of the opponent’s 
ally showing up.69 And even when this was not entirely the case – say, when a non-
aligned state was involved as one of the regional antagonists –,70 the superpowers’ 
preoccupation still tended to be to extract maximum benefits from the crisis in terms of 
their geopolitical positioning. They inevitably picked sides and furthered their positional 
interests through their crisis choices. 
Theoretical literature produced during the Cold War also discussed third parties 
(non-superpowers) as deliberate instigators of superpower conflict.71 The concept of 
“catalytic war” referred to potential situations where a third party could inadvertently or 
                                              
69 For the conceptual underpinning of this tendency, see Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among 
Nations, 29. Often when the superpowers were involved, the presumption was that they could 
take control of their client’s actions in a crisis situation, going well beyond simply ensuring 
restraint on the part of the principal antagonists, and thereby transforming the situation into a 
superpower crisis. This tendency is well-recognized in alliance dynamics in a bipolar world. See 
Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 30. 
70 Non-aligned states were part of a grouping that chose to present a foreign policy face that was 
not beholden to either the Western or the communist bloc during the Cold War. The grouping was 
recognized as a ‘movement’ that sought to further certain shared objectives in international 
politics which were not merely promoting one or the other bloc’s agendas. They were also loosely 
referred to as the ‘third world’ to distinguish them from those allied to either the U.S.-led Western 
bloc or the Soviet-led communist bloc. For more on the origins and experience of the “Non-
Aligned Movement” (NAM) during the 1960s and 1970s, see Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned 
Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (New York: Nichols Publishing, 1978). Also 
see the very interesting collection of messages and papers on various aspects of non-alignment in 
Hans Kochler, ed., The Principles of Non-Alignment: The Non-Aligned Countries in the Eighties - 
Results and Perspectives (Vienna: International Progress Organization and Third World Center, 
1982).  
71 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 48. Schweller calls this type of third party an 
“abettor.” 
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by deliberate mischief or trickery lead the superpowers into conflict.72 Other variants of 
catalytic war are confrontations triggered by a mistake on the part of a third party or a 
technical malfunction or accident that causes the superpowers to go to war.73 More 
generally too, the third party was envisioned as a “laughing third” that could goad others 
into war while seeking to exploit a price for its support.74  
Where third parties were explicitly seen as seeking war avoidance – the case most 
relevant to us –, some models envisioned a balanced behavior by the third party despite 
alliances. Glenn Snyder’s “straddle strategy” in his “composite security dilemma” posits 
a third party actor as restraining both antagonists, one of whom is an ally to the third 
party.75 Here too, Crawford (2003) points out that Snyder’s operationalization of a 
scenario where the third party is using coercive tactics against both sides to pull them 
apart unnecessarily creates two separate, seemingly independent games which make it 
difficult to distinguish between the ally and the adversary at times.76  
Even in the minority of cases where alliances were considered to be absent, the 
thrust of attempts at theorizing was largely the same. Virtually all of the literature on 
“triads” is based on game theoretic formulations that either explicitly assume or 
                                              
72 Arthur L. Burns, “The Rationale of Catalytic War,” Center for International Studies, Princeton 
University, Research Monograph No. 3, April 2, 1959; Donald H. Kobe, “A Theory of Catalytic 
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, 2 (June, 1962): 1. Burns posits that in situations where 
two states regard one another as their primary enemy and view an attack by the other as likely, a 
third party could take an offensive action or create an effect of an imminent attack which one of 
the principal adversaries could misconstrue as being instigated by its opponent.   
73 T. C. Schelling, “The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” The Rand Corporation, (April 16, 
1958) (Revised on May 28, 1958), No. 1342, 28, 
http://130.154.3.14/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2007/P1342.pdf.  
74 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 48. Quoted in Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: 
Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 14. 
75 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 332-334. 
76 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 18. 
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approximate a two-against-one scenario. Analyses either assume two parties to be 
collaborating against the third or viewing each of the three in a zero-sum confrontation 
with the other.77 The concept of “triadic deterrence” proposed by Atzili and Pearlman 
(2012) is the most recent application of such a model and bears relevance to the situation 
in South Asia. It pits a state against a rival and its non-state partner whereby the 
challenger is seeking to deter the opponent from supporting the non-state entity, “if not to 
compel it to stop assisting it.”78 Other formulations that see the third party as non-allied 
are either predisposed to according it full control in a master-subject type of relationship 
over the ‘weak’ antagonist or simply as a “bystander” seeking to maximize gains by 
ultimately aligning with the party that is likely to provide it maximum benefits.79  
Also important to note, none of the literature examining third parties as non-allied 
actors explicitly factors in the possibility of the principal antagonists being nuclear 
powers. There is therefore hardly any work that examines the impact of regional nuclear 
possession on third party involvement. Filling this void is a key objective of our research.  
IV. THIRD PARTIES AS DE-ESCALATORS: POST-COLD WAR 
TREATMENT 
The tendency of classic literature to study two-actor models in contexts involving 
third parties and ignoring middle power nuclear dyads makes it only marginally relevant 
to this undertaking. However, a modest body of literature that has emerged since the end 
of the Cold War provides the building blocks for our model and theory development 
                                              
77 Ibid., 15-17. 
78 Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman, “Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by 
Weakness,” Security Studies 21, 2 (2012): 302. 
79 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 16-17. 
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exercise. Three strands of literature are most relevant in informing this discussion. First, a 
set of hypotheses predict the U.S.’s urge to prevent nuclear crises from ending up in a 
catastrophe. Most prominently, Lavoy (2009) presents what he terms the “non-
proliferation hypothesis” of the theory of nuclear revolution: “foreign powers will 
become actively involved to manage crises involving nuclear-armed states, to reduce 
pressures for military escalation, and to discourage any state from leveraging the fear of 
nuclear war to change the territorial and political status quo.”80 Others have coined terms 
such as “dual deterrence” where the U.S. is seen to be deterring two conflicting parties by 
threatening each with outright opposition should they behave ‘unreasonably’ and have 
summarily highlighted the problems in achieving this end.81 Unfortunately, hardly any 
effort has been made to systematically develop, theorize, and test these propositions. Also 
relevant in as much as our model provisions for a single or plurality of actors acting as 
third parties is Morgan’s (2003; 2009) idea of “collective actor deterrence” which applies 
most neatly to multilateral efforts at crisis management and termination usually 
sanctioned by the U.N. or a powerful coalition of states.82  
The most developed existing theoretical framework with significant overlap in its 
assumptions with ours is Crawford’s (2003) “pivotal deterrence.” He defines the theory 
as involving the pivot’s “manipulation of threats and promises in order to prevent 
                                              
80 Peter R. Lavoy, “Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare 
in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29. 
81 Robert Jervis, “What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?” in Turning Point: The 
Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy, eds. L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 122-23. 
82 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 172-202; Patrick M. Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” in T. V. 
Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz, eds. Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global 
Age (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 158-81. 
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war……by making potential belligerents fear the costs, by confronting them with risks 
they do not want to run.”83 While applicable to the nuclear contexts and a unipolar global 
structure, Crawford’s analysis in his seminal work is predominantly focused on 
conventional crises. Premised on the assumption that states seek to avoid isolation, 
pivotal deterrence works when the third party is able to “more easily align with either 
side than they can align with each other” and thus “significantly influence who will win a 
war between them.”84 Moreover, the third party must avoid making firm commitments 
between the two antagonists and leave them guessing in terms of its reaction if they go to 
war.85 Even though Crawford is primarily interested in examining the link between third 
party involvement and crisis outcomes – as opposed to unpacking dynamics of crisis 
behavior –, his theory does end up predicting certain patterns of crisis behavior that are 
useful in informing our work.  
Finally, perhaps most relevant to our research is literature specifically focusing on 
the India-Pakistan dyad that has accumulated since the end of the Cold War. Three new 
variants have been added by the debate on South Asia. Two of these, the triangular 
deterrence dynamic among China, India, and Pakistan86 and the presence of terrorists as 
quasi-free agents87 are not in focus here. We are most interested in the body of literature 
that recognizes the U.S.’s involvement in South Asian crises as an external third party 
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84 Ibid., 5. 
85 Ibid., 10-13. 
86 See for example, Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia; and Jasjit Singh, “Nature of the 
Strategic Triangle in Southern Asia,” in Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia, eds. P. R. Chari, 
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actor and therefore departs from the traditional bilateral orientation of the politics of 
nuclear weapons.  
Virtually all these works recognize that “India and Pakistan are no longer free 
agents to pursue their quarrels as they please.”88 Nuclearization is seen as an event that 
has enhanced the interest of third parties to intervene in South Asian crises.89 There is 
also widespread belief that third parties – read, the U.S. – will find reason to enter future 
crises given their concern about crisis escalation90 but there is some debate as to whether 
the U.S. would remain neutral or to seek to back one of the two parties to ‘win’ the 
crisis.91 Some argue that the third party will be forced to oppose the provoker in any 
crisis situation.92 The recognition of the South Asian calculus being a “three-dimensional 
deterrence system” 93 notwithstanding, the approximation to the two-actor model inherent 
in Cold War literature has also made its way into analyses of the South Asian rivalry. 
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89 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 7-8. 
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There is still a conspicuous tendency to treat third parties as exogenous to the calculus of 
the two principal antagonists. Moreover, analyses tend to focus on debating the 
applicability of Cold War notions of stability to South Asia within the deterrence 
optimism-pessimism frame and thus remain disproportionally focused on debating 
reasons for crisis outcomes rather than mechanisms and processes shaping crisis 
behavior.94  
Optimists like Ganguly and Hagerty (2005) argue that classic nuclear deterrence 
explains crisis choices and outcomes far better than factors such as third parties and 
conventional deterrence.95 Pessimists focus on non-nuclear aspects including third party 
presence to explain successful escalation management. Some like Chakma (2012), Kapur 
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95 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry. 
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(2007), and Mistry (2009), among others, specifically single out the U.S. as the principal 
explanatory factor for de-escalation and argue counterfactually that escalation would 
have been likely without its presence.96  
The ability and incentive of the principal antagonists to alter their behavior 
specifically to attract third-party attention is also acknowledged. In fact, there seems to be 
broad agreement that the conflicting parties would use provocativeness – read, create 
‘demonstration crises’ – to entice third parties to intervene in the crisis. Studying the 
India-Pakistan case, Ganguly and Wagner (2002) argue that the principal antagonists can 
create conflicts to force the third party to reveal its intentions.97 In perhaps the most noted 
recent addition to the theoretical toolkit on nuclear crisis behavior, Paul Kapur (2005; 
2007) establishes that the risk of nuclear escalation has allowed the weaker, revisionist98 
Pakistan to be more belligerent and thereby trigger third-party presence in crises.99 
Chakma (2011) and Ganguly and Wagner (2002) also appreciate the interplay between 
Pakistani behavior and third party concerns about inadvertent escalation.100 Others do not 
single out Pakistan but point to a similar crisis dynamic. Khan’s (2003) ‘independence-
dependence paradox’ – the regional counterpart to Lavoy’s (2009) “non-proliferation 
                                              
96 Chakma, “Escalation Control;” Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent; Mistry, “Tempering Optimism.” 
97  Sumit Ganguly and R. Richard Wagner, “India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Nuclear War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, 3 (2002): 500. 
98 Kapur uses “revisionist” in the context of Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with the territorial status 
quo in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir and its desire to alter it (see chapter three). 
For the specific connotation of the term, as used by him, see Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, 198, 
n.54. 
99 Kapur “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace;” Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent. 
100 Chakma, “South Asia’s Nuclear Deterrence;” Ganguly and Wagner “Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Nuclear War.”  
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hypothesis” –101 lacks any systematic investigation in terms of crisis behavior but inspires 
our model nonetheless.102 Khan argues that even as India and Pakistan believed that 
nuclear weapons would accord them greater strategic independence, the acquisition of 
these capabilities has only made them more dependent on the U.S. As he puts it, “both 
countries hurl themselves into crises that deepen, escalate, and reach a point of spiraling 
out of control, only to unwind with outside intervention – notably by the United 
States.”103 Highlighting the same dynamic, Limaye (2002-03) states: “in using 
brinkmanship both India and Pakistan want ultimately [to be] held back while having the 
United States push their interests forward.”104 Other works that recognize the three-actor 
dynamic in India-Pakistan crises leave this as a mere observation.105 Basrur’s (2005)  
concept of “trilateral compellence,” Raghavan’s (2009) “coercive triangle,” and Yusuf’s 
(2011) “contracted out” escalation control, among others are noticed terms in South 
Asian literature that came out of brief examinations of specific India-Pakistan crises but 
have not been expounded further.106  
                                              
101 Lavoy characterizes the ‘independence-dependence paradox’ as his non-proliferation 
hypothesis’s regional variant. Lavoy, “Introduction: The Importance,” 29. 
102 Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox.” 
103 Ibid.  
104 Satu Limaye, “Mediating Kashmir: A Bridge Too Far,” The Washington Quarterly 26, 1 
(Winter 2002-2003): 159.  
105 These include: P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” 
Working Paper 1.0, Henry L. Stimson Center, August 2003, 25, 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/escalation_chari_1.pdf ; Verghese 
Koithara, “Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia,” Working Paper, Center for 
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, March 2003, 7, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20189/Koithara.pdf; Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s 
Nuclear Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 90; Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear 
Stability in South Asia,” in The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, eds. 
Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 392. 
106 These terms were coined by the named authors in their respective analyses of the 2001-02 
39 
 
We are therefore left with Cold War literature that remained fixated on the 
superpower rivalry and inevitably tended to examine nuclear crisis dynamics through 
two-actor models; and with post-Cold War examinations that, while being more relevant 
to our research, still leave the space open to theorize and unpack middle power nuclear 
crisis behavior. In the next chapter, we introduce the ‘brokered bargaining’ model as our 
explanation for crisis behavior among middle powers. This will subsequently be put to 
test in our case studies.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
India-Pakistan standoff. Basrur, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 301-325; Srinath Raghavan, “A Coercive 
Triangle: India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Crisis of 2001-2002,” Journal of Defence 
Studies 9, 2 (June 2009): 242-260; Moeed Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider: Implications for 
Escalation Control in South Asia,” Arms Control Today 41, 5 (June 2011): 21-27.  
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CHAPTER 2: SETTING UP THE INQUIRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BROKERED BARGAINING 
Theories like pivotal deterrence that study third party involvement to prevent wars 
in situations devoid of formal alliances and literature on South Asia that takes note of the 
third party influence in crises are important to our understanding of three-actor 
frameworks in crisis situations. The reader will be able to identify a number of 
overlapping attributes as we present the propositions and model that guide this research. 
As far as pivotal deterrence is concerned however, our scope limitation to nuclear dyads 
is non-trivial; the presence of nuclear weapons and their destructive potential presents a 
fundamentally different set of opportunities and constraints for all actors involved in a 
crisis. While a number of assumptions and characteristics of pivotal deterrence – and 
indeed of all conventional contexts – still apply, the stakes involved in a nuclear crisis 
and its impact on perceptions, actions, and possibilities render the theory insufficient to 
analyze crisis behavior in the circumstances we are most interested in.  
The literature on South Asia already highlights a number of the individual 
components and patterns that inform the brokered bargaining dynamic. We build on these 
to present a deductive theory of crisis behavior for middle power nuclear states not 
operating under extended deterrence guarantees but still nested in a world with global 
hegemons. The empirical strength of the South Asian literature in terms of detailed 
chronological and analytical accounts of India-Pakistan crises provides valuable data for 
our purposes. The absence of theory development however is conspicuous. Much has 
been said about just what a third party did – almost as a matter of fact – in South Asian 
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crises and whether nuclear weapons or third party actors were more important in ensuring 
crisis termination; far less has been done to follow up on these observations and 
systematically analyze why and how the third party dynamic plays out in terms of crisis 
planning, expectations, and preferences, and what implications this has for crisis behavior 
of the three parties involved. For the most part, the black box of crisis behavior has thus 
far only been opened to the extent that it is relevant to the optimism-pessimism debate. 
There is also virtual absence of aggregate learning across crisis iterations and 
generalization of such learning. Those who do draw cumulative lessons from past 
experiences do not focus specifically on crisis behavior.1 Yet others affirm that the 
analysis of specific South Asian cases is not generalizable to other contexts.2  
Building on these relevant strands of literature, this chapter introduces our model 
and core hypothesis, as well as the research questions and method that will guide the 
investigation of our cases. We begin by presenting a number of propositions that are born 
out of the present, post-Cold War realities. These will help us predict behavior patterns 
for third party actors and the conflicting parties and thereby lay the groundwork for our 
model. The model is introduced next. The last part of the chapter will introduce our 
hypothesis, variables, benchmarks for measurements, and the research methodology.  
                                              
1 One exception is an edited volume by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur which examines crisis 
behavior but exclusively from an optimism-pessimism lens without expounding on the theoretical 
implications of Indian and Pakistani behavior. Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, eds. Nuclear 
Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb (New York: Routledge, 2009). Other 
than this, comparative analyses of South Asian ‘nuclear’ crises focus on broader aspects of crises. 
By far the most comprehensive study in this category that aims to learn cumulative lessons is P. 
R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American 
Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).   
2 Bhumitra Chakma, “Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy and America’s Role in South 
Asia’s Nuclear Crises,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, 3 (2012): 573. 
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I. PROPOSITIONS FOR CRISIS BEHAVIOR 
The propositions presented below build on the traditional understanding of 
nuclear crises and posit changes in behavior patterns from this classic benchmark based 
on today’s international structure and the impact nuclearization of middle powers is likely 
to have on the calculus of the global hegemon(s) and these second age nuclear powers. 
We present propositions for the third party actors and the conflicting parties in turn 
before highlighting the implications of these for their respective roles in successive crisis 
iterations.  
1. The ‘Third Party’ Factor 
The first proposition is that crises between middle power nuclear states will 
automatically lend themselves to hegemonic third party involvement. This goes against 
literature produced after the end of the Cold War that argued that the unipolar world 
would accord the U.S. more freedom to choose its interventions as it would no longer be 
driven by the overriding concern about superpower competition.3 These predictions were 
flowing from the Cold War conception of ‘peripheral’ conflicts that did not take into 
account the possibility of nuclear dyads in the periphery.  
A crisis involving nuclear powers can most aptly be termed an “international 
crisis” in as much as any use of this “absolute weapon”4 is liable to cause disruptive 
                                              
3 Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand 
Strategy After the Cold War,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold 
War, eds. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 144. 
4 The term was most notably coined in Bernard Brodie’s seminal edited volume, The Absolute 
Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946). 
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changes in the structure of the international system.5 Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s (1997) 
contention that a crisis necessarily threatens “one or more basic values” of a state may be 
contested in a conventional context but remains apt when use of nuclear weapons is a 
possibility.6 Heightened nuclear crises ought to eliminate the freedom for sporadic 
intervention a hegemon may otherwise have in the post-Cold War context; as predicted 
by the “non-proliferation hypothesis” of the theory of nuclear revolution, the hegemon 
cannot afford to be a mere ‘bystander’ in such contexts.7  
Indeed, there is hardly anything that would produce a bigger shock to the 
international system and shatter its stability quicker than nuclear weapons use anywhere 
on the planet. According to James Doyle (2013) of the Los Alamos National Laboratory: 
                                              
5 One of the defining conditions Brecher and Wilkenfeld identify for an international crisis fits 
any nuclear crisis context perfectly: an event that “destabilizes their [the antagonists’] relationship 
and challenges the structure of an international system – global, dominant, or subsystem.” 
Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1997), 4-5. In the case of a nuclear crisis, all three of these ‘systems’ are likely to 
be challenged simultaneously.  
6 Ibid., 3. In strictly conventional environments, Hermann’s (1969) take that a crisis threatens 
“high-priority goals” rather than basic values may be more apt. Charles F. Hermann, 
“International Crisis as a Situational Variable,” in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A 
Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: Free Press, 1969), 414. 
7 Let us also entertain another potential challenge to this proposition: that third party concern will 
depend on the kind of nuclear risk involved in a situation. A plausible contention could be that 
tactical use of relatively low-yield nuclear weapons in a localized theater would not have this 
kind of fallout and therefore depending on the geographical proximity to the hegemon, its 
possible use may not be considered a direct threat. Such a view can be challenged on two counts. 
First, the danger for the ‘force of events’ leading to uncontrolled escalation would still be ever 
present in this scenario. Limited war theorists who entertained the possibility of such use kept 
confronting this problem throughout the Cold War and were ultimately unable to provide a fully 
satisfactory answer on how successful escalation control would be assured once violence is 
initiated. We contend that the hegemonic third party would be unlikely to ignore such a potential. 
Even a hint of active deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and contemplation of its use by 
either of the conflicting parties ought to be enough to force the third party to jump into the fray. 
This is so since a deployed battlefield battery could be launched at extremely short notice, 
potentially even by a formally pre-authorized field commander without central approval and 
would thus leave no time for the third party to intervene before the decision to launch is made.  
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“A quite limited exchange of nuclear weapons against urban areas could trigger or 
accelerate global climatic catastrophe (cooling rather than warming), leading to the 
deaths of millions who had been uninvolved in the conflict itself.”8 Specifically with 
regard to South Asia, Robock and Toon (2010) argue that “regional nuclear war between 
India and Pakistan could blot out the sun, starving much of the human race.”9 It could 
“cause widespread loss of life even in countries far away from the conflict.”10 The sheer 
threat of direct harm to it or its global interests hints at the inevitable compulsion of a 
global hegemon to influence a nuclear crisis. 
More importantly, a global hegemon, by virtue of its position, must be interested 
in more than simply protecting itself from immediate harm. For one, as the global 
sheriff,11 altruistic and humanitarian concerns must have some bearing on its decision 
making.12 More tangibly, it has serious stakes in protecting its systemic position and can 
reasonably be expected to take measures to prevent any development that would call into 
question its role as the leader and provider of global security.13 Few other developments 
                                              
8 James Doyle, “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?” Survival 55, 1 (2013): 8.  
9 Alan Robock and Owen B. Toon, “Local Nuclear War, Global Suffering,” Scientific American 
(January 1, 2010): 74. 
10 Ibid., 76. 
11 For a definition of a ‘sheriff’ in the international context, see Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant 
Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 
6. 
12 Robert Jervis, “Kargil, Deterrence, and International Relations Theory,” in Asymmetric 
Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 391. Jervis goes far enough to argue that the 
main reason for U.S. (third party) concern about nuclear crises is “altruism – the desire to save 
the lives of millions of innocent civilians.” 
13 The classic structural perspective on unipolarity underscores the global interests of the 
hegemon and its incentive to defend them.  Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment;” 
John G. Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Introduction: Unipolarity, 
State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61, 1 (January 2009): 12. Jervis has 
45 
 
could confirm a hegemon’s ineffectiveness more obviously than a break in one of the 
strongest global norms in the world: the tradition of nuclear non-use.14 The concern ought 
to be especially acute since nuclear non-use is also one of the most fragile social taboos 
in that “extraordinary measures would need to be taken to restore and reconstruct the 
world” once the taboo was broken.15 Declaring the non-use norm as a ‘tradition,’ Paul 
(2010) confirms the fear among normative thinkers that once broken, it may set a 
precedent and make others feel less burdened by the need to avoid using nuclear 
weapons.16 This normative belief was one major reason the world went through pains to 
delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.  
To be sure, all major nuclear powers have an interest in preserving the general 
inhibition of use of nuclear weapons.17 However, in a unipolar world where intervention 
decisions are not dictated by superpower rivalries, the unipole is the sole de facto 
custodian of global stability. The stakes are even higher for an acutely reputation-
                                                                                                                                      
challenged this argument to suggest that unipolarity may incentivize revisionism. Robert Jervis, 
“Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics 61, 1 (January 2009): 188-213. As far as 
the need to avoid a systemic disruption due to nuclear weapons use is concerned however, we 
posit that the classic structural perspective will hold. 
14 The nuclear non-use was originally termed a ‘tradition’ by Thomas C. Schelling in The 
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). For discussion of the tradition 
of nuclear non-use (and whether it is a tradition, taboo, or norm), see T. V. Paul, “Taboo or 
Tradition? The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics,” Review of International Studies 
36, 4 (2010): 853-863; T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009); Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and 
the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53, 3 (Summer 1999): 
433-68; Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International 
Security 29, 4 (Spring 2005): 5-49. 
15 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 16.   
16 Paul, “Taboo or Tradition?” 855-56. 
17 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 177. 
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sensitive actor like the U.S.18 that, despite significant political pressure to focus on 
domestic problems post-Cold War,19 has made a conscious decision to implement a 
“forward engagement” policy in nuclear-prone regions such as Asia to ensure global 
security,20 and in turn preservation of its unipolar status.21 Not to mention, the last two 
decades have also seen a demand for the U.S.’s role as global security facilitator.22 These 
pressures and its own outlook ought to make it readily amenable to ensuring crisis de-
escalation in nuclear contexts.   
Proposition: A global hegemon will see a direct interest in influencing a heightened 
nuclear crisis between two middle powers. Its intervention will be driven by the concern 
about the potential for escalation to the nuclear level.  
 
The global concerns about the dangers associated with possession of nuclear 
weapons by second age nuclear powers further reinforces the inevitability of external 
intervention in a crisis deemed to have high escalatory potential. While there is vigorous 
                                              
18 Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 2-3. For a discussion of the U.S. obsession with its reputation during the 
Cold War, see Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 136-51. 
19 Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff, 137-38. 
20 The U.S. security strategy has prioritized a direct presence in Asia since 1995 as a means of 
ensuring stability in the region. The 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific argued 
that “if the American presence in Asia were removed, the security of Asia would be imperiled 
with consequences for Asia and America alike.” “United States Security Strategy for the East 
Asia-Pacific Region,” Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, February 
1995, 9. This trend is likely to be strengthened with the recent U.S. ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific 
which is ostensibly aimed at making the U.S.’s ‘foreign engagement’ more efficient and effective. 
The rationale of the engagement remains to avoid major conflicts. See Michèle Flournoy and 
Janine Davidson, “Obama’s New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments,” 
Foreign Affairs 91, 4 (July/August 2012): 54-63. Also see Mark E. Manyin et al., “Pivot to the 
Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” Congressional Research 
Service, March 28, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf.  
21 Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” 139. 
22 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow 
Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 8. 
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debate on the consequences of horizontal proliferation between the optimist and pessimist 
camps, the policy community has traditionally seen the “nth country problem” as highly 
destabilizing.23 Worries have only grown since the end of the Cold War.24 
 On no other issue have proliferation pessimists found more traction among 
Western policy circles than on the question of the dangers associated with the horizontal 
spread of nuclear weapons. Conventional wisdom among the pessimists holds that the 
learning curve of new nuclear powers will be dissimilar to the Cold War rivals and that 
this will likely affect robustness of deterrence relationships adversely.25 Pessimist 
literature raises concerns on various counts with regard to new entrants in the nuclear 
club. 26  Their small arsenals are more likely to be susceptible to preemption. They are 
also presumed to have an incentive to focus on building up their nuclear capability – to 
the detriment of operational safety and security concerns crucial to ensuring crisis 
stability. Moreover, political instability and disputes affecting the core interests and 
identities of states are seen as factors likely to push developing country leaders to risk 
nuclear confrontation to protect national survival. Furthermore, Scott Sagan’s (1994) 
organization theory perspective argues that absence of robust democracies in a number of 
                                              
23 Moeed Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons,” 
Policy Paper 9, Brookings Institution, January 2009, 24-27, 41-54. Also see Sagan and Waltz, The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 46-87. 
24 David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 
21, 3 (Winter 1996-97): 87-88. 
25 T. V. Paul “Complex Deterrence: An Introduction,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the 
Global Age, eds. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 9; Luis Dunn, “Containing Nuclear Proliferation,” International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 263, London, Winter 1991, 4. 
26 For a summary of the concerns raised by proliferation pessimists in terms of second age nuclear 
weapon states and a rebuttal of these arguments, see Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of 
Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 16-37. Also 
see, Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism,” 87-98. 
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politically volatile countries would allow militaries to call the shots in line with their 
organizational practices: path dependent behavior would make escalation more likely.27 
The possibility of ‘loose nukes’ – most likely during activation preparations or 
precautionary movements of the nuclear arsenals amidst a crisis – and rogue leaders have 
also been a special cause for concern in the post-Cold War literature.28  
The point is not to say that such hypotheticals are necessarily merited. Indeed, 
optimists have constantly challenged these notions and argued that new nuclear powers 
can be expected to behave with as much caution as the original nuclear states: the future 
resembles the past as far as they are concerned.29 Some scholarship has even accused 
Western pessimists of ethnocentrism.30 Nonetheless, the bottom line is that the pessimists’ 
view is considered conventional wisdom among policy circles in influential third party 
capitals around the globe and shapes their thinking about approaching second age nuclear 
states. The mindset is so entrenched and reflexive that any change in it will require no 
less than an overhaul of the very psychological processes that underpin the present 
culture of policy thinking and decision making in key international capitals.  Short of that, 
the deep-rooted concerns of third party policy makers should not only lead them to 
intervene in crises but do so to seek swift de-escalation to mitigate any dangers of a 
potential breakdown of crisis stability.  
                                              
27 Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, 4 (Spring 1994): 66-107. 
28 Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 28-33.   
29 Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” Journal of 
Peace Research 44, 2 (March 2007): 142. For an optimist view on deterrence among ‘emerging 
nuclear powers,’ see Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism,” 87-119. Also see Sagan and Waltz, The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 3-45.  
30 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 171, 1981, 11. 
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Proposition: The extreme concerns about the dangers associated with crises involving 
middle power nuclear states will further reinforce the interest of hegemonic third parties 
to influence the situation. Their immediate primary interest will be to ensure de-
escalation.  
 
To be sure, situational factors at the time of the crisis will also influence third 
party behavior. Its precise demeanor will be affected by the specific crisis context, the 
third party’s foreign policy interests in the crisis region, its relations with the principal 
antagonists, and its reputation as a third party intervener (built up from past crises and 
otherwise), among other situational concerns. In as much as its regional foreign policy 
interests could be complemented with efforts to ensue swift de-escalation, the third party 
can be expected to pursue them. However, where they contradict, the overbearing 
concerns about the risks involved in a potential nuclear exchange would be strong enough 
for it to prioritize crisis de-escalation. All other prior preferences of the third party actors 
will be rendered secondary during the crisis period. This may force the third party to 
compromise on its broader interests and policies momentarily to ensure that the nuclear 
crisis ends peacefully. It could return to them once the crisis is over. 
Proposition: Swift de-escalation of a nuclear crisis will remain the third party’s foremost 
objective and would trump any particular foreign policy interests that are inherently 
contradictory to achieving it during a crisis. 
 
The extreme concern about the possibility and implications of escalation to the 
nuclear level also hints at a low risk threshold for third party intervention in middle 
power nuclear crises. Determining whether a particular situation qualifies as a ‘crisis’ and 
the severity of risk of escalation involved in a crisis situation is an inherently subjective 
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enterprise.31 It largely depends on the perceptions of the actors involved.32 There are 
countless historical examples of virtually identical situations causing a ‘crisis’ between 
states versus those that were allowed to pass without much notice. The ones that do lead 
to crisis situations seem to entail a conscious – still entirely subjective – choice on the 
part of the antagonists to raise the stakes in a bid to either challenge or defend against the 
adversary.33  
While we are unable to specify a measurable risk threshold for third party 
intervention, we posit that any context involving nuclear antagonists who have chosen to 
take notice of and/or react to an event known to have crisis triggering attributes will 
interest third party actors. The third party can be expected to enter the fray unsolicited by 
the antagonists if it feels that a tense environment contains sufficient risk, and do so much 
before the crisis has actually escalated appreciably. This would be irrespective of the root 
cause of the crisis, whether domestic compulsions or geo-strategic interests on the part of 
the leaders of the conflicting parties were more prominent in choosing to engage in it, and 
whether it was deliberately created, accidentally triggered, or instigated by a state or non-
state actor.  
Proposition: The third party can be expected to have a low risk threshold in choosing to 
intervene in middle power nuclear crises. It will seek to enter the fray, even unsolicited, 
much before the situation has escalated appreciably.  
 
                                              
31 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 4-8. 
32 Hermann, “International Crisis, 414-16. 
33 This does not preclude the possibility of crises being triggered accidentally or inadvertently for 
even in that case, a conscious decision must be made by at least one of the conflicting parties to 
raise the stakes and exhibit behavior associated with crisis situations. If both antagonists choose 
to ignore the potential trigger event completely, no crisis would ensue. 
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One major distinguishing feature between the bipolar structure of the Cold War 
and the one we envision here is the absence of a direct competitor to the global hegemon 
that could color its intervention decisions. As long as this holds, the potential catastrophe 
of any nuclear weapon use should prompt other outside actors with clout over the 
principal antagonists to also see an interest in preventing escalation during nuclear crises. 
The situation would lend itself to ‘collective actor’ intervention whereby a plurality of 
third parties overcome their competitiveness to help further the goal of crisis de-
escalation. 
The present day context is a good marker for what we envision here. The primacy 
of alliances aimed at limiting the external influence of the chief hegemonic rival in 
important geographical regions and to find new allies against this rival no longer 
applies.34  Today, not only is the U.S. a hegemonic unipole in all respects but it has also 
chosen to preserve the unipolar moment through global engagement. Importantly, there is 
no indication of potential rivals coming together to organize a balancing coalition35  even 
as some positional competition between the U.S. and its most likely future challengers 
like China continues and despite the fact that the swift pace of Russia’s resurgence has 
belied predictions.  
Such a scenario lends itself to coalescing of a number of external state and 
multilateral third party actors with clout over the conflicting parties to apply collective 
                                              
34 These were the two predominant drivers of alliance-building activities of the superpowers 
during the Cold War. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, “Alliances and the 
Preservation of the Postwar Peace: Weighing the Contribution,” in The Long Postwar Peace: 
Contending Explanations and Projections, ed., Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York: HarperCollins, 
1991), 277-79.  
35 Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” 145; Jervis, “Unipolarity,” 201. 
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pressure during a crisis. One can envision scenarios where a hegemon-led coalition seeks 
to influence a crisis or even one where the hegemon delegates the role of the principal 
intervener to another state or group of states whose relationship with the antagonists 
make them relatively more effective influencers.36 As long as the interveners are non-
competitive and unite in their immediate objective, they could join hands to push for 
swift de-escalation.  
Proposition: Strong powers with clout over nuclear rivals will align with the global 
hegemon to reinforce its efforts to ensure de-escalation rather than competing with or 
opposing its efforts. 
 
We have thus far discussed the drivers of third party intervention in a nuclear 
crisis. We now examine what this ‘intervention’ might look like. Given our emphasis on 
third party presence triggered by a belief of the urgent need for de-escalation, one could 
expect the third party to bring all its relevant resources to bear on the situation to control 
escalation and affect crisis termination. A global hegemon making an uncontested (by 
other outside actors) intervention of the sort we are depicting could, with its wide and 
overbearing array of military, economic, and diplomatic leverage, directly threaten one or 
both antagonists and force them into submission. The situation would then conform to 
Crawford’s (2003) pivotal deterrence where direct coercion by the third party is central to 
                                              
36 What we envision here is a hegemon-led collective-actor security arrangement. We borrow the 
concept of the ‘collective actor’ from Morgan (2009) who identifies this arrangement as the 
“international-hegemony model” of organizational options for collective-actor security 
management. Incidentally, he argues that a hegemon would be unlikely to allow a collective actor 
to play a consequential role in a crisis. Patrick M. Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” in T. 
V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz, eds. Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global 
Age (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 163-64. 
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war avoidance.37 It would also be reminiscent of much of the superpower intervention in 
peripheral conflicts during the Cold War where outright or veiled threats of direct 
military intervention were common. 
Our focus on nuclear possessor states as the regional conflicting parties however 
markedly constraints the options available to the third party. Irrespective of the 
differential in strength between it and the principal antagonists, the outsider’s coercive 
tools are blunted by the dangers involved in the situation and the principal antagonists’ 
knowledge of the third party’s acute concerns about these dangers.38 Even if the third 
party’s capacity to threaten and employ direct force against one or the other antagonist is 
never in doubt, its credibility to carry out such an action would be questionable. Any 
aggressive coercion of this sort could easily induce destabilizing reactions from either of 
the conflicting parties. Even open threats of aggression – let alone actual use of force – 
could be perceived by the target as a “gang up” against it. It could conceivably buckle 
and give in but equally, it could presume an imminent danger of attack and get into the 
‘use them or lose them’ mindset. In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that any third 
party provocation that forces the target to contemplate precipitous or desperate actions 
would also unnerve its rival conflicting party – in support of whom the third party would 
have been acting belligerently. It may prompt this actor to request the third party to back 
                                              
37 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence. 
38 The fact that a nuclear context constraints the options of an intervening third party is 
recognized, albeit in the context of the Cold War superpowers dealing with a relatively weak state 
that may have acquired nuclear weapons. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International 
System (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 198-99, 202. 
54 
 
off to prevent outright panic in the adversary’s camp or seeing the adversary in panic 
mode, it may act preemptively itself.39  
The very possibility of a desperate response from the target makes such behavior 
on the part of the third party inherently contradictory to its aims. It can therefore be 
expected to restrain itself from applying offensive strategies like compellence to force the 
antagonists into submission in the first place. Indeed, as long as a third party is concerned 
about the escalatory potential, it cannot see total isolation of, and subsequently loss of 
leverage over, either antagonist as beneficial.  Oddly enough, the compulsion for the 
hegemon to ensure nuclear non-use and avoid exacerbating any situation where it 
perceives the threat to crisis stability to be real makes it ‘dependent’ on the antagonists. 
This is another, often ignored, dimension of the mutual interdependence nuclear weapons 
create among actors involved in a crisis.40  
The third party’s behavior then can be expected to be in line with hegemonic 
stability theory which would hint at the hegemon’s propensity to provide outlets to the 
antagonists to back down in order to maintain the sanctity of the international system.41 
                                              
39 This dynamic leading to preemption is well understood in classic nuclear crisis literature. Steve 
Fetter explains it clearly: if “one side believes that war is inevitable, it may try to preemptively 
destroy the other side’s vulnerable but valuable weapons of mass destruction. Even if both sides 
prefer not to preempt, each may fear that the other side will; consequently, both may decide to 
launch at the first (perhaps false) indication of an attack.” Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?” International 
Security 16, 1 (Summer 1991): 28. 
40 The fact that nuclear weapons create ‘immediate interdependence’ in a crisis situation has been 
noted previously, but in the context of the two conflicting parties. Rajesh M. Basrur, South Asia’s 
Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Contemporary Perspective (London: Routledge, 
2008), 8. Our formulation would extend this conceptualization to the third party actors. 
41 On hegemonic stability theory, see Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding 
the International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 93-102; Robert 
O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic 
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One could also posit that it would be willing to bear the costs of providing inducements 
and face savers, incur reputational damage, and allow limited adverse impact on its 
relations with one or both antagonists – all this to keep the larger benefits of global 
stability under its command intact.  
The theoretical conception that best fits this somewhat constrained role by a 
hegemonic third party is Fisher’s (2001) “power mediator.”42 Usually considered to be a 
non-coercive technique and therefore a misfit for nuclear crisis situations,43 ‘mediation’ is 
relevant in as much as it explicitly focuses on the third party’s role as an agent of de-
escalation rather than as a complete backer of one of the conflicting parties seeking to 
‘win’ the crisis. 44  Flowing out of the realist framework, the power mediator – or 
“manipulator” as this role is also commonly called – banks on its “leverage” which 
                                                                                                                                      
Regimes, 1967-1977,” in Change in the International System, eds. Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. 
Siverson, and Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 131-62. 
42 Ronald J. Fisher, “Methods of Third-Party Intervention,” in Berghof Handbook for Conflict 
Transformation, eds., Norbert Ropers, Martina Fischer, and Eric Manton (Berlin: Berghof Center 
for Conflict Management, April 2001), 1-25. 
43 As Kumar (2007) points out, no existing theory of deterrence takes third party mediation into 
account. Arvind Kumar, “Theories of Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Subcontinent,” in 
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, ed. 
E. Sridharan (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007), 254. 
44 I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era,” in 
Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A. 
Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 
1996), 451. 
For literature on mediation in international crises, also see Jacob Bercovitch, “Mediation in 
International Conflicts: Theory, Practice, and Developments,” in Peacemaking in International 
Conflict: Methods and Techniques, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2007), 163-94; Kyle C. Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style and Crisis 
Outcomes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, 1 (February 2006): 58-86; Marieke Kleibor, 
“Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40, 2 (1996): 360-89; and Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffery Z. Rubin, eds.,  Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992). 
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denotes resources linked to power and influence over the conflicting parties. It can offer 
positive inducements – side payments – or deprive and sanction both sides materially.45  
As the third party uses its “reward-punishment leverage”46 to ‘manipulate’ the 
incentive structures of the nuclear antagonists to pull them away from conflict, it will 
likely focus on non-military sanctions and positive inducements for the most part.. 
Diplomatic costs,  economic deprivation, and persuasion are most likely to combine with 
promises of concessions and benefits. Direct military threats, much less use of exemplary 
force,47 will likely remain absent. In fact, even the diplomatic, economic, and 
psychological threats may play out existentially to some extent. The hegemon’s strength 
and capability to impose these costs can often be enough to make the conflicting parties 
sensitive to them.48    
Proposition: The third party will have to rely on use of “power mediation” to ensure de-
escalation and crisis termination without alienating either antagonist completely. 
                                              
45 Mediators are known to perform three functions: communication, formulation, and 
manipulation. Jacob Bercovitch, “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International 
Relations,” in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict 
Management, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey S. Rubin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 
1-29. Quoted in William J. Dixon, “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation 
and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization 50, 4 (Autumn 1996): 658. 
Manipulation is the most aggressive of the three roles. For more discussion on this role and the 
carrots and sticks the third party can use, see Zartman and Touval, “International Mediation,” 
454-56; Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style,” 64-65; and Kleibor, “Understanding the Success,” 
371. 
46 Jeffery Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiating 
(New York: Academic Press, 1975), 63-64. 
47 “Exemplary” force is “the use of just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate 
resolution to protect one’s interests and to establish the credibility of one’s determination to use 
more force if necessary.” Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an 
Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5 
48 Beardsley (2008) argues that when global powers mediate, their mere involvement can change 
the incentives of the combatants who might have interests in wooing the allegiance and protection 
of these third party great powers. The mediators therefore do not need to make their offers or 
threats explicit. Kyle Beardsley, “Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time 
Inconsistency Problems,” American Journal of Political Science 52, 4 (October 2008): 737. 
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Finally, we posit that the third party’s overriding interest in attaining de-escalation 
will mean that its bargaining stance would be tailored to pursue what it deems to be the 
most assured means of achieving this in the specific context. It could retain flexibility in 
its crisis behavior if it believes that fully revealing its intentions may embolden one side 
while creating panic for the other. In other situations, announcing neutrality or an 
intention to tilt towards one or the other side publicly at a particular point in the crisis 
may be deemed prudent in terms of affecting expectations and incentives of the principal 
antagonists in a desirable manner. Its public and private stances could also be much 
different. Ultimately, the stance would be dictated by the de-escalation agenda. In doing 
so, the third party may leave one or both sides dissatisfied with its intervention role and 
for that matter, with the outcome of the crisis.  
Proposition: The third party’s specific bargaining stance will be determined by what it 
deems to be the most assured way to control escalation and swiftly de-escalate the crisis. 
This may leave one or both conflicting parties dissatisfied with its performance and the 
crisis outcome.  
 
2. The Conflicting Parties 
The first proposition with regard to the behavior of the principal antagonists stems 
from rational nuclear deterrence theory and therefore applies to any nuclear dyad. 
Conflicting parties will have to balance between achieving crisis objectives and 
exercising caution induced by the mutual possession of nuclear weapons. On the one 
hand, both the crisis initiator and responder would need to employ functions of force in 
pursuit of their crisis objectives. They can be expected to manipulate the risk of war and 
use actions and signals to communicate preparedness and resolve to establish credibility 
of their deterrent or compellence postures. Depending on the particular context and 
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objectives, they may also use limited force while consciously trying to remain below the 
nuclear threshold. On the other hand, the interdependence nuclear weapons create among 
antagonists due to their need to avoid nuclear war would inject prudence.49  
Proposition: The principal antagonists could manipulate the risk of war as they seek to 
establish credibility of resolve in employing force functions most suited to their crisis 
objectives. At the same time, their need to avoid nuclear war would instill caution.  
 
In addition, the reality of global politics will force middle powers without formal 
extended deterrence guarantees from powerful patrons to confront a paradox that was not 
applicable to the Cold War rivals. The first aspect of this paradox should increase their 
space for making independent strategic choices. It flows from the power effects 
associated with the possession of a nuclear capability: nuclear weapons are known to 
enhance the strategic autonomy of possessor states and to allow them to assert “their 
freedom and identity.”50 During a crisis, a nuclear possessor could theoretically choose to 
stay the course in outbidding the opponent in establishing resolve as it competes for key 
interests. While the principle truly applies to all nuclear powers, it ought to hold greater 
importance for middle powers that are otherwise highly susceptible to pressure by 
stronger hegemons. 
The above said, there are tangible limits to the ‘freedom’ nuclear weapons confer 
on possessors. Not only has this been noted in the South Asian context – this is the 
                                              
49 Basrur (2008) argues that mutual possession of nuclear weapons makes the possessors 
interdependent on each other. The mere mutual presence puts the antagonists in a state of ‘general 
interdependence’ while crisis situations transform this into ‘immediate interdependence.’  Basrur, 
South Asia’s Cold War, 8. 
50 Muthiah Alagappa, “Exploring Roles, Strategies, and Implications: Historical and Conceptual 
Perspectives,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. 
Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 85; Handel, Weak States, 204. 
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essence of the independence-dependence paradox –, but the Cold War literature focused 
on examining attributes of state power also recognized that possession of nuclear 
weapons by ‘weak’ states would bring additional pressure to bear on them.51 The 
destructive potential and systemic effects of any nuclear weapon use and the earlier-
discussed concerns about the lack of maturity of second age nuclear possessors imply that 
a middle power will be under far greater scrutiny, especially in times of crises. The 
awareness of this reality on the part of the conflicting parties ought to limit the extent to 
which they will be able to go in upping the ante during a crisis. Being ‘norm takers’ (as 
opposed to ‘norm setters’ that marked the preeminent Cold War superpower rivalry), they 
ought to be wary of the consequences of behavior that seriously threatens crisis 
stability.52 Outright defiance of the hegemonic third party’s demands to exhibit maturity 
in a nuclear crisis environment  would be certain to galvanize international opinion 
against the defiant party; it would be going against the international community that is 
                                              
51 Handel, Weak States, 12. Also see Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 265-323. 
52 The consequences of defiance of third party actors for middle powers could be even stronger 
due to the global economic realities of the post-Cold War era. The increasing globalization and 
interdependence in today’s world ought to put weaker states under greater burden to adhere to 
hegemonic demands. Bernard Wood, “Middle Powers in the International System: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Potential,” Working Paper 11, World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, June 1987, 9. While interdependence affects all countries, the weaker powers 
ultimately must conform to the global economic rules set by the ‘core’ states. See Theotonio D. 
Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” in Readings in U.S. Imperialism, eds. K. T. Fann and 
Donald C. Hodges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), 225-36. Market oriented economics has lent 
primary importance to export-led growth and left weaker economies desperate for export markets 
and Foreign Direct Investment. Moreover, the financial revolution makes states vulnerable to 
shocks induced by speculation driven by security and stability considerations, among other 
factors. Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 7. Since these international regimes and large-scale 
investments are heavily influenced by powerful states, a combined effort by these states to target 
a middle power could therefore devastate the target’s economy, and in turn, stability.  
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often presumed to be speaking of “objective justice” as a collective.53 The threat of global 
isolation and the attendant material losses that come with it would be clear and present. In 
as far as states are expected to avoid isolation, especially in crisis situations, 54 middle 
power nuclear states should remain sensitive to third party concerns and therefore shy 
away from such intransigence. 
Proposition: While possession of nuclear weapons would accord conflicting parties 
greater strategic autonomy and in turn freedom to pursue a determined and resolute 
course to achieve their crisis objectives, the antagonists will also face significant third 
party pressure to exhibit prudence. This would act as a limiting factor in terms of each 
antagonist’s ability to utilize its strategic autonomy.  
 
Another driver of risk manipulation for the conflicting parties can be their 
knowledge of the inevitability of third party involvement in a nuclear crisis. In this stead, 
manipulation of the threat of war would be employed as a means of soliciting the external 
actor’s backing against the adversary. Ironically, the underlying driving force here would 
be the concern about not allowing the opponent uncontested space to conjure favor with 
the third party actor. Provocativeness would be seen as a vehicle to get noticed and obtain 
the third party’s support, both for the force functions a conflicting party seeks to employ 
to deliver gains vis-à-vis the opponent, and to have the third party act as a buffer against 
unwanted escalation. While the antagonist that feels more likely to receive third party 
support due to situational factors at the time of the crisis may initiate this course and 
                                              
53 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, 
and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 204. 
54 For the desire of states to avoid isolation, see Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: 
Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 20; and 
Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American 
Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique (London: Francis Pinter, 1980), 41-43. Ashley 
specifies that isolation avoidance becomes especially salient for leaders when they are 
“confronted with a prospect of war” and when “conflict levels approach the brink of war.” 
Ashley, The Political Economy of War, 41-42. 
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pursue it more eagerly, neither would be able to ignore the third party factor. Doing so 
would only play into the rival’s hands as it could plead its case with the third party with 
greater ease in the absence of a counter-effort. 55  
Risk manipulation then partly becomes an attention seeking device vis-à-vis the 
third party; the rivals would compete to ‘win’ out in this effort. Any belief on the part of 
an antagonist that the third party ultimately retains sufficient leverage to pull the 
opponent back from the brink should incentivize display of even greater resolve and 
intransigence. Moreover, a decision to back down from aggressive, attention-seeking 
behavior may be predicated on extraction of concessions from the third party. 
Incidentally, this inclination on the part of the conflicting parties would work to reinforce 
the earlier-established compulsion felt by third party actors to intervene in middle power 
nuclear crisis contexts. 
The attraction of manipulating the risk of war in any crisis situation 
notwithstanding, the third party’s desire for de-escalation implies that such manipulation 
will not necessarily be the only means of soliciting the external actor’s backing for the 
conflicting parties. Restrained and prudent behavior can also get the third party to 
appreciate one’s crisis stance and to present the opponent as the belligerent party risking 
escalation. In as much as this could be expected to lead third parties to bring more 
                                              
55 Mediation literature notes that a decision by a conflicting party to ignore or deny a stronger 
third party who has expressed interest in mediating would only force it go to closer to the 
opponent. Touval notes this in the Cold War context where states even accepted a ‘biased’ 
mediator favoring the opponent given the even greater loss entailed in defying it. As she states: 
“all the situations have a common characteristic: it appears to be safer to have a superpower play 
the mediator than risk that superpower aligning itself with one’s enemy.” Saadia Touval, “The 
Superpowers as Mediators,” in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to 
Conflict Management, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffery Z. Rubin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992), 239.  
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pressure to bear on the opponent, the opponent should find it unattractive to allow such a 
situation to arise in the first place. The dynamic could easily develop into competition 
between the principal antagonists in projecting greater prudence rather than manipulating 
the risk of war. While the precise balance between these opposing tendencies (for each 
antagonist) will be a function of the specific context and situational factors at play, both 
can be expected to operate in parallel in any crisis as the conflicting parties seek to 
calibrate their behavior to maximize the chances of attaining third party backing for their 
objectives.   
Proposition: The principal antagonists will compete in attracting third party support. 
This may entail attempts to outmaneuver each other in playing on the third party’s fear of 
war or using restraint and prudence as a vehicle to obtain its backing. 
 
3. Implications for the Posited Trilateral Engagement in Successive Crisis 
Iterations 
The final two propositions establish the structural quality we attribute to crisis 
dynamics between middle power nuclear dyads as far as the posited trilateral engagement 
is concerned. Recurring crises between the same rivals can be expected to manifest the 
three-way interaction in each iteration. The inevitability of third party involvement, the 
principal antagonists’ knowledge of the same, their propensity to extract gains from the 
situation, and the inability of any of the three parties to ignore the others without 
incurring excessive costs will make our proposed trilateral formulation a permanent 
fixture.  
This iterative quality may well lead to perverse incentives for the inter-crisis 
(post-crisis) period. It could lead the conflicting parties to take measures to be better 
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placed to ‘win’ the next crisis iteration within the trilateral framework rather than putting 
their trust in robust bilateral escalation control mechanisms. Since it is only the 
immediate deterrence context of a crisis that heightens the interdependence of the three 
parties on each other, the antagonists can be expected to find space after a crisis to take 
autonomous capability or position-enhancing decisions that in a crisis situation would 
have elicited extreme disapproval from the third party.56 With the overwhelming 
influence of the crisis objectives gone, the third party can also be expected to revert its 
focus away from micromanagement of the conflicting party’s behavior to its broader 
foreign policy interests vis-à-vis the antagonists that may have been subdued or neglected 
to some extent during the crisis. In as much as these inter-crisis moves by the antagonists 
could leave them more capable and wedded to forcing the opponent into accommodation 
in the next crisis, successive crisis iterations ought to end up making crisis management 
progressively more challenging for the third party. 
Proposition: The trilateral framework posited here will have an iterative quality. This 
may prompt the antagonists to focus on preparing to ‘win’ the next trilateral engagement 
and in the process make crisis management in the future iteration more challenging.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, we posit that the constraints on escalation imposed by 
the interplay of crisis expectations, goals, and the compulsions of the three parties will 
ultimately favor successful de-escalation during crises. Specifically, the limits on the 
                                              
56 This observation flows from sociological literature that sees bargaining as a special 
circumstance marked by aggressive social encounters and where the limelight on the bargainers 
increases their sensitivity to their performance evaluators. Rubin and Brown, Social Psychology, 
46. The same underlying concept is also embodied in the distinction Morgan (2003) draws 
between general and immediate deterrence contexts. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. Crisis situations are marked by immediate 
deterrence and are bound to exhibit different sensitivity to the environment (and thus different 
behavior) given the urgency and intensity of the threats they face. 
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antagonists in how far they can allow the crisis to escalate in applying functions of force 
and on the third party on how boldly it can threaten to or work towards isolating one of 
the antagonists will remain intact irrespective of inter-crisis behavior of the three parties. 
The overbearing mutual interest in holding back from escalation would be just as potent 
every time. We therefore posit that the third party will tend to be successful in preventing 
uncontrolled escalation in middle power nuclear crises.  
That said however, we do not see de-escalation as an over-determined outcome. 
Rather, our trilateral framework introduces an additional aspect of the escalation-de-
escalation dynamic that was irrelevant to classic bilateral nuclear crisis behavior models. 
On the one hand, the challenges to crisis stability decrease in as much as concerns about 
the third party’s ability to impose costs are likely to prompt the principal antagonists to 
forego behavior that could make a first strike more likely. Indeed, a decision to employ a 
nuclear weapon deliberately, preemptively or otherwise, for instance could only be 
undertaken in complete defiance of the third party’s preferences. Even short of that, third 
party presence could induce caution among the conflicting parties in terms of deployment 
and heightened readiness of nuclear forces since these may be seen as excessively 
provocative steps in a crisis situation. On the other hand, the desire to play on the third 
party’s fear of war or a belief that the third party will eventually force the opponent to 
back down may lead to excessively provocative behavior. Moreover, in addition to the 
multitude of factors identified as instability-inducing in traditional bilateral contexts by 
deterrence pessimists, the third party’s presence can introduce its own dynamics that 
make inadvertence or a miscalculation more likely. For one, the multiple audience 
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problem57 will be inherent when behavior is simultaneously directed at the opponent and 
the third party. Next, the third party could misunderstand the situation due to its 
perceptual biases or faulty intelligence and end up making an ill-informed choice that 
increases the likelihood of escalation. On the other hand, the third party, despite 
comprehending the situation properly and while trying to avoid such an impression may 
nonetheless be perceived by one of the conflicting parties as siding with the opponent to 
gang up against it. The alienated actor could then feel compelled to take matters into its 
own hands and respond through desperate precipitous action. Moreover, since the crisis 
plays out in a framework where the principal antagonists may see an interest in testing 
the limits of their autonomy vis-à-vis the third party, hostilities could break out if either 
of the principal antagonists misperceives the third party’s signals or miscalculates its 
intensions. Either believing that the third party is supportive of its aggression or 
discounting the marginal loss of third party support by making one additional provocative 
move, it could end up initiating hostilities. The adversary would likely be forced into a 
counteraction, thus unleashing a conflict with potential for tit-for-tat escalatory steps. If 
the context is one where the conflicting parties have no understanding or prior 
agreements on limiting wars – this is not an unreasonable assumption for new nuclear 
dyads – the situation could easily spiral out of control.58   
                                              
57 The ‘multiple audience problem’ refers to the complexity in signaling to multiple targets 
simultaneously and the potential dangers of misinterpretations and misperceptions in such a 
situation. For an analysis of the problem from the strategic communication perspective, see J. H. 
Fleming and J. M. Darley, “Mixed Messages: The Multiple Audience Problem and Strategic 
Communication,” Social Cognition 9, 1 (1991): 25-46. 
58 Limited War Theory envisions an a priori understanding between the rivals in terms of the 
concept of war limitation. As Kissinger (1962) notes, “limited war is based on a kind of tacit 
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Proposition: The brokered bargaining dynamic will favor successful de-escalation in 
crisis situations but escalation due to misunderstandings and misperceptions born out of 
some of the mechanisms inherent in the trilateral bargaining exercise posited here 
remains possible.  
 
II. THE MODEL  
Having laid out propositions that are likely to shape behavior during middle 
power nuclear crises, we now turn to formalizing the model that forms the core of this 
research. Foremost, it is premised on the belief that crisis dynamics between middle 
power nuclear states without formal extended deterrence guarantees are likely to play out 
in a manner much different than that predicted by classic Cold War models. Situated in 
the rationalist framework, the propositions posited above lead to a model of trilateral 
engagement where the recursive interaction between the principal antagonists and a 
hegemonic third party (singular or plural) – each entering the crisis with non-identical 
goals – ultimately determines crisis behavior, with its attendant implications for crisis 
trajectory and outcome.  
 We are now in a position to define brokered bargaining more fully: a bargaining 
framework where two parallel but intrinsically wedded set of interactions are operative: 
the principal antagonists are aiming actions and signals at each other, either to compel the 
opponent to respond in a certain way in line with their respective crisis objectives or deter 
it from taking an action (as classic theories of nuclear crisis behavior would predict); at 
the same time, they are also trying to lure the third party to act in certain ways towards 
                                                                                                                                      
bargain not to exceed certain restraints…….it takes two to keep a limited war limited…..” Henry 
A. Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1960), 60. 
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them and their adversary. The third party is simultaneously attempting to find space to 
mediate between the two principal actors to ensure swift de-escalation. In the process of 
engagement in this ‘three-cornered’ bargaining exercise, all three parties effect each 
other’s expectations, incentives, strategies, and overall behavior and in turn, the outcome 
of a crisis.  
Brokered bargaining plays out in a context that imposes significant constraints on 
the freedom of action of each of the three parties. The principal antagonists have to deal 
with two competing sets of demands. They could potentially be forced to pursue 
aggressive behavior to establish credibility of the force functions they are employing 
during a crisis and to play on the third party’s fear of war. The competing need to show 
prudence will be driven both by the dangers in excessive risk-taking in a nuclear 
environment and by their sensitivity to third party preferences born out of the factors 
highlighted in our propositions. The conflicting parties would thus be faced with a 
“resolve-prudence trade-off” with a dual characteristic: vis-à-vis the principal opponent 
and vis-à-vis the third party. The trade-off implies that they would have to concede some 
of their decision making autonomy that otherwise underpins efforts to manipulate the risk 
of war.  
During any crisis, the conflicting parties would have an interest to portray their 
ability and desire to retain a high degree of autonomy. This would be needed to make 
their intent more credible for the adversary and the third party. The third party would 
seek to chip away at their autonomy and thereby alter their cost-benefit calculus by 
utilizing its “reward-punishment leverage.” At the same time, the third party will seek to 
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minimize the reverse influence the antagonists can exert on it. This complex and 
recursive interaction will lead all three actors to manifest behavior along the lines 
predicted by the brokered bargaining model.  
Successful escalation management would be a function of the third party’s ability 
to subjugate the autonomy of the principal actors each time their actions threaten to push 
tensions beyond the brink. It would entail the third party reorienting the antagonists’ cost-
benefit analysis, making swift crisis termination the most attractive option – ahead of 
their ideal crisis outcomes and possibly while incurring political and reputational losses 
that may come with settling short of the original crisis objectives. In effect, the principal 
antagonists would have prioritized their sensitivity to third party preferences above their 
desire to take autonomous offensive decisions that could cause an outbreak of hostilities. 
The conflicting parties’ sensitivity to third party preferences could best be 
described as a desire for “positive evaluation” on their part. The formulation is borrowed 
from sociological literature and specifically from Rubin and Brown’s (1975) concept of 
“evaluation” in bargaining frameworks.59 It is predicated on the belief that bargaining 
situations can have ‘audiences’ that act not only as observers but also as evaluators of 
their performance. Third parties would behave as audiences and in that stead provide 
performance “feedback” to the principal bargainers.60 Rubin and Brown argue that “the 
mere presence of an audience (including psychological presence) motivates bargainers to 
seek positive, and avoid negative, evaluation – especially when the audience is salient to 
                                              
59 Rubin and Brown, Social Psychology, 44-48. 
60 Ibid., 44. 
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the bargainers.”61 This is driven by the audiences’ “apparent readiness to make demands 
or impose sanctions upon him [the bargainers] if their preferences are not pursued to their 
satisfaction.”62 The need for positive evaluation “puts the bargainer on notice that his 
behavior is being, or will be, scrutinized, and that the esteem in which he is held is 
contingent upon the appropriateness of his performance, as this is defined by the 
particular audience.”63 It develops a sort of accountability towards the audience; 
accountability in turn provides audiences the requisite leverage to affect behavior.64 A 
‘dependent’ audience which depends on a bargaining exercise’s outcome for achievement 
of its crisis objectives is most likely to hold the bargainers accountable.65 In our case, the 
third party’s dependence on the antagonists to achieve de-escalation puts it squarely in 
this camp.  
To be sure, positive evaluation implies more than just a concern about one’s 
image. It is driven by concerns about the third party’s ability to inflict material losses or 
potential for tangible concessions and gains. It follows that the higher the sensitivity an 
actor will show to the third party’s demands and preferences, the more positive its 
evaluation – and therefore the likelihood of avoiding or minimizing losses or maximizing 
gains – would be.66 Both sides then can be expected not to lose sight of their need for 
                                              
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 46.  
64 Ibid., 48-50. 
65 Ibid., 48.  
66 Interestingly, literature on ‘evaluation’ tends to focus disproportionately on domestic audience 
whereby actors are often driven to exhibit resoluteness to obtain positive evaluation. Dean G. 
Pruitt and Douglas F. Johnson, “Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 14, 3 (1970): 239-46; Rubin and Brown, Social Psychology, 
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positive evaluation even as they strive to pursue their crisis objectives. The third party’s 
task on the other hand would be to play on the regional rivals’ desire for this positive 
evaluation to ensure de-escalation.  
Principal antagonists’ desire for positive evaluation  
 
Third party’s ability to extract compromises on the principal antagonists’ decision 
making autonomy  
 
We adopt this formulation over the more traditional coercive lens applied to the 
preponderant outsider’s behavior in Cold War models and theories such as pivotal 
deterrence given the relatively constrained nature of third party involvement – in terms of 
its primary reliance on non-military punishment and positive inducements – envisioned 
here.  Our formulation allows us to see the crisis as a competition between the antagonists 
to obtain third party support to achieve crisis objectives rather than one in which they 
simply react to the fear of direct third party action against them.  
The brokered bargaining model then presents a very different conceptualization of 
nuclear crises than classic bilateral rational deterrence models. The following illustrations 
depict the difference between the two approaches in terms of how a crisis’s progression is 
envisioned. 
                                                                                                                                      
48-54. Applied to foreign third parties in contexts most relevant to our discussion however, the 
pressures ought to be reversed.   
  
Illustration 1: Conceptual Framework for Crisis Progression Under the Classic Rational Deterrence Model 
Brinkmanship
One side backs down/both 
mutually accommodate
Both keep upping the ante
Successful de‐
escalation 
Continued escalation 
(potentially to the 
nuclear level)
Crisis triggering event Initiator employs functions of force/responder responds Rising tensions
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Illustration 2: Conceptual Framework for Crisis Progression Under Brokered Bargaining 
Third party intervenes
Initiator’s and responder’s 
desire for positive evaluation
>
Desire to continue 
manipulating risk of war
Initiator's and responder’s 
desire to continue 
manipulating risk of war
>
Desire for positive evaluation
Successful de‐
escalation 
Continued escalation 
(potentially to the 
nuclear level)
Crisis triggering event Initiator employs functions of force/responder responds
Rising tensions
 
Source: Author’s compilation.
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These varying conceptualizations of nuclear crises also quite obviously imply 
different drivers of crisis behavior in the two cases. As table 1 shows, despite 
considerable overlap, a number of factors at play under brokered bargaining are irrelevant 
to the classic understanding of nuclear crisis behavior.  
Table 1: Drivers of Crisis Behavior in Classic Versus Brokered Bargaining Contexts 
Drivers of resolute behavior Drivers of prudent behavior 
Applicable to classic nuclear crisis behavior and brokered bargaining 
Need to establish credibility of resolve to 
follow up on threats made in employing 
functions of force 
Need to avoid undermining crisis stability and forcing 
the adversary to take precipitous action 
Strategic autonomy attributed to possession of 
nuclear weapons 
Cost-prohibitive outcome in case of a nuclear war 
Absence of robust bilateral escalation control 
mechanisms 
Importance of exhibiting responsible behavior as 
nuclear weapon states 
Reputational concerns  
Applicable to brokered bargaining only 
Risk manipulation to play on the third party’s 
fear of war 
Principal antagonists’ sensitivity to the third party’s 
concern about escalation potential and its interest in 
preventing it above all prior preferences 
Possible belief that the third party has 
enough leverage to prevent the opponent 
from causing a breakdown of crisis stability 
Third party’s ability to raise the costs of defiance for 
and reward deference of the principal antagonists  
State of relations with third party actors (e.g. 
pre-crisis international image of the 
conflicting parties, perception of the third 
party’s reliance on each antagonist for its 
broader foreign policy objectives, etc.) 
State of relations with third party actors (e.g. pre-crisis 
international image of the conflicting parties, perception 
of the third party’s reliance on each antagonist for its 
broader foreign policy objectives, extent of economic 
interdependence vis-à-vis third party actors, etc.) 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
III. HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, AND MEASUREMENTS 
1. Hypothesis 
The foregoing discussion leads us to set up our core hypothesis for crisis behavior 
as a comparison between the classic bilateral explanations born out of rational deterrence 
models and brokered bargaining.  
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H0: Classic rational deterrence explanations set in the bilateral context continue to 
account for crisis behavior between middle power nuclear states that operate without 
formal extended deterrence guarantees in a world with stronger hegemonic powers.    
H1: The brokered bargaining model better accounts for crisis behavior between middle 
power nuclear states that operate without formal extended deterrence guarantees in a 
world with stronger hegemonic powers.   
Since we are most interested in explaining the mechanisms of crisis behavior, our 
alternative hypothesis does not necessarily amount to a wholesale rejection of the rational 
nuclear deterrence theory. However, we do rule out bilateral nuclear deterrence as the 
principal driver of crisis behavior and de-escalation. Nuclear weapons remain central to 
creating fear of unacceptable consequences of escalation and thereby imposing 
constraints on the behavior of the three parties engaged in brokered bargaining. But we 
see the presence of nuclear weapons as endogenous to the crisis dynamic encompassed 
by our three-cornered bargaining framework. It therefore contributes to the process of 
interaction (along with other structural and situational factors that underpin our foregoing 
propositions) that ultimately shapes crisis behavior. Pressures to avoid escalation are a 
combination of both strands of the resolve-prudence trade-off described earlier. Since the 
presence of the third party is also endogenous to the crisis outlook of the principal 
antagonists, the situation neither lends itself to establishing that nuclear weapons are the 
principal factor at play, nor to a straightforward counterfactual analysis which would see 
the absence of uncontrolled escalation solely as a function of third party presence. Studies 
that usually argue based on straight counterfactuals – escalation would likely have 
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occurred had the third party not been present – overlook the endogeneity problem in their 
analysis.67 The subtle but significant distinction between such analyses and what is 
argued here must be noted: we are contending that it is the process of trilateral interaction 
encompassed by our model that explains crisis behavior, and in turn, trajectories and 
outcomes. Studies of the sort referred to above on the other hand focus on the exogenous 
third party’s presence alone as central to their explanation. The fairest a priori assertion 
we can make is that in crises where behavior is shaped by brokered bargaining, the 
answer to whether classic nuclear deterrence would have held in the absence of the 
trilateral framework must remain indeterminate. Our contention challenges positions of 
both deterrence optimists and pessimists. We contest optimists in as far as they present 
nuclear deterrence as the principal variable driving crisis dynamics in nuclear dyads.68 
The opposite is true of pessimists who tend to attribute escalation control to non-nuclear 
reasons like third party presence and see this as significantly weakening, if not 
necessarily falsifying, optimist arguments.  
2. Variables 
The process marked by the recursive interplay of the perceptions, expectations, 
incentives, and strategies among the three parties that lies at the heart of the posited 
framework forms our dependent variable. If our hypothesis is to hold (if our theory of 
                                              
67 Endogeneity refers to a situation whereby the values an explanatory variable takes on are a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of the dependent variable. Such situations are common when 
observing political processes but create misleading conclusions about the direction of causality. 
Garry King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 185 (and 185-96 
for a more in-depth discussion of the endogeneity problem). 
68 Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism,” 91.  
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crisis behavior is right), the process – and thus the expected crisis behavior – must 
manifest itself any time a middle power nuclear crisis context appears and the triggers for 
our model to be set into motion are present: high sensitivity of the third party to the 
escalatory potential and the subsequent implications of escalation; and high sensitivity of 
the principal antagonists to third party preferences. The combination of these two 
sensitivities forms our key explanatory variable. Table 2 presents the possible variability 
in the sensitivity levels of the antagonists and the third party on these two counts.  
Table 2: Possible Combinations of Sensitivity of the Third Party to the Escalatory 
Potential and of the Antagonists to Third Party Preferences 
 Third party’s sensitivity to escalatory potential and subsequent 
implications 
Principal antagonists’ sensitivity 
to third party preferences  
Low, Low Low, High 
High, Low High, High 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 As laid out in our propositions, cell 2,2 (High, High) in table 2 is likely to depict 
reality in the contexts most relevant to our discussion. This leads us to reiterate the rather 
deterministic prediction central to the theory of brokered bargaining: the three-cornered 
bargaining exercise that underpins the brokered bargaining model will play out in the 
expected manner every time a middle power nuclear crisis takes place in a world with 
stronger hegemons not intervening as competitor third parties.  
3. Measurements 
In any such crisis situation, four specific patterns of crisis behavior must be 
discernable for us to substantiate our hypothesis: (i) there should be clear evidence of the 
three-cornered interaction during a crisis; (ii) part of the behavior of the antagonists must 
be aimed at the third party actor(s) and there should be an observable influence of this 
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behavior on third party choices during the crisis; (iii) there should be an observable 
connection between the principal antagonists’ decisions to forego escalation and 
ultimately agree to terminate the crisis and the use of the third party’s “reward-
punishment leverage;” and (iv) in cases where uncontrolled escalation to the nuclear level 
takes place, there should be evidence that this occurred despite the conflicting parties’ 
desire to maintain positive evaluation and the third party’s fixation on the de-escalation 
goal rather than due to their indifference to third party preferences and de-escalation 
respectively. The last pattern also underscores the fact that the validity of the model does 
not hinge on successful de-escalation. Since the model explains and predicts the 
mechanisms shaping crisis behavior, its explanatory power will be confirmed as long as 
the above-mentioned patterns are satisfied.  
A stereotypical crisis that ends without uncontrolled escalation should exhibit 
autonomous decision making by the principal antagonists combined with deference to 
third party preferences even at the cost of political and reputational losses. The third party 
should not necessarily wait to be solicited into the mix, let alone be reluctant to intervene, 
and it should remain central to altering the preferences of the antagonists throughout the 
crisis. We should also find evidence of efforts by the conflicting parties to get third party 
backing for their stance while attempting to project the rival negatively and to isolate it 
but the third party should arduously work to attain swift de-escalation without alienating 
either of the antagonists completely. Ultimately, there should be sufficient evidence of 
the desire for positive evaluation by the conflicting parties rather than a situation where 
they ignore the third party. The primacy of the desire for positive evaluation would have 
78 
 
to hold even if both antagonists are left with sub-optimal results as far as their ideal crisis 
objectives are concerned.  
IV. METHODOLOGY 
We use the “structured focused comparison” method to test our hypothesis.69 The 
method involves devising a set of standardized instrumental questions in line with the 
research objectives and theoretical framework and applying them identically to each of 
the chosen case studies. The questions are general enough to allow for systematic 
comparisons among cases. At the same time, they must be “focused” on specific aspects 
of cases relevant to the research objective such that tangible and meaningful conclusions 
can be drawn. Structured focused comparison overcomes the weak cumulative potential 
of independent case studies while still retaining its strength of being able to conduct an 
in-depth investigation of each case. Since the questions are standardized, new cases that 
fit the conceptual framework and scope limitation of the study could be added and 
compared to the original set at any stage. This enhances the study’s relevance for policy 
makers. Moreover, the method is flexible enough to allow inclusion of additional 
questions for a particular case if it has interesting unique aspects as long as they fit within 
the research frame.  
                                              
69 For a basic introduction to the structured focused comparison method, see Alexander L. 
George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul G. Lauren 
(New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68;  and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72. 
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1. Research Questions 
The research questions that form the basis of our inquiry for the case studies 
included here are listed below. These flow directly from our theoretical framework 
and will collectively allow us to test our core hypothesis.  
1. What crisis objectives did the principal antagonists enter the crisis with and 
what functions of force did they employ in pursuing these? 
2. What situational factors in the period since the previous crisis and at the time 
of the crisis most obviously impinged on the crisis outlook and objectives of 
the principal antagonists? How did these affect behavior patterns during the 
crisis? 
3. If there is evidence of third party presence, what were the primary motivations 
for the third party to get involved? What strategy did the third party employ in 
pursuit of its objectives? 
a. Was the third party a reluctant or eager entrant? 
b. Did one or both principal antagonists target behavior to lure third party 
intervention?  
4. Is there evidence of each actor behaving to affect the calculus of the other two 
actors (as opposed to just the conflicting parties affecting each other’s 
behavior) during the crisis to further their respective objectives? 
5. How did the behavior of the principal antagonists affect the third party’s 
expectations, strategy, and actions? 
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6. How did third party’s behavior affect the principal antagonists’ expectations, 
strategy, and actions? 
7. Is there evidence of the principal antagonists conceding part of their decision 
making autonomy in deference to third party preferences?  
a. Is there evidence that specific choices made by antagonists at ‘critical 
junctures’70 during crises were causally linked to the third party’s use 
of its “reward-punishment leverage” at those particular moments?  
8. What is the implication of brokered bargaining for crisis stability? 
9. How does experience with brokered bargaining affect behavior of the three 
parties after the crisis (the inter-crisis period) and during the next crisis 
iteration?  
a. Is there evidence of “learning” by the principal antagonists that dictates 
preparations and behavior aimed at tilting the brokered bargaining 
dynamic in their favor during successive crises?  
b. Is there evidence of “learning” on the part of the third party that alters 
its behavior in successive crisis iterations to increase the probability of 
successful crisis management on its part? 
We will answer these questions by conducting a process tracing exercise.71 We 
will ‘soak and poke’72 in the details of each case study to decipher the presence of 
                                              
70 ‘Critical junctures’ refer to phases or moments of institutional flux in an otherwise stable and 
path-dependent environment. The term, as used here, implies a decision point in the crisis that can 
prove to be crucial in determining the trajectory and outcome of the crisis. On critical junctures, 
see Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, 3 (April 2007): 
341-369.  
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brokered bargaining. A process tracing exercise will allow us to examine the sequence 
of events, the linkage among choices and decisions of each of the three parties, and 
the motivations behind actions and signals of each actor. These are all crucial to 
identifying evidence that each of the three parties was influencing the other two’s 
behavior, that the antagonists’ behavior was partly aimed at the third party, that they 
were sensitive to third party preferences and the third party’s reward-punishment 
leverage was affecting their choices, and that the third party was consciously avoiding 
completely isolating either antagonist while pushing for de-escalation. In following 
this method, we would also have examined the pertinence of the principal rival 
explanation – centrality of classic bilateral nuclear deterrence – for the observed crisis 
behavior. The analysis will also allow us to examine the implications of brokered 
bargaining for crisis stability.  
 In the interest of readability, we have not structured the sequence of our case 
studies according to the order in which the research questions have been presented. 
The sequence of developments and complexity of crises vary among the three cases 
and do not naturally lend themselves to an identical structure. Nonetheless, readers 
                                                                                                                                      
71 For a basic introduction to the method of process tracing, see Stephen V. Evera, Guide to 
Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64-67; and 
John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 172-85. 
72 ‘Soaking and poking’ is a methodological term brought to prominence by Richard Fenno’s 
work on members of the U.S. Congress. It describes a technique which relies on ‘thick’ and 
detailed description of any mechanisms or occurrences relevant to the research question. Our aim 
to delve deep into the crisis behavior of the actors involved in our case studies and to 
contextualize it approximates a soaking and poking exercise. For Fenno’s seminal work, see 
Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1978). 
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would be able to decipher that the narrative in each case study provides answers and 
explanations for each of the posed research questions. 
2. Cases 
This dissertation analyzes three case studies of middle power nuclear crises: 
the 1999 Kargil crisis; the 2001-02 standoff; and the 2008 Mumbai crisis. Each is a 
crisis between South Asian rivals, India and Pakistan. The U.S. operated as the principal 
third party in all three iterations although other external actors worked in tandem with it.  
While we are studying only one rivalry, looking at three different crises helps us 
study behavior across time. Each crisis is a different ‘case’ within the overarching rivalry 
and can be compared and aggregated to provide cumulative knowledge for theory 
development. The patterns of behavior in each case will form the within-case 
‘observations.’ Focusing on one nuclear dyad also implies that background ‘noise’ – 
underlying conditions that, depending on the extent to which they vary across 
observations, may affect our ability to determine causal linkages – can be minimized. At 
the same time, the variance over time on some of the situational ‘control’ variables 
allows us to test whether any of these were significantly correlated to crisis behavior such 
that they could bring into question the explanatory power of our theory.  
Also to be noted, confirmatory evidence in line with our hypothesis would 
provide stronger-than-usual substantiation for the model. This is so since India is known 
to be obsessed with retaining its strategic independence and was traditionally wary of 
intervention from third party actors in India-Pakistan disputes. Pakistan, on its part, 
believes that the U.S. is actively interested in disarming its nuclear arsenal and is thus 
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hyper-sensitive to any situation that may allow U.S. say or intrusion in its nuclear matters. 
The South Asian dyad therefore constitutes a “least-likely” case in methodological terms: 
a case “that seems on a priori grounds unlikely to accord with theoretical predictions.”73 
Finally, focus on a single rivalry lends itself to “aggregate learning” in terms of crisis 
behavior among the examined actors. Their behavior would indicate how their outlook 
towards crises and brokered bargaining has changed over successive iterations. Has 
brokered bargaining become more entrenched or have the antagonists moved to block the 
third party’s role during crises? How has the third party approached each crisis? Has its 
propensity to intervene and its crisis behavior changed over time? What has the collective 
learning of the three actors meant for crisis stability? These findings would help us 
generalize possible behavior patterns to other dyads as well.  
A. Cases not Included in the Dissertation 
Our case selection constitutes the “universe” of crises between two middle power 
nuclear states operating without any formal extended deterrence guarantees in a unipolar 
world. Every other nuclear crisis has either involved a global hegemon as one of the 
conflicting parties or has taken place under extended deterrence umbrellas.  
There are four prominent cases that involved an antagonist other than the world’s 
hegemons and thus had a stronger third party potentially available for intervention: the 
India-Pakistan crises of 1987 and 1990; the Sino-Soviet border confrontation of 1969; 
and the simmering tensions on the Korean peninsula that have witnessed threats from a 
                                              
73 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 209. 
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nuclear North Korea from time to time since its first nuclear test in 2006.74 Each’s 
exclusion from the list of our case studies is driven by the scope limitation of our model.  
The non-South Asian cases quite obviously fall outside the delimitations of the 
model. As already discussed, the Ussuri river incident involved one of the Cold War 
superpowers and this colored its hegemonic rival’s response. The Korean context, on the 
other hand, involves U.S. extended deterrence guarantees to South Korea and Japan. 
Exclusion of the South Asian cases needs more elaboration since a small strand of 
literature focused on South Asia has latched on to the 1987 and 1990 episodes as the first 
two South Asian ‘nuclear crises.’75 Some have even gone on to argue that ‘existential’ 
deterrence most powerfully explained successful escalation management, at least in the 
1990 crisis.76  
Our decision to leave out these two cases flows from a key prerequisite for the 
posited three-cornered crisis engagement to be triggered. Since our model is specific to 
nuclear contexts and is predicated on the impact presence of nuclear weapons have on the 
outlook of the parties involved, all of them must perceive a nuclear environment to be 
present and internalize it in their outlook towards the crisis and their crisis choices. We 
therefore assume some evidence of an operational capability that can be successfully 
employed by both antagonists against each other as a necessary condition for crisis 
                                              
74 For a timeline of related developments and tensions on the Korean peninsula dating back to 
2002, see “Timeline: North Korea Nuclear Standoff,” BBC News, April 2, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11811861.  
75 See Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful 
Symmetry, 68-115; and Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 39-117. 
76 Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation.  
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behavior to play out as predicted. Ambiguous, opaque deterrence/proliferation77 
situations where even one of the three parties may not be convinced of either antagonist’s 
possession of an operational nuclear deterrent – and thus it cannot be expected to 
necessarily internalize this variable in its crisis planning and choices –, fall outside our 
scope limitation.  
Discussed in more detail in the next chapter, evidence from the 1987 and 1990 
South Asian crises suggests that even if clandestine nuclear capabilities may have existed, 
in neither crisis did both antagonists believe that the opponent had an operational nuclear 
capability. Indeed, recent analyses of these crises question earlier accounts that featured a 
prominent nuclear role by presenting the constraining role of the nuclear dimension as 
“nonexistent or at best ambiguous.”78 This is despite the fact that the U.S. is believed to 
have been modestly concerned about the nuclear aspect during the 1990 crisis.79 Neither 
crisis therefore conforms to our delimitation that all three parties must be convinced of 
the presence of operational nuclear capabilities in the hands of both antagonists.  
                                              
77 Opaque deterrence refers to situations where possession of nuclear weapons is not publicly 
acknowledged but there is belief nonetheless that the adversaries in question may have nuclear 
weapons capability. Questions of operational status, size of the arsenal, its survivability, ability to 
actually deliver a weapon, and the like are often either considered futuristic or are a matter of 
conjecture under opaque deterrence. For a discussion of the concept, see Avner Cohen and 
Benjamin Franklin, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, 3 
(September 1990): 14-44; and Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 39-62.  
78 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 194 
79 Notwithstanding U.S. perceptions, there is a general consensus that India did not believe that 
Pakistan had an operational capability and did not take the nuclear dimension into consideration 
in the decision making (see chapter three for more discussion on these crises). 
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3. Data 
The case research in this undertaking relies on a combination of primary and 
secondary information. The latter utilizes literature which describes the developments 
during the selected crises, the planning and strategies behind them, the thinking among 
policy makers, the military and non-military actions taken by India, Pakistan, and third 
party actors, and the public and private signals they transmitted during the crises. Primary 
information has been obtained from interviews with relevant officials and individuals 
with intricate knowledge of or insights into the crises. A total of 46 interviews and one 
roundtable discussion with ten participants were conducted. Sixteen interviewees were 
former or current officials or strategic experts from Pakistan, fifteen were from India and 
fourteen were from the U.S. or other countries. The roundtable discussion involved 
former senior Indian civilian and military officials and strategic analysts with expertise 
relevant to out topic. The focus of this primary research component was disproportionally 
on the 2008 Mumbai crisis given that it has the least amount of publicly available 
accounts that provide insights into Indian, Pakistani, and third party crisis behavior. The 
second aspect of primary research was archival newspaper data collection that helped us 
create a database of signals transmitted by officials or other relevant crisis managers and 
record any actions reported by the press during each crisis. Relevant news items80 in 
Indian, Pakistani, and international press outlets during the three crisis periods (Kargil: 
April 1-August 15, 1999; 2001-02 standoff: December 13, 2001 – April 13, 2003; and 
                                              
80 Since we are most interested in official statements and information on events and developments 
during crises, we limited our research to news items. Opinion and analysis pieces were omitted.  
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Mumbai: November 26, 2008-March 15, 2009) were searched for this purpose.81 A 
content analysis of the signals pertaining to each crisis was conducted and this was drawn 
upon for the respective case studies.82  
 
                                              
81 Two English language daily newspapers each were selected from India and Pakistan as our 
primary sources: The Hindu and Indian Express in India; and The News and Dawn in Pakistan. 
The Associated Press was selected as the international outlet. These were augmented with other 
outlets as and when needed. The choice of multiple sources was necessitated by the tendency of 
national newspapers to focus disproportionately on statements by their own officials and also to 
highlight nationalist viewpoints during crisis situations. Selecting the listed sources allowed us to 
triangulate the information and therefore eliminate the potential bias that may have crept in had 
we relied on only one source.  
82 For an introduction to the various methods of content analysis in qualitative research, see Hsiu-
Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” 
Qualitative Health Research 15, 9 (November 2005): 1277-1288. Also see, B. Devi Prasad, 
“Content Analysis: A Method in Social Science Research,” in Research Methods for Social Work, 
eds. D. K. Lal Das and V. Bhaskaran (New Delhi: Rawat, 2008), 173-93. 
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SECTION II: INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND NUCLEAR CRISES 
89 
 
Figure 1: Map of Pakistan 
Source: Prepared by the United States Institute of Peace Press. Used with written 
permission. 
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Figure 2: Map of India 
Source: Prepared by the United States Institute of Peace Press. Used with written 
permission. 
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CHAPTER 3: INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY AND THE THIRD PARTY 
FACTOR: A LOOK BACK AT THE COLD WAR YEARS AND BEYOND 
The India-Pakistan relationship has been termed an “enduring rivalry” and a 
“protracted conflict” for good reason.1 For nearly seven decades, these two South Asian 
states have been engaged in a deeply adversarial relationship marked by tensions, crises, 
and active conflicts.2 Already one of the more prominent rivalries in the periphery during 
the Cold War era, this bilateral equation grew further in importance and stature with India 
and Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in 1998. The crisis prone nature of their bilateral 
equation led U.S. President Bill Clinton to term the Indian subcontinent as “the most 
dangerous place in the world” two years later.3   
 This chapter provides a brief overview of this antagonistic relationship, Indian 
and Pakistani foreign policy orientations over the years, and their push towards 
nuclearization. We also pay special attention to the major bilateral crises that predated 
overt nuclearization and the third party involvement therein. In covering this aspect, the 
chapter serves as a comparative baseline for our case studies to follow. We begin by 
providing a historical overview of India-Pakistan relations. Next, we highlight the two 
                                              
1 Paul (2005) defines “enduring rivalries” as inter-state conflicts that last over two decades and 
are marked by several militarized disputes. T. V. Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring 
Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. Protracted conflicts are associated with difficulty in 
finding means to resolve them peacefully. On protracted conflict and its definitions, see Jacob 
Bercovitch and Patrick M. Regan, “The Structure of International Conflict Management: An 
Analysis of the Effects of Intractability and Mediation,” The International Journal of Peace 
Studies 4, 1 (1999): 1-16. 
2 For a discussion of this “enduring rivalry,” see Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of 
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 154-75.  
3 Jonathan Marcus, “The World’s Most Dangerous Place?” BBC News, March 23, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/687021.stm.  
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countries’ outreach to third party patrons during the Cold War and the impact this 
outward engagement had on their bilateral rivalry, both during the Cold War era and 
beyond it. This is followed by a discussion of the key characteristics of behavior during 
crises involving India and/or Pakistan before the overt nuclearization phase. Finally, 
India and Pakistan’s quest for nuclearization is discussed as one of the outcomes of their 
experience with third party patrons during the Cold War.  
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY 
The genesis of the hostility between India and Pakistan lies in the 1947 partition 
of British India. The run up to partition was marked by increasing communalism and a 
demand from the sizable Muslim minority of British India to create an independent state 
separate from the Hindu majority. India and Pakistan formally gained independence from 
the British, respectively, on August 14 and 15, 1947. The Muslim majority areas of north-
west British India and eastern Bengal in the far east became Pakistan.4 This partition 
accentuated the brewing animosity as over 10 million people moved and over half a 
million died in the violence that ensued during the process of relocation.5 Soon, territorial 
disputes were to become the moniker of this South Asian rivalry even as the emotive and 
psychological barriers remained extremely potent.  
 The territorial dispute centered on the state of Jammu and Kashmir – a name that 
is all too familiar to students of international conflict. Jammu and Kashmir was one of the 
                                              
4 For details and analyses of the history and events of partition of British India, see Talbot and 
Singh, Partition of India; Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); and Stanley Wolpert, Shameless Flight: The Last 
Years of the British Empire in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
5 World and its Peoples, World and its Peoples: Eastern and Southern Asia (New York: 
Cavendish Square Publishing, 2008), 392. 
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notionally independent 565 princely states in British India which were free to join either 
India or Pakistan according to the partition plan.6 Three of these, Junagadh in western 
India, Hyderabad in central India, and Jammu and Kashmir in north-western India were 
claimed by both India and Pakistan. The first two had Muslim rulers but Hindu majority 
populations and these were annexed – forcibly or in response to popular will depending 
on which side’s point of view one accepts – by India, much to Pakistan’s dismay.7 
Jammu and Kashmir however was to become a bone of contention for times to come. It 
had a Muslim majority population but was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. The Maharaja 
favored independence but under pressure from a revolt from his Muslim population 
which was subsequently assisted by Pakistani tribesmen and regular forces, he acceded to 
India as a pre-condition for New Delhi’s help in subduing the uprising.8  
 The Maharaja’s October 1947 accession introduced a formal bilateral dimension 
to the conflict. Pakistan argued that it had moral right over Kashmir since 78 percent of 
the state’s population was Muslim and it was geographically contiguous with Pakistan.9 
                                              
6 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2003), 28. While Schofield lists the number at 565, the most commonly cited tally in 
terms of the number of princely states at partition is 562. 
7 For basic facts on India’s incorporation of Junagadh and Hyderabad, see Arun Kumar Banerji, 
“Borders,” in Aspects of India's International Relations 1700 to 2000: South Asia and the World, 
ed., Jayanta Kumar Ray in ‘History of Science, Philosohy and Culture in Indian Civilization,’ Vol 
X, Part 6, ed., D. P. Chattopadhyaya (New Delhi: Pearson Longman, 2007), 206-207. 
8 For an excellent analysis of the revolt and circumstances surrounding the accession, see 
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 41-67; and Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1954), 73-96. 
9 At the time, majority of the princely state’s trade flowed through Pakistan and its main road and 
rail links were also through present-day Pakistan. Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An 
International Law Perspective (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1998), 6-7; Schofield, 
Kashmir in Conflict, 33-35. From Pakistan’s perspective, it therefore met the three principal 
guidelines that were to inform any princely state’s decision to accede to Pakistan: Muslim 
majority, geographical contiguity, and the peoples’ desires.  
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Nonetheless, Indian troops intervened to quash the revolt. The first India-Pakistan war 
ensued. It ended with a U.N.-brokered ceasefire that came into effect on January 1, 
1949.10 The ‘ceasefire line’ (now ‘Line of Control [LoC]) resulted in a de facto division 
of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, pending final resolution of the dispute (see 
figure 3). 11  
Figure 3: Map of Jammu and Kashmir 
 
Source: After Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin, 
https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kashmir.html. 
 
                                              
10 For a discussion of this ‘first Kashmir war,’ see Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 49-70. 
11 Today, the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir is divided, with India controlling 45 percent 
of the territory, Pakistan holding on to 35 percent, and China in control of the remaining 20 
percent. Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2011), 48. Part of the territory under China’s control was ceded by Pakistan in 
1963. For a discussion of the Chinese link to the Kashmir dispute, see Robert G. Wirsing, India, 
Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994), 93-109. 
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 The Kashmir dispute has been held up as the root cause of all tensions between 
India and Pakistan ever since. For Pakistan, Kashmir is the unfinished agenda of partition 
which has left a Muslim majority area in Indian control and epitomizes its deep-seated 
concerns about Indian hegemonic designs over Pakistan. Islamabad, and more 
specifically the dominant Pakistani security establishment,12 has remained deeply 
discontent with the status quo in Kashmir. Its ‘revisionism’ has led it to attempt 
everything from seeking international mediation to direct military interventions to wrest 
the area from India. In India, Kashmir is seen as a litmus test of the country’s secularism 
and any compromise on this Muslim majority state is believed to weaken India’s claim of 
being able to absorb multiple identities.13 New Delhi however has grown increasingly 
comfortable with the territorial status quo in Kashmir over the years. While both sides 
                                              
12 The term ‘security establishment’ (or, more commonly, ‘establishment’) is specifically used to 
refer to “a small military–intelligence-led clique [that] has operated as a rather opaque and insular 
conglomerate dictating Pakistan’s foreign policy direction. The establishment consists of the 
army’s top leadership along with a section of the intelligence community, the civilian 
bureaucracy, amenable politicians (whose strength and make-up have varied over time), and a 
chorus of intellectuals willing to underwrite their worldview.” Moeed Yusuf, “Decoding 
Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan,” Stockholm International Policy Research Institute, 
May 2013, 2. For two previously floated and often quoted definitions of the ‘establishment,’ see 
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 4; 
and Mushahid H. Syed, “Media Barons,” The Friday Times XVIII, 26, August 18, 2006. For an 
analysis of the dominance of the Pakistani Army (the pivot of the establishment), see Cohen, Idea 
of Pakistan, 97-130. 
13 The centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan relations has perhaps been best captured by 
Alastair Lamb when he notes that Kashmir is “the dominant force in shaping the foreign policies 
of both India and Pakistan; and there can be no doubt that it has infected every aspect of the 
internal political life of the two nations.” Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990 
(Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991), 2. Also see generally, Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the 
Kashmir Dispute. For a broader discussion of the Indian and Pakistani narratives on their rivalry, 
see Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India-Pakistan 
Conundrum (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).  
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still formally claim the princely state’s territory in its entirety, it has been Pakistan that 
has stood out as the party eager to change the territorial distribution.14  
 India and Pakistan’s perpetual hostility has amounted to Machiavellian policies 
towards the other, including overt and covert conflict, a zero-sum global foreign policy 
orientation, active promotion of negative views about the adversary among their 
respective citizenries, and minimal bilateral economic and human interaction.15 The 
Kashmir issue has directly or indirectly been linked to all India-Pakistan crises. After the 
‘first Kashmir war’ of 1947-48, both sides fought another armed confrontation in 1965. 
While the backdrop was created by tensions in early-1965 over the disputed boundary in 
the Runn of Kutch marshland next to the Arabian Sea, the immediate cause was 
Pakistan’s infiltration into Kashmir later in the year. Pakistani leaders had wanted to take 
advantage of anti-India commotion in the state and by instigating a rebellion that would 
bring international attention and force a settlement of the dispute. The crisis ended after a 
short war led to a stalemate.16 In 1971, civil war broke out in Pakistan, with the East 
Pakistanis (the portion of Bengal that was incorporated into Pakistan at partition) calling 
                                              
14 Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison J. Medby, “Limited Conflicts Under the 
Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis,” National Security 
Research Division, RAND, 2001, 46, 69. 
15 For a discussion on the opportunity costs and losses entailed by India and Pakistan due to their 
rivalry, see Mahmud A. Durrani, The Costs of Conflict; The Benefits of Peace (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). Specifically on the link between conflict and dwarfed economic 
interaction, see Shaheen R. Khan, Faisal H. Shaheen, and Moeed Yusuf, “Managing Conflict 
through Trade: The Case of Pakistan and India,” in Regional Trade Integration and Conflict 
Resolution: Southern Perspectives, eds. Shaheen Rafi Khan (London: Routledge, 2008), 130-64. 
16 On the 1965 war, see Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1968); and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 31-50. On why Pakistan’s efforts to spark a rebellion in 
Kashmir did not work, see Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political 
Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” International Security 21, 2 (Fall 1996): 80-85. 
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for an independent state. An India-Pakistan war ensued as Indian forces intervened on 
behalf of the insurgency. Pakistan suffered a humiliating loss; it was dismembered and 
East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh.17 Pakistan saw this episode as 
confirmation of its perennial suspicion about India’s hegemonic designs over it. Even 
though the 1971 debacle was not directly linked to Kashmir, concerns of Indian 
encroachment in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir during the war18 brought in the Kashmir 
dimension. Moreover, the ‘Simla Agreement’ of 1972 concluded between the two sides 
in the context of the war converted the ‘ceasefire line’ in Kashmir into the LoC and both 
sides resolved not to “seek to alter it unilaterally.”19  
 Since 1971, the two countries have found themselves amidst several near-war 
situations. After a quiet decade following the Simla Agreement, India and Pakistan were 
involved in skirmishes on the Siachen glacier in 1984, a dispute that has lingered to this 
day.20 Later in the year, they experienced a mini-crisis sparked by fears of an Indian 
                                              
17 For perhaps the best account of the 1971 war and the events surrounding it, see Richard Sisson 
and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990). For a briefer account, see Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 51-
78. 
18 Geoffrey Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” International Affairs 
81, 5 (2005): 1112.  
19 The text of the Simla Agreement is available as “Text of the India-Pakistan Agreement on the 
Promotion of a Friendly Relationship (signed in Simla on July 2, 1972),” Henry L. Stimson 
Center, http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/simla-agreement/. 
20 The Siachen glacier is situated at 20,000 feet above sea level in the north of Kashmir in a 
region where the LoC is not delineated. While both India and Pakistan contest each other’s 
versions on the reasons for this development, the dispute began when Indian forces occupied 
strategic points on the Glacier. Pakistan deployed its own troops in response. The conflict has 
continued since, with limited periodic fighting as the two sides maintain a stalemate situation. For 
a background of the dispute, see Raspal S. Khosa, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Imbroglio on 
the Roof of the World,” Contemporary South Asia 8, 2 (July 1999): 187-209. Also see Robert G. 
Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia 1977-1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian 
State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 143-94. 
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preventive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in Kahuta near the capital city of 
Islamabad.21 It amounted to nothing. The Brasstacks crisis of 1987 was next. It was 
triggered by a threatening Indian military exercise near the international border which 
was seen by the Pakistani military as potential preparation for war. Pakistan’s military 
maneuvers in response and India’s counter-moves quickly led both to adopt a war-footing. 
The crisis was defused by direct negotiations and a mutual withdrawal plan.22 The last 
major crisis between the two sides before overt nuclearization was the “compound 
crisis”23 of 1990. It was caused by a combination of factors, most tangibly Indian 
accusations of Pakistani support to an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir that 
had just taken off at the time. Both sides moved significant amount of forces to the border 
and put their respective air forces on high alert. The crisis peaked in April 1990 but had 
wound down by early-June. Third party intervention proved important in affecting de-
escalation.24 Bilateral relations between the two sides remained sour thereafter. They 
were to receive a fresh jolt with the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998. The 
overt nuclearization phase has experienced three major crises – Kargil, the 2001-02 
standoff, and Mumbai – to date, each of which is the subject of a detailed case study in 
the chapters to follow. 
                                              
21 See Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis in the 
Shadow Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 44-67. 
22 For a detailed study of the crisis, see Kanti P. Bajpai et al., Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception 
and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 
23 The name for the crisis is borrowed from P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, 
Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 
24 For analyses of the crisis, see Ibid., 80-117; Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear 
Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 133-170; and 
Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 82-115. 
99 
 
 
  Indian and Pakistani efforts to undermine each other have not been limited to 
open conflict. Both sides have also been active in subversive violence in each other’s 
territory.25 Nowhere has this aspect of their strategy been more obvious and 
consequential than in Pakistan’s support to anti-India elements in Indian-administered 
Kashmir.  Indian Kashmir erupted in an indigenous rebellion calling for ‘azadi’ 
(independence) from New Delhi in 1989. A time when the U.S. and Pakistan-backed 
Islamic resistance, the Mujahedeen, had just forced the Soviet Union to retreat from 
Afghanistan after a decade-long occupation,26 young Kashmiris crossed over the LoC by 
the hundreds and found welcoming patrons in the Pakistani intelligence services, the 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI used its experience of working with the 
Mujahedeen to train these Kashmiri youth as fighters in the insurgency.27 The Pakistani 
military-intelligence combine would make the use of this type of sub-conventional force 
against India a key pillar of its military strategy from this point on. Throughout the 1990s, 
                                              
25 Pakistan’s allegations of India’s subversive activities include its involvement in the 1971 
uprising, in the ethnic strife in Karachi during the 1980s and 1990s, in the ongoing secessionist 
insurgency in the western province of Balochistan, and more recently in the Islamist insurgency 
currently raging in the country’s northwest. India, on its part, blames Pakistan for its involvement 
in the Sikh secessionist movement in the Indian state of Punjab during the 1980s, in championing 
the cause of Indian Muslims by constantly alleging Indian maltreatment and by providing active 
support to extremists among them, in Kashmir since the very beginning, and for promoting 
terrorism in general in mainland India.  
26 For an influential account of the U.S.-Pakistan cooperation during the anti-Soviet war in 
Afghanistan during the 1980s, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, 
Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004). 
27 For an excellent analysis of the insurgency in the 1990s, India’s counter-insurgency campaign, 
and Pakistan’s role, see Rekha Chowdhary, “India’s Response to the Kashmir Insurgency: A 
Holistic Perspective,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a 
Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2014 [forthcoming]), ch. 2. For an analysis specifically focused on the onset and early dynamics 
of the insurgency, see Edward Desmond, “The Insurgency in Kashmir (1989–1991),” 
Contemporary South Asia 4, 1 (1995): 5-16. 
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it not only trained Kashmiris but also injected thousands of Islamist militants who acted 
as its proxies and tied down as many as 600,000 Indian security forces in a full-fledged 
insurgency.28 Starting off by supporting indigenous Kashmiri outfits like the Jammu 
Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen (HM), Pakistan would soon play 
kingpin and pick favorites, primarily Pakistani Islamist outfits like the Harkat-ul-
Mujahedeen (HuM) led by Nasrullah Mansur, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) headed by 
Hafiz Saeed and later on, the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) headed by Maulana Masood 
Azhar.29  
 Not only this, but Pakistan’s sub-conventional strategy extended to Afghanistan 
during the 1990s where the ISI had helped a nationalist-Islamist movement, the ‘Afghan 
Taliban,’ rise to power.30 During Taliban rule, the Pakistani security establishment used 
Afghan territory to set up militant training camps from where fighters joined the anti-
India insurgency in Kashmir.31 This was also the period when Osama Bin Laden’s Al 
                                              
28 For a basic summary of Pakistan’s role during the 1990s, see Peter Chalk, “Pakistan’s Role in 
the Kashmir Insurgency,” Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1, 2001. 
29 Chowdhary, “India’s Response to the Kashmir Insurgency,” ch. 2. For a basic background on 
HM, LeT, HuM, and JeM, see Kaia Leather, “Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing 
Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict,” Congressional Research Service, 
September 30, 2002, 18-23, 
http://congressionalresearch.com/RL31587/document.php?study=Kashmiri+Separatists+Origins+
Competing+Ideologies+and+Prospects+for+Resolution+of+the+Conflict.  
30 For an excellent analysis of the Taliban, their rise, and Pakistan’s role in it, see Ahmed Rashid, 
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008). 
31 Don Rassler and Wahid Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida,” 
Harmony Project, The Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, New York, July 14, 2011, 32-
35, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CTC-Haqqani-Report_Rassler-Brown-
Final_Web.pdf. Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, 186. In reality, ISI had begun to set up training 
camps to train fighters for the insurgency in Kashmir immediately after the onset of the Kashmiri 
uprising in 1989. It continued its use of Afghan territory for this purpose, allying closely with 
Gulbadin Hikmatyar, an Afghan ‘Mujahid,’ who was to fall on the wrong side of the Taliban after 
their rise. Coll, Ghost Wars, 221, 292. 
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Qaeda found tremendous space to operate in Afghanistan, including for providing support 
to the Kashmir insurgency.32 
 When the 9/11 attacks took place in the U.S. and Washington reacted by initiating 
a military campaign against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan in 
October 2001, the Pakistani state was deeply invested in its sub-conventional strategy in 
Kashmir and its pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan.33 Pakistan had denied its direct 
subversive involvement in Kashmir throughout but owned up to ‘moral and political’ 
support to the ‘freedom struggle’ of the Kashmiris. In as much as this strategy helped put 
the international limelight back on the Kashmir problem and tied down the Indian 
security forces, it proved useful. However, it did not bring Pakistan any closer to its 
revisionist objectives. India remained as intransigent on its insistence on the territorial 
status quo as its only compromise offer. Post-9/11, India’s hand has strengthened further 
as the insurgency has gradually lost potency and the world has given up any sympathy for 
the Pakistani stance; its mantra of providing moral and political support to a ‘freedom 
struggle’ has been decisively overtaken by the global rebranding of all sub-conventional 
activity of the sort as ‘terrorism.’ Domestically, Pakistan’s support to militancy ended up 
providing a host of Islamist outfits space to recruit and train fighters, create a popular 
following in pockets of Pakistan, and link up with the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in 
                                              
32 Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus,” 28-38; Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, 186.  
33 When the 9/11 attacks took place, Pakistan was internationally isolated on the Taliban question. 
The Taliban had come under increasing international censure and Pakistan was the only country 
standing by them. It even sided with the Taliban on U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 
calling out the Taliban for exporting terrorism, violating human rights, narco-trafficking, and the 
like. One such example was the Security Council resolution of December 8, 1998. Rashid, 
Taliban: Militant Islam, 77.  
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Afghanistan. These groups have since metastasized, collaborated with disparate Islamist 
outfits that have sprung up in reaction to the post-9/11 U.S. military campaign in 
Afghanistan, and have now transformed into an existential threat for the Pakistani state 
itself.34 The fundamentals of the India-Pakistan relationship however have remained 
unchanged. 
II. INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE THIRD PARTY 
Since our focus is on third party involvement in nuclear crisis management in 
South Asia, it is important to highlight that external actors were no strangers to the region 
when overt nuclearization took place. The Cold War superpowers (and other third parties) 
had engaged India and Pakistan throughout the bipolar era.  
 Pakistan was always eager to reach out to third party benefactors. Its keenness 
was driven by the inherently asymmetric nature of its rivalry with India.35 The Pakistani 
security establishment and strategic elite have always seen their state as being too strong 
to behave as just another Bangladesh, which, as they see it is “a state denuded of its 
                                              
34 Moeed Yusuf (with contributions from Megan Neville, Ayesha Chugh, and Stephanie 
Flamenbaum), “Pakistan’s Military Challenge: From Where, to What,” in Pakistan’s Counter 
Terrorism Challenge, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014 
[forthcoming]), ch.1; Muhammad A. Rana, “Taliban Insurgency in FATA: Evolution and 
Prospects,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens, 
ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014 [forthcoming]), 
ch. 4. 
35 India constitutes 80 percent of South Asia’s Gross Domestic Product, nearly three-fourths of 
regional exports, over two-thirds of the population, it has by far the strongest conventional 
military, and it boasts a geographical and historical centrality in South Asia that makes it the 
natural pivot for the region. Moeed Yusuf, “The Intersection of Development, Politics, and 
Security,” in Development Challenges Confronting Pakistan, eds. Anita Weiss and Saba Gul 
Khattak (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2013), 240. Even though Pakistan’s differential vis-à-vis 
Pakistan on the economic and military aspects was significantly lower till India’s remarkable rise 
over the past two decades, there was never any doubt on the inherent asymmetry built into the 
configuration. Paul (2005) terms the power differential in this bilateral relationship, “truncated 
asymmetry.” See Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” 12-19.  
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military power and politically as well as economically subordinated to a hegemonic 
India.”36 Standing up to India as a peer competitor and thwarting hegemonic Indian 
designs against Pakistan has been their top most foreign policy priority. This led them to 
seek external support to bolster their economy, and more importantly, defense 
capabilities throughout the Cold War and beyond. They also constantly sought third party 
mediation and support specifically for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. 
 Pakistan allied itself with the Western world early in the Cold War. This meant 
massive third party military and economic assistance and periodic diplomatic support 
including attempts to find a peaceful settlement to Kashmir,37 and most crucially from 
Pakistan’s perspective, an assurance of U.S. support in case of aggression against 
Pakistan.38 Rather ironically, this last understanding heightened expectations of 
guaranteed U.S. backing in conflicts with India and left Pakistanis dismayed with the 
Western alliance when such backing failed to materialize.39  
                                              
36 Stephen P. Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan.” The Washington Quarterly 26, 3 (2003): 
19. 
37 For the seminal study of the U.S. diplomatic efforts on Kashmir during the Cold War (and 
beyond), see Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings University Press, 2009). 
38 Pakistan and the U.S. began their formal alliance through the ‘Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement’ of 1954. Pakistan subsequently also joined pro-West regional security arrangements, 
specifically the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. The 
U.S. assurance of support during times of aggression against Pakistan came as a result of the 1959 
U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A 
Concise History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 46-50. 
39 The 1959 U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement was interpreted as a blanket assurance of U.S. 
support during a war by the Pakistanis while the U.S. continued to take a narrower view of the 
commitment and evaded Pakistani requests for U.S. military support during crises. For a Pakistani 
take on the agreement and disconnect in perceptions, see Ibid., 57-58. This agreement also 
became the basis of an aide-memoire the U.S. provided Pakistan during the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border clash to comfort it against fears of Indian aggression at the time. The memoir reiterated 
assurance of U.S. assistance in case of Indian aggression. Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal 
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 All along, there was one fundamental disconnect between the U.S. and Pakistani 
approaches to their partnership. While Pakistan saw it as a means of balancing against the 
much larger India, for Washington, it was a classic Cold War alliance with a strategically 
located country in the periphery which had to be prevented from leaning towards the 
communist bloc.40 The Western bloc had little interest in supporting Pakistan’s quest for 
forcible revision of the status quo in Kashmir or in isolating India completely. The 
relationship therefore developed schizophrenic qualities and ebbed and flowed between 
periods of extreme support and virtual breakdowns. This pattern continued even after the 
end of the Cold War.41  
                                                                                                                                      
Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 141. This aide-memoire, which was made public, would in turn be used by Pakistan as the 
basis for future requests for U.S. support. Interestingly, it was also used by the U.S. in a display 
of threat manipulation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union – to signal U.S. commitment to intervene in a 
conflict on Pakistan’s side – in the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the 
Breakup of Pakistan,” 1114. 
40 For a brief discussion of this fundamental disconnect, see Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. 
Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 3-8. 
41 The Pakistani military-led regime in the 1950s, a time when the alliance took off, in the 1980s 
when both sides came together to reverse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in the post-9/11 
period when the U.S. presence in Afghanistan once again propelled Pakistan as the frontline ally 
and its increasing internal instability worried the world marked periods of close coordination 
between Pakistan and the Western bloc/U.S. The 1960s and 1970s were riddled with problems as 
tensions developed over the Western bloc’s refusal of outright support to Pakistan ahead of India 
and due to Pakistan’s closeness to China, as were the 1990s when Pakistan’s nuclear program led 
to sanctions against it. On the oscillatory pattern of ties between the U.S. and Pakistan till the turn 
of the century, see Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001). Working against Pakistan in the late-
1990s was also its patronage to the Afghan Taliban and unwillingness to assist the U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts against the Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden, 
by then involved in terrorist attacks on U.S. interests globally. Rashid, Taliban, Militant Islam, 
181-82. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 865-66. For the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship since 9/11, see Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured 
Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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 Looking back at the seven decades, Pakistan cannot deny the central role U.S 
assistance played in allowing it to maintain some semblance of parity within its overall 
asymmetric relationship with India. But the experience has also been a tale of shattered 
expectations, and tremendous angst, mistrust, and disappointment that has led to an 
impression of the U.S. as being an unreliable and fickle partner in Pakistan42 and of 
Pakistan as an ungrateful, troubling one among American policy makers.43  
 China and the Gulf States have been Pakistan’s other major patrons. Both were 
sought after for the same reason: balancing against the larger India. China’s role has been 
especially crucial. Having naturally congruent strategic objectives throughout the Cold 
War given its border disputes with India, Beijing sought to prop up Pakistan against New 
Delhi and in the process provided it with tremendous military support, including in 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile development process.44 Unlike Pakistan’s 
disappointment with the Western bloc, China came to be seen as an ‘all-weather friend.’45  
Exaggerated as it may be, New Delhi sees the Sino-Pakistani partnership as deliberate 
                                              
42 Schaffer and Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates, 2. 
43 For a scathing critique of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship centered on their mutual 
misperceptions and misrepresentation of the other, see Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: 
Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 
2013). 
44 See Shalini Chawla, Nuclear Pakistan (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2012), 61-94. 
Specifically, the nuclear dimension of their cooperation has been a matter of great controversy. 
For authoritative revelations of cooperation in this realm, see Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The 
Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). For an Indian view on 
Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, see Siddarth Ramana, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance,” 
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Special Report 109, August 2011, 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR109.pdf. 
45 Schaffer and Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates, 23-24. For a typical, simplistic and positive 
Pakistani statist view of Sino-Pakistan relations, see Ahmed H. Shah and Ishtiaq A. Choudhry, 
“Pak-China Diplomatic and Military Relations: An Analysis,” Berkeley Journal of Social Science 
3 (Spring 2013), http://www.berkeleyjournalofsocialsciences.com/spring2.pdf. 
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connivance to hold India back and Pakistan as playing the role of China’s proxy in this 
arrangement.46 
 India’s interactions with third party actors since 1947 have been far more complex. 
On the one hand, Indian leaders championed non-alignment and maintained a formal 
stance independent of either superpower during the Cold War.47 Simultaneously however, 
New Delhi tilted heavily towards the Soviet Union even as it sought Western support in 
moments of need.48 Domestically though, the Indian strategic elite were so strongly 
wedded to the idea of non-alignment and strategic independence that third party 
engagement came to be seen as somewhat of an anathema.49 Especially in dealing with 
Pakistan, India stuck to its preference for bilateralism with a “religious fervor.”50 It was 
loathe to entertaining the idea of third party mediation in Kashmir. While India has shed 
some of its skepticism about third party interveners in the post-Cold War era as it has 
more freely engaged a world eager to benefit from its economic and military rise, the 
                                              
46 A number of the author’s interviews with Indian strategic elite and ex-military officials 
confirmed this.  
47 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001), 271-72. 
48 On India’s Cold War foreign policy, see M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, eds., Sisir Gupta: 
India and the International System (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981); Ramachandra 
Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2007). Also see Chester Bowles, A View From New Delhi: Selected Speeches and 
Writings (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969). For India’s engagement with the U.S., see 
Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941-1991 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press Publications, 1993). 
49 India championed the non-alignment cause and came to be seen as one of the pioneers of the 
idea. The term “non-alignment” was also floated by India in 1953 and Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru was a key architect of the NAM that was officially recognized in 1961. Nehru’s 
and the early Indian strategic elite’s obsession with strategic independence in international affairs, 
born out of apathy for the colonial experience and the emphasis on non-violence in the struggle 
for independence from the British, lay at the heart of this Indian drive.  
50 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 218. 
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attachment to strategic independence and distrust in third parties in general remains 
strong.  
 Ironically, it was India that introduced external actors as arbitrators in India-
Pakistan disputes by approaching the U.N. with a formal complaint against Pakistan’s 
support to the “invaders” in Kashmir during the first Kashmir war.51 It was in large part 
its disappointment with the U.N. response that called for a plebiscite rather than 
automatically upholding the Hindu Maharaja’s accession of Kashmir to India which led 
Indian leaders to abhor the idea of any external mediation in India-Pakistan disputes. The 
Simla agreement of 1972 codified the Indian preference by stipulating that all India-
Pakistan matters should be resolved bilaterally.52 Indian leaders have anchored their 
argument in favor of bilateralism vis-à-vis Pakistan in this agreement ever since.  
 In terms of the larger Cold War context, while India also received U.S. and 
British assistance intermittently, by and large, its apathy for the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, 
and the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War made Moscow a preferred partner for New 
Delhi. The Indo-Soviet ‘special’ relationship began in the 1950s just as Pakistan formally 
allied with the U.S. and was formalized with the 1971 Indo-Soviet “Treaty of Peace, 
                                              
51 For a detailed analysis of U.N. involvement in the Kashmir issue in the early years, its 
resolutions calling for plebiscite, and reactions of both countries, see Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 
97-197. 
52 The agreement left India and Pakistan with very different interpretations of what the reference 
to bilateral settlements meant. This was partly because verbal understandings allegedly 
accompanied the agreement and were not necessarily identical to what was agreed on paper. For 
India, the bilateralism clause superseded the U.N. resolutions calling for plebiscite. Pakistan 
disagrees with this interpretation. Cohen, Emerging Power, 219. Also see Zafar I. Cheema, “The 
Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 47-49. Even as Indian and Pakistani positions have remained contested, the Indian 
view seems to have gained more traction in the policy debate.   
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Friendship and Cooperation” that assured mutual strategic collaboration between the two 
sides.53 The Soviet Union backed India through economic and military assistance and as 
India’s patron in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) where it regularly vetoed U.S. 
proposed resolutions on Kashmir.54   
 While the collapse of the Soviet Union left India friendless, New Delhi has seen a 
remarkable turnaround in its fortunes since. Although the shift was only truly felt after 
the turn of the century, India’s economic and strategic importance began to be recognized 
and started attracting global capitals in general and the U.S. in particular after the end of 
the Cold War.55 The May 1998 nuclear tests derailed ongoing attempts to improve 
relations but Washington and New Delhi became ‘natural allies’56 in the new century.57 
Even with China, where relations reached their nadir after India pointed to a Chinese 
threat to justify its nuclear tests,58 the upturn has been swift. While Sino-Indian border 
                                              
53 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 48. The text of the 1971 treaty is available as “Text 
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty,” Mainstream, XLIX, 34 (August 13, 2011), 
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2950.html. 
54 There is significant literature on the Indo-Soviet relationship and their close cooperation during 
the Cold War. See Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: 
Praeger, 1982); Peter J. S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (London: Routledge, 1989); 
Robert H. Donaldson, “The Soviet-Indian Alignment: Quest for Influence,” University of Denver, 
Monograph Series in World Affairs, 16, 3&4 (1979); and Hemen Ray, The Enduring Friendship: 
Soviet-Indian Relations in Mrs. Gandhi's Days (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989). 
55 For an excellent analysis of India’s situation and rise in the 1990s and the outlook of the world 
towards it, see Cohen, Emerging Power.  
56 The term ‘natural allies’ was first used by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998. 
Richard Fontaine, “Rejuvenating Strategic Partnership,” Times of India, October 22, 2010, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-10-22/edit-page/28218951_1_global-interests-
strategic-partnership-largest-democracies. 
57 For the India-U.S. partnership since the turn of the century, see Teresita C. Schaffer, “India and 
the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS 
Press, 2010). 
58 Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter to U.S. President Clinton the day after India’s first 
round of tests on May 11, 1998 tests in which he pointed to China as a the reason for his decision 
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disputes persist and have led to intermittent tensions, and even though India continues to 
see China as a strategic rival, the relationship has expanded at the behest of fast growing 
economic ties in recent years.59 More broadly too, in terms of the international stature and 
foreign partnerships, India has never before been as comfortably and prominently placed 
as it is today. 
1. Crises, Crisis Behavior, and the Role of Third Parties  
Unsurprisingly, the Cold War superpowers and other key third parties like China 
also featured prominently in pre-overt nuclearization crises involving India and/or 
Pakistan. Before moving on to our main case studies, we briefly highlight the major 
characteristics of crisis behavior in this period. This will help set up a comparative 
baseline between these conventional crisis contexts and those taking place under the 
nuclear umbrella in a unipolar world (our case studies). We begin by analyzing behavior 
patterns in the major India-Pakistan crises between 1947-1989. We also include in this 
discussion the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 which remains relevant in as much as it 
was a major conflict involving one of the two South Asian powers under discussion here 
                                                                                                                                      
to go ahead with the explosions. For the text of Vajpayee’s letter, see “Nuclear Anxiety; Indian’s 
Letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, May 13, 1998, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-
nuclear-testing.html. 
59 An obvious marker of improving ties, trade between the two sides has grown multifold, with a 
15 times rise to $39 billion between 1999 and 2007. K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” 
Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2008, 18, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109486.pdf. While strategic competition still remains 
strong, the two sides have also begun to warm up in the security realm. For instance, they have 
conducted a number of joint military exercises during the past decade, including, quite 
remarkably, one named “Hand-in-Hand” during the India-Pakistan Mumbai crisis of 2008. 
Vijaykumar Patil, “Sino-Indian Exercises Today,” The Hindu, December 6, 2008, 
http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/06/stories/2008120661461500.htm. The year 2006 was also 
dubbed the “Year of India-China Friendship.” Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” 22. 
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and manifested an unexpected, yet vivid third party role.60 We then turn to the 1990 
“compound crisis” which took place as the Soviet Union’s alliances were disintegrating 
and the international order was rapidly changing, and at a time when South Asia was just 
beginning to manifest nuclear overtones. The discernable behavioral shift in this crisis 
demands a separate examination. 
During the Cold War, the single most important driver of crisis choices by third 
parties was their global hegemonic interests. Even a cursory analysis of major crises 
involving India and/or Pakistan highlights the overbearing superpower tendency to 
approach each situation as an opportunity to outmaneuver the rival. The superpowers 
tended to determine their posture towards the conflicting parties on a case-specific basis, 
and often their decisions did not fit neatly with their alliances in the region. For instance, 
the Western bloc led by the U.S. and U.K. saw Soviet Union’s preference to lean towards 
communist China over India in the Sino-India border war of 1962 as a godsend.61 Quite 
remarkably, they went in to provide military assistance to India in order to weaken China 
and wean New Delhi off the Soviet Union.62 As post-conflict assistance to India 
continued, Pakistan was pacified by assurances that making India dependent on U.S. 
                                              
60 For a comprehensive recounting of the 1962 war, see Steven Hoffmann, India and the China 
Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
61 Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian 
Subcontinent 1945-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 153, 155-56; Crawford, 
Pivotal Deterrence, 141. 
62 Even though firmly allied with Pakistan, the U.S. and U.K. provided emergency military 
assistance to India during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. A post-war package of military 
assistance was also agreed upon. The aid was embargoed (along with Pakistan’s) when India and 
Pakistan got involved in the 1965 war. For U.S. and British engagement with India during the 
1962 war and the passage of emergency aid and negotiation of a post-conflict package, see 
McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia, 149-82. 
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assistance would afford greater leverage to pressure it on Kashmir.63 In the 1971 India-
Pakistan war, the U.S. administration believed that a breakup of Pakistan would 
strengthen the pro-Soviet India’s, and by extension the Soviet Union’s, hand and 
undermine U.S.’s then recent thaw with China.64 It thus supported Islamabad and cut off 
all economic assistance to India for declining to heed to U.S. warnings.65 On other 
occasions like the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, the U.S.’s only goal was quick crisis 
termination as any escalation would have been counterproductive for its ongoing proxy 
campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and may have also affected its modest 
opening with India that had occurred two years earlier.66 The commonality in all these 
instances was that crisis choices always represented what the third parties believed would 
accord them the greatest positional advantage within the bipolar international structure.   
 This primary concern also meant that the extent of third party interventions varied 
significantly across crises. So did their enthusiasm about crisis prevention or mitigation. 
The Western block sought to play a significant role in the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and 
in 1971, but much less so in the 1965 India-Pakistan war where the U.S. acted as a 
‘pivot’67 to deter both antagonists but it really only showed urgency to ensure crisis 
                                              
63 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 142. 
64 In fact, U.S. National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger believed that the consequences 
would be far direr, including a war in the Middle East which may become part of the swift 
waning of American power. Warner argues that Kissinger’s concerns were grossly exaggerated. 
See Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan,” 1097-1118.  
65 Ibid., 1111. Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of 
Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 171. 
66 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 69-70. The U.S. and India had 
found modest openings since the early-1980s, and specifically in 1985 through a science and 
technology agreement that paved the way for U.S. technology transfer.  
67 See Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence. 
112 
 
 
termination towards the tail end of the crisis when the Chinese transmitted multiple 
signals suggesting the possibility of their direct intervention.68 The U.S. seemed even less 
moved during the Brasstacks crisis despite Pakistan’s efforts to heighten its concerns.69 
The Soviet Union was equally inconsistent. It cashed in on the vacuum left by the U.S. in 
1965 by offering its good offices and helping India and Pakistan reach a negotiated end to 
the conflict.70 It also supported India in the face of veiled U.S. threats in the 1984 
preventive war crisis by declaring Washington’s resolve signals aimed at India as 
constituting a direct threat to Moscow.71 On the other hand, it was relatively removed in 
the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.  
 Third party involvement in South Asian crises was often aimed at achieving de-
escalation – again, because it suited their geo-strategic positioning. However, the desire 
for quick crisis termination was not universal. The Soviet Union, for instance, ended up 
facilitating India’s all-out offensive against Pakistan in 1971 even if there is evidence to 
suggest that it initially did not feel enthused about an Indian military intervention.72 It 
                                              
68 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 96-98. For the Chinese role in the war, see McGarr, The 
Cold War in South Asia, 326-333. 
69 The U.S. ended up treating Brasstacks as a non-crisis. Bajpai et al., Brasstacks and Beyond, 81-
82. 
70 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 99-100. The Soviet Union invited the leaders of India and 
Pakistan to Tashkent and the two signed the ‘Tashkent Declaration’ on January 10, 1966 after 
some intense negotiations. The text of the document is available as “Text of the Tashkent 
Declaration (signed on January 10, 1966),” Henry L. Stimson Center, 
http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/tashkent-declaration/. 
71 Bajpai et al., Brasstacks and Beyond, 9-10. 
72 There are contradictory views on the Soviet Union’s preference during the war. Ultimately, 
reality seems closer to the U.S. view which emphasized that the Soviet Union not only provided 
military replenishments to India during the war but it also blessed India’s intervention and warded 
off U.S. diplomatic pressure to press India harder not to dismember Pakistan throughout the war. 
See Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan.” This is not to completely dismiss 
the contrary view which emphasizes the Soviet Union’s efforts to dissuade India in the lead up to 
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also played an unhelpful role during Brasstacks where it saw an escalated crisis as 
beneficial to its ongoing Afghanistan campaign.73 The Western bloc was also guilty of 
being more interested in wooing India during the Sino-Indian border war than focusing 
outright on deterring the Chinese assault. 
 For the antagonists, great power rivalry was equally important in determining 
crisis strategies. Outreach to third parties was carefully calculated to exploit great power 
wedges and tensions. India and Pakistan often tailored their signals to convey their 
propensity to reach out to other third parties, should one disappoint them. At the same 
time, they were careful not to overplay their hand, so as to force the third party in 
question into total opposition. The third parties, on their part, sought to raise the costs of 
the antagonists by threatening diplomatic or military punishment to attempt such policy 
changes during a crisis; they simultaneously offered rewards as quid pro quo for the 
conflicting parties showing sensitivity to their concerns. The 1965 India-Pakistan war can 
be considered a demonstration crisis in as much as Pakistan sought to ignite a rebellion in 
Indian Kashmir and elicit third party attention and support for the limited war it planned 
to fight to wrest the area from India.74 Failing to convince the U.S. of its stance, the 
Pakistani leadership hinted at seeking greater support from the Chinese but stopped short 
of doing so given Washington’s punishment leverage. India, on the other hand, defied all 
U.S. calls and pressure to halt its offensive in East Pakistan in 1971 by relying on Soviet 
                                                                                                                                      
the war. See K. Vijayakrishnan, “The Problems of Security in South Asia: Soviet Perceptions and 
Policies 1964-1971” (PhD diss., School of International Relations, Mahatama Gandhi University, 
India, 1995), 265-85. 
73 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 67-68. 
74 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 161-62. 
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support. To the contrary, it shed the cloak of non-alignment to make desperate pleas for 
Western assistance during the Sino-Indian war, thereby signaling its openness to a pro-
West tilt.75  
 Interestingly, the principal antagonists’ outreach to third parties most often 
entailed demands for direct military intervention on their side to defeat the opponent (and 
its third party patron if it were to join the war). Pakistan sought to invoke its agreement of 
assured U.S. military support in times of aggression in virtually every crisis. India also 
asked for direct Western military intervention in 1962. It however remained reluctant to 
do so in conflicts with Pakistan, especially when Kashmir was at stake.   
 The superpowers were open to using threats of direct military intervention and 
undertook force demonstrations to coerce their rival great power into reigning in its 
regional partner. Superpower attempts at persuasion of a regional conflicting party or its 
rival third party were often quickly followed by hints at readiness to up the ante and 
cause a superpower confrontation if the rival great power remained unwilling to restrain 
its ally. In 1971, the Nixon administration dispatched an impressive naval taskforce 
including USS Enterprise, the world’s largest nuclear aircraft carrier, to the Bay of 
Bengal as a show of strength to deter India and the Soviet Union,76 and it pressured 
Moscow through threatening private messaging to prevent the total disintegration of 
                                              
75 McGarr reports that the Indian leadership’s eagerness and appetite for Western military 
assistance was high enough to stun officials in Washington and London. McGarr, The Cold War 
in South Asia, 159. Also see Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis, 196-200, 206-10. 
76 Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S., 177-80. 
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Pakistan at India’s hands.77 The Western bloc also contemplated deployment of a 
commonwealth brigade on the Kashmir buffer zone to free up Indian soldiers to fight 
China in 1962.78 Both the Western bloc and Soviet Union also tended to provide military 
supplies and other related assistance during conflicts to bolster their respective crisis 
partners.79 
 Their brinkmanship notwithstanding, the great powers were also extremely 
cautious not to let any situation transform into direct confrontation between them. This 
meant that they were receptive to each’s others demands and threats to a large extent. The 
1971 war exhibited both the limits to superpower leverage and the rival great power’s 
sensitivity to the other’s demands. On the one hand, U.S. ultimatums to India and the 
Soviet Union did not succeed. India marched ahead with dismembering East Pakistan and 
Moscow masterfully backed New Delhi and warded off U.S. pressure just long enough to 
allow this outcome to take effect.80 This was an obvious reflection of the limits of third 
party leverage over a conflicting party backed by the rival superpower. On the other hand, 
when the U.S. gave the final ultimatum of direct intervention even at the cost of 
reciprocal Soviet involvement if India sought to occupy territory in West Pakistan, 
Moscow obliged by getting a guarantee from New Delhi that it would not do so.81 In as 
far as the Western bloc’s hesitance to make a more forceful intervention in the 1962 
                                              
77 Warner, Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan;” Henry A. Kissinger, White House 
Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 909-10. 
78 McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia, 171-72. 
79 The one exception was the 1965 India-Pakistan war where the U.S. imposed an embargo on 
arms transfer and asked India and Pakistan not to use U.S. supplied weapons in the war.  
80 Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan,” 1116. 
81 Ibid., 1115-16. 
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Sino-Indian war was driven by its concern about direct Soviet intervention, the U.S.’s 
sense of urgency in the 1965 India-Pakistan war was a function of threat of Chinese 
involvement, the Chinese reluctance to mobilize troops in Pakistan’s support despite U.S. 
requests in 1971 was driven by its fear of a Sino-Soviet clash, and the U.S. and Soviet 
signals suggesting their inclination to defend their respective allies during the 1984 
preventive war crisis contributed to quick crisis termination, the mutual concern about 
great power confrontation was also at play here.  
 Ultimately though, the superpowers were willing to stand back and absorb even a 
major loss for the ally if their efforts at threat manipulation in a particular crisis failed and 
if the alternative seemed great power confrontation. In 1971, there was significant 
internal debate within the U.S. officialdom on the consequences of Pakistan’s collapse. 
Although President Nixon’s view that Washington must support Pakistan prevailed, there 
were many who argued that an independent East Pakistan would not be a bad outcome 
for U.S. global positioning.82 There were even attempts to embargo the already limited 
arms supplies to Pakistan and consideration was also given to stalling economic aid 
contrary to the Presidential directives.83 Notwithstanding, even when Nixon pursued his 
preference, the U.S. quickly toned down its goals to saving West Pakistan once it was 
clear that it had little leverage short of direct intervention to stop India from ‘liberating’ 
                                              
82 Ibid., 1104. For some of the internal differences in points of view in Washington, also see 
Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S., 148-84.  
83 The policy was driven to force the Pakistani government to seek a political settlement with the 
East. Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan,” 1107.  
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the East.84 Washington eventually stood by as the East fell. Even in the 1962 war, 
Western diplomacy ended up doing little more than standing back to see China decimate 
Indian forces; neither was the largely symbolic emergency military aid ever likely to 
prevent a Chinese victory, nor were Western diplomatic interventions any more than 
platitudes aimed at signaling possibilities of future support to India.  
 These characteristics are representative of the Cold War era crises involving India 
and/or Pakistan. The overlapping traits and fundamental differences between these and 
the crises that have taken place in the overt nuclearization phase will become clear as we 
conduct our case studies in the following chapters. We treat the ‘compound crisis’ of 
1990 separately due to the qualitatively different international environment and state of 
nuclearization of the region under which the crisis unfolded. The bipolar international 
structure had begun to unravel by 1990. The anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan was also over. 
South Asia’s geostrategic importance had therefore declined abruptly. The crisis also 
marked the first in the region with any noticeable nuclear overtones – even if not obvious 
enough to fall within the scope limitation of our model.85 Even though there was no 
                                              
84 Ironically, the U.S. NSA Henry Kissinger, the most vocal opponent of the breakup of Pakistan 
during the war, quickly came to terms with the failure to prevent this and instead told U.S. 
President Nixon: “Congratulations, Mr. President…..You saved W[est] Pakistan.” Warner, 
“Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan,” 1117. 
85 Some have considered the Brasstacks crisis the first South Asian crisis with a noteworthy 
nuclear dimension. While at one level, the nuclear aspect was naturally relevant to any crisis 
situation throughout the 1980s given that India and Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons was 
strongly suspected, the nuclear dimension was not comprehended well enough to impinge upon 
crisis choices in a major way. To call Brasstacks a nuclear crisis is quite an exaggeration given 
that there is no evidence to suggest that either India or Pakistan thought of the context as anything 
other than a typical conventional one. Hagerty (1998) rightly calls it a “prenuclear weaponization 
crisis.” Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 112. Also, a much-quoted nuclear 
‘signal’ by the Pakistani nuclear program’s chief architect, A. Q. Khan that threatened that 
Pakistan could build a bomb and has led many to point to South Asia’s nuclear dimension at the 
118 
 
 
clarity on the specific status of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons and it was 
impossible for the conflicting parties to judge the third parties’ sensitivity to this aspect 
prior to the crisis, the U.S. seems to have taken the nuclear dimension into account in 
shaping its crisis strategy. 86  
 These factors ought to have significantly affected Indian, Pakistani, and third 
party behavior according to the predictions of our model presented in chapter two. With 
the context moving closer to our model’s scope limitation, we could reasonably expect 
the compound crisis to provide some early indications of behavior patterns posited by our 
model. Indeed, the 1990 crisis saw four discernable characteristics that contrasted with 
the experience of the previous crisis iterations discussed above.87 First, even though the 
conflicting parties upped the ante by undertaking military deployments and offensive 
signaling – including an alleged deterrent threat by the Pakistani Foreign Minister –88 in a 
                                                                                                                                      
time was published two months after the crisis had ended. Perhaps the only real nuclear 
dimension to Brasstacks was the impetus the crisis provided to India and Pakistan to accelerate 
their weaponization process. Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 66-67; 
Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 118. 
86 Both India and Pakistan were still not weaponized and while they could probably have 
mustered a crude delivery plan in an eventuality, the nuclear dimension was murky at best. Both 
sides operated on the premise that they did not have a nuclear capability. For India, Chari reports 
that nuclear weapons “had no role to play in this crisis.” P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation 
Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Working Paper 1.0, Henry L. Stimson Center, August 
2003, 17. The U.S. seemed more convinced of a nuclear angle even though it was equally 
uncertain of the status of the nuclear capability of the antagonists. See Chari, Cheema, and 
Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 99-108; and Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation 
Control,” 17. 
87 These lessons have been drawn principally from Chari, Cheema, and Cohen’s (2007) analysis 
of the crisis, and to a lesser extent from Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 82-115; 
Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 133-70; and Chari, “Nuclear, Crisis, 
Escalation Control,” 16-18. 
88 Although denied by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the supposed signal 
even elicited an Indian public resolve signal in response. Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises 
and a Peace Process, 89-91, 101-02. 
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brinkmanship exercise, neither antagonist seemed enthused by the prospect of war and 
both were as eager to wind down as they had initially seemed to scale up. This was also 
partly true for Brasstacks and the 1984 crisis but only marginally so when compared to 
the 1990 episode. Second, in a major departure from the past, India did not object to 
U.S.’s involvement in helping manage a crisis that directly related to Kashmir. The U.S. 
Ambassadors in India and Pakistan were allowed to informally verify the ground 
positions of both militaries and report back to dispel fears of war.89 Towards the latter 
part of the crisis, U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA) Robert Gates visited 
India and Pakistan. He urged de-escalation in both countries and signaled that war would 
not be useful to either.90 Although crisis termination was already being contemplated by 
India and Pakistan before Gates arrived, his mission did provide both sides with “face-
saving measures” and therefore had an obvious impact in terms of lowering tensions.91 
Within two weeks of his departure, the crisis was over.92 Third, in contrast to its 
aloofness at Brasstacks, the U.S. seemed eager to play the role it did. This was despite the 
fact that its immediate interest in Afghanistan had vanished. Finally, U.S. crisis 
diplomacy was not driven by great power concerns. Equally, none of the other third 
parties competed with the U.S. agenda; they all counselled Indian and Pakistani restraint 
as well.93 These characteristics would manifest themselves more obviously (along with 
other fresh ones) in the overt nuclearization phase.  
                                              
89 Ibid., 96. 
90 Ibid., 97-98; Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 150-52. 
91 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 98. 
92 Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 151-52. 
93 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 99. 
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III. SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT 
If outreach to third parties was one Pakistani and Indian strategy to bolster their 
capabilities and enhance their security, the quest for nuclear weapons was the other. 
Ironically, this pursuit was in no small part triggered by their disillusionment with the 
efficacy of third party support.  
 India, followed by Pakistan, declared their nuclear weapon status to the world in 
May 1998. India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13. In direct response, 
Pakistan conducted six tests on May 28 and 30.94 Long suspected to be operating under a 
covert nuclear umbrella, South Asia was now officially nuclearized, leaving no ambiguity 
about the nuclear overtones of future India-Pakistan crises. Their journey to this point had 
been an arduous one, courtesy of the third parties – specifically, the U.S. Both sides had 
stayed outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – India on the pretext that the 
treaty created a nuclear apartheid by allowing the first five nuclear states to legitimize 
their status95 and Pakistan because it made its membership contingent on India’s – that 
                                              
94 India’s tests entailed subkiloton explosions, a fission test (15 kiloton), and a two-stage 
thermonuclear one (43 kiloton). Pakistan’s tests entailed boosted fission devices and test of the 
sub-system of a miniaturized device. The highest yield obtained was between 30-35 kiloton while 
the miniaturized device’s test yielded 18-20 kiloton. Khan, Eating Grass, 269, 281-82. 
95 The NPT has an inbuilt dichotomy between nuclear haves and have-nots. It was opened for 
signature in 1968 and only countries that had tested nuclear weapons by that time were formally 
recognized as nuclear weapons states. All others had to foreswear nuclear weapons to become 
members under the quid pro quo that they would have access to peaceful nuclear energy and that 
the five recognized states would work towards global disarmament in earnest. India used this 
inherent dichotomy as the basis of its stance against the Treaty and the justification for its non-
membership. The text of the NPT that stipulates its various provisions is available as “The Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)” on the U.N. website, 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html. 
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prohibits weapons production and developed clandestine programs in the face of 
international opposition and sanctions.  
 India’s nuclear development finds its roots in the 1950s when a peaceful nuclear 
energy program was instituted.96 The early Indian leadership remained opposed to 
nuclear weapons on normative grounds but the loss in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and 
the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 began to solidify an Indian elite consensus around 
greater focus on bolstering the country’s defense capabilities. Gradually, the idea of a 
‘peaceful nuclear test’ gained traction for an India otherwise championing global 
disarmament. New Delhi ultimately tested a fission devise in May 1974, terming it a 
‘peaceful nuclear explosion.’ Contrary to expectations, it chose not to weaponize 
thereafter and only gradually inched towards producing a deliverable nuclear capability. 
Estimates suggest that India qualified as a nuclear capable state only in the mid-1980s 
and by the end of the decade, it may have had the capability to assemble weapons 
reasonably quickly.97 Actual weaponization came in the 1990s. While already possessing 
aircraft delivery capability, India was simultaneously investing in missile delivery 
systems. This program also accelerated in the 1990s.  
                                              
96 There have been a number of influential books that provide an intricate and detailed account of 
India’s nuclear development. This summary draws on a collective read of these. For the most 
prominent one, see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global 
Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). For perhaps the most 
comprehensive Indian account, see Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The 
Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002). For a detailed chronology of 
India’s nuclear development, see “India Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/india_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791. 
97 Perkovich reports that by 1990, India may have had two dozen weapons that could be quickly 
assembled and mounted on aircraft for delivery. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 293. 
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 Since 1998, India has presented itself as a mature nuclear power with an 
untarnished track record in terms of nuclear safety, security, and non-assistance to other 
aspiring states. India’s nuclear weapons are under tight civilian control. A Nuclear 
Command Authority was set up in 2003 which is headed by the Prime Minister who is 
the final authority on all decisions pertaining to nuclear use. New Delhi’s nuclear 
doctrine espouses “credible minimum deterrence” – as opposed to the MAD doctrine of 
the Cold War –, it adheres to a No-First Use (NFU) policy, and it envisions a triad of 
nuclear options.98 It is believed to maintain its weapons in a de-alerted and de-mated state. 
India has continued to invest in expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal and today 
has a secure air and land -based second strike capability comprising of aircraft and 
ballistic missiles. This augments its accelerated pace of conventional military 
modernization. Table 3 summarizes India’s nuclear capabilities and their progress since 
1998, with special attention to the years in which the post-1998 India-Pakistan crises took 
place.  
Table 3: India’s Nuclear Upgradation 1998-2013 
January 2000* 
Warheads 25-40 
Delivery systems 
Type Range  
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft 
MiG-27 
Flogger 
800 3000 Operational 
Jaguar IS/IB 1600 4775 Operational 
Ballistic missiles 
Agni I 1500 1000 Flight tested but status unclear 
Agni II 2000 1000 First flight test on April 11, 1999 
                                              
98 For the salient features of the doctrine and a succinct analysis, see Vijay Shankar, “A Covenant 
Sans Sword” (paper prepared for the Ottawa Dialogue on India-Pakistan nuclear issues, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, June 18-19, 2010).  
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January 2002 
Warheads 30-35 
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft 
MiG-27 
Flogger 
800 3000 Operational 
Jaguar IS/IB 1600 4775 Operational 
Ballistic missiles 
Prithvi I 150 1000 Deployed. May have nuclear role 
Agni I 1500 1000 Flight tested but status unclear 
Agni II >2000  1000 Flight tested. Deployment expected soon 
January 2009 
Warheads 60-70 
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft 
Mirage 2000H 1850 6300 Operational. Reportedly certified for delivery of nuclear 
gravity bombs 
Jaguar IS 1400 4760 Operational. May have nuclear role 
Land-based ballistic missiles 
Prithvi I (P-I) 150 800 Operational. Widely believed to have nuclear role. Fewer 
than 50 launchers deployed 
Agni I >700 1000 Operational tests conducted.  Deployed with Army 
Agni II >2000 1000 Inducted into Army but operational status uncertain 
Agni III >3000 1500 Under development 
Sea-based ballistic missiles 
Dhanush 350 1000 Induction underway 
K-15 700 500-600 Test-launched from submerged pontoon on February 26, 
2008 
January 2013 
Warheads 90-110 
  
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft 
Mirage 2000H 1850 6300 Operational. Reportedly certified for delivery of nuclear 
gravity bombs 
Land-based ballistic missiles 
Prithvi I/II 150/350 800/500 Operational. Both widely reported to have nuclear role but 
role likely diminished due to Agni. Fewer than 50 launchers 
deployed  
Agni I ~700 1000 Deployed with Army 
Agni II 2000 1000 In-service with Army 
Agni III ~3 000 1500 Inducted into service but not fully operational 
Agni IV ~4 000 1000 Under development  
Agni V >5000 1000? Under development 
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Sea-based ballistic missiles 
Dhanush 350 500 Induction underway but probably not operational 
K-15 700 500-600 Under development. Being integrated with the submarine 
INS Arihant  
* January 2000 is the earliest available credible information on Indian nuclear forces that 
is comparable with the data presented for later years.  
? = Uncertain figure  
 
Sources: Modified from Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Tables of Nuclear 
Forces,” Appendix 8A, in SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament, and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15; Hans M. Kristensen 
and Joshua Handler, “World Nuclear Forces,” Appendix 10A, in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: 
Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 37; Shannon N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, and Hans M. Kristensen, “World Nuclear 
Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 368; Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, 
“Indian Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament, and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 312.  
 
Note: This table does not provide complete information about other possible 
developments or the caveats to the developments presented here. The information is 
based on the estimates the cited SIPRI yearbooks provide in their tabular representation 
of the data. For further explanations and caveats tied to the data, see the cited SIPRI 
yearbooks.  
 
 While India has not acceded to the NPT and thus does not qualify as a lawfully 
recognized nuclear state, its growing warmth with the U.S. earned it a unique civilian 
nuclear deal in 2008 which paved the way for it to receive dual-use technology, otherwise 
prohibited for non-NPT members.99 This is a major change from the Cold War period 
when the U.S. sanctioned India, both after its 1974 explosion and the 1998 nuclear tests, 
                                              
99 The nuclear deal was signed on October 10, 2008 after a protracted negotiation and approval 
process and despite significant international and domestic opposition within India. It required a 
change in the U.S.’s “Hyde Act” and in the regulations of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group whose 
permission is necessary for export of such dual-use technology. For a timeline of the nuclear deal, 
see “Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” Times of India, October 9, 2008, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-10-09/us/27932585_1_civil-nuclear-cooperation-
atomic-energy-act-exports-of-nuclear-materials. On the importance of the deal for India-U.S. 
relations, see S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: 
An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey 47, 4 
(July/August 2007), 650-53. 
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and demanded elimination of its weapons program. Notwithstanding however, the Indian 
strategic elite have remained uncertain of the U.S.’s outlook towards its nuclear weapons 
capability even in the overt nuclearization phase.100  
 Pakistan’s nuclear development had one goal from the very outset: guaranteed 
defense against India.101 Its pursuit of a nuclear weapon began in earnest after the loss of 
East Pakistan and was reinforced by India’s 1974 explosion. Pakistan relied on a mix of 
clandestinely obtained foreign hardware and technology and indigenous development to 
acquire both a nuclear weapon and missile delivery capability against heavy odds. While 
it had received a weapon design and sufficient quantity of Highly Enriched Uranium 
from China for two bombs in 1981,102 its indigenous fissile material production only 
managed to cross the enrichment threshold in 1985. It was 1995 by the time Pakistan 
managed to develop some degree of confidence in and assurance of its ability to deliver a 
nuclear weapon.103 The 1990s also saw rapid progress in Pakistan’s missile development 
with software and hardware assistance from China and North Korea.104 Pakistan has been 
able to produce a mix of liquid and solid fuelled short and medium range ballistic 
missiles, and land and air-based cruise missiles.  
                                              
100 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 218. 
101 Authoritative literature on Pakistan’s nuclear program dwarfs in comparison to that on India. 
By far the best and most complete account of Pakistan’s nuclear development has been provided 
by Khan, Eating Grass. The summation of developments presented here draw from his account. 
For a basic timeline of the Pakistani program’s development, see “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons – A 
Chronology,” Federation of American Scientists, 
https://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/chron.htm. 
102 Khan, Eating Grass, 188. 
103 Ibid., 233. 
104 For a discussion of the Chinese and North Korean role in Pakistan’s missile development, see 
Ibid., 238-47. 
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 Pakistan has not formally announced a nuclear doctrine but it espouses a 
“minimum credible deterrent” and retains the right to First-Use of nuclear weapons.105 
Like India, its weapons are de-alerted and believed to be separately stored. Pakistan’s 
National Command Authority is presently headed by the Prime Minister but it was led by 
its Army Chief cum President, Parvez Musharraf, for the first eight years of its existence. 
Unlike India, the predominance of the Pakistani military in the country’s national security 
decision making has left the nuclear weapons program tightly in the hands of the military 
establishment.  
 Pakistan’s overt nuclearization phase has been similar to India in terms of its 
determination to upgrade the nuclear capability. In fact, its drive has been stronger than 
India’s given its growing conventional disparity with New Delhi that is quickly eroding 
any semblance of parity between Indian and Pakistani capabilities, and may for the first 
time leave Pakistan’s conventional deterrent totally incredible. (See figure 4 for a time-
series comparison of Indian and Pakistani defense expenditures and Gross Domestic 
Products (GDPs) [included as a proxy for their respective capacities to invest in their 
militaries]).106 This partly explains why, as most observers believe, Pakistan’s pace of 
                                              
105 For the salient features of Pakistan’s otherwise undeclared doctrine and a discussion of the 
logic of its non-declaratory posture, see Shahzad Chaudhry, “The Matter of Nuclear Doctrines” 
(paper prepared for the Ottawa Dialogue on India-Pakistan nuclear issues, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, June 18-19, 2010). 
106 For a current comparison of Indian and Pakistani conventional capabilities, their likely future 
direction, and an analysis of their implications for conventional deterrence, see Christopher Clary, 
“Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia,” in Deterrence 
Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson 
(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2013), 135-60. 
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upgradation has been faster than India’s in recent years and why its nuclear inventory 
outstrips its rival’s at this point.107  
Figure 4: GDP and Military Expenditure Differentials between India and Pakistan 
 
Data Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military 
Expenditure Database 2013,” 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx.  
 
Note: GDP data has been calculated based on information on total military expenditures 
and military expenditures as share of GDP. 
 
                                              
107 In recent years, Pakistan has been alleged to have the fastest growing nuclear stockpile of any 
country in the world. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, 4 (July 2011): 91-99. Pakistan is also believed to have taken 
over Britain as the fifth largest nuclear power. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani 
Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy,” New York Times, January 31, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/asia/01policy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Table 4 summarizes Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and its progress since the 1998 
tests, again with special attention to the years in which the post-1998 India-Pakistan 
crises took place.  
Table 4: Pakistan’s Nuclear Upgradation 1998-2013 
January 2000* 
Warheads 15-20 
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft  
F-16A/B 1600 5450 Operational 
Missiles    
Ghauri I 
(Hatf-5) 
1300-1500 500-750 Test fired on April 6, 1998. Version of North Korean 
No Dong missiles 
Ghauri II 
(Hatf-6) 
2000-2300 750-1000 Test fired on April 14, 1999 
January 2002 
Warheads 24-48 
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft 
F-16A/B 1600 5450 Operational 
Ballistic Missiles 
Shaheen I 
(Hatf-4) 
700 1000 Test fired on April 15, 1999. Possible nuclear role 
 
Ghauri I 
(Hatf-5) 
1300-1500 500-750 Test fired on April 6, 1998. Version of North Korean 
No Dong missile 
 
Ghauri II 
(Hatf-6) 
2000-2300 750-1000 Test fired on April 14, 1999 
January 2009 
Warheads 60 
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft 
F-16A/B 1600 4500 Operational. Most likely aircraft to have nuclear role 
Ballistic missiles 
Ghaznavi 
(Hatf-3) 
~400 500 Inducted into Army. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed. 
Believed to be a copy of M-11 missile acquired from 
China in 1990s 
Shaheen I 
(Hatf-4) 
>450 750–1000  Inducted into Army. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed 
Shaheen II 2000 ~1000? Army operational readiness launches conducted 
Ghauri I 
(Hatf-5) 
>1200 700–1000 Inducted into Army. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed 
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Cruise missiles 
Babur 
(Hatf-7) 
700 N/A Ground, air, and sea-launched versions under 
development 
Ra’ad (Hatf-
8) 
350 N/A Air-launched. Under development 
January 2013 
Warheads 100-120 
Delivery systems 
Type Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Status 
Aircraft  
F-16A/B 1600 4500 Operational. Undergoing mid-life upgrades 
 
Mirage V 2100 4000 Operational. Possibly nuclear-capable 
Ballistic missiles 
Abdali 
(Hatf-2) 
~180 200–400 Under development 
Ghaznavi 
(Hatf-3) 
290 500 Inducted into Army. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed 
Shaheen I 
(Hatf-4) 
650 750-1000 Inducted into Army. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed 
Ghauri 
(Hatf-5) 
>1 200 700-1000 Inducted into Army. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed 
Shaheen II 
(Hatf-6) 
2500 ~1 000? Under development. Expected to become operational 
soon 
Nasr (Hatf-
9) 
~60 N/A Under development 
Cruise missiles 
Babur 
(Hatf-7) 
600 400-500 Under development. Initially ground-launched; sea and 
air-launched versions reportedly also under 
development 
Ra’ad (Hatf-
8) 
350 N/A Air-launched. Under development 
* January 2000 is the earliest available credible information on Pakistani nuclear forces 
that is comparable with the data presented for later years.   
? = Uncertain figure  
 
Sources: Modified from Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Tables of Nuclear 
Forces,” Appendix 8A, in SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament, and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17; Hans M. Kristensen 
and Joshua Handler, “World Nuclear Forces,” Appendix 10A, in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: 
Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 41; Shannon N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, and Hans M. Kristensen, “World Nuclear 
Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 374; Phillip Schell and Hans M. Kristensen, 
“Pakistani Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament, and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 318.  
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Note: This table does not provide complete information about other possible 
developments or the caveats to the developments presented here. The information is 
based on the estimates the cited SIPRI yearbooks provide in their tabular representation 
of the data. For further explanations and caveats tied to the data, see the cited SIPRI 
Yearbooks.  
 
 The other aspect of Pakistan’s nuclear experience since 1998 has been hugely 
embarrassing. The chief architect of Pakistan’s bomb, A. Q. Khan, was found to be 
lording over a global nuclear black market and had transferred technology and hardware 
to countries like Libya, Iran, and North Korea while he was still part of the Pakistani 
nuclear establishment.108 The scandal came to surface in the early years of overt 
nuclearization and added to the already strong evidence about Pakistan’s nuclear 
collaboration with China and North Korea on missile and nuclear technology and 
hardware. The proliferation saga forced Pakistan’s nuclear establishment to undertake a 
number of export control and safety and security-enhancing measures that have been duly 
noted by the world.109 However, this has not rid Pakistan of its image of a problematic, 
military-dominated, and deeply unstable state with nuclear weapons.  
 To be sure, Pakistanis see their image as more than a mere coincidence. On the 
nuclear question, they remain deeply suspicious of the West, believing that it has never 
                                              
108 For a detailed account of A. Q. Khan’s ‘nuclear black market,’ see International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation 
Networks - A Net Assessment,” May 2, 2007.  
109 For an official representation of Pakistan’s efforts, see Zafar Ali, “Pakistan’s Export Control 
Measures” (presentation to the Partnership for Global Security workshop on ‘Meeting the Nuclear 
Security Challenge in Pakistan,’ February 21-22, 2008), http://partnershipforglobalsecurity-
archive.org/documents/zafar_export.pdf. Also see Paul K. Kerr and Mary B. Nikitin, “Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 
2012, 24-25, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb388/docs/EBB035.pdf. 
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reconciled with a Muslim nuclear weapon state.110 They remember well the U.S.’s 
dissuasion of suppliers of civilian nuclear hardware dealing with Pakistan in the 1970s.111 
Towards the end of this decade, the U.S. even considered preventive strikes against 
Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.112 Even though it took a U-turn by turning a blind eye to 
Pakistan’s program in the 1980s – it did however continue to seek ways to provide 
incentives to Islamabad to affect a reversal of its program –113 given Pakistan’s 
immediate need in the anti-Soviet Afghan war,114 more current in the Pakistani memory 
is Washington’s decision to impose stringent sanctions and all but cut off ties in 1990 
once the Soviet Union had withdrawn from Afghanistan.115Already under sanctions and 
internally weak, Pakistan also hurt disproportionally when fresh sanctions were imposed 
on it (and India) after the May 1998 tests.116 While it sees its nuclear capability as non-
negotiable and has persistently defied any calls for a reversal of its program over the 
years, extreme U.S. pressure on Pakistani leaders after the proliferation scandal and 
demands for greater transparency in its safety and security protocols has only increased 
the paranoia of Pakistani planners about U.S. designs in recent years.117 Rumors that the 
                                              
110 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line Of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 202. 
111 The most prominent case was U.S. dissuasion of France which had agreed to sell a 
reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The French delayed the sale, asked for stringent and rather 
unprecedented preconditions to be met for the sale, and ultimately backed out of it, largely due to 
U.S. pressure. Khan, Eating Grass, 191-92. 
112 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 55. 
113 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 69-70. 
114 Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 275-79, 282-86. 
115 Ibid., 308-11. 
116 Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, “The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India 
and Pakistan,” The Nonproliferation Review 6, 4 (Fall 1999): 10-12. 
117 Today, Pakistani planners feel that the global non-proliferation regime is singularly aimed at 
squeezing their space to maintain a robust deterrent. Their nuclear expansion plans are driven in 
no small part by this concern. Similarly, their storage and dispersal protocols and posturing are 
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U.S. is already “baby sitting” Pakistan’s program118 or views that promote the need for 
Washington to prepare contingencies to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in an 
eventuality have not helped.119  
This is the backdrop in which the Kargil, 2001-02 and Mumbai crises took place. 
As India and Pakistan entered the overt nuclearization phase, they had been locked in an 
enduring rivalry. They had regularly engaged with third parties during the Cold War and 
the U.S. in particular had extensive experience in dealing with both South Asian rivals in 
peace and crisis time. Yet, neither trusted the U.S. fully and India had traditionally been 
shy of third party involvement in Kashmir. How would these factors influence crisis 
behavior in the overt nuclearization phase that coincided with a unipolar global setting? 
Would behavior patterns conform to our model or would crisis dynamics play out in line 
with the more traditional predictions? We address these questions as part of our case 
studies in the next three chapters. 
                                                                                                                                      
greatly affected by the lingering concern about a ‘bolt out of the blue strike’ by the U.S. or a 
U.S.-India-Israel combine. Author’s interviews of relevant Pakistani officials. 
118 Retired U.S. Army Colonel David Hackworth had suggested at the height of India-Pakistan 
tensions in 2002 that the U.S. was already “baby sitting” Pakistani nuclear weapons. The 
comment elicited a severe response from the Pakistani officialdom, with the Pakistani 
Ambassador to the U.S. Maleeha Lodhi rebutting it publicly. 
119 For one prominent example of the U.S. expert community suggesting a need for the U.S. 
government to prepare such contingencies, see Frederick W. Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, 
“Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” New York Times, November 18, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE KARGIL CRISIS 
The Kargil episode was the first active confrontation between two nuclear armed 
rivals since the Sino-Soviet Ussuri river clashes of 1969. Coming just a year after the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, it was also the “first unambiguous case of 
crisis management between India and Pakistan as nuclear-armed rivals.”1 Even though 
the fighting was limited to a remote mountainous region in Indian Kashmir, the 
circumstances surrounding the crisis attracted considerable domestic and international 
attention. The antagonists’ efforts at compellence were on display as was third party 
intervention – led by the U.S. but backed by a number of other external powers – with the 
primary aim of de-escalating the crisis.  
This chapter examines the Kargil crisis in light of the conceptual framework laid 
out in chapter two. It begins by providing a brief background of the crisis. Next, it 
highlights the strategic and international outlook of India, Pakistan, and the third parties 
as they entered Kargil. The subsequent section examines Pakistani and Indian actions and 
signaling in a classic bilateral context without factoring in the role of the third party. 
Thereafter, the third party dynamic is introduced into the discussion and Indian, Pakistani, 
and third party behavior is analyzed through the lens of our three-cornered bargaining 
framework. The final section examines the centrality of brokered bargaining to crisis 
behavior and its implications for explanations rooted in classic deterrence theories and for 
the escalation-de-escalation dynamic.   
                                              
1 Rodney W. Jones, “Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview,” Final 
Report, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, October 1, 2001, 38.  
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE KARGIL CRISIS 
The Kargil crisis was triggered by the incursion of Pakistani paramilitary forces 
and their allied jihadi militants in the Kargil district of Ladakh in northern Kashmir on 
the Indian side of the LoC.2 In what was Pakistan’s first direct attempt to capture territory 
under Indian control since 1965, between 700 and 1,000 paramilitary soldiers from 
Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry Division crossed over undetected in the winter months 
of 1999. 3 They occupied strategic heights in the Batalik, Dras, Mushkoh, and Kaksar 
sectors (see figure 5).4 This area was of extreme strategic value as the heights overlooked 
the all-important National Highway 1A, India’s only warm-weather road link between Sri 
Nagar, the summer capital of Kashmir, and Leh, the largest town in Ladakh, and its only 
land access to the Indian forces deployed on the Siachen glacier.5  
                                              
2 Kargil was originally part of Ladakh region but was later made a separate district.  It has never 
been part of the Kashmir Valley. J. N. Dixit, “A Defining Moment,” in Guns and Yellow Roses: 
Essays in the Kargil War (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1999), 188. 
3 Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (New 
York: M. E. Sharp Inc., 2003), 36. There is no consensus on the number of intruders and on the 
split between Pakistani regulars and militants. The SIPRI Yearbook 2000 puts the number at 
1,000 while Keesing’s record has a lower estimate of 600. Some Indian sources suggest that the 
number was as high as 1,200-1,500. See P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, 
Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 121. Former Pakistani army officer Shaukat Qadir however 
maintains that the number of Pakistani regular troops “never exceeded 1,000” but that about 
4,000 men were used to provide logistical backup to them. Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the 
Kargil Conflict 1999,” RUSI Journal 147, 2 (April 2002), 26. The militants were mostly given 
portering duties and their numbers are believed to be a fraction of the regulars.    
4 See John H. Gill, “Military Operations in the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South 
Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 92-129. 
5 Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 36-37; Samuel Black, “The Structure of South Asian 
Crises from Brasstacks to Mumbai,” Appendix I, in Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential 
Consequences, eds. Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2011), 41.  
The Kargil Review Committee set up by the Indian government to draw lessons from the Kargil 
experience admitted that the route’s closure would have had “far reaching political, diplomatic, 
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Figure 5: Map of Key Conflict Locations at Kargil 
Source: Prepared by author for this research. 
Note:     depicts movement of Pakistani intruders from the Pakistani side of the LoC to 
the strategic heights of Kargil. 
 
The Kargil region is exceptionally inhospitable to any kind of military maneuvers 
during the non-summer months.6 For years, Indian troops had created a routine of 
vacating the area’s snow-capped heights during the winter and going back to occupy 
them after the mountain passes reopened for the summer.7 Pakistan had eyed these 
heights for over a decade as a means of avenging India’s 1984 occupation of the Siachen 
glacier.8 The winter of 1998-99 proved fateful. A small clique within the Pakistani 
                                                                                                                                      
and military implications” for India. National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India, 
From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, February 2000. See 
published version: Government of India, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review 
Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2000), 93.   
6 The Kargil region has mountain peaks rising to 13,000-18,000 feet and Valley floors as high as 
7,000 feet. The heights remain covered with snow between November and May. Qadir, “Analysis 
of the Kargil Conflict,” 25; Krepon, “Crisis in South Asia,” 41. 
7 Krepon, “Crisis in South Asia,” 41-42; Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the 
Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 310. 
8 The initial plan was conceived as far back as the late-1980s and was presented to then President 
General Zia-ul-Haq. In 1996, then Director General Military Operations (DGMO) presented the 
plan to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Both premiers rejected the idea because of the danger of 
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military top brass decided to act on the ‘Kargil plan.’ Executed in extreme secrecy, the 
Pakistani intruders managed to set up 100-130 posts on various strategic heights five 
miles deep into Indian Kashmir.9 By early-May 1999, they had entrenched themselves on 
these heights. India, having detected the intrusions for the first time on May 3 courtesy of 
local shepherds in the Batalik sector, responded by escalating the conflict vertically by 
late-May, eventually throwing in as many as 20,000 troops10 into the contested area and 
employing ground and air power on its side of the LoC to evict the intruders. After a brief 
initial period of success, Pakistani forces were left to face relentless Indian attacks. Fast 
running out of tactical and diplomatic options, Islamabad eventually agreed to a U.S.-
brokered withdrawal that was formally announced on July 12. However, this was not 
before the seventy-five day crisis had etched itself in history as the longest and bloodiest 
confrontation between two nuclear powers.11 
                                                                                                                                      
full-scale war and due to the concern of international reaction and opprobrium. Exercises of the 
plan were reportedly conducted in 1997 nonetheless. For some background on the gestation of the 
Kargil plan (with differing information), see Feroz H. Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher 
Clary, “Pakistan’s Motivations and Calculations for the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare 
in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 76-79; Jasjit Singh, “The Fourth War,” in Kargil 1999: 
Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir, ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 133-
34; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South 
Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 117-18; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into 
Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M. E. Sharp Inc., 2005), 
170;  and R. Sukumaran, “The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of 
Air Power,” Strategic Analysis 27, 3 (July-September 2003): 344-45. 
9 Khan, Eating Grass, 311. 
10 D. Suba Chandran, Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak Conflict (New Delhi: India 
Research Press, 2005), 61. 
11 Waheguru P. S. Sidhu, “Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram: The Victory of Theory?” in 
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International  Relations, 
ed. E. Sridharan (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007), 220. Prominent estimates put the casualty 
numbers of Indian and Pakistani soldiers at a combined total of above 1000. Numbers of Indian 
soldiers killed vary from a low end estimate of 449 to a high end estimate of 1,717. Pakistani 
figures range from 97 to 772. For various estimates, see Gill, “Military Operations,” 122; 
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II. THE ROAD TO KARGIL: STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC OUTLOOK 
OF THE THREE ACTORS 
This section analyzes the strategic and diplomatic landscape in the years 
preceding the Kargil crisis to highlight the outlook of the principal antagonists and the 
U.S.-led third party as they entered the crisis. Their respective outlooks impinged on their 
objectives and behavior during the crisis.   
1. India 
The decade of the 1990s saw considerable acrimony between India and Pakistan 
courtesy of Pakistan’s support to the armed insurgency in Indian Kashmir. Throughout 
the 1990s, India’s strategy in Kashmir was aimed at quashing the insurgent movement 
without allowing Pakistan to make the uprising an excuse to “internationalize” the 
Kashmir issue by seeking third party intervention for its resolution.12 Simultaneously, the 
Indian state sought to punish Pakistan’s for its proxy war strategy by constant shelling 
and cross-LoC artillery exchanges, thereby causing civilian displacement and interrupting 
Pakistani supply lines to its posts on the LoC.13 It was not until the late-1990s that India 
began to gain the upper hand over the insurgency.  
                                                                                                                                      
Chandran, Limited War, 61;  and Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-
Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 143. 
12 On the various facets of the Indian response to the Kashmiri insurgency and the Pakistani role 
during the 1990s, see Rekha Chowdhary, “India’s Response to the Kashmir Insurgency: A 
Holistic Perspective,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a 
Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2014 [forthcoming]), ch. 2. 
13 During the 1990s, the Indian military shelled and interdicted through small arms the all-
important Muzaffarabad-Kel road as it ran through Neelum Valley, a strategic route for the 
Pakistani military to reach its posts along the LoC. Indian actions eventually led to the closure of 
the road in 1994. Zafar I. Cheema, “The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric 
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The insurgency in Kashmir was far from over when Kargil erupted but the 
preceding years had seen tangible improvements. According to official Indian estimates, 
the number of militants in Kashmir was down from 5,000-10,000 in the early-1990s to 
about 2,500 – less than 1,000 of these were considered “active gun-toting militants” – by 
the late-1990s.14 Internationally too, whatever attention Kashmir received in this period 
was to reinforce India’s preference for a bilateral solution to the dispute. This turnaround 
signified a failure of the Pakistani strategy to bleed India through its support to the 
insurgency and bring international pressure for a negotiated settlement to bear on it. 
India’s problems in Kashmir during the 1990s were compounded by its foreign 
policy challenges. While India’s efforts to keep the limelight away from Kashmir were 
largely successful, it nonetheless did receive periodic criticism on its human rights 
violations in Kashmir from capitals like Washington.15 Moreover, even though a number 
of Western countries and Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) were deeply interested in 
improving ties with India, none of this got off the ground.16 Washington had just begun to 
explore ways to engage India through a ‘strategic dialogue’ when New Delhi conducted 
nuclear tests in May 1998. Even on the Indian side, deep-rooted suspicion of U.S. designs 
                                                                                                                                      
Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 56-58. 
14 John F. Burns, “In Brinkmanship’s Wake, All Quiet on the Kashmir Front,” International 
Herald Tribune, June 16, 1998. Quoted in Devin T. Hagerty, “The Kargil War: An Optimistic 
Assessment,” in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb, eds. Sumit 
Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur (New York: Routledge, 2009), 101.  
15 Chowdhary, “India’s Response to the Kashmir Insurgency,” ch. 2. 
16 The Clinton administration was attracted to India’s potential and to the merits of improved 
Indo-U.S. ties. However, the decade of the 1990s was marked by much indecision as the non-
proliferation lobby argued that the norms upheld by Washington for half a century would be 
undermined by any proactive move in this direction. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 
107-08.  
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in South Asia and of third party intervention in India-Pakistan ties continued to dominate 
thinking.  Few other countries of consequence had exceptional relations with India on the 
eve of the Kargil crisis. Russia was still recovering from the Soviet breakup and Sino-
Indian ties had hit rock bottom in the wake of the nuclear tests. 
The one positive spinoff of India’s troubles with the insurgency in Kashmir and 
the problematic international context was New Delhi’s propensity to open up bilateral 
engagement with Pakistan. Forced by extreme international pressure and immediate 
imposition of international sanctions after the nuclear tests, India and Pakistan initiated a 
bilateral dialogue. The goal was to allay widespread international fears about the 
implications of nuclearization of South Asia and to present themselves as mature powers 
capable of handling nuclear weapons responsibly. 
The real impetus to the process came when the two sides activated a bus service 
between New Delhi and Lahore and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided 
to ride the first bus to cross over into Pakistan on February 20, 1999.17 The mood was 
euphoric. Vajpayee termed his trip as the “defining moment in South Asian history” and 
                                              
17 For a detailed account of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit, see Jaswant Singh, A Call to 
Honour: In Service of Emergent India (New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2006), 192-200. The process of 
rapprochement was preceded by an appreciable shift in the tone on both sides after the initial 
chest thumping that followed the nuclear tests. At the tenth South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation summit in Colombo in July 1998, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee stressed his 
government’s desire to have good relations with India’s neighbors, including Pakistan. In August, 
the two Prime Ministers agreed to reinitiate the stalled ‘composite dialogue’ process and discuss 
all outstanding issues including Kashmir. The Premiers met at the U.N General Assembly session 
in New York in September and formally announced their desire to “operationalize the 
mechanism, to address all items in the agreed agenda” from a previous attempt at talks in June 
1997. A week before Prime Minister Vajpayee’s bus trip, Pakistani and Indian parliamentarians 
met for the first time in 50 years. In March, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote to his Pakistani 
counterpart reinforcing their understanding at Lahore and stating his desire for a peaceful 
relationship with Pakistan. Ashfaq Hussain, Witness to Blunder (Lahore: Idara Matbuaat-e-
Sulemani, 2008), 85-89; Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 17-19, 24.  
140 
 
the two sides went further by signing a broad and comprehensive agreement, the ‘Lahore 
Declaration,’ that resolved to deal with virtually all outstanding issues.18 The seriousness 
of the initiative was clear from the fact that the two sides opened a secret backchannel for 
dedicated negotiations specifically on the Kashmir issue shortly thereafter.19  
The Indian political elite meanwhile believed that nuclear weapons had ruled out 
the prospects of war between New Delhi and Islamabad.20 They also felt that the dangers 
associated with nuclear weapons had made Pakistan’s sub-conventional strategy in 
Kashmir untenable.21 The bilateral dialogue bid would have further buoyed their 
confidence in having cushioned against Pakistani provocations. As India entered the 
Kargil conflict then, it, like Pakistan, was under the international scanner. It however 
faced a situation where territory under its control had been forcibly occupied. Its most 
immediate concern therefore was to compel Pakistan to reverse its intrusion. At the same 
time, its concern about “internationalization” of Kashmir was alive. Given its negative 
view of external involvement, India could not have been expected to allow its response at 
Kargil to permit third party attempts to mediate.  
                                              
18 Singh, A Call to Honour, 194. The full text of the “Lahore Declaration’”is available at 
http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/lahore-summit/.     
19 The backchannel was initiated on March 3, 1999. The two sides immediately began 
contemplating viable proposals for Kashmir’s resolution including the long-standing ‘Chenab 
Formula’ and the Livingston proposal, among others. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 
25-29; Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, 168-69. For brief descriptions of these (and other) 
proposals on Kashmir, see Moeed Yusuf and Adil Najam, “Kashmir: Identifying the Components 
of a Sustainable Solution,” in Troubled Times: Sustainable Development and Governance in the 
Age of Extremes (Karachi: Sustainable Development Policy Institute and SAMA Publishing, 
2006), 418-446. For an analysis of these proposals, also see Moeed Yusuf and Adil Najam, 
“Kashmir: Ripe for Resolution?” Third World Quarterly 30, 8 (December 2009): 1503-1528. 
20 Timothy D. Hoyt, “Kargil: The Nuclear Dimension,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: 
The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 154. 
21 Ibid., 150. 
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2. Pakistan 
Pakistan’s strategic considerations were the opposite of India’s. For one, its 
revisionist aims in Kashmir remained strongly intact. Moreover, in the view of the 
Pakistani planners of the Kargil operation, India had nibbled away at the LoC over the 
years to stake claim on Pakistan-controlled areas, without any international notice.22 As 
India attempted interdiction on the LoC to raise Pakistan’s costs for its support to the 
insurgency then, Pakistan responded in kind, most prominently in the Kargil region, and 
specifically the Dras sector where the LoC ran parallel and in close proximity to strategic 
heights overlooking Indian National Highway 1A (see figure 5).23  Simultaneously, 
Pakistan had hoped that a vibrant insurgency would elicit repressive measures from India, 
                                              
22 Pakistan Army Chief Parvez Musharraf captured this sentiment aptly: “Kargil was 
fundamentally about Kashmir……..Indians have been snapping up bits of Pakistani territory in 
Kashmir, for example at Siachen. Siachen is barren wasteland, but it belongs to us.” Interview of 
Parvez Musharraf, April 2004, as reported by Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, 122. 
23 Cheema, “The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict,” 56, 58. 
As India’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective: 
 Evict the intruders and claim back the territory occupied by the Pakistani 
intrusion 
 Avoid providing interested third parties space to force their mediatory role 
on the Kashmir issue  
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Use force but in a manner that did not create an excuse for third party 
intervention  
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and in the process attract global condemnation for its actions in this internationally 
disputed territory. The May 1998 nuclear tests created an unexpected, fresh opening for 
Pakistan in this regard. It could now raise the fear of Kashmir becoming a “nuclear 
flashpoint” openly and bring the otherwise absent international focus on the dispute.24 
Indeed, not only did the nuclear tests bring immediate attention on South Asia25 but the 
view that Kashmir was the most likely issue to land India and Pakistan in a crisis with a 
potential to escalate to the nuclear level took center stage.26 Pakistan’s cause was helped 
further by the fact that the world, while dejected with both India and Pakistan, was unable 
to ignore that New Delhi, not Islamabad, had initiated the nuclear testing.27  
Moreover, unlike India, Pakistan also had the sympathetic ear of relevant powers 
like China and a number of Gulf States. While its relations with the U.S. were anything 
but conducive, it did not back off from its traditional preference for third party – read U.S. 
– mediation in disputes such as Kashmir. Indeed, as Howard and Teresita Schaffer (2011) 
point out, there is something reflexive about Pakistani preference for outside intervention 
on India-Pakistan issues as is its belief that external influence would somehow end up 
favoring the Pakistani stand.28 This held true as Pakistan entered the Kargil crisis. For 
                                              
24 Hagerty, “The Kargil War,” 103; Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 14, 87. 
25 Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 14, 87. 
26 The view that South Asia was the most likely place to witness nuclear war had in fact lingered 
since the 1990 ‘compound crisis.’ Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 
117. 
27 Wirsing (2003) argues that the U.S. demand for India and Pakistan to enter into serious 
negotiations on outstanding issues including Kashmir in the list of asks it put forth as a 
precondition for relaxing post-nuclear test sanctions – the other four were specifically linked to 
nuclear arms control issues – was a reflection of its impatience with New Delhi and a “mild” 
signal of its disapproval of India’s Kashmir policy. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 95. 
28 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: 
Riding the Roller Coaster (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 146. 
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Kargil’s planners however, there was a dilemma. Ever since the May 1998 nuclear tests, 
the conventional wisdom that territorial and political status quo is more likely to maintain 
peace than any revisionism was playing on the minds of the U.S. and other external 
powers. The international community also believed that the quest for peace in South Asia 
would be best served through bilateral diplomatic engagement between India and 
Pakistan. Furthermore, the Pakistani civilian government at the time felt as compelled as 
India to initiate the ‘Lahore process’ and had put its weight behind these efforts to convey 
its sense of responsibility and maturity.29 Kargil’s planners somehow had to mold 
international attention to ensure active support for their revisionist stance in Kashmir 
despite this context.   
A crisis in a nuclearized environment, these planners hoped, would raise 
international concerns in a way that it would force India to leave the freshly occupied 
land in Pakistani control in deference to the third party’s preference for crisis termination. 
Ironically, the cordial environment created by the parlays at Lahore made a clandestine 
operation that much more unexpected –30 and thus permissible.  
                                              
29 Interestingly, even as the civilian government invested in the bid for rapprochement, Pakistan’s 
army chief Parvez Musharraf, the chief architect of the Kargil plan, publicly maintained that 
nuclear weapons had not made conventional war obsolete. Hoyt, “Kargil,” 154. 
30 The Indian leadership was quickly consumed by the positive atmosphere and were unwilling to 
entertain any possibility of Pakistani misadventure. Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 
159. 
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3. The Third Party 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests alarmed the global powers. The Indian tests 
came as a surprise as no imminent threat or recent developments would have suggested a 
need for New Delhi to declare its nuclear status in such a manner. The tests immediately 
brought renewed attention on South Asia. The U.S. took the lead in conducting 
international diplomacy as the world came down hard on India and Pakistan, imposing 
several economic and military sanctions on both countries.31 Washington’s initial goal 
                                              
31 Specifically, U.S. sanctions included termination of government credit and investment 
guarantees and a ban on exports of dual-use items in addition to holding back on a number of 
other assistance transfers. Mario E. Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear 
Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 
115.  
As Pakistan’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective: 
 Revise the territorial distribution of Kashmir by occupying strategic heights in 
the Kargil area 
 Internationalize Kashmir and bring international pressure on India to find a 
negotiated settlement to the dispute 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Undertake a land grab operation in the Kargil area 
 Present Kashmir as a “nuclear flashpoint” that required international 
intervention and mediation  
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was to get India and Pakistan to “cap, roll back and eliminate” their respective nuclear 
programs.32  
In tandem with sanctions, the nuclear tests prompted the U.S. to directly engage 
India and Pakistan on the nuclear question. Even as Washington called for a rollback of 
the nuclear programs, some influential voices were advising the Bill Clinton White 
House to move away from rollback and establish “a more stable plateau for Indo-
Pakistani nuclear competition” by working to help stabilize Indian and Pakistani nuclear 
programs.33 Separate non-proliferation dialogues were initiated with the two sides. 34 The 
U.S.-India dialogue proceeded far more smoothly than the one with Pakistan. In fact, the 
conversations held between U.S. lead, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and 
Indian lead, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh created a fair amount of goodwill 
and provided a critical channel of communication for the two sides during the Kargil 
crisis. On the other hand, if anything, the rather heated exchanges with Pakistani 
delegations created fresh acrimony between Washington’s and Islamabad’s 
bureaucracies.35  
                                              
 32 Ajay Bisaria, “Bill Clinton and the Kargil Conflict: From Crisis Management to Coercive 
Diplomacy,” Case Studies in International Diplomacy 547, Woodrow Wilson School, May 12, 
2009. 6.  
33 Richard Haass and Gideon Rose, “A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan,” Report of 
an Independent Taskforce, Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, 34-35.  
34 Between June 1998 and January 2000, the U.S. conducted 12 rounds of talks with India and ten 
rounds with Pakistan (ten of the total of 12 were parallel dialogues where Indians and Pakistanis 
were engaged separately). Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 94-95.  
35 Discussions with Pakistan were abruptly suspended in February 1999 after unconstructive 
rounds of dialogues. Tensions in the dialogue were apparent early on and were a function of the 
Pakistani suspicions that the U.S. was sympathetic to India’s position more than Pakistan’s and 
over time, also due to Strobe Talbott’s obvious liking and admiration for Jaswant Singh. Author’s 
interview of relevant Pakistani official. 
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When the Kargil crisis erupted, the international community’s focus was almost 
exclusively on the nuclear issue and the need to continue nonproliferation diplomacy to 
persuade India and Pakistan to sign up to arms control and disarmament measures. The 
non-proliferation dialogues notwithstanding, extreme concerns were generated after the 
tests as the pessimists wasted little time in pointing out that South Asia contained all the 
ingredients for the ultimate doomsdays scenario to come true.36 Amidst these concerns, 
Indian and Pakistani efforts at rapprochement and the understanding reached at Lahore in 
February 1999 were unsurprisingly welcomed. According to Tahir-Kheli and Biringer 
(2000), “the world breathed a sigh of relief. It seemed that the testing of nuclear weapons 
in 1998 did not, after all, mean a march toward conflict. The Lahore meeting was 
accepted as the official policy of the two governments….the world found it inconceivable 
that Pakistan was sponsoring simultaneously a peace offensive in Lahore as it was 
furthering a military offensive along the LoC.”37  
News of the Kargil conflict dented all optimism and confirmed the worst fears of 
Western policy makers. “[It] indicated to the outside world that there is a high risk of 
                                              
36 The South Asian rivalry qualified as a prototype of a high risk case according to most pessimist 
literature. India and Pakistan were involved in a deeply emotive rivalry and had a history of crises 
and conflicts, Kashmir was still festering, the conventionally inferior party was revisionist and 
thus could plausibly bank on its nuclear capability readily, it was dominated by a military 
establishment with a history of risk taking and pathological hatred towards India, the rivals were 
geographically contiguous and thus the chances of uninformed and hasty decisions in the fog of 
war were high, both sides had nascent and unpredictable capabilities which the outside world 
knew little about, there was no information about the safety and security protocols but the 
tradition of lax security cultures in South Asia was well known, the antagonists had no experience 
of managing declared arsenals, and hardly any bilateral crisis prevention or management 
mechanisms were in place. 
37 Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Kent L. Biringer, “Preventing Another India-Pakistan War: Enhancing 
Stability Along the Border,” Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Paper, SAND 98-0505, 
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, October, 2000, 17.  
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nuclear conflict in the subcontinent”38 and forced the U.S. and other international actors 
to react instantly. Fixated on the nuclear issue, their involvement in Kargil was solely 
driven by the desire to ensure that the crisis did not result in a nuclear catastrophe.  
 
III. AS THE KARGIL CONFLICT UNFOLDED: CLASSIC NUCLEAR 
CRISIS BEHAVIOR VERSUS BROKERED BARGAINING 
The Kargil conflict has been examined in literature as a classic ‘limited war’ 
whereby the objectives of the war and its geographical scope are limited, use of military 
force is restricted in quantum and type, targets are chosen selectively, there is only 
fractional commitment of the resources available to the belligerents, and the fundamental 
patterns of existence of the antagonists are not under serious threat.39 Kargil fits each of 
these parameters neatly. Pakistan and India employed military force and undertook force 
demonstrations and signaling to achieve localized territorial objectives. Simultaneously, 
they showed utmost restraint to keep the conflict limited to the remote Kargil region. The 
situation never developed into a full-fledged war despite the absence of any robust 
bilateral mechanisms for war limitation and escalation control.  
                                              
38 Jones, "Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia," 38.  
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of Chicago Press, 1957), 1-2. 
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The following section examines the Kargil conflict in this light, explicating on 
Pakistani and Indian efforts to fight a limited war with use of force while also exhibiting 
prudence to buffer against unwarranted escalation. After evaluating conflict behavior in 
this classic bilateral framework, the discussion introduces the third party factor to analyze 
its impact on the crisis and to examine the role of brokered bargaining in explaining crisis 
behavior and outcomes.  
1. Kargil: A Classic Limited War? 
A. Pakistan’s Attempt at Land Grab 
The planners of the Kargil operation had authorized the intrusion across the LoC 
with extremely limited territorial goals in mind. Pakistan sought to grab key peaks 
overlooking National Highway 1A in the Kargil region and apply the ‘finder’s keepers’ 
rule to the unattended heights.40 As seen by India, this was a “typical case of salami 
slicing” whereby Pakistan tried to achieve small territorial gains not significant enough to 
push India into a general war.41  
Pakistani intrusions entailed groups of 30-40 men occupying various points along 
ridge lines to control dominating heights.42 Approximately 250 men intruded into the 
Batalik sector; about 100 into Kaksar; close to 250 into Dras; and about 250-300 into 
Mushkoh.43 By May 15, 1999, the Pakistani personnel had occupied about 800 square 
kilometers.44 The penetration was far deeper than the routine infringements on the LoC 
                                              
40 Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 42.  
41 Government of India, From Surprise to Reckoning, 242. 
42 Dixit, “A Defining Moment,” 193. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line Of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 91.  
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by both sides that had been going on for years but it was still inconsequential as far as 
any threat to either country’s heartland was concerned. Interestingly however, the size of 
the penetration signified a massive overreach in comparison to the original plan. As 
devised, the Kargil operation only sought to capture 25 to 30 posts in a much smaller 
swath of territory near the LoC.45 But “mission creep” had set in:46 upon finding a large 
area vacant and facing no resistance, the intruders felt compelled to keep pushing forward, 
thereby overstretching themselves.  
Pakistan’s crisis behavior was directly impacted not only by its strategic 
considerations and immediate crisis objectives but also by the internal discord between 
the civilian and military leadership that left the two at odds on the wisdom of the Kargil 
operation. The operation was planned by a small group of army officers led by the Army 
Chief Parvez Musharraf.47 Fifteen years later, there is still controversy on just how 
transparent the Pakistani military leadership was in sharing the scope of the Kargil 
operation with the country’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif. Most likely, the operation 
was presented as a mere intensification of cross-LoC infiltration that had become routine 
over the years.48 Throughout the crisis, the military continued to present the operation’s 
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46 Ibid. 
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progress in an extremely upbeat manner, convincing the Prime Minister for the first 
month of the crisis that the intrusion had made it impossible for the Indians to evict 
Pakistani troops.49  It was only in mid-June when the Indians began gaining ground in 
Kargil and a string of press reports confirmed the turning tide that the mood in Islamabad 
changed. Prime Minister Sharif began distrusting Musharraf and his team who were still 
painting a rosy picture. The Prime Minister, who less than a month ago was asking his 
army chief if the intrusion “will …. eventually lead to Srinagar?,”50 now confirmed his 
changed outlook in a June 13 remark to his Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz: “Musharraf has 
landed us in a terrible mess, but we have to find a way to get out of this impossible 
situation.”51 Pakistan’s demeanor and crisis management approach shifted abruptly after 
this point as it actively explored the diplomatic route to end the crisis while preserving as 
much of its original objective as possible in the process. 
(i) Pakistan’s Military and non-Military Approach in the Bilateral Context 
Pakistan’s military activity during Kargil amounted to a brinkmanship exercise.52 
It was concentrated on the Indian side of the LoC. While military movements and 
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51 Ibid., 274. 
52 Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in 
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preparations were also undertaken beyond the Kargil region, this was merely an effort at 
force demonstration and was fairly limited in nature.  
Pakistan chose to undertake the Kargil operation while retaining plausible 
deniability as far as its direct involvement in the crisis was concerned. It portrayed the 
intrusion as the work of freelance Mujahedeen who had been fighting Indian control of 
Kashmir for nearly a decade.53 The Mujahedeen cover story was to allow Pakistan to 
escape the obvious duplicity in conducting diplomatic parlays at Lahore while 
simultaneously planning a land grab operation.54 Equally important, the Mujahedeen 
façade sought to sow confusion among Indian military ranks and thereby delay their 
counter-moves. It seemed to have worked in as much as it took the Indian military nearly 
three weeks to determine the true extent and nature of the Pakistan intrusion. Between 
May 5, 1999 when the first Indian patrol was dispatched to tackle the intruders and May 
25, India had lost over 50 soldiers.55  
Pakistan’s honeymoon period ended shortly after the Indian leadership decided to 
vertically escalate the crisis in the backdrop of its initial failures.  The Indian Air Force 
(IAF) combined with massive ground reinforcements were engaged from May 25 
onwards. This surprised Pakistanis who had not envisioned such a heavy handed 
response;56 indeed, introduction of air power was rather unprecedented for a remote 
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region along the LoC in what Pakistan still wished to conceive as ‘peace time.’57 After 
initial successes that led to India losing three aircraft within the first week of its air 
campaign, Pakistani fortunes began dwindling in the face of relentless Indian artillery and 
air assaults. While the Pakistani intruders managed to hold off the Indians for another 
fortnight without suffering any major losses despite bitter fighting, the tide began to shift 
in India’s favor after its first major victory in the Tololing Complex in the Dras sector on 
June 13.58 Within three weeks, India had reclaimed virtually all critical peaks that gave 
Pakistan the capability to interdict National Highway 1A with relative ease. As the 
ground situation shifted, the Pakistani Prime Minister looked for a way out. After 
exploring and utilizing various diplomatic options to gain support, he announced 
withdrawal of Pakistani forces on July 12, 1999. The first batch of intruders pulled out on 
July 14.59 
Pakistani behavior at Kargil further reinforces the claim that the operation 
planners had a very limited probe in mind and had not thought through its escalation 
potential. They were neither interested in climbing the escalation ladder nor prepared for 
it (thus the earlier reference to Pakistanis conceiving the situation as ‘peace time’). 
Pakistan did not reinforce its intrusion with personnel or fresh supplies. Instead, the 
Pakistani military effectively abandoned its men once the IAF was introduced into the 
mix. Only sparing artillery cover was provided at times. Moreover, while Pakistan did put 
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its air force on alert, it was never authorized to engage in combat, not even from a 
distance. As Air Commodore Jasjit Singh notes, “the PAF mounted patrols on an ongoing 
basis, but prudently preferred discretion…and did not attempt to challenge the IAF.”60 
Without a doubt, this was a conscious decision and was aimed at keeping the crisis from 
escalating.  
Pakistan exhibited restraint outside the Kargil region as well. The Pakistani 
military activated its second and third lines of defense – including moving armor units – 
on the international border61 days after the IAF was introduced and Indian troops and 
equipment were seen moving towards the Rajasthan border as part of India’s wider 
mobilization. However, Pakistani strike corps never made any decisive movements and 
no full-scale mobilization was ordered at any point during the crisis.62 Moreover, as the 
Indian navy mobilized in the Arabian sea, Pakistan’s Navy remained defensive and asked 
all its units to keep clear of Indian ships.63  
Though denied by Pakistan, nuclear weapons were alleged to be part of Pakistan’s 
military movements. U.S. sources reported intelligence towards the end of June 
indicating that Pakistan was moving nuclear missiles and preparing them for mating with 
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their delivery systems.64 The facts have never been ascertained but what is clear is that if 
such movement did take place, it had no impact on the military dimension of the crisis. 
Indian sources never received this information at the time. The Indian military was only 
aware of some movement in the Tilla Ranges area in Pakistan at the height of the crisis in 
June but these were modest enough that they only prompted India to “take some 
protective measures.”65 While Pakistan’s nuclear capability was never in doubt, as far as 
the official Indian calculation was concerned, it never saw an imminent nuclear threat 
during the Kargil crisis.  
Combined with use of force and force demonstrations, the Pakistani leadership 
resorted to frequent signaling, including nuclear rhetoric. These signals had three 
defining characteristics: a constant attempt to keep the Mujahedeen cover by denying 
direct involvement in the intrusion; offensive and deterrent threats; and an effort to 
present India as the party resorting to excessive force.  
The initial period of the crisis witnessed the most intense signaling aimed at 
portraying India as the ‘aggressor.’ This lasted till the Pakistanis enjoyed superiority in 
the battlefield. Pakistan continued to threaten a “befitting response to India, if New Delhi 
launched any misadventure at the Line of Control.”66 Once the IAF began operations, 
Pakistan criticized India for excessive use of force and for breaching international 
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frontiers during this period. It denounced the IAF strikes as “very, very serious”67 and 
blamed India for dropping bombs on the Pakistani side of the LoC.68 The Pakistani Prime 
Minister, taken in by the military’s upbeat briefings, remained defiant during this period 
as well.  
Pakistani policy makers also issued a slew of deterrent threats in the last week of 
May, with the most categorical resolve signal coming Pakistani Foreign Secretary 
Shamshad Ahmad on May 31. He let it be known that Pakistan “will not hesitate to use 
any weapon in our [its] arsenal to defend our [its] territorial integrity.”69 Although 
Pakistan denied the statement the following day, both the statement and the denial were 
likely deliberate and planned as such. During this period, Pakistan was seriously 
concerned about possible Indian ‘hot pursuits’ in Pakistani Kashmir.70 The signals would 
have been intended to thwart that possibility by putting the Indian military on notice. 
Moreover, with Pakistan doing well militarily, the signalers may have seen sabre rattling 
as a means of reinforcing Pakistan’s resolve and forcing India to the negotiating table. 
Pakistan’s nuclear First-Use policy also meant that its resolve signals fit neatly with its 
doctrine of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in case of fear of a decisive 
conventional defeat at India’s hands. Pakistani leaders may also have felt that their tactics 
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were working given that India had hinted at a safe passage for Pakistani intruders around 
this time.71 
Pakistan’s signaling then tapered off considerably even though violence continued 
to escalate in June. Conventional threats were made but not with the same intensity. 
Deterrent threats only returned in the second half of June. Perhaps triggered by the fact 
that India had activated and mobilized all three of its services and escalation seemed 
imminent, Pakistan let out a string of fresh signals in the hope of forcing restraint on 
India, with its Prime Minister threatening to use the “ultimate weapon” and warning of 
“irreparable losses” if India crossed the LoC.72 Interestingly, this was a time when Sharif 
was convinced that “India was getting ready to launch a full-scale military operation 
against Pakistan.”73 Ghani (2012) believes that Pakistan’s deterrent threats ended up 
impacting Indian thinking and encouraging restraint.74  
Pakistan broached one other non-military avenue during the crisis: it activated the 
bilateral diplomatic channel with India, seeking cessation of hostilities followed by talks. 
The hope would have been to leave Pakistan in possession of some of the strategic 
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heights and negotiate Kashmir from a position of strength. The two Prime Ministers 
spoke at least four times during the crisis. Pakistan twice proposed a meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers amidst vertical escalation of the crisis in late-May and again on June 8. 
The Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz ultimately visited New Delhi on June 11. It 
turned out to be a huge embarrassment as a day prior to Aziz’s arrival, India released 
secretly recorded tapes of two conversations between Army Chief Musharraf and his 
Chief of General Staff, General Aziz from May 26 and 29 which left little doubt that the 
Pakistani military had directly planned and executed the Kargil operation.75 This blew 
Pakistan’s Mujahedeen cover completely. Sartaj Aziz’s plea in India for a cease-fire 
followed by negotiations on the status of the LoC now seemed comical and “so totally 
irrelevant” in the face of unflinching evidence of Pakistani involvement in the 
operation.76 On June 13, a day after Aziz’s visit ended, Sharif called Vajpayee again, 
reiterating the need to end the crisis peacefully.77  
The failure of these formal parlays led Sharif to look towards quiet diplomacy to 
produce an acceptable outcome. The backchannel on Kashmir initiated by the two Prime 
Ministers immediately after the Lahore Declaration came in handy. Indian lead R. K. 
Mishra and his Pakistani counterpart Niaz A. Naik were roped in when the threat of 
escalation seemed real in the middle of June.78 Pakistan’s demeanor over the next two 
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weeks was interesting: deterrent threats were being issued in public at the same time that 
intense backchannel diplomacy was being conducted to find a way out of the crisis. To 
the Pakistani leadership’s mind, both were reducing the chances of an expansion of the 
conflict, a development they were desperate to avoid. 
Conducted in great secrecy, the backchannel engagement finally led to an in-
principle understanding on immediately ending the conflict. The Pakistanis were to end 
fighting and both sides were to return to the path outlined in the Lahore Declaration. 
Optics of how the deal would be publicized were crucial to ensure that neither side came 
across as having succumbed to the other. The plan was for the Pakistani Prime Minister, 
scheduled to visit China and Hong Kong from June 27 on a six day trip, to fly over India 
and send a goodwill message to his Indian counterpart en route. Vajpayee was to invite 
Sharif to make a ‘technical stop over’ in India in response. This would have set the scene 
for a brief bilateral meeting and an announcement that would have effectively brought an 
end to the Kargil episode.79 The plan never materialized as India pulled out at the last 
minute.80  
With battlefield losses mounting and no breakthrough on the bilateral diplomatic 
front, Pakistan agreed to withdraw soon thereafter. The Pakistani and Indian Director 
General of Military Operations (DGMOs) met on July 11 and reached an understanding 
on a phased withdrawal from Kargil to be completed by July 16.81  
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Pakistan’s attempt at land grab at Kargil and its effort to compel India to negotiate 
from a position of weakness failed miserably. Musharraf and his team miscalculated the 
Indian response to their intrusion and were subsequently not prepared to deal with an 
escalated conflict. Pakistan therefore showed utmost restraint and refrained from backing 
the intruders or opening up new fronts along the LoC or the international border. It used 
aggressive signaling to convey its political resolve and deterrent credibility but that too 
was seen as a means of preventing an Indian horizontal escalation of the conflict. 
Ultimately, the fighting remained limited but Pakistan was the clear loser.  
B. India’s Success at Compellence 
India took close to three weeks to ascertain the severity of the challenge posed by 
the Pakistani intruders. During this period, the default explanation for the unexpected 
presence of men atop the strategic heights in the Kargil region was heavier than usual 
cross-LoC militant infiltration from the Pakistani side.82 Defense Minister George 
Fernandez later reflected: “The Kargil incursions caught India totally unawares.” “At first 
the incursions seemed small, and the army thought that they could easily handle it. And 
they told the government that it was small. The size of the problem emerged only two 
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weeks later.”83 Army Chief V. P. Malik is perhaps more accurate in his assertion that “the 
fog of war remained thick till the end of May 1999.”84  
India’s response to Pakistan’s intrusion was also an exercise in compellence. It 
sought to evict the Pakistani intruders and persisted with its demand for complete 
Pakistani withdrawal to achieve this. Its response can be broken down into three phases. 
The first phase ran from May 3 to May 25 and featured piecemeal efforts to dislodge the 
intruders.85 The second ran from this point to mid-June when the Indian military, despite 
using excessive force in the conflict area, failed to make any significant headway. The 
third phase proceeded from mid-June till the end of the crisis in late-July and proved to 
be definitive in determining Kargil’s outcome in India’s favor.  
Military operations only began in earnest after the IAF was deployed on May 25.  
Decided after some deliberation and delay and not without caution from India’s Air Chief 
that New Delhi “should be well prepared to anticipate the expansion of war beyond 
Jammu and Kashmir,”86 the orders to the armed forces were to “take any action necessary 
to evict the invaders.”87 However, the IAF was strictly told not to cross the LoC.88 It was 
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the IAF that proved to be the deciding factor in the Indian response. Pakistan had not 
contemplated Indian use of air power in its crisis planning and was thus left checkmated. 
By the time this highly successful air campaign was over, “Operation Safed Sagar” had 
conducted nearly 5,000 sorties including 1,200 air strikes, reconnaissance, search and 
destroy missions, escort missions, and close air support tasks.89  
In the second and third phases, India also undertook broader mobilization along 
the international border. The Indian military maneuvering was quite obviously meant to 
signal its preparation and resolve to expand the conflict if necessary despite the presence 
of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Classic compellence was at play. As early as late-May, 
“elements of the Indian army’s main offensive ‘strike force’ were loading tanks, artillery, 
and other heavy equipment onto flatbed rail cars.”90 “Armored units intended for 
offensive use were leaving their garrisons in Rajasthan….and preparing to move.”91 By 
late-June, Indian “mechanized and artillery divisions advanced to forward positions…..” 
along the international border and the LoC.92 Trains continued transporting tanks and 
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ammunition towards the Rajasthan border.93 More than 19,000 tons of ammunition was 
moved in total. 94 All personnel leaves were also cancelled. Moreover, India had also 
activated its navy, undertaking the largest amassing of naval ships ever in the region.95 
Even though India did not move its strike corps and mechanized units into final 
attack positions, the Indian Army’s mobilization could easily have been taken as a 
precursor of horizontal escalation. Indeed, it was clear that India had seriously 
contemplated attacking across the international border. On June 18, Army Chief V. P. 
Malik had told his commanders to “be prepared for escalation – sudden or gradual – 
along the LoC or the international border and be prepared to go to (declared) war at short 
notice.”96 He explains, “my instructions....were that our forces should be deployed and 
maintained in such a state of readiness so that, given six days’ notice, we should be in a 
position to launch an offensive anywhere across the international border or the LoC.”97  
Despite the vertical escalation in the Kargil region and force demonstrations along 
the international and maritime border, Pakistan remained defiant in the second phase. The 
Indian response failed to bag any major battlefield successes till mid-June. On June 13, it 
finally captured Point 4590 north of Tololing; this was the closest point overlooking the 
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National Highway 1A and allowed interdiction of the route with small arms.98 Control of 
key heights in the Tololing complex gave India a foothold inside Pakistan’s linear 
defenses.99 From here on, major Points began to fall to India but not without bitter 
fighting that continued throughout June. Other important heights reclaimed included 
Point 5140 in Dras on June 20; Point 5203 in Batalik on June 22; strategic peaks Three 
Pimples and Point 4700 in Dras on June 28; the all-important Tiger Hill in Dras and Point 
4875 in Mushkoh on July 4; and Khalubar on July 6.100 The capture of Tiger Hill is what 
finally broke the back of Pakistani intruders. The peak was highly strategic given the ease 
with which Highway IA could be interdicted from here. Victories continued to flow in 
the following week as India remained firm on its demand of complete Pakistani 
withdrawal. Pakistan agreed to withdraw shortly thereafter. On July 26, the Indian 
DGMO announced that all intruders had been evicted.101  
Like Pakistan, information also surfaced about Indian nuclear missile movements 
during Kargil, but a year or so after the crisis was over. Well-known Indian journalist Raj 
Chengappa (2000) claimed that India “activated all its three types of nuclear delivery 
vehicles and kept them at….Readiness State 3 – meaning that some bombs would be 
ready to be mated with the delivery vehicle at short notice.”102  This account has never 
been fully corroborated. More importantly, Pakistan had no information about any 
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nuclear movements during the crisis and thus, even if they did take place, they would 
have had no bearing on the crisis dynamics.103  
 Indian military actions during Kargil were supplemented by signaling that sought 
to balance resolve and prudence. Much like its use of military force, its rhetoric also 
hardened as the crisis progressed. Overall however, Indian signaling, especially 
statements involving mention of nuclear weapons, were far more measured than 
Pakistan’s.  
In the early stages, even as the Indian establishment began to realize that the scale 
of the intrusion was unusual, it sought to avoid creating panic and giving the international 
community an excuse to intervene in the crisis. The tone began to harden only after more 
information about the nature of the intrusion and the involvement of official Pakistani 
personnel filtered in. An Indian official hinted at the possibility of a stern military 
response to the intrusion on May 21, the day India received air surveillance information 
on the extent of Pakistan’s intrusion.104 He said: “If the Pakistanis are aiding and abetting 
the alteration of the LoC, there is no reason for us to let it be a localized issue. We too 
can make gains on the LoC and we may well exercise that option.”105 This was to become 
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a constant feature of Indian signaling throughout the crisis. Indian officials projected 
maturity and restraint but simultaneously warned that the option to cross into Pakistani-
controlled territory across the LoC and the international border remained open.106 The 
frequency of these messages increased in June as the level of fighting escalated and 
Indian mobilization along the international border began to take shape. A fair amount of 
chest thumping, aimed at signaling India’s firmness in seeking nothing short of Pakistani 
withdrawal was on display once India had acquired the upper hand in the crisis.  
As for nuclear signaling, India was markedly restrained during the Kargil crisis. 
Interestingly, even though some Indians considered Pakistani signals as “not so veiled 
threats”107 to employ nuclear weapons, there seems to have been a conscious decision on 
the Indian side to convey prudence. As Tellis, Fair, and Medby (2001) point out, India 
saw Pakistan’s strategy as “exploiting its nuclear capabilities to underwrite limited 
conflicts.”108 This would have prompted New Delhi to exhibit restraint in its signaling 
behavior.109  
The only Pakistani signal that received a disproportionally strong response from 
India was Raja Zafarul Haq’s resolve signal at the end of June in which he suggested that 
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Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if imperative for its security.110 Prime 
Minister Vajpayee responded with a threat of his own. However, consistent with the 
pattern of Indian messaging throughout the crisis, Vajpayee also emphasized Indian 
restraint while hinting that this could not be taken for granted.111  Defense Minister 
George Fernandez stated that the threat of full-fledged nuclear war “should not be taken 
frivolously and that the country was prepared for any eventuality.”112 NSA and Principal 
Secretary to the Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra, while reiterating India’s No First Use 
pledge said that India will use nuclear weapons if “some lunatic tries to do something 
against us.”113  
Finally, in terms of direct bilateral contacts, India’s response to Pakistan’s efforts 
to initiate talks was firm and unflinching: talks would only center on Pakistan’s 
withdrawal and not on the broader Kashmir question.  When Prime Minister Vajpayee 
agreed to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz’s June 11 visit for instance, he made this 
stance public in a formal address to the nation: “I do want to make it plain: if the 
stratagem now is that the intrusion should be used to alter the Line of Control through 
talks, the proposed talks will end before they have begun.”114 During Aziz’s visit, India 
pointedly made its demands to the Pakistani Foreign Minister: immediate withdrawal; 
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reaffirmation of validity of the LoC; abandonment of cross-border ‘terrorism;’ 
dismantling of militant infrastructure in Pakistani Kashmir; and reaffirmation of the 
Simla and Lahore agreements.115 It stuck to this position for the rest of the crisis.  
 Then came the backchannel. Reasons behind its failure are a matter of much 
debate. Indian lead R. K. Mishra’s June 25 visit to Islamabad as part of the backchannel 
negotiations proved to be consequential. He came with a blunt message for Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif: India and Pakistan were “one inch away from war.”116 Whether 
they were at the time – the overall atmosphere did suggest that escalation was a real 
threat –, this was a clear signal of India’s willingness to up the ante. The signal worked. 
The Pakistani Prime Minister immediately outlined a crisis termination plan to be 
conveyed to his Indian counterpart. The plan entailed an end to the fighting in Kargil – 
effectively a Pakistani withdrawal – and a return to the understanding reached at Lahore 
that prized diplomatic solutions to all problems, including Kashmir.117 The next two days 
saw a flurry of backchannel engagement that finally led to the in-principle understanding 
on crisis termination. The plan was however leaked to the Press Trust of India, forcing 
the Indian government to disavow any talks with Pakistan without prior commitment to 
unilateral withdrawal. Indians blamed Pakistani sources for the leak.118  Some respected 
journalists on both sides however maintain that hawkish elements within the Indian 
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establishment who did not wish to let Pakistan escape without being branded as the clear 
loser may have been to blame.119  
India’s overall demeanor in the crisis backed its goal to ‘win’ the limited war by 
compelling Pakistan to reverse its intrusion. It imposed ruthless punishment on Pakistan 
in the zone of conflict and threatened horizontal expansion in case Pakistan did not undo 
the incursion. While this aspect of Indian behavior amounted to classic brinkmanship, it 
simultaneously exercised restraint when it came to crossing the LoC or the international 
border. The military mobilization along the international border ended up being an 
exercise in force demonstration. New Delhi also balanced resolve and prudence in its 
signaling. It conveyed utmost resolve to cross into Pakistani territory if needed but also 
signaled calm, giving Pakistan the space to retract and thus forego escalation. It also 
studiously shied away from belligerent deterrent threats, perhaps to avoid giving Pakistan 
the excuse to portray the crisis as heading towards nuclear escalation. Ultimately, India’s 
compellence strategy proved successful as Pakistan retreated, with little to show for its 
effort.   
2. Enter the Third Party: Brokered Bargaining at Play 
This section will introduce the role of the third party and recast developments in 
the crisis in light of our three-cornered bargaining framework. In doing so, it will 
establish that the traditional nuclear crisis behavior lens applied in the foregoing 
discussion only provides partial, and often misleading, insights into the processes that 
shaped crisis behavior. A more accurate depiction of the mechanisms driving behavior 
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and the crisis’s progression is to be found in the process of interaction between India, 
Pakistan, and the ‘third party’ – led by the U.S and backed by virtually all global powers. 
The third party’s role was internalized before the onset of the crisis, during the 
confrontation, and in the crisis termination phase.  
A. Centrality of the Third Party in Pakistan’s Calculus 
The third party was central to Pakistan’s Kargil operation. It lay at the heart of its 
conceptualization and planning of the crisis. Tellis (2001) notes: “Pakistan’s military 
operations at Kargil may well have focused at least as much on precipitating international 
intervention in support of its claims over Kashmir as they did on securing marginal pieces 
of Indian territory.”120 Indeed, factoring in the third party dimension, Kargil can be 
viewed as a classic demonstration crisis aimed at focusing the world’s attention on the 
Kashmir dispute and pressuring India via third parties to agree to a compromise solution.  
Shekhar Gupta (1999) sums up what Pakistan wanted to convey to the world be 
perpetrating the crisis: “We are fighting over Kashmir, the conflict can widen, this is a 
likely nuclear flash-point, so please intervene.”121 To achieve this, Pakistan not only 
required international attention, but it also wanted the third party to be sympathetic to its 
cause. Positive evaluation from the third party was a prerequisite for Pakistan to have any 
hope of achieving its goals. Meanwhile, Pakistani planners seemed to have banked on 
quick international intervention in reaction to its intrusion as an insurance policy against 
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an all-out Indian offensive.122 The logic: India would not act forcefully when the 
international eye was fixated on its response. This was one major reason Pakistan never 
contemplated preparing for India’s vertical and horizontal escalation.  
Pakistan’s Mujahedeen cover story also had much more to it than its earlier-
discussed tactical dimension of confusing the Indian military. An equally important 
interest was to further the goal of positive evaluation. To gain international sympathy, 
Pakistan could neither have come across as a hypocrite that undertook the Lahore parlays 
while plotting a limited war nor as the willful violator of bilateral accords like the Simla 
Agreement which prohibit violation of the LoC.123 Its concern for the third party’s 
outlook meant that the Mujahedeen cover had to be maintained even after its utility in 
causing confusion among Indian ranks was exhausted. Even more significant, keeping the 
Mujahedeen story going  forced Pakistan to abandon its forces rather than engaging the 
Indian offensive with its own vertical escalation within the Kargil region.   
Pakistan failed miserably in convincing the world of its innocence. Its stance was 
not taken seriously by any third party actor.124 According to one account, the U.S. knew 
“almost at the beginning” that Pakistani regulars were involved in Kargil.125 As Pakistan 
continued to deny its involvement, terming its direct role in the intrusion as an 
“unfounded charge,”126 it dented its own credibility and reassured the world, not only of 
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its culpability but also its duplicity. The global perception hardened as the crisis 
progressed. Pakistani officials regularly confronted pointed questions and allegations 
about their state’s role in Kargil.  
 If there was still any doubt left about Pakistani involvement by the second week 
of June, India’s release of the transcripts of the Musharraf-General Aziz conversation on 
the eve of Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz’s visit to New Delhi removed it. 
Pakistan was condemned by all Western capitals in unisons after this point; their demand 
was a Pakistani pullout from Kargil. Rather comically though, the Pakistani Foreign 
Minister stuck to the official line, contending even after this humiliation that Pakistan had 
“no troops in Held Kashmir” and that the militants were “not under our [Pakistani] 
control.”127 The Foreign Minister and the Pakistani public diplomacy machinery knew the 
absurdity of their position. Having banked on this ploy to obtain positive evaluation 
however, a formal public admission of guilt at this late stage was deemed to be even 
more damaging to its crisis objectives.128  
If guising its involvement was one Pakistani ploy to gain support from third 
parties, its attempts to portray India in a negative light and itself as the peace-aspiring 
party was another. Fundamentally, Pakistan wanted that “India’s adverse possessions” at 
Siachen (and elsewhere) “should be looked at” keenly by the world.129 In a classic 
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display of threat manipulation, Pakistan presented India’s aggression as raising the 
prospects for escalation of the crisis. Proactive Pakistani denouncements of the IAF’s 
induction, threats to retaliate in case of any air space violations, as well as the deterrent 
threats rampant during the last week of May also served a dual purpose: to signal resolve 
to India and to manipulate the risk of war for the third party actors to take note of India’s 
‘excessive’ use of force in the Kargil region. The Pakistani Foreign Secretary’s deterrent 
threat on May 31 which essentially hinted at a lowered nuclear threshold130 is one good 
example of a resolve signal partly designed to attract the international community’s 
attention to intervene diplomatically. Pakistan’s second burst of aggressive signaling 
from the third week of June till the end of the month was also designed – in addition to 
putting India on notice – to signal the danger of escalation to the world. Along with 
conventional and deterrent threats in this period, the Pakistani civilian and military top 
brass decided to inform the world that Pakistan may resort to the “ultimate option” if 
India breached the international border.131 Although the fact that most Pakistani resolve 
signals came in response to India’s conventional buildup cannot be discounted,132 it is 
also clear that this messaging simultaneously sought to attract the international 
community’s attention.  
Another major aspect of Pakistan’s strategy during Kargil was its direct outreach 
to the international community to seek intervention in the crisis, and mediation on the 
Kashmir issue more generally. The volume, frequency and emphasis of Pakistani 
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statements calling for direct foreign engagement leave no doubt of the centrality of this 
element of Pakistan’s plan. While these pleas continued from the very outset, including 
formal requests for “the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 
to send its observers” and for U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to send a special 
representative,133 calls to the international community took a new life after mid-June 
when Prime Minister Sharif began to sense trouble. Interestingly, his immediate concern 
around this time was not driven by the battlefield situation nearly as much as the 
foregoing discussion conducted within the bilateral framework suggested. When Sharif 
remarked to his Foreign Minister that Pakistan was “in a terrible mess,” he was not even 
aware of India’s first major victory in Tololing.134 His comment was triggered by the 
growing international pressure and condemnation he had been facing for days. It was also 
the Pakistani Prime Minister’s concern about the international mood that prompted him to 
actively seek out countries like the U.S., China, Russia, friendly Muslim states, and 
forums such as the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)135 in addition to activating 
the bilateral backchannel in the latter half of June.  
(i) The Game Changers: Pakistan’s Engagement with the U.S. and China 
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The single most important third party actor at Kargil was the U.S. The Pakistani 
and U.S. leaderships were constantly in touch, both through private and public channels. 
Till mid-June, while Pakistan remained congenial in its messaging, Sharif continued to 
retain strategic autonomy by defying Washington’s plea for withdrawal. Simultaneously, 
he persisted with attempts to seek U.S. President Clinton’s support. Pakistan even 
complained of U.S. bias in India’s favor and on occasion also sought to embarrass the 
U.S. publicly by suggesting that its partisan approach (as Pakistan presented it) was 
making Indian leaders inflexible and confident about expanding the war. Similar 
messages were also passed on to the Group of Eight (G-8) countries136 who were both 
asked to help in the resolution of Kashmir and to avoid taking a view of the crisis that 
provided India space to justify escalation.    
Pakistani diplomatic outreach changed tact after mid-June and intensified efforts 
to seek U.S. intercession. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed a meeting 
with President Clinton in Europe in mid-June on the sidelines of a G-8 summit in 
Cologne, Germany. After an initial agreement, the U.S. deferred the request. Sharif then 
wrote a letter to Clinton about “meeting with the conditions that India had laid down.”137 
This was the first sign of a softened Pakistani position. Within a week, President Clinton 
dispatched Central Command (CENTCOM) chief General Anthony Zinni and State 
Department official Gibson Lanpher to Pakistan to convince Sharif and Musharraf to 
withdraw. Even though their trip coincided with the second burst of Pakistan’s aggressive 
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nuclear signaling and its emphasis on its resolve to fight back against any expanded 
Indian offensive – these signals in themselves partly directed to put the international 
community, and specifically these U.S. visitors on guard –, General Zinni’s hard talk is 
believed to have softened up his Pakistani interlocutors. When General Zinni met Army 
Chief Musharraf on June 24, the latter seemed amenable to working out a face-saver that 
would allow his forces to withdraw. Musharraf is even believed to have asked Zinni to 
offer what rationale he could use to order withdrawal of his forces.138 The two reportedly 
also discussed the mechanics of a negotiated withdrawal in some detail.139 General Zinni 
reports that Musharraf also encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to “hear me [Zinni] out.”140  
Interestingly, the Pakistani and U.S. teams ended their discussions with very 
different conclusions of what was agreed. While Zinni believed that Pakistan had agreed 
to withdraw, the Pakistani side thought they had left open the space to negotiate the terms 
for crisis termination but that they had nonetheless secured a promise of a Sharif-Clinton 
meeting to finalize the deal.141 Regardless, the Zinni mission had caused a rethink in the 
Pakistani camp. It was no coincidence that Musharraf used the word “withdrawal” 
publicly for the first time – even though he rejected the idea of a unilateral withdrawal – 
immediately after Zinni’s mission.142  
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As Pakistan worked on the bilateral and U.S. options from mid-June onwards, it 
also sought to reach out to its time-trusted ally, China. It banked solely on direct pleas (as 
opposed to threat manipulation) and played up the historic Chinese support for Pakistan’s 
stance on Kashmir to get Beijing’s sympathy. The Chinese message was categorical: end 
the crisis peacefully and bilaterally.143 This is what General Musharraf was told when he 
visited China in the last week of May.144 And this is precisely what the Chinese Foreign 
Minister conveyed to Sartaj Aziz who went on an unscheduled one-day trip to China to 
garner support before his fateful June 11 visit to New Delhi.145 Prime Minister Sharif 
made a last ditch effort to woo Beijing during his visit at the end of June. The Chinese 
leadership did not budge. Shocked, disappointed and desperate –also because the bilateral 
backchannel had collapsed by this time –, Sharif cut short his trip and returned home on 
July 1 to focus on the only remaining opening: Washington.146  
Crisis termination at Kargil is directly owed to U.S. diplomacy. Out of options 
and facing a politically suicidal unilateral withdrawal, Sharif traveled to Washington 
literally “on a wing and a prayer.”147 The ‘Blair House’ meeting in Washington on July 4 
was a classic display of successful manipulative mediation from the Clinton team.148 
                                                                                                                                      
the Prime Minister’s decision. We will not withdraw unilaterally.” “No Unilateral Withdrawal 
from Kargil: Pak,” Rediff, June 26, 1999, http://in.rediff.com/news/1999/jun/26mush.htm. 
143 Kapil Kak, “International Responses,” in Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir, 
ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 201. 
144 Hagerty, “The Kargil War,” 105.  
145 Ibid. 
146 Siddique-ul-Farooque, Kargil: Adventure or Trap!, 47.  
147  Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 160. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad reported back to 
Washington that Sharif was “desperate” when he returned from China. Talbott, Engaging India, 
159.  
148 Bisaria, “Bill Clinton and the Kargil Conflict,” 22. 
177 
 
Sharif raised concerns about India’s inflexibility and violations in Kashmir and the need 
for the U.S. to play the role of an honest broker.149 Nothing worked; each Sharif attempt 
to get Clinton to back Pakistan’s stance was rebutted strongly. Ultimately, the Pakistani 
Prime Minister stood down and agreed to a withdrawal. He did extract a face saver in the 
shape of Clinton’s promise to take “personal interest” for resumption of India-Pakistan 
dialogue.150 The bottom line of the joint statement issued after the meeting however was 
unconditional Pakistani withdrawal.  
The Pakistani decision to withdraw merits a closer examination. It is clear that 
Pakistan was losing ground militarily to Indian forces and that the intruders would 
ultimately have been evicted. Mistry (2009) however rightly points out that fighting 
could have lingered on for a long time before India would have managed to affect total 
eviction.151 Owen Bennett Jones (2002) concurs: “The Pakistanis’ strength on the ground 
helps explain why so many in the military establishment resented the order to pull 
back.”152 Moreover, in terms of conflict expansion, Pakistan was arguably in a better 
position to defend itself at the end of June as additional forces deployed to the conflict 
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area had just begun to take position at that time.153 As Jones and McMillan (2009) argue, 
at the very least, the Sharif-Clinton Blair House meeting expedited an end to the crisis 
which would otherwise have lingered and cost many more lives before it ended.154 
Prime Minister Sharif’s decision to withdraw was especially bold given that it 
entailed high political costs. Throughout the crisis, the Pakistani state’s domestic 
messaging, largely parroting the military’s line, continued to present a positive picture of 
the on-ground situation in Kargil.155 Right-wing parties therefore denounced Sharif’s 
decision to pull out instantly and some circles declared him a traitor for letting down the 
military.156 Sharif was acutely aware of this political backlash and therefore explicitly 
stated his need to receive a face saver from the U.S. to keep his political power. He also 
confided in the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. about his concerns of losing power to the 
military upon his arrival in Washington for the Blair House meeting.157  
The immense international pressure and Pakistan’s growing isolation at Kargil 
weighed heavily in Sharif’s decision to order the pullout of Pakistani forces. Distrustful 
of his military and internally challenged, Sharif could ill-afford to face further 
international sanction. Clinton’s stern approach during the Blair House meeting must 
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have reinforced Sharif’s fears that Washington would tilt even more strongly in India’s 
favor if Pakistan remained defiant. Sharif may well have perceived Clinton’s firmness to 
be a threat of a ‘gang up’ against Pakistan. 
Incidentally, Sharif’s sensitivity to third party preferences would have been that 
much higher given Pakistan’s debilitated economic situation. The Pakistani Prime 
Minister had been informed by his advisors that even “if the multilateral agencies 
managed to withstand U.S. pressure [and] maintain their support for Pakistan, the Kargil 
hostilities have the potential to run the country’s foreign exchange reserves completely 
dry in the next three months.”158 In late-June, the U.S. had also threatened to force the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to withhold a much-needed $100 million loan to 
Pakistan pending at the time.159  
Sharif’s detractors saw his decision to pullout as an effort to unnecessarily 
appease the third party. Notwithstanding, Sharif chose to prioritize positive evaluation 
from his American interlocutors than to convey continuing resolve to India or to serve his 
domestic political constituency. This also explains his stopovers in London and Riyadh 
on the way back from the Blair House meeting where he managed to get the British and 
Saudi governments to back his decision to withdraw.160 To be sure, the Blair House 
meeting epitomized the propensity of one of the two conflicting parties to compromise on 
its decision making autonomy in favor of deference to third party preferences. 
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Notwithstanding, the Kargil crisis proved to be a military and diplomatic failure 
for Pakistan. Pakistan’s outlook was based on a number of flawed assumptions. The 
operation’s planners never addressed the inherent contradiction between perpetrating a 
demonstration crisis by using force under the nuclear umbrella and eliciting sympathetic 
international responses. Poor planning and preparation to win international support – 
most obviously the fact that the diplomatic corps was kept in the dark in the planning 
phase and thus had no outreach strategy in place – further dented any hope for 
Pakistan.161 As international pressure grew, Pakistan’s desire for strategic autonomy gave 
way to sensitivity to third party preferences. Pakistan ended the crisis condemned and 
isolated, with only a weak face saver offered by the July 4 Blair House meeting to hide 
behind.  
B. India’s Proactive Outreach to the World 
Notwithstanding its acceptance of a U.S. role in the 1990 ‘compound crisis’ (see 
chapter three), India’s traditional apathy for third party involvement on Kashmir was still 
intact when Kargil occurred. Therefore, its eagerness to harness international efforts to 
influence the outcome of the crisis surprised most. India adopted a dual approach, dealing 
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directly with Pakistan both through use of military force and dialogue and pursuing an 
“international strategy” aimed at eliciting favorable third party support.162 One newspaper 
aptly described India’s strategy as a “double act of war and diplomacy.”163 That said, 
even as the Indian policy enclave worked hard to outdo Pakistan’s effort to gain 
international backing and to use third party involvement to its advantage, the tension of 
this approach with its traditional stance was noticeable. Domestically,  New Delhi 
reiterated its non-negotiable preference for bilateralism.164 Initially, even the third parties 
seemed to sense Indian reluctance to allow them to engage in crisis diplomacy.165 Even 
those Indian voices that appreciated the benefits of India’s international engagement 
during Kargil warned the government of the thin line between an outside actor’s crisis 
diplomacy and mediation for dispute resolution.  
(i) Facets of India’s Third Party Engagement 
India’s third party interaction was a mirror image of Pakistan’s to a large extent. 
Unlike Pakistan however, New Delhi was able to convince the world of Pakistan’s 
“treachery” and duplicity and to portray it as the aggressor,166 thereby defeating 
Pakistan’s efforts to pin the blame on India. It also took advantage of Pakistan’s 
Mujahedeen cover and worked ardently to expose it. Although India had shared various 
pieces of evidence linking the intruders with the Pakistani state with the press and the 
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foreign diplomatic presence in New Delhi, its decision to go public with the Musharraf-
General Aziz tapes proved to be the game changer. Indian External Affairs Minister 
Jaswant Singh was candid in acknowledging that the rationale for releasing the tapes on 
the eve of Sartaj Aziz’s visit was to expose Pakistan’s duplicity to third party actors. He 
stated: “The making public of this evidence at this juncture, is to expose the Pakistani 
game plan to the entire world, to preempt any designs that Pakistan may be nurturing 
about obscuring the central issue of their involvement, complicity and continued support 
to an armed intrusion and aggression in which Pakistani regular troops are 
participating…..”167  
Simultaneously, India continued to stress its restraint. It couched its own vertical 
escalation in the Kargil region as a defensive response to Pakistan’s offensive.168 Like 
Pakistan, New Delhi also reached out with direct pleas to key third party actors. But 
unlike Pakistan where the secrecy of the operation’s planning left its diplomatic corps 
unprepared for outreach, the Indian diplomatic strategy was underpinned by skillful 
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mobilization of the media. The Indian diplomatic corps and defense ministry coordinated 
a public relations campaign built on the spirit of transparency and entailing daily 
exchanges with the media.169 To play to the sensitivities of the U.S., the Indian press and 
media drew parallels between Washington’s concern about terrorism and India’s fight 
against ‘Islamist terrorists’ in Kashmir. Links were also made between the Pakistani state 
and Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.170 The media prong of the Indian strategy acted 
as a force multiplier in the truest sense; it shaped India’s outright success in convincing 
the world of its narrative.  
As mentioned earlier, one of India’s key goals was to prevent internationalization 
of the Kashmir issue. It therefore also invested enormous effort, and was successful, in 
blocking U.N. efforts to get involved in the crisis in the wake of Pakistani requests to 
Secretary General Kofi Annan in late-May. It also rejected Annan’s desire to send an 
envoy and observers during this phase of the crisis.171 Instead, India proactively sought 
assurances from the P-5 that the Kargil crisis would not be allowed to become an agenda 
item at the UNSC.172  
Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh also visited China at the height of 
the conflict in mid-June. Though the visit was preplanned and focused on broader 
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bilateral issues, Singh did get a confirmation from the Chinese that they had asked 
Pakistan to “resolve the problem through peaceful means and dialogue.”173 The Chinese 
stance was a major boost to India’s quest to isolate Pakistan. In addition, New Delhi used 
powerful groupings like the G-8 to put pressure on the IMF and other multilaterals to stop 
assistance to Pakistan’s feeble economy.  
(ii) India’s Unexpected Trump Card: The United States 
The most important third party relationship exploited by India was also with 
Washington. All facets of brokered bargaining were most obviously at play in the Indo-
U.S. interaction during the crisis. India’s approach entailed a mix of direct lobbying for 
support, threat manipulation, and a combination of defiance and deference to U.S. 
preferences. India lobbied hard in Washington through multiple channels – public and 
private. Then Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Riaz Khokhar recalled to the author 
while discussing Indian diplomacy that he felt as if a “diplomatic earthquake” had taken 
place in Washington during Kargil.174  
Most critical to India’s outreach efforts were private official channels. The 
Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott connection developed prior to Kargil through the non-
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proliferation dialogues was crucial in building a certain level of comfort about U.S. 
intentions in New Delhi.175 India’s first major request to the U.S. came through this 
channel when Singh and Talbott met in Moscow on May 25. Singh appraised Talbott of 
India’s position that Pakistan had violated the LoC and that India had no option but to 
respond with force. He convinced Talbott to back the Indian position firmly. The two 
agreed that the U.S. would push Pakistan to withdraw its forces while India would 
exercise restraint and bar its forces from crossing the LoC in return.176 Both adhered to 
this gentleman’s agreement throughout the crisis.   
India did not take this understanding at face value however. It pushed the issue by 
employing threat manipulation to coerce the U.S. into pressuring Pakistan – signaling that 
the alternative would be an Indian escalation of the conflict. As Sidhu (2007) rightly 
argues, these Indian threats to cross the LoC may have had more to do with pressuring 
the U.S. than signaling resolve to Pakistan.177 The most obvious example of Indian 
manipulation of the threat of war vis-à-vis the third party came in mid-June, a time when 
then Indian Army Chief General V. P. Malik believes India and Pakistan were closest to 
expanding the conflict. With bitter fighting still ongoing, Indian NSA and Principal 
Secretary to the Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra was sent to Paris to meet his U.S. 
counterpart Sandy Berger. By design, the trip coincided with the G-8 meeting taking 
place in Cologne on June 18-20.178 Mishra was carrying a letter from Prime Minister 
Vajpayee for President Clinton. In it, was a pointed message – also relayed verbally by 
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Mishra – warning that India’s policy of restraint was reaching its limits and that it was 
becoming difficult for the government to force the military to keep taking casualties 
without escalating the conflict to ease the pressure in the Kargil region.  Mishra informed 
Berger that the Indian military may be allowed to cross into Pakistani territory “any 
day.”179 According to Wirsing (2003), “the letter was a transparent attempt to induce 
Clinton ‘to turn up the pressure on Pakistan’.”180 Indeed, Mishra also goaded Berger by 
suggesting that Washington’s pro-Pakistan policy had encouraged Pakistani 
provocativeness and that the U.S. ought to publicly call upon Pakistan to withdraw to 
help end the crisis. He also used the opportunity to press Berger to get the G-8 leaders to 
issue a statement in favor of the Indian position. As the Telegraph reported on June 19, 
“India has turned to Washington for help to convince the world’s richest and most 
powerful nations – the Group of Eight – of the need to send a strong signal to Pakistan to 
vacate the armed intrusion in Kargil.”181 Just days later, timed to coincide with Gibson 
Lanpher and Niaz Naik’s arrivals (unconnected with each other) in New Delhi, the Indian 
Army Chief Malik hinted at the possibility of crossing the LoC.182  
India’s quest to balance between resolve and prudence vis-à-vis the third party 
was evident from its deference to U.S. preferences in parallel to its threat manipulation. 
Nowhere was the link between Indian behavior and its sensitivity to third party 
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preferences more obvious than in its decision not to cross the LoC and the international 
border. At first look, the Indian military response to Pakistan’s intrusion can easily be 
construed as excessive given that it entailed mobilization of all three services across the 
length of the India-Pakistan boundary. In reality however, like Pakistan, India took pains 
to limit its use of force to the remote mountains of Kargil. Accurately put, India’s 
response was a combination of swift escalation on its side of the LoC and conscious 
restraint to avoid horizontal expansion of the conflict.  
The Indian decision to exercise restraint was not an easy one. In fact, it was 
illogical: it made eminent military sense to cross the LoC to interdict the Pakistani supply 
lines and subdue the opposition expeditiously and with lesser casualties on the Indian 
side.183 Given the domestic political premium on the lives of Indian soldiers, the fact that 
this was India’s first televised war and had gotten the entire nation clued in and seething 
with discontent,184 and that India was being run by the bellicose, right-wing Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) government that was in de facto caretaker status185 and headed to 
elections, why would Indian leaders take such a risk? Even apart from the political 
concerns, the situation presented a serious moral dilemma to India’s crisis managers: they 
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were choosing between restraint and casualties of their armed forces. The question is 
especially pertinent as the BJP government had already been contemplating and had 
publicly highlighted its capacity to conduct hot pursuits into Pakistani territory well 
before the Kargil crisis.186 
The predominant explanation for India’s decision is that the ground situation 
never required it to escalate the conflict. The absence of a full blown war is credited to 
the Indian military victories from mid-June onwards.187 But this still does not answer the 
question why India chose to take avoidable casualties and incur heavy material losses if it 
could have prevented these by crossing the LoC? While multiple factors undoubtedly 
impinged on the Indian leadership’s thinking, what lay at the heart of the Indian decision 
to exercise restraint was its concern about positive evaluation. This has been 
acknowledged by a number of Indian officials. Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan G. 
Parthasarathy summarizes the Indian outlook aptly: “We had to get the world to accept 
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that this was Pakistan’s fault.”188 India would “keep the moral high ground” by staying 
on its side of the LoC, thereby making “political gains with the world community.”189 A 
number of other Indian civilian and military officials have also been candid in accepting 
this. According to General V. P. Malik, Indian “political leaders felt that India needed to 
make its case and get international support” and that this could best be achieved by 
showing restraint.190 Brajesh Mishra opined that if India had crossed the LoC, “sympathy 
and respect for India would have diminished.” Restraint meant that “we retained 
international support and allowed for condemnation of Pakistan’s actions by the 
international community. And ultimately that was important.”191  Hardly any other 
measure can establish the importance of positive evaluation for India as clearly as its 
decision to absorb additional casualties to keep third party support intact.  
Also encouraging Indian restraint was the concern that an expansion of the 
conflict would inevitably lead to a more forceful international role, possibly amounting to 
direct internationalization of the conflict and even calls for a resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute through the UNSC.192 Specifically in terms of military hostilities, an expansion of 
the conflict could have forced the international community to prioritize an immediate 
ceasefire above other preferences. This would have possibly left Pakistan in possession of 
some of the captured territory. Hinting at this concern, Jaswant Singh argued that 
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abandoning restraint would have been “a strategic error of incalculable dimensions, 
principally because of the nuclear status of both India and Pakistan, which for the world 
was the foremost worry.”193 India’s desire to maintain its new-found support from third 
party actors and its traditional opposition to internationalization of Kashmir therefore 
converged in favor of exercising restraint. It was this Indian restraint in the face of 
Pakistani recklessness that ended up according the LoC an inviolability after Kargil that 
had escaped it in all the years gone by.194  
The virtual absence of aggressive nuclear rhetoric from India was also linked to 
the third party dynamic. The Indian effort to present itself as the mature and measured 
party and given its NFU policy, it made perfect sense for Indian decision makers to avoid 
deterrent threats. It therefore limited its nuclear signaling to a sparing response to 
Pakistani deterrent threats. By doing so, it also calmed lingering international fears about 
the possibility of the South Asian rivals getting carried away and forcing the crisis to 
spiral out of control. Such demeanor would also have helped India’s quest to present 
itself as being desirous of peace despite Pakistan’s irresponsible behavior.  
India’s decision not to up the ante in responding to Pakistan’s deterrent threats 
may also have been linked to the timing of the Pakistani signals. The first batch of 
resolve signals from Pakistan came at a time when the U.N. Secretary General had 
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offered to send an envoy to help resolve the crisis. The international community was on 
the fence and concerned about escalation. The second spurt of belligerent rhetoric from 
Pakistan on the other hand coincided with the Zinni-Lanpher mission to the region and 
subsequently to Prime Minister Sharif’s impending visit to the U.S. Even when the Blair 
House meeting took place, India had plans to flight test its Agni II ballistic missile. It 
decided to forgo it on the advice of Army Chief Malik who argued that conducting a test 
at that juncture would have gone against India’s policy of ‘strategic restraint’ that had 
helped garner outright international support.195 In the same vein, Sidhu (2007) argues that 
India’s subdued responses may have been a function of its desire to continue exhibiting 
prudence, thereby retaining the international community’s goodwill.196 In other words, 
India had preferred to give third party diplomacy a chance ahead of the alternative of 
communicating resolve to the adversary in a tit-for-tat fashion.  Arguably, India’s 
lingering skepticism and less-than-absolute confidence in the third party’s intentions 
would have added to its impulse for prudent behavior. There is little doubt that Indian 
decision makers were initially surprised at U.S. support and were not convinced that it 
would last for the duration, let alone beyond, the crisis. If Indian leaders believed that 
outside support was based not on the international community’s appreciation for India’s 
overall position on Kashmir or their conviction of seeing India as a partner but merely as 
the most assured means of ending the crisis, they would have seen third party sympathy 
as a function of their measured behavior. It follows that a more provocative demeanor 
would have reversed international goodwill.   
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Finally, one other aspect – a potentially negative one – may also have played out 
at Kargil as far as the third party’s influence on Indian decision making was concerned: 
India pulled out of the backchannel negotiations with Pakistan partly because of U.S. 
messaging at the time. A number of developments in the two weeks between the 
initiation of the backchannel and its collapse on June 27 dissuaded India from going 
through with a negotiated deal with Pakistan. Two in particular directly impacted the fate 
of the secret parlays. First, India’s ascendency in the battlefield had been established by 
late-June. Second, the world’s powerful nations had begun to back India unequivocally 
and vocally. Moreover, the Zinni-Lanpher mission had visited the region. The mission 
and the subsequent press reporting left no doubt that the U.S. favored Pakistani 
withdrawal and that General Zinni had pressed Pakistani leaders hard to order a pullout. 
Lanpher was sent on to New Delhi after Islamabad where he informed Indian policy 
makers of the American position and his understanding that Pakistan had agreed to a 
withdrawal in principle.  
Pakistani sources alleged that Lanpher’s mission to New Delhi and the U.S.’s 
(and the rest of the world’s) otherwise reassuring messages to India around this time 
prompted New Delhi to back out of negotiations with Pakistan.197 Indian and American 
sources however attribute the Indian decision solely to its military successes on the 
ground.198 To be sure, the impact of the change in the military situation on the Indian 
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attitude cannot be overstated. This may well have been the single most important factor 
playing on the minds of the Indian decision makers when choosing their stance on the 
backchannel. However, there is equally little doubt that the messages coming out of 
Washington at the time increased Indian confidence that they could end the conflict 
decisively on top rather than striking what would have been seen as a compromise secret 
deal with Pakistan.199 The Indian decision makers and press had taken note of the U.S. 
pressure on Pakistan with some enthusiasm. For instance, External Affairs Minister 
Jaswant Singh reveals in his memoirs that he thought there was no way Pakistan would 
have sent General Zinni back with a “no response” to his demand for withdrawal.200 
Indeed, even though there is no evidence of any U.S. interest or effort to scuttle the 
backchannel, Washington’s role seems to have dented the prospects for a deal through the 
secret parlays nonetheless.  
India ended the crisis victorious. It had evicted the Pakistani intruders and 
Pakistan was left globally isolated. Even though third party presence did ‘internationalize’ 
the crisis, it benefited India immensely. The Indian officialdom recognized this. As the 
Telegraph noted at the time, “few Indian officials deny that the Kashmir dispute has been 
internationalized. But they argue that by doing so New Delhi has benefited as most world 
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powers have sided with it.”201 The Kargil crisis proved to be a watershed for Indian 
outlook towards third parties in times of crisis.   
C. The Third Party: Umpiring the Crisis in Pursuit of De-escalation 
Studies that examine the international community’s, and specifically the U.S.’s, 
role in the Kargil crisis tend to focus disproportionately on the crisis termination phase. 
The July 4 Blair House meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Bill 
Clinton is often held up as Washington’s noteworthy contribution to the crisis. Moreover, 
the categorical departure of the U.S. from its traditionally pro-Pakistan Cold War stance 
during the crisis and the remarkable improvement in the Indo-U.S. relationship thereafter 
has led many to judge U.S. crisis diplomacy as an attempt at resetting its ties with India. 
Neither is an accurate depiction of the ‘third party’s’ motives and activities. As will be 
borne out by the following discussion, the international community got involved in the 
crisis in earnest from the moment its escalatory potential was established in the latter part 
of May. Much of the Western world approached the crisis from a nuclear prism – perhaps 
even more so than was warranted; it was singularly interested in de-escalation and swift 
crisis termination. As one U.S. official key to crisis diplomacy at Kargil remarked, the 
U.S.’s top three goals were “de-escalation, de-escalation, de-escalation.”202 The positive 
spinoffs of U.S. crisis diplomacy for the Indo-U.S. relationship marked collateral benefits 
that Washington welcomed nonetheless.  
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The international community’s worry about escalation was not necessarily 
warranted by an objective reading of the ground realities in Kargil. Given the history of 
violence along the LoC, a conflict in a remote mountainous region of Kashmir need not 
have automatically triggered alarm. However, Western capitals saw Kargil as a test case 
of a nuclear crisis between two developing countries with unclear safety and security 
protocols. In a view representative of the Western policy community, Michael Krepon 
states: “The U.S. and the world had justifiable concerns that any escalation in the war 
may lead to an environment where the nuclear option is brandished.”203 Bruce Riedel 
(2002), the point person from the Clinton White House dealing with the crisis, goes even 
further: “We could all too easily imagine the two parties beginning to mobilize for war, 
seeking third party support…..and a deadly descent into full-scale conflict all along the 
border with a danger of nuclear cataclysm.”204  
The key concern was that India may cross the LoC and the expanded conflict may 
lead to swift escalation.205 The third party communicated this worry to the conflicting 
parties frequently during the crisis, initially somewhat generically but subsequently with 
pointed concerns about Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons. It led the international 
community to unanimously call for the sanctity of the LoC to be restored and for both 
sides to show restraint. Pakistan was seen as the culprit; it had, in the words of U.S. State 
Department Advisor Mathew Daley, violated the “unwritten law” that nuclear weapon 
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states do not violate “recognized zones of control;”206 in the process, Pakistan had also 
“wrecked the talks” that had been ongoing as part of the parlays between India and 
Pakistan before Kargil.207 Pressuring Pakistan to withdraw its troops and impressing upon 
India not to expand the conflict horizontally was therefore seen as the legitimate course 
of action and the quickest and surest way of achieving the overriding objective of de-
escalation. A softer approach towards Pakistan may have emboldened the Pakistani 
leadership and incentivized further provocativeness. The international community also 
had to be mindful that any hint that it was being forced to submit to Pakistan’s nuclear 
blackmail would set a damaging precedent for nuclear crisis behavior worldwide.208  
 U.S. crisis diplomacy spanned the late-May to end-July period. The Clinton 
administration issued its first set of demarches on May 24 when it was becoming clear 
that the situation in Kargil was not business as usual on the LoC.209 Washington’s 
involvement only increased thereafter and remained in hyperactive mode with daily 
attention to the issue and regular contacts between the U.S. crisis management team and 
Indian and Pakistani leaders through phones, letters, and shuttle diplomacy to and from 
South Asia and with other third party actors. 
 Washington’s signaling conveyed three key messages in the first three weeks or 
so of its involvement: that Kashmir is a bilateral issue; that Pakistan is to blame for the 
crisis and so Pakistani forces must withdraw; and as a logical extension, that it was 
willing to back the Indian position on the crisis. These messages set the tone for 
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Washington’s, and indeed the rest of the world’s, stance on the situation; it was an 
explicit rejection of Pakistan’s desire to use Kargil to prompt interest in third party 
mediation of the Kashmir dispute. 
Simultaneously, Pakistan was blamed, first in private and then in public, as part of 
an obviously choreographed approach. Privately, U.S. officials were categorical in 
multiple interactions with the Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Riaz Khokhar in late-
May that the U.S. would be forced to put all blame on Pakistan publicly if it did not 
withdraw from Kargil.210 In what was the first public U.S. call for Pakistani withdrawal, 
Assistant Secretary Inderfurth acted on the U.S. threat to Khokhar days earlier by making 
a well-thought out statement: “Clearly, the Indians are not going to cede this territory that 
militants have taken…They have to depart and they will depart, either voluntarily or 
because the Indians take them out.”211 In a letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister on June 
3, President Clinton also indicated that withdrawal of Pakistani forces had to be a 
precondition for any hope of U.S. diplomatic involvement in Kashmir.212 Others also 
piled on blame and censure for Pakistan. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, despite 
having proposed an envoy in line with Pakistan’s request, candidly stated on May 29 that 
Pakistan was “violating the Line of Control.”213  
                                              
210 Schaffer and Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates, 155-56; Author’s interview of Riaz Khokhar, 
May 9, 2013, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
211 N. C. Menon, “Ultras will Have to Go: Inderfurth,” Hindustan Times, May 31, 1999. Quoted 
in Chandran, Role of the United States, 205-206. 
212 Talbott, Engaging India, 158. 
213 “France, Annan say LoC Must be Respected,” The Statesman (India), June 2, 1999. Quoted in 
Lavoy, “Why Kargil Did Not Produce General War,” 198. 
198 
 
On the other hand, India was universally acknowledged as the victim and while its 
use of force in the conflict area was seen as justified, it was constantly pushed to exercise 
restraint and avoid expanding the conflict. In return, it received accolades from across the 
world.214 Specifically for the U.S., the biggest challenge was to win India’s trust as an 
honest third party broker whose role could prove to be beneficial for its crisis objectives. 
To overcome the historical trust deficit about Washington’s involvement in India-
Pakistan crises, the U.S. banked on transparency; it shared with New Delhi’s leadership, 
complete information of all its dealings with Pakistan. This allowed Indian leaders to 
judge the U.S. role for themselves and they quickly realized that Washington was willing 
to act as a supportive force. Throughout the crisis, the Indian demand for unilateral 
Pakistani withdrawal was readily supported in return for New Delhi’s assurance that it 
would not expand the conflict horizontally while the international community impressed 
upon Pakistan to pullout.  
The U.S.’s support for the Indian position remained consistent. It started from 
Strobe Talbott’s assurance of a firm U.S. stance in India’s favor during his May 25 
meeting with External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh in Moscow. Talbott’s pledge 
surprised the Indians but it was welcomed and appreciated nonetheless. By May 29, all 
permanent members of the UNSC except China had ensured India that they would not 
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allow the Kargil issue to be raised in the Security Council.215 President Clinton personally 
worked to block any move by the U.N. Secretary General to appoint a formal envoy or 
mediate the crisis.216 On May 30, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright assured 
Jaswant Singh that the U.S. was aware of Pakistani complicity in the Kargil operation.217  
U.S. diplomacy truly heated up from mid-June onwards when the fighting was at 
its peak. India, followed by Pakistan, had mobilized well beyond Kargil, and both Indian 
and Pakistani leaders remained steadfast in their stances. U.S. stood behind India even 
more sternly from this point onwards; it put out calls for Pakistani withdrawal more 
candidly in private and in public. At the same time however, it continued to call on India 
to show restraint. President Clinton talked to Prime Minister Vajpayee on June 14 to 
convey his appreciation for Indian restraint, to urge its continuation at all costs, and to 
confirm that the U.S. would persist with the stance that Pakistan must withdraw from 
Kargil and return to the status quo ante. He however also prodded Vajpayee to talk to the 
Pakistani leadership directly.218  
Around the same time, the U.S. declined Sharif’s request for a meeting with 
Clinton in Europe. Washington felt that a meeting at the time may have been construed as 
U.S. support for Pakistan’s stance and may have forced India to stop deferring to the U.S. 
to ensure a Pakistani pullout. Escalation would have become a more realistic possibility 
in such a scenario. Washington continued to harden its position vis-a-vis Pakistan instead. 
In what is evidence of the U.S.’s increasingly firm messaging to Pakistan at the time, 
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Assistant Secretary Inderfurth stated categorically that the “Line of Control has to be 
respected, (and) the intruders would have to first leave what they had occupied.”219 
Jaswant Singh recalls this statement as the first unambiguous U.S. articulation about the 
LoC. 220 The State Department released other statements squarely blaming the Pakistani 
infiltration for the crisis.  
U.S. diplomacy was forced to go into even higher gear after the Mishra-Berger 
meeting on June 16.221 As Mishra claimed, the U.S. took the Indian Prime Minister’s 
message “quite seriously;”222 it initiated immediate measures to reduce the possibility of 
an expanded war. For one, Berger assured Mishra that U.S. action would come “in days, 
not weeks.”223 Moreover, in line with India’s demands, the U.S. pressed the G-8 countries 
to issue a strong statement favoring New Delhi.224 Even though the statement left enough 
room for Pakistan to claim victory by calling for a ceasefire and resumption of dialogue 
between India and Pakistan, in reality it was an indictment of Pakistan’s actions.225 Most 
notably, the statement termed “any military action to change the status quo as 
irresponsible.”226 Vajpayee’s statement shortly thereafter claiming that “India had the 
world community’s understanding” 227 indicated that the U.S. had successfully satisfied 
the Indian leadership and bought time to put more pressure on Pakistan to withdraw.  
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It was also Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton that was 
responsible for prompting the U.S. President to dispatch General Zinni on his mission to 
Pakistan.228 Zinni’s task was to get Pakistan to agree to withdraw. His intent to use U.S.’s 
‘punishment leverage’ with his Pakistani interlocutors became evident during his meeting 
with Musharraf. He argued with the Pakistani Army Chief: “if you don’t pull back, 
you’re going to bring war and annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be very 
bad news for everybody.”229 Zinni’s prodding must have convinced Musharraf that 
continuing the conflict risked isolation.230As a potential face saver, Zinni offered to 
arrange the Clinton-Sharif meeting the Pakistani Prime Minister had originally requested 
for mid-June but only after he agreed to withdraw. Zinni also offered that the U.S. would 
pressure India to allow safe passage for the retreating Pakistani troops during the 
withdrawal phase.231  
In the days following the mission, the U.S. kept up public and private pressure on 
Pakistan. Meanwhile, when Gibson Lanpher reached New Delhi from Islamabad, the U.S. 
let it be known that Pakistan may have problems in receiving its $100 million IMF loan it 
so desperately needed.232 The IMF had also directly sent a public signal to Pakistan. It 
had officially stated that it “will look with a cold and searching eye on the fulfillment of 
the IMF conditionalities and full adherence to the integrity of the members, which is an 
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integral part of the IMF arrangement.”233  The international community also threatened 
further economic isolation and re-imposition of a ban on aid from international 
organizations.234  
The U.S. perspective on the India-Pakistan backchannel is that it never dissuaded 
India to negotiate an acceptable crisis termination plan with Pakistan. The U.S. had 
known of the backchannel virtually from the time it was initiated235 but it doubted that 
the effort was ever serious enough to manage a breakthrough. As Washington conceived 
it, Lanpher’s follow-on visit to New Delhi was in keeping with U.S.’s decision to 
maintain transparency in its crisis diplomacy. Incidentally, the visit had already been 
cleared with the Indians as an opportunity to brief them on the developments during 
Zinni’s trip to Pakistan.236 When Lanpher informed his Indian counterparts that Pakistan 
had all but agreed to India’s desired outcome237 – an unconditional withdrawal –, he was 
only following his instructions to provide the Indians with an honest recounting of what 
transpired in Zinni’s meetings with the Pakistanis. That the messaging was not a 
deliberate effort to bolster India’s position is borne out by the fact that Lanpher also 
stressed the need for continued Indian restraint.238 Implicit here was the suggestion that 
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India had to persist with its measured behavior to allow the U.S. to continue justifying its 
support for New Delhi’s stance.  
To be sure, U.S. interlocutors could not have been totally oblivious to the fact that 
their highly supportive messaging to India since mid-June would embolden Indian 
leaders, including potentially dissuading them from seeking any compromise solution 
with Pakistan.239  However, since the U.S. crisis managers did not consider the 
backchannel to be nearing any breakthrough and instead saw their own role as central, 
they may not have fully absorbed the implications of their signaling to New Delhi. From 
their point of view, the Zinni-Lanpher mission was choreographed simply to find the 
quickest and most assured way to de-escalate the crisis.  
Arguably the single most important element of the U.S.’s crisis engagement was 
its role in crisis termination. The Clinton team’s management of the Blair House meeting 
was the most pronounced manifestation of the use of the third party’s punishment 
leverage attempted during the crisis. In advance of the meeting, the White House made it 
known that “any proposal for a supervised withdrawal by the U.S. or even the U.N. 
Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is a non-starter.”240 This 
was a preemptive strike against the Pakistani Prime Minister’s predictable attempt to lure 
the U.S. President to back U.N. involvement in the crisis.  
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Clinton’s refusal to mediate the Kashmir dispute during the meeting was driven 
by his belief that it would be unacceptable to New Delhi. In fact, he told Sharif: “If I tell 
you what you think you want me to say, I’ll be stripped of all influence with the Indians. 
I’m not – and the Indians are not – going to let you get away with blackmail, and I’ll not 
permit any characterization of this meeting that suggests I’m giving in to blackmail.”241 
The U.S. President also upped the ante by letting Sharif know that his team had already 
prepared two draft statements, one of which had to be released after the meeting. One 
bluntly put all blame for the crisis and for supporting terrorism in Afghanistan and in 
Kashmir on Pakistan while the other was more conciliatory and provided face saving 
language for it.242 A unilateral withdrawal, Clinton promised, would be followed by his 
efforts to nudge India to restart dialogue on Kashmir (but not mediation).243 Plainly put, 
Clinton had given Pakistan the choice of withdrawing and leaving some hope of U.S. 
assistance post-crisis or to continue fighting, possibly with outright U.S. backing of the 
Indian position. The ‘alignment card’ was being used to good effect.  
Clinton’s master stroke was still to come. Just prior to the meeting, the U.S. had 
received what Bruce Riedel (2002) later described as “disturbing evidence that the 
Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment.”244 With 
escalation on their minds and all intelligence at the time suggesting that the crisis could 
easily escalate, this information only confirmed the U.S.’s worst fears. Clinton informed 
his team that he would use the information “to scare the hell out of Sharif” during the 
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meeting.245 Accordingly, he confronted Sharif by asking him if he was aware that his 
military was readying the nuclear arsenal.246 Already distrustful of Musharraf, Sharif 
would have been all too willing to believe that his Army Chief could take such a step 
without his permission.  
There is great deal of controversy about the authenticity of Riedel’s claim. Not 
only Pakistanis but even Indians dismiss the information as deliberately manipulated to 
pressure the Pakistani Prime Minister to give in and agree to a withdrawal.247 Pakistanis 
continue to deny to this day that any preparatory nuclear movement had taken place.248 
The truth is difficult to ascertain. However, Clinton’s prior plan to use the information to 
jolt Sharif and even more so, the fact that despite the spirit of transparency maintained 
throughout the crisis, the U.S. never shared this – possibly the single most important 
piece of intelligence – information with New Delhi does raise questions. It may well have 
been that the intelligence existed but was speculative and not fully verified but that the 
U.S.’s lingering concerns about escalation colored its threat perception. Or it could be 
that President Clinton deliberately chose to use the information, irrespective of its 
veracity, to pressure Sharif and further the de-escalation goal.  
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Regardless, Clinton’s diplomacy worked. The already beleaguered Pakistani 
Prime Minister agreed to the withdrawal and also accepted that the sanctity of the LoC 
must be maintained. Sharif only asked for one specific line to be included in the joint 
statement of the Blair House meeting in return. It read: “the President would take a 
personal interest to encourage an expeditious resumption and intensification of those 
bilateral efforts [agreed as part of the Lahore Declaration] once the sanctity of the Line of 
Control has been fully restored.”249 The U.S. team agreed. 
Going into the meeting, Clinton’s team was acutely aware that given their 
traditional distrust in the U.S., as far as the Indians were concerned, the burden of proof 
of U.S. sincerity about taking New Delhi’s security concerns into account was still on 
Washington.250 New Delhi’s satisfaction with the proceedings was ensured by keeping 
the Indian leadership fully updated on the progress of the Blair House meeting in real 
time.251 President Clinton called Prime Minister Vajpayee to update and assure him that 
he was standing his ground that Pakistan must withdraw unilaterally.252 He also 
previewed the joint statement with Vajpayee and got his approval before sealing the deal 
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with Sharif.253 U.S. NSA Sandy Berger and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott also 
talked to Brajesh Mishra and Jaswant Singh respectively to apprise them of the 
developments and outcome of the meeting.254 The coordination was so close and 
surprising for the Pakistani team that some believed that the U.S. received direct input 
from New Delhi on the text of the statement.255  
While Pakistan remained under the scanner throughout, one other seemingly 
contradictory aspect of U.S. crisis diplomacy between mid-June and the end of the crisis 
was its appreciation of the danger of isolating Pakistan completely. While backing New 
Delhi’s stance was seen to be the most potent means of avoiding escalation, squeezing 
Pakistan without any respite could easily have been seen by Islamabad as a U.S. attempt 
at ganging up against it. The U.S. risked losing its leverage had Pakistani leaders become 
truly convinced of this. Pakistani decision makers could have resorted to even greater 
provocativeness in desperation. Moreover, with Pakistan’s feeble economic situation and 
internal political tensions, there was always the concern of a collapse of the government – 
or worse yet, the country.256  The U.S. therefore compensated for its stern messaging 
towards Pakistan with sparing concessions.  
 During the Berger-Mishra meeting, Berger was cautious in responding to 
Mishra’s demand to isolate Pakistan. He stressed the need to provide Pakistan a face 
saver to back down. The U.S. also felt that such an outlet was necessary for Pakistan to 
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be able to return to the Lahore process after the crisis, something that Washington had a 
constant eye on.257 The call for a ceasefire in the G-8 statement emerging from the 
Cologne meeting was therefore no coincidence; it was aimed at providing Pakistan space 
to stress that it had the ear of the international community. Indeed, Pakistan put a positive 
spin on the statement. Information Minister Mushahid Hussain remarked two days after 
the G-8 summit: “The international community now has a better understanding of our 
position as they realize that Pakistan has gone an extra mile for peace and there has also 
been sympathy for the Kashmiris who have been denied their fundamental rights by 
India.”258 The spin went unchallenged by the G-8. The third party’s threats of economic 
sanctions and withholding of multilateral loans were also relaxed once the objective was 
accomplished. The Paris Club rescheduled Pakistan’s debt servicing within days of the 
July 4 Blair House meeting.259  
 The most obvious example of the U.S. concern of Pakistan’s complete isolation 
was that it went into the Blair House meeting seeking withdrawal but also fully prepared 
to offer Sharif a tangible face saver. The U.S. team believed that a political cover was 
necessary if Sharif had to order withdrawal and see it through.260 This is why President 
Clinton readily agreed to the one-line addition to the joint statement offered by the 
Pakistani side. The U.S. saw it as a means of giving Prime Minister Sharif the strength to 
order retreat without losing power. The full joint statement also found a mention of 
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President Clinton’s desire to visit South Asia in the near future.261 Since it did not single 
out India, Pakistan could present this as an indication of being treated on an even keel 
with its adversary. Equally, the U.S. prevented India from misconstruing the results of the 
meeting to paint Pakistan as internationally isolated. Also, when India subsequently 
attempted to suggest that the U.S. had agreed that an end to all cross-border infiltration 
from Pakistan should be a prerequisite for dialogue with Pakistan, the State Department 
immediately rebutted India’s claim.262  
Ultimately, the U.S. engagement at Kargil was crucial in ensuring de-escalation. 
In fact, the U.S.’s own assessment was that it had “played a critical role in ensuring that 
the situation didn’t spin out of control.”263 Western press and officials concurred with the 
view, arguing that India and Pakistan were close to an expanded war and that U.S. 
diplomacy had been instrumental in preventing a possible nuclear confrontation.  
(i) The Broader International Community: Reinforcing U.S. messaging 
As the sole superpower, the U.S. executed its role of the global sheriff. At the 
same time, it made a conscious effort to get key third parties to back its crisis diplomacy. 
No longer burdened by the Cold War’s overbearing alliance and positional concerns, 
other third party actors readily agreed to unite to reinforce Washington’s pleas. As the 
crisis played out, Russia, France, the U.K., and even much of the Muslim world, among 
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others advocated restraint and backed calls for Pakistani withdrawal with varying degrees 
of candor. None came to Pakistan’s rescue.  
By far the most crucial crisis diplomacy role after the U.S. was China’s. Its 
refusal to back Pakistan’s stance came as a shock to Islamabad given Beijing’s tradition 
of support for Pakistan. Pakistani planners would likely have factored a positive response 
from their ‘all-weather friend’ when planning the operation. While Pakistani and Chinese 
officials were in constant touch through multiple visits by leaders and officials from both 
sides,264 China’s message throughout was to encourage Pakistan to defuse tensions on the 
LoC. While its public messaging remained neutral, in private, it signaled this even more 
firmly once the Indian military began clocking victories on the ground and the rest of the 
world pressed Pakistan to pull back. Singh (2007) argues that the Chinese role may have 
been the single most important factor in prompting Pakistan to terminate the crisis 
prematurely.265  
The Chinese stance was dictated by a number of factors, not least by its own 
concern about a nuclear crisis on its borders. Any nuclear escalation, or a move towards it, 
would inevitably have brought China’s own arsenal under the global scanner. As an 
emerging global power, China may also have been conscious of the need to display 
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maturity rather than defying global opinion.266 Perhaps just as important was China’s 
concern about growing U.S. influence in its backyard. At Kargil, the Chinese interest in 
regional stability naturally converged with its interest in fending off Western intervention 
that could increase the U.S.’s clout in the South Asian region after a decade of neglect 
during the 1990s.267 It may also have seen the possibility of an improved Indo-U.S. 
relationship due to the Kargil experience adversely. On June 26, the China Daily 
newspaper provided an insight into Beijing’s thinking: “India and Pakistan should also 
consider that intensifying the conflict runs the risk of involving Western intervention. An 
immediate ceasefire is in the interest of both countries and would be applauded by their 
neighbors and the international community.”268 It is rather interesting then that even as 
the Chinese backed the U.S. position on Kargil, their interests were only partly shared; 
they had a common agenda in seeking de-escalation but were simultaneously competing 
for regional influence in South Asia. To this extent, the dynamic was not much different 
than that seen in third party interventions in South Asian crises during the Cold War (see 
chapter three). Nonetheless, the immediate concern about escalation seems to have taken 
precedence at Kargil: Beijing did nothing to actively prevent U.S. engagement in the 
crisis. In fact, by backing Washington’s stance and disappointing Pakistan, it forced 
Prime Minister Sharif to reach out to the U.S. to end the crisis. 
While the U.S. was undoubtedly the lynchpin of the third party engagement at 
Kargil, the importance of the collective weight of the international community ought not 
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to be discounted. The Pakistani leadership was clearly trying to garner support from 
multiple avenues. It was only after all trusted partners had refused to back its position that 
Prime Minister Sharif agreed to an immediate end to the crisis through U.S. intercession. 
A more divided third party role, as feared by some U.S. crisis managers at the outset,269 
may have emboldened Pakistan to prolong the crisis.  
The Western powers had entered the crisis due to their “immediate and continuing” 
concern that the “conflict would escalate into a nuclear exchange.”270 Ultimately, the U.S. 
and the international community writ large created an environment that forced Pakistan to 
withdraw. To achieve this, the third parties had to put immense pressure on Pakistan 
while seeking an Indian assurance that it would not undertake horizontal escalation 
outside Kargil as long as the international community maintained its outright support for 
its stance. At the same time however, the third party actors remained sensitive to India’s 
threat manipulation and were also mindful of the dangers of sending Pakistan into 
oblivion. The crisis also exposed clear limits of third party influence. Pakistan, while 
pleading for support and remaining conciliatory in its interactions with the U.S. and other 
third parties, remained defiant in the face of calls for withdrawal till the latter part of the 
crisis. It was only after the international community reinvigorated its calls after mid-June 
and the battlefield situation turned against Pakistan that it began to seek a way out 
proactively. In India’s case, it did not budge from its demand for Pakistani troop 
withdrawal as a precondition for crisis termination. Of course, given that the international 
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community backed the Indian position, there was little need for outright defiance on its 
part. That said, India’s decision to continue mobilizing troops and its preparation for a 
larger offensive and constant threat manipulation ran in the face of third party preferences. 
In the final outcome, crisis behavior presented a mix of sensitivity of the principal 
antagonists and the third party actors towards each other and limitations on the extent to 
which the third party could erode India and Pakistan’s decision making autonomy. At no 
point however did the drive for autonomy undermine sensitivity to third party preferences 
in a manner that could cause uncontrolled escalation.  
IV. BROKERED BARGAINING IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
KARGIL CRISIS 
The Kargil crisis was the first ever confrontation between two second age nuclear 
powers. In terms of crisis behavior, there was little institutional memory to go by. The 
fear of the unknown dominated the thinking of the third party actors. This triggered their 
involvement in the crisis, which in turn instituted the three-cornered bargaining 
engagement that shaped crisis behavior of the two conflicting parties and the third party 
actors. India responded to Pakistan’s attempt at land grab and compellence to alter the 
status quo with its own compellence strategy. It simultaneously employed threat 
manipulation to coerce the third party to support its stance. India and Pakistan’s 
deference to third party preferences was also on display. The third party leaned heavily in 
India’s favor as the quickest and most assured way of achieving de-escalation and crisis 
termination. 
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1. The Advent of Brokered Bargaining 
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Kargil crisis was the extreme uncertainty 
about how the principal antagonists would operate. When it came to new nuclear powers, 
little had been said about the three-cornered bargaining framework central to our model. 
The emphasis in literature on demonstration crises in middle power nuclear contexts and 
on the potential role of third parties in such situations truly emerged after the Kargil 
episode.  
Brokered bargaining was neither natural to a crisis that involved two newly 
declared nuclear powers nor could this trilateral dynamic have been considered an 
obvious or preferred choice for all the parties involved. The ‘compound crisis’ of 1990 
provided some indication (see chapter three) of how they may have behaved but that 
crisis was too brief and the hints too preliminary, vague, and incomplete to have been of 
any consequence. Nonetheless, Kargil ended up providing vivid illustration of the 
trilateral framework, thereby confirming its efficacy in explaining crisis behavior among 
two middle power nuclear states. 
In as far as Pakistan favored internationalization of Kashmir, its efforts to lure the 
third party to support its crisis objectives were not altogether surprising. There was one 
caveat however: as discussed in chapter two, possession of nuclear weapons is believed 
to accord states greater strategic autonomy in their decision making.271 It would therefore 
not have been unreasonable to expect Pakistan to make a departure from the past in 
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pursuing a more independent course to achieve its crisis objectives. Instead, the third 
party was intrinsic to Pakistan’s crisis planning. As Pakistani planners had conceived 
Kargil, their revisionist aims in Kashmir could not have been fulfilled without outright 
third party support. Perhaps without realizing so, they had voluntarily triggered the 
‘independence-dependence paradox.’ To be sure, that Pakistan’s recklessness received 
widespread condemnation and left it relatively isolated does not reflect its indifference to 
positive evaluation from third party actors. Rather, its intrusion was a shocking 
miscalculation of the international community’s reaction to its aggression. Instead of 
adopting a “more mature and responsible foreign policy” as its own Foreign Office had 
recommended after the 1998 nuclear tests,272 General Musharraf and his team believed, 
wrongly as it turned out, that a demonstration crisis would mobilize the international 
community in Pakistan’s favor. The Pakistani Prime Minister’s ultimate decision to 
withdraw from Kargil signified an attempt to minimize the negative evaluation Pakistan 
received throughout the crisis. 
The real test for the brokered bargaining thesis was always going to be India’s 
outlook given that the Indian strategic elite traditionally harbored deep-rooted suspicion 
against third party intervention and staunchly opposed any efforts that could remotely be 
perceived as an attempt at outside mediation of the Kashmir issue. If Pakistan reflexively 
believed that U.S. involvement would help its cause, India equally reflexively perceived 
this to be true. The fact that India eagerly exploited the third party dynamic as a major 
element of its crisis strategy strengthens our core argument. Rather than ignoring or 
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blocking third parties once they had signaled their intent to enter the fray – a move that 
may have played to Pakistan’s advantage –, India chose to prod the world to do its 
bidding with Pakistan.  
There was also never a moment of hesitation on the part of the third party actors 
as far as their involvement in the crisis was concerned. This is despite the fact that 
fighting in Kargil erupted at a time when the Western world was preoccupied with a war 
in the Balkans.273 The U.S. was also consumed by efforts to enforce U.N. resolutions on 
Iraq and with managing fresh developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process.274  
The U.S. and the international community at large entered the fray practically 
unsolicited. Pakistan’s early calls for international intervention in the crisis had little to 
do with U.S.’s decision to undertake proactive crisis diplomacy to seek de-escalation. 
The third party actors were primarily driven by their skepticism about Indian and 
Pakistani abilities to avoid escalation. Given that the U.S. and much of the Western world 
had no vital foreign policy interests in South Asia at the time, their voluntary 
involvement substantiates the proposition that third party intervention will be virtually 
automatic in nuclear crises in comparable contexts.  
The third party prong of the brokered bargaining dynamic was complemented by 
bilateral compellence on the part of India and Pakistan. The combination meant that the 
dual attribute of the “resolve-prudence tradeoff” that underpins our model played out. 
India and Pakistan sought to extract concessions from each other by employing military 
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force, force demonstrations, and resolve signals while exhibiting restraint in terms of 
expanding the conflict. They simultaneously sought to signal defiance to the third party 
while remaining sensitive to its preferences. The U.S. and other third parties pursued de-
escalation by utilizing their reward-punishment leverage – in this case, using it to coerce 
Pakistan without isolating it completely and to back India while urging restraint on its 
part.  
2. Brokered Bargaining and the Escalation-De-escalation Dynamic 
 A number of factors helped steer Indian, Pakistani, and third party preferences 
away from steps that could have caused further escalation. On the face of it, India’s 
demeanor seemed to be indifferent to U.S. prodding. It started off by demanding 
unilateral Pakistani withdrawal and stuck to its position throughout. It also indulged in 
threat manipulation and defied U.S. demands for dialogue with Pakistan even as it was 
secretly conducting backchannel negotiations in mid-June. But all of this worked in 
parallel with India’s understanding with the U.S. that it would show military restraint 
beyond the Kargil region and avoid escalating the crisis as long as the international 
community seemed to be making headway in getting Pakistan to withdraw. Its strict 
adherence to this understanding despite incurring additional casualties was a key buffer 
against escalation.  
Admittedly, India’s ability to remain steadfast in its demand for unilateral 
withdrawal and even its vertical escalation within Kargil were facilitated by the third 
party’s outright support for its position. Indian leaders could maintain positive evaluation 
despite these actions given the third party’s view that New Delhi’s military response in 
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Kargil was justified. Interestingly however, if global sympathy for India eliminated the 
compulsion for it to soften its position, the need for keeping the international 
community’s empathetic outlook – both to maintain pressure on Pakistan and also to 
harness support for its position on the sanctity of the LoC – acted as a restraining factor. 
This paradox militated against Indian horizontal expansion of the conflict. As ought to be 
clear from some of the earlier-mentioned statements of Indian officials, the Indian 
leadership was acutely aware that giving up its policy of restraint would have altered the 
third party’s outlook – to Pakistan’s advantage.    
Also reducing the pressure to escalate was the primary Indian crisis objective: to 
revert to the status quo ante. The Indian decision makers could afford to confine their 
military response to the Kargil region as they had no territorially revisionist interests; 
meanwhile, they pressed third party actors to deliver on forcing a Pakistani pullout. 
Moreover, the Indian rejection of efforts to internationalize Kashmir also predisposed it 
to avoiding excessive belligerence. While India gained tremendously by portraying 
Pakistan as reckless to harm its evaluation by the third party, in so doing it also ran the 
risk of implying high escalatory pressures in South Asia. The danger from India’s 
perspective was that this would only confirm the Western world’s fears about crisis 
instability in second age nuclear rivalries; the result could have been an even more 
forceful and panicked response from external players calling for ceasefire and mediation. 
As mentioned, this fear partly explains why India downplayed the nuclear factor at Kargil, 
keeping its own deterrent threats to a minimum and avoiding any mention of the 
Pakistani movement in the Tilla Ranges during the crisis.  
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As for Pakistan, its propensity to perpetrate a demonstration crisis and its desire to 
receive support from third party actors were inherently contradictory. Inbuilt into the 
Pakistani crisis planning was a potent buffer against prolonging the crisis or exhibiting 
belligerence in defiance of international opinion. Since Pakistan’s objectives were 
unattainable without strong third party backing, once it had failed to muster international 
support, there was little to gain by shutting out third party actors. Having lost all 
sympathy and being projected as a “reckless, adventuristic, risk-acceptant, untrustworthy 
state,”275 Pakistani leaders had to be alive to the possibility that such defiance could have 
forced the third party’s hand into executing its veiled threats of tightening the squeeze 
further on Pakistan. These factors impinged on the Pakistani Prime Minister’s decision to 
terminate the crisis despite severe domestic opposition.  
Pakistan’s dilemma was especially acute because its Mujahedeen cover was never 
taken seriously. Nor did its efforts to paint India as the aggressive party make any 
headway. Not only was the world convinced that Pakistan had instigated the crisis but its 
constant denial only allowed India to underscore its duplicity and unreliability. As Joshi 
(2006) points out, international support for states is not necessarily automatic but it 
becomes easier to obtain in situations where a clear violation of one’s territory by the 
opponent has occurred.276 Pakistan’s ‘invasion’ at Kargil had crossed this red line, and 
quite blatantly so, as far as the third party actors were concerned. What is more, it had 
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breached this norm in a nuclear environment. The relentless pressure on Pakistan and the 
U.S. tilt towards India made abundantly clear that there was little space for Pakistani 
leaders to salvage the situation through further aggression. In essence, Pakistan’s crisis 
goals predisposed it to seeking third party support but its failure to achieve this crucial 
ingredient in its formula for success subsequently drove it to rely on diplomatic 
intervention for crisis termination. The de-escalation objective greatly benefited from 
this Pakistani predicament.  
 The third party actors engaged India and Pakistan with one key objective: to force 
them to de-escalate tensions. The U.S was not oblivious to the fact that Pakistan was 
hoping for international attention and thus intervening in the crisis could play into its 
hands. However, there is no evidence of any thought not to intervene simply to avoid 
creating the obvious moral hazard problem.277 Rather, Pakistan’s provocation in Kargil 
created a sense of urgency for the U.S. and other third parties to quickly ascertain the 
facts of the intrusion. They in turn concluded that the most assured way of achieving de-
escalation was to pressure Pakistan to withdraw. While this approach forced much of the 
international community to be seen as biased in India’s favor, in reality, the third party 
acted as an “umpire, calling the plays as it saw them.”278 The transparency built into 
U.S.’s crisis diplomacy proved crucial in convincing India of its sincerity in operating as 
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an honest broker that had judged the on-ground reality to be in line with India’s stance. 
The U.S. not only backed the Indian position seeking Pakistani pullout from Kargil but it 
also promised not to allow Pakistan to link the Kargil crisis with the broader issue of 
Kashmir and not to mediate the dispute. Despite this support however, the alignment card 
was also at play in U.S. dealings with India.279 While never conveyed explicitly, U.S. 
backing was quite clearly a quid pro quo for India’s measured behavior; there was no 
guarantee of consistency in the third party stance if India triggered fresh escalation by 
expanding the conflict. The threat never had to be played out as the U.S.’s transparency 
and empathy led Indian leaders to provide greater space and time for U.S. diplomacy to 
continue pressuring Pakistan to withdraw.  
With Pakistan, the third party actors were far more explicit in playing the 
alignment card. At the same time however, they remained cognizant of the dangers of 
isolating Pakistan completely. Easily overshadowed by the general direction and tone of 
U.S. crisis diplomacy, in reality, there were a number of inducements on offer for 
Pakistan as quid pro quos for obliging the third party on its demands. The initial third 
party calls for restraint and ceasefire worked to Pakistan’s advantage. The mention of a 
ceasefire in the G-8 communique in Cologne, rescheduling of Pakistan’s debt servicing 
payments after the Blair House meeting, and most of all, the face saver accorded in the 
Blair House joint statement have all been cited earlier as examples. President Clinton also 
made efforts to prod the Indian Prime Minister to consider reengaging in dialogue with 
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Pakistan after the crisis in line with his promise to Prime Minister Sharif.280 Even though 
none of this affected the reality that Pakistan was the clear loser at Kargil, the face savers 
and inducements were central to preventing Pakistani leaders from adopting a nothing-to-
lose mindset that may have forced it to consider fresh provocations as the only viable 
option available.  
Interestingly, the third party’s focus on the crisis at hand also meant that it only 
accorded secondary importance to larger foreign policy interests and agendas. Issues such 
as the Kashmir dispute or the desire to improve the Indo-U.S. relationship were 
entertained only in as much as they complemented the de-escalation agenda. The U.S. did 
not back Pakistan’s revisionist position on Kashmir or its attempt to link Washington’s 
intercession on Kargil with mediation on the dispute since doing so would have 
undermined U.S.’s crisis leverage with India. At the same time, the U.S. accepted India’s 
position that the LoC was inviolable but did not back its interpretation that Washington 
had made an end to all cross-LoC infiltration a prerequisite for talks on Kashmir. 
Acquiescing to this would have negated the very face saver that was to allow Pakistani 
Prime Minister Sharif enough cushion to oversee the implementation of his withdrawal 
order and still retain his hold on power. By the same token, the Indo-U.S. relationship 
gained tremendously from the Kargil experience but this was at best a positive spinoff 
from Washington’s crisis diplomacy. Equally, Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. suffered but 
the face savers it received had little to do with any effort to mend the relationship; that 
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the face savers would have had somewhat of a soothing effect nonetheless were collateral 
dividends from an action taken to ensure successful crisis de-escalation.  
Factors strengthening the quest for de-escalation ultimately prevailed to keep the 
Kargil crisis limited. De-escalation however was not an over-determined outcome by any 
means. The crisis could have escalated despite the brokered bargaining framework 
holding firm. We have already highlighted the limitations of the third party’s leverage 
over the conflicting parties, particularly India. Neither side gave up its strategic autonomy 
completely. India continued to threaten to expand the conflict and is believed to have 
come very close to taking the offensive into Pakistani territory in the third week of 
June.281 That it ultimately resisted the temptation to do so reinforces its sensitivity to third 
party concerns and highlights the potency of de-escalatory pressures built into the three-
cornered crisis bargaining dynamic. But escalation could have occurred despite Indian 
concerns for third party preferences. For one, Indian leaders could have decided 
sometime in late-June that the international community had failed to force Pakistan to 
withdraw and that any further delay would harm its chances of defeating Pakistan 
militarily in the crisis. India may have felt that the international community may give in 
to Pakistan’s intransigence and ask for a ceasefire with the ground situation frozen. 
India’s perception need not have been reality; it could have misread the situation and 
acted upon its ultimatum to key world capitals that it would expand the conflict if 
Pakistan did not agree to pull back. In a bid to maintain its positive evaluation, it would 
have presented this as a last resort option that was justified given Pakistan’s persistent 
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defiance. The world may well have reacted negatively but the Indian offensive would 
have taken place nonetheless.  
Alternatively, India could have opened up new military fronts against Pakistan if 
it felt that the international community would back such a move. This scenario would 
have confirmed Pakistan’s view that outright U.S. support was emboldening India to take 
a hardline approach towards Islamabad and had, in effect, increased the possibility of 
escalation. These miscalculations on India’s part could have unleashed a fresh escalatory 
dynamic that may not have been easy to control. Pakistan’s response options would have 
been interesting: it could have restrained itself in an attempt to reverse international 
opinion and extract sympathy to dampen some of the support for India; it could have 
responded in kind to any Indian provocation and argued that the Indian aggression left it 
with no choice; or it could have panicked and responded disproportionately, potentially 
leading to swift escalation.  
Finally, the third party could also have handled the crisis differently. For instance, 
a less transparent posture would likely not have succeeded in convincing India of the 
world’s sincerity to ensure a Pakistani withdrawal. Its recourse may have been to rely 
more heavily on the military tool to terminate the crisis on favorable terms. Such actions 
may have provided Pakistan the excuse to respond more forcefully and justify it as a 
necessary response to India’s escalation. A dangerous dynamic carrying the risk of 
uncontrolled escalation would have been triggered as a result. Moreover, the third party’s 
supposed manipulation of intelligence information about Pakistani nuclear movement 
during the Blair House meeting could have had unintended consequences. In a slightly 
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different setting, it could have led the Pakistani Prime Minister to confront his Army 
Chief and in turn triggered a meltdown of their relationship, thereby making it impossible 
for Sharif to have the military carry out his withdrawal order. Alternatively, India could 
have found out through its own sources that the U.S. had such information but that it was 
withholding it from New Delhi. Its leadership may have begun to have second thoughts 
about trusting the transparency of U.S. crisis diplomacy as a result. On the other hand, a 
decision by Washington to convey the intelligence to India could have sent it into panic 
mode and forced it to alert its own nuclear forces.    
None of this transpired at Kargil. The crisis ended without major escalation. 
Pakistan’s revisionist aim to cement an altered territorial scenario lost out to India’s 
preference for the status quo.  For Pakistan, the lesson was clear: nuclear weapons cannot 
be used to affect a change in the territorial distributions. Rather, any attempt to do so is 
likely to lead to an instant loss of positive evaluation from key third party actors. India, 
on the other hand, emerged as the mature nuclear power in the eyes of the world.  
3. Competing Explanations for Crisis Behavior and Outcomes 
 Using traditional nuclear crisis behavior explanations, the Kargil episode could 
easily be construed as a classic limited war where Pakistan indulged in salami slicing 
tactics and signaled its intent to inflict greater punishment on India if it continued to 
refuse a negotiated settlement to Kashmir. From this prism, India’s vertical escalation in 
the Kargil region would be seen as a desire to convey its resolve while seeking to forcibly 
evict the intruders. Finally, India-Pakistan dialogue during the crisis would signify efforts 
to ensure that the crisis remained limited. This need would have been especially driven 
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by the absence of any a priori understanding on the acceptable limits of escalation. The 
overall crisis outcome could be viewed as a successful experiment at limited war by the 
two antagonists, with India ending the confrontation with a clear advantage. 
A substantial amount of literature presents traditional explanations for the absence 
of all-out war at Kargil. One strand explains the crisis outcome by emphasizing prudence 
on India’s, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan’s part. India is seen to have made a conscious 
decision to restrict fighting to its side of the LoC despite having the capacity to expand it. 
Indeed, “contrary to popular belief, India did possess adequate army formations to widen 
the scope….. force constraints were hardly a problem in expanding the Kargil war.”282 
The capacity argument is less applicable to Pakistan given that its planners had 
not prepared for an escalated scenario but even in its case, had it chosen to escalate, it 
could have prolonged the conflict in Kargil and also struck India at points across the 
international border where it was at a strategic disadvantage. At the very least, Pakistan 
could have actively reinforced its troops in Kargil instead of abandoning them. This line 
of argument would suggest that it chose not to do so in the interest of limiting the conflict.   
Another explanation is that the ground situation turned in India’s favor just in 
time for it to drop plans to take its offensive into Pakistani territory. Lavoy (2009) states 
that India would have expanded the conflict had it not captured the vital Tololing Point 
                                              
282 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 161. The capacity argument is augmented by the fact 
that India’s conventional strength was well established at the time, as was its ability to ensure air 
dominance given its 6:1 advantage over Pakistan in terms of modern and capable aircraft. Rajesh 
Kumar, “Revisiting the Kashmir Insurgency, Kargil, and the Twin Peak Crisis: Was the 
Stability/Instability Paradox at Play?” The New England Journal of Political Science 3, 1 (Fall 
2008): 72. 
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5140 mountain complex in Dras in mid-June.283 Otherwise, as Chengappa (1999) notes, 
“the message was clear. Not only was India preparing to strike hard in Kargil but if 
needed it could open other fronts and was willing to risk even a full-scale war.”284 This 
view would point to Indian military victories as the primary reason for the crisis to have 
remained limited.  
Finally, some have credited the absence of all-out conflict to the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear deterrents. A number of notable voices have viewed the whole Kargil 
affair from the lens of the stability-instability paradox, confirming that it was a limited 
conflict which was both made permissible by and kept limited due to the presence of 
nuclear weapons. P. R. Chari (2001) argues that Pakistan would have believed that it 
“could with impunity, indulge in ‘salami slicing’ to capture small pieces of territory 
under the rubric of nuclear deterrence, and in the confidence that India would not find it 
possible to escalate the conflict lest it approach the nuclear level.”285 He (2003) argues 
that “a conscious effort was therefore made to threaten but not cross the conventional-
nuclear divide.”286  
                                              
283 Lavoy, “Introduction,” 12-13. 
284 Chengappa with Hussain and Shenoy, “Face-Saving Retreat.”  
285 P. R. Chari, “Indo-Pak Relations: Uncertain Future,” in Kargil: The Tables Turned, eds. 
Ashok Krishna and P. R. Chari (New Delhi: Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 2001), 261. 
For others who concur with this take, see Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 2000), 116; Robert Jervis, “Kargil, Deterrence, and International Relations 
Theory,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil 
Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 393; Anuj Panday, 
“The Stability-Instability Paradox: The Case of the Kargil War,” Penn State Journal of 
International Affairs 1 (Fall 2011): 7-14;  and Kumar, “Revisiting the Kashmir Insurgency,” 49-
97. 
286 P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Working 
Paper 1.0, Henry L. Stimson Center, August 2003, 19,  
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/escalation_chari_1.pdf. 
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These are all plausible explanations for the limited nature of the Kargil crisis. To 
be sure, an explanation rooted in brokered bargaining does not disregard the relevance of 
the arguments derived from more traditional models focused on bilateral contexts. 
However, we see these factors as feeding into the processes that underpin the three-
cornered bargaining dynamic rather than being the primary determinants of behavior 
themselves. As our model is posited, the factors outlined in these explanations would still 
affect specific crisis choices of the three parties involved but behavior would ultimately 
be shaped by an interplay between the dual characteristic of the ‘resolve-prudence 
tradeoff’ for the antagonists and the third party’s power mediation – i.e. brokered 
bargaining.  
Hardly anything could provide clearer evidence for the reasons behind India’s 
restraint than the earlier-cited statements of Indian officials acknowledging their 
sensitivity to third party preferences. The fact that the Indian leadership decided to take 
additional casualties to shore up positive evaluation underscores just how crucial the third 
party angle was for them. A traditional deterrence analysis would find other anomalies in 
Indian behavior as well. For one, India would have been expected to compensate for its 
restraint by conveying the credibility of its newly declared deterrent more forcefully 
through resolute signaling. Not doing so risked suggesting lack of resolve to bank on its 
deterrent in an eventuality; it entailed ‘reputational’ costs. Given that this was the first 
crisis under an overt nuclear umbrella, the urge to establish resolve should have been that 
much greater. Rajagopalan (2005) highlights that even if Raj Chengappa’s earlier-
mentioned account of India’s nuclear readiness is correct, it only implies that Indian 
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planners were comfortable not considering mating or readying their arsenal for use.287 
This would have been one obvious way of conveying its resolve to act in an eventuality, 
thereby raising the stakes for Pakistan. Moreover, Indian restraint meant that it lost its 
opportunity to convince Pakistan that its Kashmir policy was no longer tenable and that 
the sub-conventional space to prick India had been foreclosed by the nuclear umbrella. 
India’s crisis behavior also challenged its leadership’s pre-crisis pronouncements that it 
could conduct hot pursuits into Pakistani-controlled territory without risking escalation. 
The Indian leadership seemed willing to absorb these costs. The concern about positive 
evaluation helps rationalize Indian behavior; the prioritization of third party preferences 
as a means of evicting Pakistani intruders and isolating Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir 
above all else is what ultimately drove Indian choices during the crisis.  
At first look, traditional explanations seem more relevant to Pakistan’s efforts to 
avoid escalation. However, a classic brinkmanship model would have predicted a more 
resolute Pakistani response as well. Its compulsion to establish resolve and signal that 
overt nuclearization had opened new space for it to force the Kashmir issue militarily 
would have been greater than New Delhi’s given that Pakistan had instigated the crisis. 
Standing down in the face of an Indian response would have amounted to tremendous 
loss of face and a dilution of any perceived advantage Pakistan had gained by declaring 
its nuclear status. Indeed, classic models would have a hard time explaining Pakistan’s 
decision to abandon its troops altogether. Once again, the brokered bargaining model 
rationalizes Pakistani choices – to abandon troops, to seek diplomatic recourse after mid-
                                              
287 Rajagopalan, Second Strike, 111.  
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June, and to withdraw unilaterally. Any serious analysis of the situation would have to 
incorporate the potential costs Pakistan would have had to entail if it prized its strategic 
autonomy over sensitivity to third party preferences at a time when the entire world 
seemed united in India’s favor.   
To reiterate a point made when introducing the model in chapter two, our 
explanation is also not synonymous with existing arguments that see the U.S. (as a 
standalone) as the principal reason for the crisis outcome.288 We maintain that it is the 
process of the three-cornered interaction encapsulated in the brokered bargaining model 
that lies at the heart of crisis behavior, and in turn, effects outcomes. This external actor 
cannot be extracted from the process without undermining the very essence of the model 
and our explanation.  Our analysis has helped explain exactly why and how the third party 
is able to play its de-escalatory role and how this is intrinsically linked to the 
opportunities and constraints of the conflicting parties. Ignoring this dynamic as the 
central element of Indian, Pakistani, and third party engagement risks producing 
misleading explanations.  
                                              
288 For examples, see Chakma, “Escalation Control;” Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent; Mistry, 
“Tempering Optimism.” 
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CHAPTER 5: THE 2001-02 STANDOFF 
The 2001-02 standoff remains the most prominent and longest nuclear crisis 
between India and Pakistan to date. Since the crisis entailed full-scale military 
mobilization by both sides, it caused even greater alarm than Kargil. Its nuclear 
dimensions were also much more pronounced: both sides exchanged multiple deterrent 
threats during the standoff. The severity of the crisis and the direct interests of the U.S., 
once again the principal third party, in South Asia at the time contributed to its 
heightened activism. The crisis ended up providing vivid and systematic illustration of 
brokered bargaining.    
This chapter conducts a case study of this ten-month long border confrontation 
between India and Pakistan. The chapter is structured identically to the previous one on 
Kargil. It begins by providing a brief background of the standoff. Next, we discuss the 
strategic and diplomatic outlook of the three parties involved in the inter-crisis period 
(between Kargil and the onset of the standoff in December 2001). The subsequent 
section analyzes the behavior of the principal antagonists in a classic brinkmanship 
framework without entertaining the presence of the third party. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion that traces the centrality of the three-cornered bargaining exercise in 
the conduct of the crisis to set up a comparison with the bilateral lens applied earlier. 
The final section expounds on the implications of the behavior exhibited by the three 
parties for brokered bargaining theory, crisis stability and for alternative explanations 
for crisis behavior and outcomes.    
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE 2001-02 STANDOFF 
The 2001-02 standoff was triggered by a terrorist attack on the Indian 
parliament in New Delhi. On the morning of December 13, 2001, when the parliament 
was in session, six armed militants managed to breach security and kill eight security 
personnel before being shot dead. The motive of the attack, as later established, was to 
kill Indian political leaders.1 The Indian government swiftly blamed Pakistan-based 
militant outfits LeT and JeM for the carnage and alleged that the attackers were 
operating at the Pakistani state’s behest.2 Even as Pakistan denied any knowledge or 
responsibility, India ordered “Operation Parakram,” an exercise in full-scale military 
mobilization. Pakistan responded with its counter-deployment and when its 
mobilization was complete, the two sides had nearly a million soldiers eye ball-to-eye 
ball at the international border.  
Tensions ebbed and flowed, rising in the days following the parliament attack 
and again in the wake of the May 14, 2002 attack on a bus and an Indian army camp 
nearby in the town of Kaluchak in Jammu which killed 31people, mostly family 
members of Army personnel.3 The Kaluchak attack marked the second peak of the 
                                              
1 Sharad Joshi, “The Practice of Coercive Diplomacy in the Post 9/11 Period” (PhD diss., 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 53. 
2 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow 
Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 168; Joshi, “Practice of Coercive 
Diplomacy,” 53.  
3 “Lashkar was ‘Involved’ in Kaluchak Attack,” Tribune, May 18, 2002, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020518/nation.htm#1.  
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crisis – thus the frequent use of the term “twin peaks” to refer to the standoff.4 India 
alleged that all attackers in the May attacks were Pakistanis and pointed at LeT as the 
executer.5 Eventually, the crisis subsided without an active war when the Indian 
military was ordered to undertake “strategic relocation” – read demobilization – on 
October 16, 2002.6 However, this was not before over 2,000 casualties had been 
incurred in localized exchanges across the LoC and the international border over the 
10-month period.7 The crisis formally ended with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 
offer of a “hand of friendship” to Pakistan on April 18, 2003.8  This initiated a 
sustained period of calm between the two sides.  
II. FROM KARGIL TO TWIN PEAKS:  STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC 
OUTLOOK OF THE THREE ACTORS 
This section recounts the strategic outlook of each of the three parties and the 
international context between Kargil and the onset of the twin peaks crisis. In doing so, it 
expounds on the Indian, Pakistani, and third party mindsets and their objectives going 
into the crisis.  
                                              
4 The term has been used most prominently in Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon’s seminal study 
of the U.S. role in the standoff. Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in 
South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 57, September 2006.  
5  “Lashkar was ‘Involved’ in Kaluchak Attack,” Tribune. 
6 V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 85.  
7 India also is believed to have suffered 1,874 casualties (killed or injured) during the standoff. 
Rajat Pandit, “India Suffered 1,874 Casualties Without Fighting a War,” The Times of India, May 
1, 2003, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-05-01/india/27277371_1_bullet-proof-
jackets-jammu-and-kashmir-soldiers-face. Reliable estimates for Pakistani casualties are not 
readily available but they are believed to be less than 1,000. 
8 Shujaat Bukhari, “PM Extends ‘Hand of Friendship’ to Pakistan,” The Hindu, April 19, 2003, 
http://www.hindu.com/2003/04/19/stories/2003041905500100.htm. 
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1. India 
Kargil may have seemed like a clear military and diplomatic victory for India but 
it did not leave Indian planners as strategically content as the outcome of the crisis might 
have suggested. In fact, the episode left New Delhi deeply reflective of the implications 
of overt nuclearization for the India-Pakistan relationship. If India was going to be 
forced to restrain itself in response to Pakistani sub-conventional aggression, it risked 
conveying that its conventional superiority had been neutralized. This called the 
credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent into question. As Sood and Sawhney (2003) put 
it: “An impression has been created that Pakistan could use its nuclear weapons in a 
variety of ways: in a preemptive mode, early in a war, when the going gets tough, or 
when ultimately pushed to the wall by India’s conventional forces. This has instilled 
uncertainty among Indian planners, and especially the political leadership which 
believes Pakistan’s rash military leadership cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons.”9 
In short, India faced “strategic paralysis.”10  
Not surprisingly, Indian strategic thought after Kargil was consumed by the 
need to identify means of exploiting the conventional space below the nuclear 
threshold. India’s answer was a rather vague conception of “limited war under the 
nuclear umbrella” against Pakistan. The doctrine, as expounded by Defense minister 
George Fernandez, posited that India could “fight and win a limited war, at a time and 
                                              
9 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 147-48. 
10 Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 80; Rajesh M. Basrur, “Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear Environment: 
The December 13 Crisis,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, eds. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. 
Rowen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 303. 
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place chosen by the aggressor” and while acknowledging limitations due to risks of 
escalation, suggested that conventional war had “not been made obsolete by nuclear 
weapons.”11 Basrur (2002) explains this logic of “strategic asymmetry”: India had an 
advantage in terms of conventional and nuclear asymmetry; it could therefore inflict 
much greater damage on Pakistan by using nuclear weapons than Pakistan could on 
India; the disproportionate damage Pakistan would face in a retaliatory Indian strike 
would deter it from escalating to the nuclear level in the first place; at the same time, 
India’s conventional superiority would deter Pakistan’s conventional aggression; if this 
were true, then Pakistan would also be deterred from its sub-conventional strategy 
given the risk of Indian retaliation.12 The premise was that Pakistan had been using 
nuclear blackmail as “bluff and bluster” to exaggerate the risks in any crisis – the bluff 
had to be called.13  
 India’s growing stature in the international arena post-Kargil must have added to 
its confidence. Its behavior during Kargil had ushered in a new era in terms of the 
country’s international standing, centered on its breakthrough with the U.S. With the 
Bush administration having taken over in Washington and a stronger Vajpayee-led 
government in place in New Delhi, the U.S. and India  pushed ahead with their 
multifaceted ‘strategic engagement.’ Just months before the 2001-02 crisis, Indian 
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh explained what improving ties with the U.S. 
                                              
11 C. Raja Mohan, “Fernandes Unveils ‘Limited War’ Doctrine,” The Hindu, January 25, 2002, 
http://www.hindu.com/2000/01/25/stories/01250001.htm. 
12 Rajesh Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism, and India’s Strategic Shift,” India Review 1, 4 (2002): 46-
47. 
13 S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South 
Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 132-33. 
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since 1998 – and specifically his engagement in the nuclear dialogues with Strobe 
Talbott – had meant to India: greater U.S. support for India’s bid for a permanent 
UNSC seat; formation of a joint India-U.S. working group on terrorism; greater 
appreciation for India’s security concerns – with cross-border terrorism from Pakistan 
at its heart; continued interest in India’s position on nuclear issues and increased 
interaction with foreign dignitaries on this subject; and growing diplomatic and 
economic warmth between India and the U.S.14 
 To be sure, India’s desire to seek a closer relationship with the U.S. had not 
wiped out the deep-seated mutual suspicions the two sides had harbored for over 50 
years. Nor had it eliminated the distrust and characterization of the U.S. as an 
imperialist power among much of the Indian strategic enclave.15 Some even went to the 
extent of saying that post-1998 “India sought to improve relations with the superpower 
at the cost of national security.”16 Nonetheless, the post-9/11 context only worked to 
convince the Indian political leadership that the change in global outlook towards 
countries facing terrorism had now bound India and the U.S. by a common grievance 
and that this would get the world to back its position – even that of waging war.17 India 
was now in a position to portray Pakistani support for the insurgency in Indian Kashmir 
as an obvious case of “terrorism” that justified a proactive response to force Pakistan to 
                                              
14  Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 16. 
15 For one representation of this sentiment, see Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram. 
16 Ibid., 89. 
17 Rajesh Kumar, “Revisiting the Kashmir Insurgency, Kargil, and the Twin Peak Crisis: Was the 
Stability/Instability Paradox at Play?” The New England Journal of Political Science 3, 1 (Fall 
2008): 79. 
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reverse its policy.18 Even though Pakistan became the U.S.’s frontline ally in the War 
on Terror after 9/11, “India’s foreign policy establishment quite skillfully emphasized 
its own trials and tribulations with terror and sought to link them to America’s global 
concerns.”19  
The combination of India’s strategic outlook and a favorable post-9/11 
environment meant that it was able to enter the 2001-02 crisis openly committing itself 
to doing unto Pakistan what it had done to it at Kargil – conducting a limited war across 
the LoC – if Pakistan refused to reverse its Kashmir policy and to stop sponsoring 
terrorist acts like the one on December 13 on the Indian parliament. Like Kargil, its 
crisis strategy was one of compellence.20 In taking this approach, India was behaving in 
line with what Press (2005) calls “Never Again Theory” whereby a state’s credibility – 
in this case to follow through on threats linked to the compellence strategy – is perceived 
to be inversely proportional to its past track record of fulfilling its commitments. States 
operating within this framework believe that a poor past track record would make it even 
more costly to back down under a present situation; such a state would thus be expected 
to see a need to push harder and uphold the present threat.21  
 
                                              
18 S. Kalyanaraman, “Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy,” Strategic 
Analysis 26, 4 (2002): 483; Zafar N. Jaspal, “Understanding the Political-Military Context of the 
2002 Military Standoff – A Pakistani Perspective,” in The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: 
Crisis and Escalation in South Asia, ed. Zachary S. Davis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 60. 
19 Sumit Ganguly, “Continuing Challenges,” Securing South Asia: A Symposium on Advancing 
Peace in the Subcontinent, Seminar 517, September 2002. Quoted in Jaspal, “Understanding the 
Political-Military Context,” 60. 
20 Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism,” 47-49. 
21 Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 29. 
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2. Pakistan 
Pakistan’s journey after Kargil was much different than India’s as far as its 
strategic outlook and international stature were concerned. Condemned for its 
irresponsible behavior at Kargil, its fortunes were to dwindle further in the wake of a 
military coup in October 1999 that brought General Parvez Musharraf – the architect of 
the Kargil war – to power.22 After Kargil, and especially after Musharraf’s takeover, the 
levels of infiltration and militancy in Indian Kashmir rose sharply.23 
                                              
22 Musharraf took over reigns of the country in a bloodless coup in which he ousted Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. For the factors that played into this move and details 
of the coup itself, see Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 34-55. 
23 The years 1999-2001 saw some of the highest fatalities of Indian security forces and the 
number of foreign (non-Kashmiri) terrorists operating in Kashmir saw a commensurate 
increase. Praveen Swami, “The Roots of Crisis – Post-Kargil Conflict in Kashmir and the 2001-
2002 Near-War,” in The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation in South Asia, 
ed. Zachary S. Davis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 31-33. The latter was an indicator of 
Pakistan’s support to infiltration of foreign militants across the LoC. As many as 5,000 people 
As India’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective:  
 To compel Pakistan to reverse its sub-conventional pro-militancy strategy 
in Kashmir and support for terrorism on the Indian mainland 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Threaten use of force to pressure Pakistan to reverse its policy 
 Use favorable international sentiment and improved relations with the U.S. 
to build up additional pressure on Pakistan to comply with Indian demands 
 Execute doctrine of limited war should mere threats and diplomacy fail to 
affect a change in Pakistani policy 
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 Not only that but Pakistan-based militant organizations upped their anti-India 
rhetoric, promising attacks not only in Kashmir but also in mainland India. In late-1999 
and early-2000, Hafiz Saeed, the LeT chief repeatedly warned of attacks in Indian 
metropolis and on one occasion singled out the Red Fort in Delhi as a target.24 This was 
a year before the Fort was successfully attacked in December 2000. Other outfits like 
Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami who had been active in Kashmir in the 1990s were making 
threats in the same vein; at least one ominous proclamation promised that “all of its 
[India’s] states will become Kashmir.”25  
It is hardly surprising then that this period was marked by continued tensions in 
the India-Pakistan relationship. Even conciliatory overtures – some of these taken under 
U.S. pressure to improve ties in the inter-crisis period – like a de facto ceasefire on the 
LoC in late-200026 and an effort at bilateral diplomacy marked by the much-hyped Agra 
Summit in July 2001 between the premiers of both sides failed to make any headway. In 
fact, the parlays at Agra left India and Pakistan pointing fingers at each other and only 
raised the temperature further.27 
                                                                                                                                      
were killed in insurgency-related violence in 1999-2000 in Indian Kashmir. Amit Gupta and 
Kaia Leather, “Kashmir: Recent Developments and U.S. Concerns,” Congressional Research 
Service, June 21, 2002, 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/13390.pdf. Swami (2011) 
argues that by increasing levels of violence, Pakistan sought to scuttle the Indian government’s 
late-2000 efforts to initiate a dialogue process with Kashmiri separatists and to demonstrate that 
the Kashmir insurgency was alive and well. Swami, “The Roots of Crisis,” 35-36. 
24 Swami, “The Roots of Crisis,” 30. 
25 “Lashkar, Harkat Issue Fresh Threats,” Times of India, December 12, 1999. Quoted in Swami, 
“The Roots of Crisis,” 41. 
26 Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management,” 14. 
27 For how the Pakistani and Indian premiers saw Agra’s failure, see respectively, Pervez 
Musharraf, In the Line Of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 300-01; and  “‘Mush 
Responsible for Agra Summit Failure’,” Times of India, September 26, 2006, 
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 India was not the only country with whom Pakistan’s relations had deteriorated. 
Islamabad was going through an overall isolationist experience since Kargil.28 Moreover, 
while India was on its way to establishing itself as a mature power in possession of 
nuclear weapons, Islamabad remained cornered. Though not public at the time, the U.S. 
leadership was aware of the nuclear proliferation scandal involving Pakistan’s nuclear 
kingpin A. Q. Khan. As mentioned in chapter three, Khan had transferred nuclear 
technology and hardware to various countries across the world.29 There were also 
suspicions of Pakistani nuclear scientists assisting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.30 
While today Islamabad’s plea that Khan acted as a free agent finds more receptivity, 
Pakistani state’s complicity in the scandal was still under question when the 2001-02 
standoff occurred.31 These episodes combined with the presence of a milieu of militant 
                                                                                                                                      
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-09-26/india/27803608_1_agra-summit-jammu-
and-kashmir-joint-statement. 
28 International sentiments specifically about Pakistan’s Kashmir policy in the post-Kargil period 
were most aptly captured by U.S. President Clinton’s remarks during his brief stopover in 
Pakistan on his way back from his five-day visit to India in March 2000. He said: “International 
sympathy, support, and intervention cannot be won by provoking a bigger, bloodier conflict.” 
“This era does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders in blood.” Charles 
Babington and Pamela Constable, “Clinton Pushes for Peace, Democracy in Pakistan,” 
Washington Post, March 26, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-
03/26/108r-032600-idx.html. 
29 For a detailed account of A. Q. Khan’s ‘nuclear black market,’ see International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation 
Networks - A Net Assessment,” May 2, 2007. 
30 Munir Ahmad, “Pakistan Confirms Probing Scientists,” Associated Press, October 26, 2001, 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2001/Pakistan-Confirms-Probing-Scientists/id-
9d8075ae96d42761ed949ea66efc0824. It later transpired that Bashiruddin Mahmood, one of the 
stalwarts of Pakistan’s nuclear program, and another nuclear scientist Abdul Majid had met Al 
Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the summer of 2001. They confirmed Bin Laden’s inquiry about 
attaining nuclear weapons. Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 360-63. 
31 Even now, the Pakistani state, while not implicated, has also not been completely absolved. The 
International Institute of Strategic Studies presented to the press its in-depth investigation on the 
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outfits on Pakistani soil had heightened fears of the possibility of ‘loose nukes’ in 
Pakistan.32 The Pakistani leadership was under the scanner and had to make repeated 
public assertions assuring the world of the safety and security of its arsenal in the weeks 
following 9/11.33  
Pakistan found some respite unexpectedly courtesy of the 9/11 attacks that 
thrust Afghanistan into the limelight and led the U.S. to launch a military campaign 
against the Taliban government in Afghanistan in October 2001. Under a time bound 
ultimatum of being “with us or against us” from the U.S., the Pakistani government 
under Musharraf agreed to undertake a reversal of the country’s pro-Taliban policy.34 
The move catapulted Pakistan to the status of a frontline U.S. ally in Afghanistan 
overnight. Interestingly, in convincing his nation, President Musharraf revealed the 
                                                                                                                                      
A. Q. Khan affair and the global nuclear blackmarket with an observation that accurately reflects 
the general view today: “Past Pakistani government knowledge of and even involvement in A.Q. 
Khan’s secondary proliferation activities remains open to debate. The connection between A.Q. 
Khan and the Pakistani government does not lend itself to easy delineation. The Pakistani 
government should have known what key officials such as Khan were up to in an area so 
fundamental to Pakistan’s national security and international reputation, and it is logical to 
assume that its intelligence apparatus did know more than Pakistan has ever let on. While 
knowledge of a transaction implies complicity, however, it does not necessarily denote 
authorization. Most of Khan’s dealings were carried out on his own initiative.” John Chipman, 
“Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks - A Net 
Assessment,” Press Statement. May 2, 2007, https://www.iiss.org/-
/media/Silos/Press%20Releases/2007/Black-Markets-Dossier-Press-Statement/Black-Markets-
Dossier-Press-Statement.pdf. 
32 Joshi, “Practice of Coercive Diplomacy,” 97.  
33 The concern about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons was already being 
debated in the international press at the time. For examples of Pakistani official statements 
rebuking these concerns in the weeks following 9/11, see “No Danger to Nuclear Assets: FO,” 
The News, October 30, 2001, 1; “Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets in Safe Hands, says Sattar,” The 
News, November 2, 2001, 1; “No Country can Find Location of Pak N-assets,” The News, 
November 8, 2001, 1. 
34 Musharraf claims that U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage threatened Pakistan’s 
ISI chief that Pakistan “should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age” if it did not 
support the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201.   
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deep-rooted Pakistani suspicions towards the U.S.: a refusal to assist America may lead 
Washington to try and forcibly neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.35    
Even as this development meant that Pakistan’s de facto pariah status had ended 
abruptly – much to India’s disliking –, worries about the safety and security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear assets, opposition to use of militant Islam as an essential part of 
Pakistan’s regional policy toolkit, and acute mutual mistrust between Washington and 
Islamabad remained intact. On the other hand however was the reality that U.S.’s 
compulsion to use Pakistan as a transit route into land-locked Afghanistan and its 
demands for Pakistan to employ troops on its Western border to complement U.S.’s 
efforts in Afghanistan had made Washington excessively dependent on Pakistan.  
As the terrorists struck the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001 then, 
Pakistan found itself in an awkward position. On the one hand, it realized that the world 
had not forgotten its behavior at Kargil and that its policies still continued to worry 
most world capitals; any recklessness would have antagonized the international 
community. Especially in the backdrop of the nuclear proliferation scandal and 
international concern about its weapons, Islamabad could ill-afford to come across as 
irresponsible in the management of its nuclear capability in a crisis situation. On the 
other hand however, Pakistan remained intrinsically wedded to the Kashmir issue and 
was politically unable to give into Indian demands for complete policy reversal. Not 
only did the Pakistani military strongly believe in the merits of the sub-conventional 
                                              
35 Ibid., 202; Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation 
and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2013, 15, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf. 
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Kashmir strategy as intrinsic to the country’s “offensive-defense” military doctrine,36 
but now Pakistan’s U-turn on the Taliban policy of the 1990s also meant that it had 
already irked the pro-Taliban Islamist enclave and alienating the pro-Kashmir militants 
could easily have resulted in a united militant front against the Pakistani state.37 Thus, 
Pakistan was faced with the paradoxical challenge of avoiding condemnation from the 
international community while keeping its Kashmir policy intact. It had working for it 
its position as the frontline U.S. ally in the freshly started war in Afghanistan.  
 
                                              
36 Joshi, “Practice of Coercive Diplomacy,” 67. 
37 The fear was not unfounded as has been proven by the metastasis of militant outfits in Pakistan 
over the past decade. As Pakistan tried to pull back from its active support to some of the militant 
outfits after the 2001-02 standoff, a number of traditionally anti-India outfits splintered and 
turned to fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan or against the Pakistani state. For 
a description and analysis of this metastasis, see Moeed Yusuf (with contributions from Megan 
Neville, Ayesha Chugh, and Stephanie Flamenbaum), “Pakistan’s Military Challenge: From 
Where, to What,” in Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Challenge, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014 [forthcoming]), ch.1. 
As Pakistan’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective: 
 To deter Indian use of force, limited or full-scale 
 To avoid a forced reversal of its pro-militancy Kashmir policy 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Threaten retaliation in case of Indian aggression 
 Use its new-found leverage with the U.S. to pressure India to give up its 
designs to employ force and to back off from pressuring Pakistan 
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3. The Third Party: U.S.’s Crisis Outlook 
From the U.S. perspective, the 2001-02 crisis came at a very delicate time. The 
origins of the 9/11 attacks in Afghanistan had brought South Asia’s importance to the 
fore after a decade’s lull. Unlike Kargil, Washington now had real and immediate 
security interests at stake in the region.   
While the U.S. had shown interest in courting India towards a better relationship 
since 1999 and was looking to offer it tangible support in terms of military exercises, 
technology sales, economic warmth, and acceptance of India as a victim of terrorism,38 
it now also needed Pakistan for success in its campaign in Afghanistan.39 On the eve of 
the December 13, 2001 parliament attack, Pakistan had only just finished moving over 
100,000 troops to its Western border to complement U.S. military efforts across the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border.40 During the twin peaks crisis, the U.S. military would 
                                              
38 P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: 
American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 165.  
39 Pakistan’s role was critical in terms of providing logistical and transit support and 
intelligence on the Afghan Taliban to the U.S.-led international military presence. Zahid 
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 37. Moreover, Pakistan’s border tribal areas were beginning to become 
important to the fight as a number of Taliban and affiliated Islamist militants had escaped the 
U.S. attack in Afghanistan and found refuge in these semi-autonomous regions. The U.S. 
needed the Pakistani military to provide the “anvil” to its “hammer” across the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. For developments during this period as well as the later transformation of 
these tribal areas, see Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier 
(New York: Viking, 2009); Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the 
Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 
2008), 265-83; Hussain, Frontline Pakistan. 
40 David Smith, “The 2001-2002 Standoff: A Real Time View from Islamabad,” in The India-
Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation In South Asia, ed. Zachary S. Davis (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 191; Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia,” 16. 
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also establish physical presence in Pakistan, including airbases in Western Pakistan.41 
An escalated India-Pakistan crisis potentially threatened to cause direct physical 
damage to this presence. 
Washington’s customary concern about escalatory potential of an India-Pakistan 
nuclear crisis was also intact. It was even more salient now given that any escalation 
would have undermined the U.S.’s Afghanistan campaign. With Pakistani and Indian 
nuclear capabilities still opaque and with disparate doctrinal positions and a high degree 
of ambiguity in their posturing, U.S. policy makers genuinely believed that the risk of 
escalation was high in the South Asian context. In the days after the December 13 
parliament attack, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) assessment confirmed 
its belief of a high risk of inadvertent escalation born out of the lack of clear 
understanding on both sides on how and when conventional war could escalate.42 CIA 
Director George Tenet revealed the outlook while testifying before the U.S. Senate in 
February 2002: “….a conventional war – once begun – could escalate into a nuclear 
confrontation.”43 The White House’s fears would have only been exacerbated by its 
knowledge of the A. Q. Khan proliferation affair and by the perceived prospects of 
terrorists managing to get their hands on the Pakistani arsenal in an environment 
                                              
41 Joshi, “The Practice of Coercive Diplomacy,” 71; Khalid Hasan, “US Forces at Jacobabad 
Airbase: Pakistan Agreed to Long Term Use,” Daily Times, October 29, 2002, 
http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/29-Oct-2002/us-forces-at-jacobabad-airbase.  
42 Steve Coll, “The Standoff: How Jihadi Groups Helped Provoke the Twenty-First Century’s 
First Nuclear Crisis,” The New Yorker, February 13, 2006, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213fa_fact_coll.  
43 George J. Tenet, “Worldwide Threat – Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World” (testimony 
of Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 
6, 2002), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-
testimony/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192002.html.  
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shrouded in the fog of war.44 Finally, the U.S. also remained concerned about 
Pakistan’s deliberate nuclear weapon use relatively early on in a crisis. Colonel David 
Smith, a U.S. Army officer posted at the American embassy at Islamabad during the 
standoff and considered an authority on the Pakistani military confirmed this in a 
statement representative of the wider thinking in U.S. policy circles: “Cross the red line, 
they [Pakistan] would use it. No question in my mind. If their country was destroyed, so 
be it. They would take India down with them.”45 In essence, under no circumstances 
could the U.S. afford to let the situation get out of control.  
It was the first time the U.S. was entering a crisis situation in South Asia which 
all but necessitated good ties with both India and Pakistan. While Washington had to be 
careful not to alienate Pakistan, backing Islamabad outright would have jeopardized its 
broader strategic interests with India. It would also have laid bare Washington’s 
duplicity – promoting a doctrine of preemption against terrorism on the one hand46 and 
                                              
44 Coll, “The Standoff.” The fear of terrorists getting access to an operational Pakistani arsenal is 
most relevant to a crisis situation given that Pakistan’s arsenal is believed to be kept de-mated and 
separately stored during peace time. Amidst crises, any move to mate, transport, and disperse 
increases the possibility of sabotage by terrorists, with or without insider support. On the 
concerns about ‘loose nukes’ in Pakistan, see generally Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Nuclear Security 
in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today (July/August 2009),  
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/Mowatt-Larssen; Vipin Narang, “Posturing for 
Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, 3 
(Winter 2009-10). 
45 Coll, “The Standoff.”  
46 The George W. Bush administration in the U.S. had adopted a doctrine of preemption that 
justified the use of military force against regimes and countries perceived to be posing a threat to 
U.S. national security even if such threat was not imminent. The doctrine was codified in the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America document released in September 2002. 
National Security Council, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 
September 20, 2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html. The 
essence of the doctrine was captured in a speech by President Bush at the West Point military 
academy in June 2002: “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We 
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backing an alleged supporter of militant outfits in Indian Kashmir on the other. U.S. 
policy had to walk a tight rope between these two extremes while pushing for swift 
crisis termination to rule out any possibility of escalation to the nuclear level. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then 
systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too 
long…..Our security will require transforming the military…..that must be ready to strike at a 
moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to 
be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our 
liberty and to defend our lives.” The text of the speech is available at “President Bush Delivers 
Graduation Speech at West Point,” The White House, June 1, 2002, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html. The doctrine was 
employed most controversially in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
This preemptive doctrine should have most logically implied, not only U.S. receptivity to India’s 
characterization of the Kashmiri insurgency as “terrorism” but also support to take the fight to 
the source of terrorist infiltration in Pakistani Kashmir. Russell J. Leng, “Realpolitik and 
Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. 
T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 121. 
As the third party’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective: 
 To ensure the crisis did not escalate to the nuclear level 
 To avoid any development that negatively affected the U.S.-led campaign 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s ability to support it 
 To ensure that the strengthening U.S.-India relationship was not 
undermined 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Focus on de-escalation and swift crisis termination to prevent war 
without alienating either side  
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III. AS THE CRISIS UNFOLDED: CLASSIC NUCLEAR CRISIS BEHAVIOR 
VERSUS BROKERED BARGAINING  
Crisis behavior during the twin peaks crisis can be best analyzed across the two 
phases marked by the ‘peaks’ – phase I from the December 13, 2001 parliament attack till 
the May 14, 2002 Kaluchak attack; and phase II from the Kaluchak attack till India’s 
demobilization in October 2002 – and the tail end of the crisis between October 2002 and 
April 2003. Below, we examine Indian and Pakistani actions and signals in these phases 
through a classic brinkmanship lens to highlight how the crisis would be seen to play out 
in the absence of a substantive third party role. We subsequently reevaluate the crisis 
with an eye on our trilateral framework.  
1. Was it Classic Brinkmanship? 
A. Phase I: The First Peak 
(i) Indian Quest for Compellence 
The initial days after the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian parliament were 
extremely tense. Amidst Indian allegations of LeT and JeM involvement in the attack, the 
Indian government produced a list of specific demands for Pakistan. New Delhi wanted a 
stop to LeT and JeM activities; a closure of their offices and freezing of their assets in 
Pakistan; and detention of the groups’ leadership.47 About two weeks into the crisis, India 
also handed over to Pakistan a list of 20 alleged criminals wanted for heinous crimes in 
India and asked for their extradition.48  
                                              
47 Patrik Bratton, “Signals and Orchestration: India’s Use of Compellence in the 2001-2002 
Crisis,” Strategic Analysis 34, 4 (2010): 596. 
48 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 95. 
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It was clear from India’s demeanor that use of force against Pakistan was on the 
cards or, at the very least, India was willing to put its military preparedness on display to 
compel Pakistan into amenable action. On December 15, the Indian Cabinet Committee 
on Security (CCS), the highest decision making body on national security issues, 
authorized military mobilization.49 Various military options were discussed among 
decision makers during this period. While a consensus was elusive, the political top brass 
seemed to be favoring limited operations involving “hot pursuit” or “punitive use of 
force.”50 The military however presented plans for a “short and intense war” that would 
put the onus of conventional escalation on Pakistan.51 It envisioned primarily targeting 
Pakistani Kashmir through multiple thrusts across the LoC to inhibit infiltration in 
tandem with full-scale mobilization along the international border to take on a Pakistani 
offensive should it expand the war theater in response.52 This was perhaps the closest the 
Indian military had come to specifying its hitherto vaguely defined doctrine of “limited 
war under the nuclear umbrella.”  
Pakistan dug in on its part, denying any involvement in the parliament attack – 
in fact vocally condemning it and thereby signaling its distinction between ‘terrorism’ 
and the situation in Kashmir – and offering an impartial inquiry.53 This only frustrated 
India further. On December 18, Prime Minister Vajpayee asked his military service 
chiefs to prepare for war, albeit without giving them specific direction on what he 
                                              
49 Khan, Eating Grass, 347. 
50 Bratton, “Signals and Orchestration,” 600. 
51 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 77.  
52 Ibid., 73. 
53 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 153. 
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expected to achieve from it.54 The result was “Operation Parakram” (Valor), India’s 
largest military mobilization since the India-Pakistan war of 1971.55 India reportedly 
put 95 percent of its air force on alert, deployed its fighter jets, and moved and put into 
position its short range Prithvi missiles.56 Within days, bunkers had been dug, mines had 
been laid to reinforce defensive positions along the border, heavy artillery was being 
moved to the front, and India’s defensive and strike corps were beginning to take war-
ready positions.57  India subsequently also moved its aircraft carrier and other ships 
including submarines to the Western front.58 At the turn of the year, it also commenced 
its largest military exercise on the international border in 15 years – Exercise 
‘Chivalry.’59 A classic brinkmanship exercise was on display; India had upped the ante 
and was conveying resolve to use force despite the risks of escalation inherent in such 
aggression. Pakistan had absorbed the message. Within a week of the initiation of 
Operation Parakram, Pakistani estimates believed that Indian preparations had reached 
                                              
54 When asked what the goal of the order was, the Prime Minister reportedly responded by saying 
“wo baad mein batayein gey” (that we’ll tell you later). Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 
62.  
55  When complete, India had mobilized half a million troops on the international border. Ibid., 
10; Khan, Eating Grass, 347.  
56 Wallace J. Thies and Dorle Hellmuth, “Critical Risk and the 2002 Kashmir Crisis,” The 
Nonproliferation Review 11, 3 (Fall-Winter 2004): 7; Vishal Thapar, “Prithvi Missiles Moved 
Near Border in Punjab,” Hindustan Times, December 25, 2001; Sujit Chatterjee and V. S. 
Chandersekar, “India’s Missile System in Position: Fernandez,” Rediff, December 26, 2001, 
http://in.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/26fer.htm. 
57 Basrur, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 307. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism,” 48. The exercise also included deployment of special “anti-nuke” 
attack units.  “A Unique Army Exercise,” The Hindu, December 30, 2001, 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2001/12/30/stories/2001123001040100.htm. These tests to cope 
with a nuclear strike would have been a signal of India’s willingness to risk the possibility of 
escalation – in case Pakistan remained recalcitrant.  
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a stage where they could launch an attack within 24 hours.60 Islamabad believed the 
possibility of such an attack to be real. 
Early-January 2002 was to be the defining period in India’s efforts to raise the 
stakes. Reportedly, the Indian military had been given the go-ahead to aggress and was 
in position to launch an offensive somewhere between January 5-7, 2002.61 However, 
an operation “to hit and seal off major terrorist launching pads in Pakistan occupied 
Kashmir” was called off at the last minute.62 In fact, after U.S. satellites picked up 
Indian II Corps’ movement into offensive strike positions and confronted India with 
evidence suggesting an imminent attack on Pakistan, New Delhi abruptly removed Lt. 
General Vij, the concerned Corps Commander,  for having gone beyond orders.63 Sood 
and Sawhney (2003) argue that the move signified the Indian political leadership’s 
backtracking on their approval of military action rather than a case where General Vij 
had exceeded his authority.64 The decision was inconsistent with Indian behavior to that 
point and signaled either a change of heart or weakened resolve among the political 
leadership. 
Next came Pakistani President Musharraf’s January12 televised speech in which 
he promised to act against militant outfits and announced bans on LeT and JeM. 
                                              
60 Smith, “The 2001-2002 Standoff,” 194-95. 
61 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 80; Alex Stolar, “To the Brink: Indian Decision-
Making and the 2001-2002 Standoff,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 68, February 2008, 
14. 
62 P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Henry L. 
Stimson Center, Working Paper 1.0, August 2003, 21, 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/escalation_chari_1.pdf. 
63 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 80. 
64 Ibid.  
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Abruptly, the worst of phase I had ended: even as the Indian military remained 
mobilized and in position to execute its military plans and continued signaling resolve – 
most prominently through a test of its Agni I nuclear capable ballistic missile on 
January 25 –,65 Indian posturing suggesting an imminent danger of war subsided after 
this point.  
India matched its military mobilization with aggressive rhetoric throughout the 
first month of the crisis; in terms of employing extreme coercion then, the package was 
complete: full military preparations were backed by aggressive signaling to convey 
political resolve to use force and to enhance the credibility of India’s deterrent 
capability. There was broad support for this resolute Indian stance. The Indian Prime 
Minister’s domestic political constituencies came out in support of, in fact pressured, 
the government to target militant camps in Pakistan.66 Immediately after the parliament 
attack, the Indian cabinet also threatened in a unanimous resolution that India would 
“liquidate the terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are, whoever they are.”67 The 
government continued to up the ante with Prime Minister Vajpayee declaring that the 
                                              
65 With its range of 700-900 kilometers and 1,000 kilogram payload, this missile system was 
“Pakistan specific.” Feroz H. Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in 
South Asia,” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon, 
Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 88. 
Even as India downplayed the test and maintained that it was driven by technological demands, 
former Indian Army Chief General V. P. Malik rightly pointed out that the test was part of India’s 
coercive crisis strategy. Atul Aneja and Sandeep Dikshit, “Short-range Agni Test-Fired,” The 
Hindu, January 26, 2002, http://hindu.com/2002/01/26/stories/2002012605030100.htm; Sumit 
Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, 2 (April-June, 2005): 301-302. 
66 Srinath Raghavan, “A Coercive Triangle: India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Crisis of 
2001-2002,” Defence Studies 9, 2 (June 2009): 244-245. 
67 Celia W. Dugger, “Terrorists Attack Parliament in India, Killing Seven People,” New York 
Times, December 13, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/13CND-
INDIA.html?ex=12100464008. 
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parliament attack was a challenge to the Indian nation’s very “existence and honor” and 
thus “other [military] options are all open.”68 Meanwhile, in a major diplomatic move, 
India recalled its High Commissioner to Islamabad on December 21 and cut the strength 
of its mission in Islamabad and Pakistan’s in New Delhi to half less than a week later.69 
Not since 1971 had such formal downgrading of diplomatic ties occurred.70 This move 
eliminated the possibility of any regular diplomatic channels being used by the two sides 
during the crisis; indeed, the 2001-02 standoff was peculiar in that India and Pakistan 
never talked directly in a strictly bilateral setting. Subsequently, India banned bus and 
train services between the two countries.71 Hints were also dropped that India could 
consider revoking Pakistan’s Most Favored Nation status.72 
Nuclear signals were also provocative even though India continued to reinforce 
its NFU stance. While discussing the nuclear calculus on the floor of the Indian 
parliament on December 18, Indian junior Minister Omar Abdullah stated that 
“geographical features should not leave anyone in doubt so as to who would recover 
from such an [nuclear] attack.”73 Relentless deterrent threats continued over the next 
fortnight. Significantly, on January 2, 2002, a time when the Indian military was all but 
                                              
68 “All Options are Open: PM,” The Hindu, December 20, 2001, 
http://hindu.com/2001/12/20/stories/2001122001010100.htm 
69 “India Recalls High Commissioner to Pakistan: Samjhauta Express, Lahore Bus Service to be 
Terminated,” Tribune, December 21, 2001, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011222/main1.htm; “India Cuts Strengths of Missions by 
Half: Bans Overflights by Pakistani Planes,” Tribune, December 28, 2001, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011228/main1.htm. 
70 Stolar, “To the Brink,” 9. 
71 Bratton, “Signals and Orchestration,” 597. 
72 Ibid. 
73 “Pak Designs will be Foiled: Omar,” The Hindu, December 19, 2001, 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2001/12/19/stories/2001121901451100.htm. 
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ready to launch an offensive in Pakistani Kashmir, the Indian Prime Minister stated 
ominously: “no weapon would be spared in self-defense. Whatever weapon was 
available, it would be used no matter how it wounded the enemy.”74  
It was not until January 7, the week in which India was confronted with 
information about its II Corps being on an active war footing that Defense Minister 
George Fernandez sought to ease the nerves through a formal statement. He reiterated 
India’s NFU and assured that “no surgical strike has been planned against anyone.”75 On 
January 10, Indian Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani reassured his audience during a 
visit to Washington by stating that India “will not abandon restraint and the country 
would stand by its assertion of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.”76 The next day, 
Fernandez sent his second prudence signal in four days but this time it was aimed at 
clarifying the Indian Army chief’s provocation earlier in the day. While addressing a 
press conference on January 11, Army Chief General Padmanabhan had stated that 
India had a second strike capability and that any country “mad enough” to initiate a 
nuclear strike against India will be “punished severely.”77 In what was likely a tag team 
                                              
74 J. P. Shukla, “No Weapon Will be Spared for Self-Defence: PM,” The Hindu, January 3, 2002, 
http://www.hindu.com/2002/01/03/stories/2002010303010100.htm. This statement has been 
noted as a reaction to President Musharraf’s comments at a Corps Commanders meeting in 
Rawalpindi where he had expressed satisfaction at the military’s preparedness to inflict 
“unacceptable damage” on India. “JCSC Reviews Counter-strategy,” Dawn, January 3, 2002, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/13217/jcsc-reviews-counter-strategy.  
75 “No War, but Troops to Stay Where they are: George,” Indian Express, January 7, 2002 . 
76 Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Bush Expects Musharraf to Take all Steps Against Terrorism,” The 
Hindu, January 11, 2002, 
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effort,78 Fernandez immediately rebutted the statement arguing that “the use of nuclear 
weapons is far too serious a matter that it should be bandied about in a cavalier 
manner.”79 On January 13, India responded with cautious optimism to Musharraf’s 
pledge to clamp down on militant outfits made during his speech but promised to keep 
its military mobilized till it saw tangible signs of a reversal of Pakistan’s pro-militancy 
policy vis-à-vis India.  
(ii) Pakistan’s Defiant Balancing Act 
Pakistan began the crisis by denying any links to the parliament attack and 
blaming India for stage-managing the episode.80 Simultaneously, it displayed its 
conventional military preparedness in the face of Indian mobilization. Pakistan’s 
counter-mobilization included, much to Washington’s dismay, an eastward 
redeployment of parts of the two corps it had stationed on its Western border with 
Afghanistan to assist the U.S. Afghan campaign just a month earlier.81 On December 25, 
it was reported that Pakistan had “moved” its short-range Hatf conventional missiles.82 
Even as Pakistan continued to emphasize its preparedness, it simultaneously stressed 
that it was only reacting to the mobilization of India’s superior military might and that 
                                              
78 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 177. The author’s interviews 
with former Indian officials suggest that it is highly unlikely that an Indian Army Chief would 
have taken the liberty to make such statements without either a formal approval or a tacit nod 
from the civilian principals. Some however have argued that General Padmanabhan’s comments 
were unauthorized and his own. Bratton, “Signals and Orchestration,” 604. 
79 “Uncalled for Concerns: Fernandes,” The Hindu, January 12, 2002, 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/01/12/stories/2002011201040100.htm. 
80 Smith, “The 2001-2002 Standoff,” 195.   
81 Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management,” 16. 
82 Atul Aneja and Sandeep Dikshit, “Pakistan Moves Missiles Closer to Border,” The Hindu, 
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its build up was defensive in nature. In an official statement representative of a 
conscious and persistent effort to project that it had been forced to do so, the Pakistani 
President’s spokesperson stated on December 27: “They (India) have moved all their 
formations to the border. We know it. We are monitoring that and as minimum defensive 
measures, we will just move minimum troops if we have to.”83 This public posturing 
continued even as Pakistan mobilized fully to match the Indian deployment. 
In terms of on-ground actions that were linked directly to activating the nuclear 
arsenal, reports suggested that Pakistan may have moved its Chinese-supplied M-11 
nuclear-capable missiles in early-January 2002.84 In mid-January, the press reported U.S. 
intelligence-based information alleging that Pakistan was preparing five launch sites for 
these missiles.85 Pakistani officials have continued to deny any such movement to this 
day.86 Nonetheless, on-ground military preparations during the first month of the crisis 
confirmed that both Pakistan and India were on war footing and fully expectant of an 
outbreak of conflict. Localized skirmishes across the LoC had continued with some 
ferocity throughout this period.   
                                              
83 “Pak. Rules Out Nuclear War,” The Hindu, December 28, 2001, 
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Risk,” 7. 
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Pakistan’s non-military response to India’s actions and signals however was 
unlike its tit-for-tat behavior in demonstrating military preparedness. In terms of tangible 
measures taken to address Indian concerns about cross-border terrorism, Pakistan showed 
some flexibility after its initial recalcitrance. By end-December 2001, Pakistan had 
rounded up at least 50 militants belonging to LeT and JeM.87 The defining moment of 
phase I however came with President Musharraf’s January 12, 2002 speech. In what was 
an obvious departure from Pakistan’s traditional stance of pleading disassociation with 
militants operating in Kashmir, Musharraf affirmed that Pakistan was threatened by 
militant groups and that he would no longer tolerate them in any form. He announced the 
banning of five militant organizations including LeT and JeM and vowed not to allow 
Pakistani soil to be used for terrorism in Indian Kashmir. Even though he pledged to 
continue “moral, political, and diplomatic” support for the Kashmir cause and refused to 
hand over the 20 alleged criminals demanded by India, his speech was essentially an 
acceptance of ongoing infiltration into Kashmir from Pakistani soil.88 The Pakistani state 
followed up this pledge by detaining 1,430 alleged militants and sealing as many as 390 
offices suspected of links to militant organizations by January 15.89 Even though a 
number of these individuals were to be released soon thereafter and infiltration was to 
rise again during the spring of 2002, Musharraf’s speech and these detentions helped 
ratchet down tensions. India’s compellence seemed to have delivered.  
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The most counterintuitive aspect of Pakistani behavior however was how it went 
about signaling its intent. Pakistan wasted no opportunity to convey its commitment to 
retaliate in kind to any Indian military aggression. This went along with its counter-
mobilization and with the overall tense atmosphere. In terms of conveying deterrent 
threats however, Pakistan’s demeanor was a stark contrast. When tensions were at their 
highest in the first month after December 13, Pakistani nuclear signals conveyed maturity 
and prudence. The tone changed in favor of conveying resolve to the adversary much 
after tensions had decreased and the imminent threat of war had subsided. 90   
                                              
90 Much of Pakistan’s resolve signaling occurred from March onwards when phase I was all but 
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conventionally,” the message was interpreted differently by the international press. “Pakistani 
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perhaps hinting at a move away from Pakistan’s restraint in terms of its nuclear signals during the 
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reinforcement along the Pakistani border during the spring of 2002. Waheguru P. S. Sidhu, 
“Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram: The Victory of Theory?” in The India-Pakistan 
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In the initial days and weeks of the crisis, there seemed to have been a conscious 
effort to avoid any sense that Pakistan’s First-Use doctrine made it trigger-happy or eager 
to deploy its nuclear option. The first noticeable mention of nuclear weapons came on 
December 21 when Musharraf responded to a question on the security of Pakistan’s 
weapons during a press interview: “I can say they [the nuclear and missile assets] are 
absolutely secure. We have no doubt.”91 He again sought to convey calm amidst 
aggressive Indian rhetoric by stating on December 27 that Pakistan will “step very 
cautiously….as we are a responsible state of 140 million people with nuclear 
capabilities.”92 Keeping up with the pattern of prudence signaling, Foreign Minister 
Abdul Sattar stated on December 29: “Nuclear weapons are awful weapons and any use 
of these weapons should be inconceivable for any state.”93 He further added the next day 
that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were meant for defense and deterrence, and that it “did 
not want a local, general or nuclear war.”94  
Pakistan also made an attempt to signal its nuclear threshold in January. This was 
the first time it had done so since the May 1998 nuclear tests. General Khalid Kidwai, the 
head of Pakistan’s nuclear establishment enunciated Pakistan’s red lines while talking to 
a group of Italian scientists: Pakistan would employ the nuclear option if India attacks 
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Pakistan and takes over a large part of its territory (space threshold); it destroys a large 
part of Pakistan’s land or air forces (military threshold); it proceeds to strangle Pakistan 
economically (economic threshold); or it pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or 
creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic threshold).95 While many 
have seen this as a provocative signal conveying Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold, it was 
a clever message that conveyed resolve but was equally meant to allay concerns that 
Pakistan would choose to use its nuclear capability early on in a conflict.96  The message 
was that nuclear weapons use would only be contemplated if conventional deterrence 
failed completely. In that sense, it was a prudence signal, meant to challenge the 
prevalent concern about Pakistan military’s risk-taking tendencies, an anxiety that had 
only been accentuated by the Kargil episode.  
B. Phase II: The Second Peak 
(i) India’s Complex Behavior 
While the imminent threat of war had begun to subside after mid-January 2002, 
India had not found enough reason to order de-mobilization of its troops. As the winter 
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months passed and the spring season made conditions conducive for infiltration again, the 
cross-border militant movement into Kashmir began to soar. Pakistan had released as 
many as 1,800 of the 2,000 individuals it had rounded up in January. 97 By April, about 
60 militant camps were operating in Pakistani Kashmir; as many as 2,000 militants 
allegedly crossed over into Indian Kashmir by May.98 On what turned out to be the eve of 
the Kaluchak attack, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh publicly alleged that 
Musharraf had broken his promise and that militants had been freed to operate again.99 
New Delhi was vindicated in its reluctance to pull its troops back and formally 
end the crisis when terrorists struck Kaluchak on May 14, 2002. This attack was 
potentially more far-reaching than the December 13 assault not only because Indian and 
Pakistani militaries were still mobilized but also because the attack had targeted the 
families of Indian Army personnel. Also, between January and June 2002, the Indian 
military had rethought its offensive plans arguing that the “short but intense” war was 
best suited when India had the element of surprise to its advantage. After the Kaluchak 
incident, the Indian military backed a full-scale conventional attack across Pakistan’s 
Thar desert designed to deliver a sledgehammer blow and enter deep inside Pakistan.100 It 
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was to be a war of attrition, a “degradation” operation as it was later termed.101 How such 
a massive attack was to be carried out without escalating the crisis and flirting with 
Pakistan’s nuclear red lines was never clear. 
Nonetheless, in the days following Kaluchak, India sent several additional fighter 
jets to forward bases, five of the most sophisticated ships were deployed with the 
Western fleet, and INS Viraat, India’s only aircraft carrier was placed on alert.102 On May 
17, Indian army commenced heavy shelling across the LoC and Prime Minister 
Vajpayee cancelled a vacation plan to attend military briefings.103 There was also a 
growing sentiment within the Indian military circles that force must be used; backing 
down again was seen to be tantamount to capitulation. In the words of a senior retired 
Army officer: “we will lose face if we do not fight after such a build-up and 
withdraw.”104 It would demonstrate that India could only threaten and not fight. Towards 
end-May, Indian press was reporting that an attack on Pakistan was planned for mid-
June.105   
The seeming imminence of war notwithstanding, the outcome in phase II was 
identical to phase I. Pakistani President Musharraf made a speech on May 27 in which he 
reaffirmed his pledge not to allow cross-border infiltration into Kashmir. India did not 
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use force and by mid-June, Indian officials were acknowledging that war had been 
averted. Shelling on the LoC was down by as much as 90 percent soon thereafter and by 
late-June, India had restored Pakistani over flights and ceased some of its patrolling in the 
Arabian Sea even as its troops remained mobilized.106 While infiltration levels were to 
rise again by the autumn, the peak in phase II had long passed by then.  
Part of India’s verbal signaling was unsurprisingly hawkish. Indian leaders 
made a number of offensive threats and repeatedly hinted at the imminence of war in 
the days following the Kaluchak attack. Perhaps the most provocative were Prime 
Minister Vajpayee’s statements on May 22. Speaking to Indian soldiers, he conveyed a 
message akin to a troop commander’s motivational speech to soldiers before combat: “the 
time has come for a decisive battle and we will have a sure victory in this battle” and that 
“the enemy has thrown us a challenge by waging a proxy war. We accept it and pledge to 
give it a crushing defeat.” 107Just two days after his rallying message, in a move that 
surprised most observers and one that must have left the Indian troops confused about the 
political government’s intent, Vajpayee proceeded for the five-day vacation he had 
postponed a week earlier.108 No obvious development related to the crisis had occurred to 
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affect this seeming change of heart.109 Nonetheless, there was a visible shift in India’s 
signaling posture after this point. While hard-hitting rhetoric continued and the threat of 
war remained exceptionally high for another fortnight,  New Delhi now spent 
considerable energy explicitly addressing the international community in what was 
obviously a bid both to present Pakistan as irresponsible and constantly troubling and to 
get the international actors to increase pressure on it to reverse its Kashmir policy. India 
would maintain this signaling pattern through the end of the crisis.110  Finally, India’s 
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http://www.dawn.com/news/43800/delhi-reacts-to-musharraf-remarks.  Even much after tensions 
had subsided in phase II, India continued its attempts by piggy backing on U.S. rhetoric 
regarding the right to prevention and preemption. Immediately after the release of U.S.’s 
National Security Strategy in September 2002, Jaswant Singh, now having taken over as India’s 
Finance Minister, sought to draw parallels between America and India’s challenge by stating 
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nuclear signals were conveyed in tandem with the effort at international outreach and 
were relatively more restrained than in phase I. They however sought to create an 
interesting mix between signaling resolve and emphasizing prudence even if this induced 
an obvious contradiction at times. A glaring example came in early-June. On June 3, the 
Indian Defense Ministry stated: “The government makes it clear that India does not 
believe in the use of nuclear weapons. Neither does it visualize that it will be used by any 
other country.”111 The same day however, Yogendra Narain, India’s Defense Secretary 
responded to aggressive Pakistani rhetoric during this period by threatening that India 
would retaliate with nuclear weapons if Pakistan used its atomic arsenal: “Everything is 
finalized. It is in the hands of the civilian government and we don’t expect any delay in 
issuing orders.”112 A quick clarification was however issued by the same Ministry: “India 
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categorically rules out the use of nuclear weapons. India is a responsible country and it 
feels that it would be imprudent to use such weapons.”113 The fact that all these signals 
came from the top of the Defense Ministry suggests that they were deliberate and sought 
to balance the resolve-prudence tradeoff as far as deterrent threats were concerned.  
(ii) Pakistan’s Persistent Defiance 
Pakistan was on the defensive again as India blamed the Kaluchak attack on LeT. 
Moreover, the resurgence of cross-border infiltration levels clearly suggested that 
Musharraf was unwilling or unable to reverse his country’s Kashmir policy. At the same 
time however, Pakistan had grounds to see itself as having emerged from phase I ahead 
of India. Even though Musharraf had to acknowledge infiltration, India did not manage to 
launch an offensive, Pakistan had continuously pointed at India for having initiated 
military mobilization, it had exhibited restraint in nuclear signaling during the first peak 
of the crisis, and most importantly, the international community, while expressing 
support and sympathy for India never backed its plans to use force. It therefore may have 
felt that it had more space to convey resolve to deter an Indian attack in phase II.  
In terms of military preparations, Pakistan’s counter-mobilization in phase I was 
intact. As tensions soared after the attack, reports surfaced that Pakistan had also 
relocated its nuclear capable Shaheen missiles closer to the border.114 Consequent chatter 
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around Pakistan’s nuclear movements prompted India’s junior External Affairs Minister 
to say that “…..Pakistan will be stupid to consider nuclear option.”115 Nonetheless, 
shortly afterwards, between May 25-28, Pakistan conducted three missile tests in quick 
succession to demonstrate its first strike capability.116 These tests were prompted by 
Pakistani intelligence information that an Indian attack was imminent at the time.117  
Khan (2012) quotes Musharraf as recalling that he had ordered the Pakistani air force to 
hit back immediately – conventionally only – should the Indian attack occur.118 A 
message to counterattack if the Indians crossed the LoC or the international border was 
transmitted on an open line in the hope that India would intercept it and be deterred.119 
Much like India, Pakistan’s signaling behavior was also more complex in phase II. 
On the whole, it was more aggressive, especially in the last week of May when Pakistan 
was convinced of an impending Indian attack. In addition to transmitting offensive 
threats confirming resolve to use conventional force against any Indian aggression – this 
carried over seamlessly from phase I –, the nuclear signals were also bold. Just prior to 
the series of missile tests between May 25-28, Pakistan reminded India of its nuclear red 
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lines. On May 23, the Indian Water Resources Minister had issued a veiled threat hinting 
at scrapping the Indus Water Treaty that would create a “drought in Pakistan and the 
people of that country would have to beg for every drop of water.”120 Pakistan termed any 
such moves “economic strangulation,” 121 one of Pakistan’s red lines enunciated by 
General Kidwai in phase I. Immediately after the first missile test, Pakistan officially 
boasted: “all sensitive Indian places including its nuclear centers of Nagpur, Jullundur, 
Jesselmir are now within reach of Pakistani missiles.”122 This was followed by a rather 
provocative statement by Pakistan’s U.N. Ambassador Munir Akram in New York: 
“Pakistan had to rely on the means it possessed to deter Indian aggression. It would not 
‘neutralize’ that deterrence by any doctrine of no-first use...If India reserved the right to 
use conventional weapons, how could Pakistan – a weaker power – be expected to rule 
out all means of deterrence?”123  
Interestingly however, as officials around him transmitted resolve signals, 
Musharraf took on the task of conveying prudence. Analogous to January 12, 
Musharraf delivered a speech on May 27 at the height of tensions in which he reiterated 
his pledge to change Pakistan’s pro-militancy tactics: “I….give the assurance that no 
infiltration is taking place across the Line of Control…Pakistan is doing nothing across 
the Line of Control and Pakistan will never allow the export of terrorism anywhere in the 
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world from within Pakistan.”124 Contrary to India’s somewhat positive response to the 
January speech however, New Delhi saw Musharraf’s claim of absence of infiltration as 
farcical and termed his much-awaited and hyped address “disappointing and 
dangerous.”125 This was despite the fact that Musharraf instructed the ISI to curb 
militant movement immediately after the speech. In fact, his orders caused much 
rumbling among the militant enclave. In one meeting between some militant leaders and 
the ISI shortly after Musharraf’s address, the militants reportedly rebutted the ISI official 
who ordered that their activities in Kashmir be stopped by blaming Musharraf for having 
betrayed Kashmiris after having done the same to the Afghan Taliban.126 Nonetheless, 
like after January 12, there were some signs of the infiltration abating in early-June.127 
Musharraf also sought to balance the aggressive deterrent threats emanating from 
Islamabad at the time. On May 26, in an interview to a Western press outlet, he reiterated 
his military’s conventional strength and preparations to rebuff an Indian attack but on 
nuclear weapons, he affirmed: “[I] really don’t think we will ever reach that stage and I 
only hope that we — I hope and pray that we will never reach that stage. It’s too 
unthinkable.”128 A week later he sought to embarrass India when speaking to press 
reports that Pakistan may have mobilized its missiles at the time. Refuting this claim, he 
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stated that “If India has moved their missiles this is extremely dangerous and a very 
serious escalation… The international community must take note of this because you 
can’t distinguish what is conventional and what is unconventional.”129 Other prudence 
signals followed till the importance and frequency of nuclear signals decreased (from 
both sides) after mid-June.    
C. Phase III: The Tail End 
By mid-June 2002, the imminent threat of war had receded. Prime Minister 
Vajpayee acknowledged as much on June 17 when he stated: “If Pakistan had not agreed 
to end infiltration……….then war would not have been averted.”130 The positive 
direction began to reverse somewhat at the tail end of the crisis. While initially there were 
some estimates that infiltration levels had gone down substantially,131 by October the 
Indian government was alleging that militants were active. Defense Minister Fernandez 
expressed India’s frustration publicly in November: “Islamabad is continuing its negative 
and hostile attitude towards Delhi.”132 In December 2002, he further alleged that Pakistan 
had reopened terrorist camps along the border.133 Hardly surprising then, India continued 
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its efforts to tie Pakistan to terrorism.134 The blame game continued periodically till the 
Indian Prime Minister offered a new beginning to Pakistan in April 2003.  
Phase III was also to present the final twist in nuclear signaling from India and 
Pakistan. Infrequent but aggressive deterrent threats were made closer to the turn of the 
year. On December 30, 2002, Musharraf stated: “if his [Vajpayee] troops took even a 
step across the international border or the LoC, we will not only be in front of them, we 
will surround them. It will not remain a conventional war.”135 India too responded in an 
equally provocative manner. George Fernandez took Musharraf’s statement as a threat to 
use nuclear weapons and declared it “irresponsible.”136 He remained belligerent on two 
different occasions in January 2003: “we can take a bomb or two or more…but when we 
respond there will be no Pakistan;” and “…if Pakistan has decided that it wants to get 
itself destroyed and erased from the world map, then it may take this step of madness, but 
if it wants to survive then it would not do so.”137 Also in January 2003, India formally 
announced its updated doctrine that established its Nuclear Command Authority, called 
for establishing a triad of nuclear forces, and while retaining a NFU stance, advocated a 
need for “massive” retaliation against any nuclear state.138 Rajagopalan (2008) argues 
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that the inclusion of the ‘massive retaliation’ concept was likely meant to be a signal of 
Indian resolve to Pakistan;139 India may have felt the need to do so given that it had failed 
to follow through on its threats against Pakistan during the standoff. India would however 
continue to highlight its now-formal commitment to NFU in the weeks to follow.  
The other behavioral aspect of note was Pakistan’s signaling to reassure the world 
as it emerged from the crisis that its nuclear arsenal was safe and secure. Official 
statements during this period emphasized that there was no danger of ‘loose nukes’ or 
accidental war. Musharraf revealed that Pakistan’s delivery systems and warheads were 
de-mated and stored separately.140 Moreover, among other prior statements, the Pakistani 
Foreign Minister highlighted his country’s elaborate security protocols for the nuclear 
arsenal, rebuffing concerns of dangers of terrorist infiltration into Pakistan’s nuclear 
establishment.141  
2. Enter the Third Party: Brokered Bargaining at Play 
The foregoing discussion about crisis behavior of the principal antagonists can 
easily be construed as a case of classic coercion and bilateral brinkmanship.  Indeed, 
many in Pakistan saw India’s crisis strategy as a combination of a “try-and-see” and 
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“gradual turning of the screw” approaches central to coercive diplomacy142 as New Delhi 
combined military preparedness with a show of political resolve through aggressive 
signaling. Pakistan’s response also fits the tit-for-tat pattern expected of brinkmanship 
exercises. Islamabad’s decision to temporarily target anti-India militants may seem 
anomalous in this stead but it can easily be explained as a success of India’s compellence 
strategy that forced Pakistan to oblige to avoid war.  
This section will introduce the role of the third party and recast developments in 
the crisis in light of our three-cornered bargaining framework. In doing so, it will 
establish that the classic brinkmanship lens only provides partial insights – or more aptly, 
misleading ones – as far as understanding the mechanisms of crisis behavior is concerned. 
The processes shaping crisis behavior are driven by the dynamic between India, Pakistan, 
and the third party. The third party remained central to Indian and Pakistan calculi from 
the very beginning; its potential role was internalized by the conflicting parties at every 
stage of the crisis.  
A. Phase I: The First Peak 
(i) India: Eyeing Third Party Support  
India’s efforts to goad the U.S. after the December 13 attack on the parliament 
were instant. By promising to “liquidate the terrorists and their sponsors wherever they 
are, whoever they are,”143 the Indian leadership was taking a leaf out of the U.S. 
doctrine of preemption enunciated after 9/11. India’s behavior over the next month 
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simultaneously conveyed resolve to Pakistan and signaled to the U.S. that it would have 
no option but to take direct action and thus impact the regional dynamics negatively for 
the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan unless Washington was willing to pressure Pakistan to 
fulfill Indian demands.144 With New Delhi’s belief that the world opinion could not but 
see it as a victim of terrorism in the post-9/11 context – else it would risk diplomatic 
embarrassment –, Indian leaders could afford to bank on resolute behavior to achieve 
their desired outcome. The Indian leadership even hinted at its interest in exploiting the 
third party angle publicly in the early days of the crisis. In a finely balanced statement 
that demanded U.S. support while signaling the possibility of direct action without it, 
Vajpayee stated: “We are being counseled to exercise restraint. Our neighbor should be 
asked how long this ugly game of cross-border terrorism will go on. They [U.S.] need our 
neighbor right now but the same advice should be given to it also.” He went on to add, 
“We expect there will be action... we are not relying only on diplomacy. We are 
confident that international opinion is on our side.” “We will fight on our own.”145  
Privately, India worked the diplomatic channels both in Delhi and Washington. 
U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill was constantly prodded by Indian leaders 
and continued to impress upon Washington that India, as one official put it, had “moral 
parity” with the U.S. on the issue of terrorism.146 A number of senior officials – 
including Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani, External Affairs Minister Jaswant 
Singh, and Defense Minister George Fernandez – also visited Washington at the peak 
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of the crisis during December 2001 and January 2002. All along, India maintained that 
it had evidence of Pakistani involvement in the parliament attack. Its message was that 
“this is serious – [the] Government of India would take steps without hesitation…We 
don’t care if Pakistan has nuclear weapons – there is a price to be paid.”147 In a view 
reflective of the Indian belief at the time, former Indian Army officer General Ashok 
Mehta predicted in an interview published on December 31, 2001 that U.S. interests in 
the region guaranteed that India’s huffing and puffing will sooner or later get 
Washington to “put breaks on Pakistan.”148  
There is evidence that influential Indian strategists and the Indian military had 
even incorporated the third party angle when contemplating the possibility of military 
action against Pakistan.  The evidence lends itself to a very different understanding of 
the Indian military’s earlier-discussed confidence that a “short but intense” war could 
be fought with Pakistan without risking escalation to the nuclear level. Writing at the 
time, K. Subrahmanyam (2002), India’s best known strategic thinker close to the 
country’s official establishment, backed the permissibility of a limited war by arguing 
that U.S. presence in Pakistan had ensured that its military would not be allowed to 
escalate the crisis in the face of limited Indian strikes. He argued that the U.S. would 
promptly intervene and ensure de-escalation and if need be, it would even physically 
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prevent Pakistan from launching nuclear strikes.149 Sood and Sawhney (2003) also point 
to the realization among the Indian military that a war “could well be short depending 
on when India or Pakistan succumbed to world pressure to end war.”150 This in part 
would explain the intense Indian (and Pakistani) efforts to get international opinion to 
back their respective crisis stances.  
While the above-stated dynamic may have given India confidence, its 
engagement with the third party also imposed a number of constraints on its behavior. 
On the one hand, the fair degree of autonomy India enjoyed in its decision making was 
obvious from its aggressive rhetoric and expansive military mobilization despite the 
third party’s preferences to the contrary. On the other hand however, the limits to this 
autonomy were just as real. For one, New Delhi could ill-afford to reverse its positive 
evaluation vis-à-vis the U.S. it had so carefully cultivated in recent years. Therefore, 
even as it upped the ante, there were strong voices that cautioned Indian leaders to be 
careful not to force international opinion to turn against it.151 What crystallizes India’s 
sensitivity to the third party most obviously however are the two ‘critical junctures’ in 
early-January 2002 that eventually turned out to be game changers in phase I.  
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First came the U.S.’s satellite-based information that one of India’s strike corps 
under General Kapil Vij had moved into active strike positions and was resembling a 
formation ready to attack across the border. The U.S. had captured snapshots of the 
formations on Pakistan’s prodding and confronted India with the information.152 If it is 
true that plans to aggress against Pakistan had previously been approved for around this 
time, the move would have been demoralizing for the military. On the other hand, 
going ahead with the plans after being confronted with evidence by the third party 
would have played into Pakistan’s hands. Washington would likely have seen India as 
the aggressor and spoiler as far as avoiding escalation was concerned. The Indian 
political leadership seems to have weighed the importance of deference to third party 
preferences above the need for clear and consistent signaling to its military and 
domestic audience. It found itself in an embarrassing situation when the press picked up 
on the incident on January 20.153 
Even more crucial was the U.S.’s role in cajoling India to shed plans for military 
action in the run up to Musharraf’s January 12 speech. In the days leading up to the 
address, the U.S. worked closely with Musharraf and provided detailed input into the 
content of his remarks.154 In a display of quiet diplomacy, U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage met the Indian Ambassador to Washington Lalit Mansingh just 
days before the speech – this was the time when the Indian military was ready to attack 
Pakistan – and told him to convey to his capital that “Musharraf will make an important 
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statement, and you will be very pleased, just wait.”155 Mansingh later recalled that he 
saw the U.S. acting as a “guarantor for Musharraf’s promises.”156 Brajesh Mishra, 
Vajpayee’s Principal Secretary, also acknowledged later that U.S. had asked New Delhi 
“to be patient and to listen to what Musharraf said.”157 British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
also arrived in India a week before the speech to reinforce the third party’s desire that 
India stall any military plans.158 U.S. diplomacy, combined with Blair’s visit, proved 
crucial as New Delhi agreed to oblige, thereby subordinating its quest to negate any 
Pakistani thinking that nuclear weapons had foreclosed India’s space for conventional 
aggression to its desire for positive evaluation. To New Delhi’s embarrassment, a New 
York Times story a day before Musharraf’s speech confirmed that India had confided in 
Washington that “it will take no unprovoked military action against Pakistan as long as 
American-led diplomatic efforts continue [to pressure Pakistan] to defuse the crisis.”159 
The pattern of Indian nuclear signaling during these days was also not 
disconnected from the third party dynamic. As discussed earlier, India’s first 
consequential prudence signal came from Defense Minister George Fernandez on January 
7 in the immediate aftermath of General Vij’s removal. Since the U.S. had just 
confronted India with evidence regarding Vij’s formations, Fernandez’s comment that 
India would maintain its NFU and that “no surgical strike has been planned against 
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anyone”160 ought to be recast as deference to U.S.’s prodding. The contradictory 
messaging from Indian Army Chief Padmanabhan and Fernandez on January 11 is 
especially interesting when viewed in light of the New Delhi’s paradoxical desire to 
extract concessions from the third party while remaining sensitive to its preferences. 
Coming a day ahead of Musharraf’s speech and at a time when Washington was engaged 
in intense crisis diplomacy, the signals were undoubtedly meant for both Pakistan and the 
U.S.161 They would have aimed at putting both Islamabad and Washington on notice a 
day before the speech and reminding them that India’s future actions would depend on 
what Musharraf laid out in his address while reiterating India’s commitment to restrain 
itself in line with third party preferences.  
The Indian CCS reportedly read Musharraf’s speech as courageous. As the then-
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) chief, Vikram Sood recalled, “we felt…let’s give 
him another chance and see if there is a decline in terrorist activity.”162 In essence, the 
U.S. provided India the opening to stop short of war by coercing Musharraf to promise 
to fulfill some of India’s demands. This was the most obvious example of the third 
party being able to dissuade one side from using force by delivering concessions in line 
with its crisis objective. At the very least, Washington had bought time and warded off 
what could have been an imminent attack followed by potential escalation. On the other 
hand, India, by having obliged the third party had shifted the onus of extracting tangible 
results from Pakistan on to Washington. Interestingly, in the week following 
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Musharraf’s speech, India refused to pull back its troops. Seen from the lens of our 
trilateral framework, the mobilization would have been maintained to keep both 
Islamabad and Washington on notice that India’s restraint was tied to a tangible follow 
up on Musharraf’s promises to curb cross-border terrorism.   
(ii) Pakistan’s Quest to Outmaneuver India 
Notwithstanding Pakistan’s disappointment with the third party role at Kargil 
and its lack of trust in the U.S., it still attempted to neutralize India’s outreach to the 
third party during the 2001-02 standoff. It was equally active in creating its own 
pressures on the third party once the crisis commenced.  
Pakistan’s post-December 13 counter-mobilization was driven by a genuine belief 
on the part of its military that India could aggress if Pakistan’s conventional deterrent was 
not on display in full.163 But it was equally conscious of the need to prevent the U.S. 
intervention from tilting in India’s favor. Islamabad conveyed its position to Washington 
through various channels. President Musharraf and his team also conducted a frenzy of 
diplomatic activity with Western and Muslim country leaderships  to gain support. 
Pakistan’s messages were four-fold: that it had nothing to do with the December 13 
attack; that Indian mobilization had unnecessarily raised tensions and needed to be reined 
in; that Pakistan would have no option but to respond with force if India aggressed; and 
that the third party should help mediate a resolution of the Kashmir problem.  
The crux of Pakistan’s phase I strategy is captured by its messages to the U.S. 
diplomatic presence in Islamabad. Pakistan’s initial tact was to blame India for stage 
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management of the December 13 attack.164 This established plausible deniability which 
was meant to negate India’s ability to present the Pakistani state – as opposed to non-state 
actors – as the aggressor.165 Soon thereafter, Pakistan began using its trump card. Based 
at the Islamabad embassy at the time, Colonel David Smith (2011) reports that on 
December 20, the Chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the country’s 
senior-most military official, hinted to his American counterpart that an Indian 
provocation may affect Pakistan’s ability to assist U.S. operations in Afghanistan.166 A 
more forceful case was made in special meetings summoned by the Pakistani Army 
leadership the next day. The military provided an intelligence picture of Indian 
mobilization and shared its belief that India could launch a general attack within 24 
hours.167 The message was that Pakistan would soon have to move its troops from the 
western border if the situation persisted. On December 22, Pakistan informed the U.S. 
embassy that it had intelligence of an Indian attack before dawn on December 23.168 The 
next day, the Army let it be known that Pakistan would respond with “full force” to any 
Indian provocation.169 Smith (2011) quotes Pakistan’s Vice Chief of Army Staff as 
saying that the military would pull its two corps from the western border as it could not 
“manage two threats at the same time” and had to “deal with the most serious one 
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first.”170 Despite constant U.S. pleas and reassurances, Pakistan did eventually move its 
forces eastward at the turn of the year.171  
The above notwithstanding, Islamabad’s own sensitivity to third party concerns 
was even more evident than India’s. First, Pakistan’s relatively restrained nuclear 
signaling during the first phase of the crisis was undoubtedly underpinned by its dodged 
image in the inter-crisis period and the international community’s constant fears of the 
safety and security of its arsenal. By emphasizing that Pakistan’s response would 
primarily be based on conventional deterrence, Islamabad was dispelling the common 
perception that it would look to use nuclear weapons early on in a crisis with India. The 
fact that Pakistan signaled no eagerness to formally alert or deploy its arsenal despite 
being the weaker conventional party facing – to its mind – an imminent attack was 
puzzling from a classic deterrence perspective but it would have reassured outside 
observers. Any reckless rhetoric tied specifically to nuclear weapons may well have 
allowed India to successfully paint Pakistan as the irresponsible party and force the 
U.S.’s hand to openly sympathize with New Delhi’s position. Given Pakistan’s belief that 
this was what India partly wanted to achieve as a means of increasing third party pressure 
on it, it is hardly surprising that it sought to avoid playing to the adversary’s liking.  
In terms of actions, Musharraf’s decision to begin rounding up LeT and JeM 
militants in December 2001 and to include in his January 12 address an admission of 
guilt as far as cross-border infiltration was concerned were driven, in large part, by 
third party pressure. As will be discussed shortly, Washington pushed Pakistan to act 
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against militants in the days following the December 13 attack. Musharraf, on his part, 
believed, correctly as it turned out, that obliging the U.S. would prevent it from backing 
India’s position and prompt it to oppose Indian military aggression. As Musharraf 
worked with the U.S. on the January 12 speech, he again acquired an assurance that the 
U.S. would continue opposing Indian military designs.172 Interestingly, from 
Musharraf’s perspective, his decision to go ahead with the recommended content of the 
speech was a quid pro quo for Washington’s promise to push India to negotiate 
politically on Kashmir.  
After the January 12 address, while the U.S. leaned heavily on India to de-
escalate, it also kept pushing Musharraf to follow up on his pledges regarding cross-
border infiltration. Its efforts were only partially successful though as positive 
movement on this front was reversed in the months that followed. Nonetheless, in what 
underscores Pakistan and Musharraf’s compulsion not to alienate the U.S., Musharraf 
continued to rehearse his pledge and promised to keep up the drive to curb terrorism. 
He hid his ultimate failure behind the veil of plausible deniability – arguing that the 
Pakistani state was no longer supporting the militants – and lack of capacity to produce 
instant results. Nonetheless, a reversal of the declining trends in infiltration also points 
to the limits of the third party’s ability to force one or the other principal antagonist to 
produce desirable results in a crisis, and perhaps also to a reduced interest on the part of 
the third party in pushing for these results once the imminent danger of escalation has 
elapsed.   
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(iii) The Third Party: Playing Down the Middle 
If part of the goal of the Indian military mobilization was to manipulate the fear 
of war to force the third party to take notice, it was perhaps unneeded. Even though the 
U.S.’s entire energies were focused on Afghanistan post-9/11, there was hardly any 
dissent within Washington’s decision making enclave on the desirability of instant U.S. 
involvement in the crisis.173 The salience of one “abiding concern in the U.S. – that an 
Indian military response to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan could escalate the 
confrontation between the two nations to the nuclear level” was unmistakable.174 
Moreover, apart from any unipole’s structural compulsions to prevent escalation that 
were discussed as part of our model’s propositions in chapter two, this time continued 
tensions would have compromised Pakistan’s efforts to support the U.S. campaign in 
Afghanistan. A general conventional war would likely also have forced the U.S. to 
evacuate or evict its physical military presence from Pakistani soil.175 The U.S.’s 
regional foreign policy interests then dovetailed nicely with the goal of crisis de-
escalation. Indeed, the third party remained central to crisis management during the 
standoff. While the U.S. took the lead, it worked to reinforce its efforts through other 
partners with influence over India and/or Pakistan. The U.K. was its closest partner. 
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Other international actors were encouraged to reinforce their messages but remained 
secondary. Once again, China’s neutrality was surprising and immensely helpful. 
Carrying on from Kargil, Beijing chose to play second fiddle to the U.S., only using its 
good offices to reinforce Washington’s pleas and demands.176 Beijing remained in close 
contact with the Pakistani leadership and welcomed several visits by its officials but it did 
nothing to tangibly back its position. 177 The specter of nuclear escalation in South Asia 
once again seems to have forced Beijing to prioritize de-escalation178 over supporting its 
traditional ally.  
At the very onset of the crisis, the U.S. and U.K. choreographed a strategy aimed 
at regular interaction with the Indians and Pakistanis. They ensured that a high ranking 
U.S. or British official was ready to go to the region at short notice; the premise was that 
the conflicting parties would be careful not to initiate hostilities when an official from 
either of these countries was physically present in the region.179 In a statement that also 
provides some insight into the third party’s mindset about middle power leaders involved 
in crisis situations, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell later recalled: “we had sort of a 
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duty roster out there for who is going tomorrow to keep these clowns from killing each 
other.”180    
The third party’s strategy was to “play for time” to delay the Indian plans for an 
offensive, thereby letting the law of diminishing returns set in for New Delhi.181 It 
urged restraint on India’s part while recognizing its right of self-defense and promising 
continued support against terrorism.182 At the same time, it pushed Pakistan to curb 
export of terrorism to India but did not do it so forcefully that it would draw an adverse 
reaction from Pakistani leaders and compromise their efforts on the Afghan border.183 
In essence, the third party played down the middle in terms of responding to Indian and 
Pakistani claims, allegations, and pleas.  
In phase I, the third party’s private message to Pakistan was that it wanted swift 
and visible movement against terrorists. American officials were being quoted by the 
U.S. press in the first week of the crisis confirming that they were planning to tighten 
the screws on Islamabad.184 In public however, the U.S. tone and demands remained to 
Pakistan’s liking for the most part. Though the Pakistani state’s links with LeT and JeM 
were well known and accepted as fact and there was credible information linking the 
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parliament attackers to these non-state outfits185 – a perfect mix for a third party to 
come down hard on the conflicting party in question –, the U.S. State Department 
hinted early on that it could not blame the Pakistani state for the attack in the absence 
of hard evidence.186 Its primary public message continued to be mutual restraint and 
information sharing.  On December 16, Powell publicly asked India to desist from 
military action.187 The U.S. continued to convey this message over the next week, 
suggesting that India must avoid any action that makes “more difficult the fight against 
terrorism in the region.”188 On December 21, the White House irked India by stating 
that the parliament attack was aimed at harming Pakistan and its growing relations with 
the U.S.189 This would have been Washington’s signal of potential support for 
Pakistan’s stance should India take its aggressive military buildup and rhetoric to its 
logical conclusion.  
As Musharraf  began to show sensitivity to U.S. pressure and rounded up 
militants, Washington took the opportunity to praise him. President Bush noted 
Musharraf’s moves and stated on December 31 that “he’s cracking down hard [on 
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extremists]” and that this is “a good sign.”190 Other U.S. officials followed suit.191 
Washington also reinforced its public appreciation for Musharraf’s efforts in its private 
messaging to New Delhi. For instance, while on a visit to Washington in late-December, 
L. K. Advani was told that Musharraf had taken “some steps” and that the U.S. was 
waiting to see what “additional action he has taken.”192 The indication was that the U.S. 
knew more had to be, and would be, done and that it was willing to extract further 
concessions as needed. 
The third party was careful not to be seen leaning towards Pakistan too heavily 
however. It would have been odd in a situation where India was the wronged party even 
if the third party did not believe that the Pakistani state was directly involved in the 
parliament attack. The U.S.’s closest third party partner, the U.K. was busy 
reprimanding Pakistan in parallel to Washington’s seemingly soft public attitude. On 
December 16, the day Powell publicly called on India to exercise restraint, the British 
High Commissioner to India insinuated Pakistan’s role in anti-India terrorism and urged 
it to stop aiding militancy.193 Then on December 28, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw all 
but discounted Pakistani efforts against LeT and JeM cadres by forcefully berating 
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Pakistan and demanding that it take “more effective” steps against terrorist groups and 
suggesting that there had been “complacency, if not ambiguity” in Pakistan’s attitude to 
cross-border terrorism that had resulted in an attack on the very “heart of Indian 
democracy.”194  
The U.S.’s softer public attitude towards Pakistan was also balanced by its 
outreach and tangible steps in India’s favor. After December 13, the uptake of the 
Indian saber-rattling in Washington was that New Delhi wanted it to weigh in and 
pressure Pakistan to act against terrorism. In the days following the attack, U.S. 
officials were constantly in touch with their Indian counterparts, conveying sympathy 
and offering assistance in the investigations.195 At the forefront, and often ahead of 
Washington in appreciating India’s position was U.S. Ambassador Robert Blackwill. 
He drew parallels between December 13 and 9/11, stating that the parliament attack 
was “no different in its objective from the terror attacks in the United States on 
September 11th.”196  
Washington also offset its obvious reluctance to pin Pakistan down by 
announcing on December 20 that it was putting LeT on its terrorist list and freezing its 
assets.197 A week later, the U.S. formally declared LeT and JeM terrorist outfits.198 
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Along with growing private pressure on Musharraf to act against militants, these were 
major victories for India.  
The two critical junctures in phase I proved the centrality of the third party and 
Indian and Pakistani sensitivity to its preferences. The incident involving General Vij 
came on the heels of U.S.’s message to India that Musharraf was acting against 
militants. The fact that India had absorbed the signal and not rebutted it meant that it 
had little space to ignore U.S.’s demarche. Doing so would have implied an acceptance 
that the Indian leadership had authorized war footing despite U.S. pleas. Washington 
also saw Musharraf’s January 12 speech as a major opportunity to buy more time from 
the Indians, if not to affect de-escalation of the crisis.199 The U.S.’s goal would have 
been to get Musharraf to go far enough that Washington could persuasively make the 
case to the Indians that Pakistani pledges justified a pull back from the brink. 
Interestingly, as the U.S. interlocutors saw it, and despite what Musharraf seemingly 
believed, there was very little they were committing to a quid pro quo as far as forcing 
India to compromise on a solution to Kashmir was concerned.  
Washington continued its balancing act after Musharraf’s address. Immediately 
afterwards, in what would surely have been a predetermined signal to India, Colin 
Powell publicly came out in Musharraf’s support, appreciating his “bold and principled 
stand to set Pakistan squarely against terrorism and extremism both in and outside of 
Pakistan” while asking both antagonists to show restraint.200 President Bush also 
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congratulated Musharraf on his “firm decision to stand against terrorism and 
extremism….”201 India, realizing the U.S. preference and the counseling that had gone 
on in the pre-speech stage, responded positively. This prompted President Bush to 
felicitate Prime Minister Vajpayee for his measured take on the speech. The White 
House also pledged to remain “fully engaged” with both sides to ensure de-escalation 
of the crisis.202  
The U.S. kept up the pressure, with Colin Powell continuing his shuttle 
diplomacy within a week of Musharraf’s address. In Pakistan, he pressed Musharraf to 
fulfill his pledge and in India, he was once again providing de facto guarantees of 
Musharraf’s sincerity. He confirmed to the Indian leadership that the Pakistani leader 
was working to follow up on his promise to curb cross-border terrorism.203 He 
suggested that infiltration levels would continue to decline, hinting that the U.S. could 
be counted on to keep the pressure up on Pakistan.204 By doing so, Powell had 
indirectly played the alignment card; the message was that India may lose U.S. favor if 
it resorted to use of force options.205 This led India away from contemplating war;206 it 
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was now forced to rely solely on the U.S. for the success of its compellence strategy. 
On January 18, 2002, Jawed Naqvi reported on the success of Powell’s mission in the 
Pakistani English daily, Dawn: “A much milder India and an equally reassured United 
States seemed to be the main outcome on Friday of three days of sustained high pressure 
diplomacy between the triad of US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Indian and 
Pakistani leaders, all engaged earnestly for once to end the looming menace of war 
between the two nuclear armed states of South Asia.”207 
After this point, as tensions eased, so did the frequency of third party contact 
and prodding. The U.S. sought to refocus Pakistani attention on the Afghan border even 
as concerns grew in Washington’s intelligence community over the spring that Pakistan 
was not doing enough to end infiltration in Kashmir. Pakistani receptivity to U.S. 
prodding on its support to the Kashmiri militancy also seems to have decreased 
somewhat after the imminent threat of war disappeared. Pakistan must have felt that 
India had lost the window of opportunity to attack. Pakistani forces from the western 
border had already taken positions in the east. Islamabad also reasoned that if India did 
not aggress prior to Musharraf’s pledges, it was unlikely to do so with his assurances in 
place.208 India, on its part, kept reminding the U.S. of its promises on Pakistan’s behalf 
and refused to demobilize but its saber-rattling decreased markedly.  
The focus of the diplomacy and public signaling broadened from immediate 
crisis management to larger strategic objectives during this period of decreased tensions. 
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Pakistan publicly talked about resolution of Kashmir and the need for a mediator to 
help resolve the dispute.209 India expectedly rebuffed any such insinuation, highlighting 
its different approaches to crisis management – where it now actively used the third party 
– versus dispute resolution – where it stuck to its opposition to any third party role – in 
the South Asian context.210 The U.S. continued to respond by stressing the need for a 
political settlement to the dispute but without clearly backing either side’s position.  
The other aspect of note during this period was U.S.’s emphasis that it remained 
committed to strengthening its strategic partnership with India. In parallel to crisis 
diplomacy, U.S. and India continued to talk about avenues for expanding defense ties. In 
early-May, in what was termed as evidence of growing strategic cooperation between the 
two sides, they undertook their largest joint Army – code named “Balance Iroquois” – 
and Navy – code named “Exercise Malabar” – exercises.211  
As phase I of the crisis ended then, the U.S. had managed to keep India restrained 
without damaging its strategic engagement. With Pakistan, it managed to refocus its 
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energies on its western border without alienating it on the Kashmir question completely. 
However, neither did it force Pakistan on terrorism beyond a point nor did it insist on 
India’s return to the negotiating table to resolve the Kashmir dispute politically with 
Pakistan within any timeframe.  
The centrality of the U.S. and of Indian and Pakistani sensitivity to its concerns 
however ought not to detract us from the very real limits the two principal antagonists 
imposed on the third party’s maneuvering space. Ultimately, the third party did not 
achieve its ideal outcome. India guarded its autonomy both on the decision to mobilize 
troops and to keep the mobilization intact despite the international community’s calls for 
its reversal. Pakistan too ignored the U.S.’s number one concern of maintaining heavy 
Pakistani troop presence on the western border by redeploying eastward. Moreover, the 
U.S. pressure only managed to obtain a tactical pause in infiltration. Finally, there was 
a major disconnect, perhaps somewhat expedient for both parties, on what Washington 
and Islamabad thought each was bargaining for. While Pakistan continued to believe 
that its concessions were in some part a quid pro quo for U.S. willingness to engage on 
the wider Kashmir dispute, for the U.S. the interest was crisis management. It must 
have known that any firm commitment to engage the Kashmir issue more deeply would 
alienate India immediately.   
B. Phase II: The Second Peak 
(i) India’s Reliance on the Third Party 
India’s behavior in phase II was conditioned by its experience in  phase I. It had 
failed to follow through on its threats to aggress against Pakistan and despite its belief 
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that world opinion was certain to back its position and remain sympathetic to its 
proactive threat of aggression,212 the reality fell short of its expectations. At the same 
time, its military mobilization and constant threats towards Pakistan meant that 
Islamabad came across as relatively more restrained. India still had to convey resolve to 
Pakistan, the third party, and for domestic consumption in light of the highly charged 
atmosphere in the wake of the May 14, 2002 attack on the families of Army soldiers, 
but it must have been clear to it that there was no support for Indian aggression in world 
capitals. The global sentiment meant that there was a direct contradiction between any 
Indian use of force and its international standing as a responsible nuclear power. This 
explains why, even as India flexed its muscle by contemplating full-scale conventional 
war and backed it by a ‘we mean business’ rhetoric in the fortnight after the Kaluchak 
attack, it truly focused on directly pleading with the international community to 
pressure Pakistan and to portray the latter as irresponsible. Indeed, Indian coercion 
worked through the third party much more explicitly in this phase.  
As India’s belligerent rhetoric took off after May 14, Prime Minister Vajpayee 
made his displeasure with the situation known to President Bush when the two talked 
the day after the attack. From Vajpayee’s perspective, New Delhi had trusted 
Washington as the guarantor on Pakistan’s behalf in phase I but the third party had 
failed to reign in Pakistan and affect the reversal of its Kashmir policy. The ruling 
BJP’s spokesperson made New Delhi’s expectations from the U.S. amply clear in a 
statement on May 15: “War cannot be ruled out” if terrorist strikes like the one on May 
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14 continue. “We do not think that the U.S. can restrain Pakistan, and if Pakistan is not 
restrained the Americans may as well forget about their dream of ridding the world of 
terrorism.”213 Elevating the pressure further, Omar Abdullah, the junior External Affairs 
Minister stated: “America is either with us or with the terrorists.”214 On May 22, Brajesh 
Mishra demanded from U.S. NSA Condoleezza Rice that the U.S. pressure Pakistan to 
give into Indian demands or be ready for direct Indian action. His specific ask however 
was interesting and pointed to his recognition of India’s limits. According to retired 
General Ashok Mehta (2005), Rice asked Mishra what it would take for India to be 
satisfied on Pakistani sincerity on terrorism; the reply was: “a guarantee” that Pakistan 
would be made to end cross-border infiltration.215 Coming at a time when India was 
threatening to aggress without delay, the demand for a  mere “guarantee” rather than 
tangible actions points to India’s underlying belief of lack of international support for any 
military action. New Delhi was essentially asking the U.S. to act as the guarantor once 
again, perhaps hoping that Washington’s role would be a more forceful one than in phase 
I. India also decided to give more time to third party diplomacy – read, the upcoming 
visits of Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Deputy Richard Armitage. This also 
explains Vajpayee’s decision to take his vacation on May 24 after all.216  
Again, showing just how focused India was on using the third party as its 
principal channel to compel Pakistan, it seemed amenable to continue giving the U.S. 
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space to pressure Pakistan after Musharraf’s May 27 speech. A New York Times 
correspondent captured the context aptly: “Indian officials are clearly pleased that 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Foreign Minister Jack Straw of Britain and ‘no less a 
person than President Bush’[according to one Indian official]…… have publicly lectured 
General Musharraf about the need to deliver on his promises to halt the infiltration.”217 
Stolar (2008) reports that Brajesh Mishra believed that the May 27 speech was the 
turning point.218 Though he notes a discrepancy in how individual members of India’s 
inner decision making circle interpreted the incident, Mishra recalled that India felt it 
needed to give Musharraf another chance and that it would have only gone to war after 
this point if it was forced to.219    
If the period from General Vij’s removal to Musharraf’s January 12 speech 
crystallized India’s sensitivity to third party preferences in phase I, it was India’s 
concern about the potential impact of travel advisories issued by third party countries 
and its response to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s June 7-8 mission 
to India that did so in phase II. On May 31, 2002 U.S. and U.K. – followed by a number 
of other countries – issued travel advisories for India and Pakistan under the pretext that 
the possibility of nuclear war could not be completely ruled out.220 The impact of the 
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advisories was far greater on India given its relatively high dependence on inflow of 
capital for its foreign investment-led service sectors that were crucial to its claim of 
being a rising power. It could ill-afford capital flight and a tag of an insecure 
investment destination just when it was emerging on the map as an economic 
powerhouse. Incidentally, Indian leaders saw the advisories as a deliberate move to 
undercut their military mobilization. They blamed Washington and London for 
unnecessarily exaggerating risks of escalation to shock the Indian public and rattle the 
stock market.221 On June 5, Defense Minister Fernandez claimed that the advisories had 
a “special agenda of their own” of creating panic and affecting investment flows into 
India.222 In what is reflective of the mindset of Indian officials at the time, Jaswant 
Singh questions in his memoirs: “Why cause a deliberate scare by raising alarms about 
the possibility of a ‘nuclear conflict’, or of this troops’ mobilization acquiring any kind of 
uncontrollable autonomy? This scare was incomprehensible, for a nuclear dimension just 
did not exist.”223  
Ironically, Indian perceptions that the advisories were a deliberate move to 
undermine New Delhi’s stance would have only further confirmed to Indian leaders the 
world’s reluctance to allow it to drag on the crisis. Indeed, Bajpai (2009) suggests that 
New Delhi saw its continued defiance after this point as risking the larger strategic 
partnership with the U.S.; it would have alienated not only the U.S. administration but 
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also Western investors and tourists.224 On the other hand, Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 
(2007) observe that the Indian political leadership may well have been looking for the 
kind of pressure the advisories produced to deflect blame for backing down in the crisis 
on the U.S.225 If so, this again hints at the Indian realization even before the issuance of 
the advisories that the war option had no support. Sood and Sawhney (2003) argue that 
the travel advisories and Pakistan’s display of resolve through its missile tests between 
May 25-28 are what ultimately forced the Indian political leadership to give up on the 
war option in phase II even though the military still felt there was room to use force.226 
New Delhi would persist with the mobilization even after the advisories but it now had to 
see it as a time bound proposition that could not be stretched for too long.227  
Then came Richard Armitage’s visit to India and Pakistan that ultimately started 
the de-escalation process. Armitage’s mission (as was to be Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s the week after if Armitage had not succeeded) was to find India the 
“guarantee” Brajesh Mishra had asked for a fortnight earlier. Armitage arrived in India 
on June 7 from Pakistan with the news that Musharraf had agreed to put a permanent 
stop to infiltration. He maintained that Musharraf was sincere but added that his 
government did not have full control over the cross-border movement.228 India asked 
the U.S. Deputy Secretary to go public with this information and in return accepted this 
as enough of a guarantee even though it was no better than what it had received in 
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phase I. There was an almost instant drop in the tension levels. India even agreed to 
begin pulling back some of its ships from forward deployments in the Arabian sea.229 
Indian officials also acknowledged that Musharraf had ordered the ISI to curb 
infiltration and that positive signs were already being noticed. By late-June, India stood 
down its aggressive patrolling in the Arabian sea.230 Mistry (2009) maintains that India 
had ended up preferring to use U.S. diplomacy over direct military action even though the 
strategy only delivered short term gains in terms of temporary reduction in infiltration 
levels.231  
Over the next few months, India would keep pressing the international community 
to extract concessions from Pakistan, it would continue to make efforts to link Pakistan to 
global terrorism, it expressed disappointment in the third party’s lack of total support for 
its stance, and on occasions it also specifically confronted the third party with evidence of 
specific instances of infiltration across the LoC.232 The summer of 2002 however would 
also see growing international pressure on India to de-mobilize its military. India, after 
dragging its feet, ultimately tied its decision to pull back with the Jammu and Kashmir 
elections in October 2002.233 While its official justification was that mobilized troops 
would keep infiltration numbers down in the run up to the elections, this seems little more 
than a politically expedient excuse. In reality, New Delhi could not have ignored the fact 
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that international opinion was squarely against continued mobilization and that the longer 
it delayed the pullback, the more space Pakistan would have found to keep pointing at 
India as the party holding up talks and thereby keeping South Asia one mishap or 
accident away from a catastrophe. 234  
It was sometime after the crisis that Vajpayee provided his most candid 
acknowledgement of India’s sensitivity to third party preferences during the 2001-02 
standoff. Kapur (2007) quotes Vajpayee as stating that “all preparations were made for 
attacking Pakistan to punish it for the attack on Parliament. But America gave us the 
assurance that something will be done by Pakistan about cross-border terrorism, both in 
January and in May 2002. America gave us a clear assurance. That was an important 
factor.”235 Jaswant Singh also acknowledges in his memoirs: “to some degree, success 
was a function of India’s ability to work with the United States.”236  
(ii) Pakistan’s Own Outreach to the Third Party 
If anything, the three-cornered engagement had worked better for Pakistan in 
phase I than for India. Neither did New Delhi’s direct threats work, nor could the third 
party affect a permanent change in Pakistan’s pro-militancy policy even though it did 
force Pakistan to acknowledge infiltration from its soil and harmed its standing to that 
extent. Nonetheless, just as India was disappointed at the revival of infiltration, the 
Pakistani leadership reportedly felt that it had been pressured to agree to concessions 
without the U.S. taking seriously its commitment – as Pakistan perceived it – to 
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generate movement on a negotiated settlement to Kashmir. It therefore presented a 
more resolute face in phase II even as it kept the primacy of the third party in mind.  
The Pakistani leadership continued to liaison with the international community, 
openly calling for third party intervention to stall India’s aggressive intent. Within the 
first week of phase II, it hinted at its desire to seek UNSC intervention to force India to 
pullback.237 On May 23, with the threat of war at its peak, the Pakistani Foreign Office 
reported that it had formally reached out to the U.N. with this request.238 By doing so, 
Pakistan was attempting to paint India as the aggressor. Plausible deniability was once 
again being worked to Pakistan’s advantage. Privately, Islamabad kept its channels with 
the third party open and continued to reiterate its stance from phase I: help de-mobilize 
India. Also, underscoring the importance Pakistan attached to third party outreach, 
President Musharraf dispatched five special envoys to Western and Muslim country 
capitals at the end of May 2002 to explain Pakistan’s position and elicit support for it.239  
To the U.S., Pakistan continued to emphasize that it would have no option but to 
retaliate if India aggressed.240 Interestingly however, in a clever twist, its messaging 
tied the U.S.’s support to India with a heightened possibility of war, and in turn 
escalation. The argument, as conveyed to U.S. interlocutors was that much of India’s 
strategy was aimed at maligning Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir and to portray the 
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Kashmiri struggle as terrorism.241 Pakistan also conveyed its feeling that India was 
looking for international support to back its military aggression; if war was not being 
initiated, it was only because New Delhi could not find the unequivocal backing it was 
so desperately seeking. By this logic, third party backing of India would have 
emboldened it and increased the chances of an Indian military offensive.  
Nonetheless, the loudest message Islamabad was communicating to Washington 
– more vociferously than in phase I –, was that it would have to pull out more troops 
from the western border if India did not back down. On May 29, the Pakistani military 
refused a U.S. request for reinforcements on the western border and maintained that it 
could not spare more than two brigades, citing India’s war preparations in the east.242 In 
fact, in response, Pakistan made it known that it was seriously considering further 
redeployment to the Eastern border. Musharraf announced: “we are very seriously 
contemplating moving some elements…on to the east, if at all tensions remain as high 
as they are now.”243  
Balancing Pakistan’s coercive tactics vis-à-vis the third party was its sensitivity 
to the third party preferences. In phase II, this was most evident in the run up to 
Musharraf’s May 27 speech. Musharraf had absorbed and been affected by the third 
party’s blunt messaging to him in the days ahead of his speech. This became clear when 
Musharraf confided in his cabinet before his address that Pakistan was losing its 
standing with key third party interlocutors. He argued that the world was firmly on 
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India’s side and was no longer willing to distinguish between terrorists and freedom 
fighters. He accepted that Pakistani diplomatic efforts to make this distinction had 
failed and concluded that the only way for Pakistan to address this was to shut down 
militant camps in Pakistan.244 His admission was followed by the speech and his orders 
to the ISI to pullback from the Kashmiri militants. That this was not an easy decision 
without domestic repercussions ought to be clear from the earlier-mentioned angered 
militant reaction when the ISI broke this news to them. Musharraf had prioritized third 
party demands over his domestic compulsions. Mistry (2009) argues that Pakistan’s 
concessions would likely not have come in the absence of U.S. pressure.245  
Pakistan’s relatively sterner posture in terms of signaling deterrent threats could 
have been driven by a number of factors. Pakistani planners genuinely thought an 
Indian attack could take place and thus they may have felt it was necessary to 
demonstrate their capability and convey their resolve through missile tests and 
aggressive rhetoric. Or they could have been somewhat assured by the fact that India 
did not manage to get unequivocal support behind it in phase I and thus they perceived 
greater space to signal the credibility of their deterrent. At the same time however, 
Pakistan could not have lost sight of the fact that the May 14 Kaluchak attack was 
condemned by the international community, had prompted India to remind the third party 
of Pakistan’s links with terrorism, and had reinvigorated India’s war rhetoric.  
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Indeed, Pakistan’s balancing act in terms of its nuclear signaling came not only in 
terms of substance but also in the actors it chose to create this balance. As discussed 
earlier, Musharraf took it upon himself to convey prudence. It seems more than a 
coincidence that as other officials close to him were making provocative statements 
around the time Pakistan conducted missile tests, Musharraf continued to convey calm. It 
is not unreasonable to assume that Musharraf’s prudence signaling was meant to dispel 
any fears that the Army Chief cum Chairman of the National Command Authority – 
essentially the only man who had the right to press the ‘nuclear button’ – was ready to 
exhibit belligerence. This makes sense given the constant international concern about 
Pakistan’s military leadership being in total control of nuclear decision making and 
being doctrinally inclined to employ the nuclear option. Musharraf was also the 
principal point of contact for the third party actors and thus was much more sensitive to 
their concerns. Indeed, his receptivity to the U.S. message was evident when Colin 
Powell called him out on Pakistan’s aggressive nuclear rhetoric in late-May 2002. 
Powell pointedly told Musharraf: “All this chatter about nuclear weapons is very 
interesting, but let’s talk general-to-general.”246 “General, you are scaring the crap out of 
everybody, so you’ve got to cool it.”247 Musharraf responded by saying, “I understand”248 
and Pakistan’s deterrent threats fizzled out quickly thereafter.  
Once tensions had subsided, Pakistan’s focus shifted to stressing the need for a 
political dialogue on Kashmir and for third party involvement in the effort. It also kept up 
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pressure in terms of painting India as the reluctant party when it came to improving 
bilateral relations. The other feature of Pakistani behavior in the period of lowered 
tensions was identical to phase I. As the U.S. receptivity to Indian messaging decreased 
and the U.S. urged Pakistan to focus on the Afghan border, Islamabad let its pledges on 
infiltration take a backseat. Not only did cross-border movement rise again over the next 
few months but Musharraf also openly challenged the U.S. claim, discussed shortly, that 
distanced Washington from a commitment to help get India to negotiate sincerely on 
Kashmir.249  
(iii) The Third Party: Playing the Same Old Game 
The third party started off phase II far more concerned about the potential for 
escalation. The circumstances of the Kaluchak attack and the fact that tensions had not 
subsided completely after the first peak made the U.S. and its third party partners believe 
that the Indian threats were credible and that barring visible action from Pakistan, New 
Delhi would aggress.250 Nayak and Krepon (2006) report that the U.S. sources picked up 
signs that India had made full preparations to initiate hostilities early in phase II.251 
Interestingly however, in what provides an insight into the third party’s cognizance of the 
expectations of the principal antagonists, Nayak and Krepon (2006) also suggest that U.S. 
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Secretary of State Colin Powell believed that the crisis was still fundamentally political 
and that both India and Pakistan ultimately wanted the U.S. to act as a “separator.”252 In 
this spirit, the U.S. and U.K. along with other amenable international actors – France 
and Russia being the notable parties that played a more proactive role in reinforcing 
U.S. and U.K. efforts this time round – undertook a flurry of diplomacy.  
The message was consistent from phase I even if the attitudes of the two 
principals, India and Pakistan, were relatively more stubborn. India was urged to show 
restraint and Pakistan was pushed to deliver on its pledges in phase I.  However, in this 
iteration of third party involvement, Pakistan received much more public sanction. This 
would have signaled to India that the third party realized that Musharraf had fallen 
short of his promises and therefore deserved more pressure.  
U.S. diplomacy intensified after Brajesh Mishra’s demand for a “guarantee” from  
Condoleezza Rice. Third party efforts in the days following this were focused on creating 
conditions where such a guarantee would be palatable. To attain this, Pakistan had to be 
forced to approach the cross-border infiltration problem sincerely. Consequently, a series 
of conversations were initiated with Musharraf to push him to change tact. The 
diplomatic efforts during this period culminated in Musharraf’s May 27 speech and a 
reaffirmation of his pledge to show visible movement against terrorism directed at 
India.253 Musharraf’s confession of the loss of international support for Pakistan’s 
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position to his cabinet prior to the speech and his decision to ask the ISI to pull back 
from the militants was a clear indication of the tenor of third party messaging and the 
effect the signals had on him.   
 The third party’s harsh public signaling after Musharraf’s May 27 speech – this 
was starkly different than the praiseworthy tone adopted after his January 12 address – 
was driven by the need to deliver more tangible gains for India than had been managed 
in phase I. Moreover, the relatively more aggressive Pakistani attitude at the time was 
not helping the third party’s quest to force both sides to back down. Therefore, it 
resorted to constant public pressure on Musharraf, demanding that he guarantee a 
permanent reversal of his Kashmir policy. A day after Musharraf’s speech, the British 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Islamabad and got Musharraf to reaffirm his pledge 
against cross-border infiltration.254 President Bush himself used “very firm language” 
with Musharraf on a number of occasions.255 On May 31 for instance, while assigning 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to visit the region to ensure de-escalation, 
President Bush said:  “He [Musharraf] must stop the incursions across the Line of 
Control. He must do so. He said he would do so. We and others are making it clear to him 
that he must live up to his word.”256 This was not only a pointed demand but also a sign 
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that Washington was not impressed by Musharraf’s claim in his May 27 address that no 
infiltration was taking place across the LoC. A day earlier, Colin Powell, perhaps the 
softest voice on Pakistan in phase I, had berated Musharraf publicly while delivering 
much the same message as President Bush would the next day: “We were receiving 
assurances from President Musharraf that infiltration across the LoC would be 
ended…But unfortunately we can still see evidence that it is continuing.”257  
Like phase I, both game changing developments in phase II also had visible third 
party roles. The first were the travel advisories at the end of May 2002. The advisories 
emanated from the shared belief between the American Ambassador and British High 
Commissioner to New Delhi that the situation was precarious and that there was a higher-
than-zero possibility of a conflict breaking out and escalating to the nuclear level.258 The 
sense was shared back in Washington where the Pentagon was busy calculating potential 
medical treatment and radiation plumes in case of a nuclear war.259 The advisories 
surprised India as it had seen the increasing third party pressure on Pakistan over the 
previous week as favorable. While it suggested just how real the possibility of an 
escalated conflict was in the minds of Western decision makers, New Delhi saw this as 
too convenient a time to issue such warnings. It had a point. The move even surprised 
Pakistan whose calculations suggested that the threat of a full-scale war was lower than at 
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the peak of phase I.260 Moreover, even if their reasons were nothing more than fear of war, 
the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors in New Delhi would have known the consequences of 
their move for India. By one stroke, the onus to maintain positive evaluation was shifted 
squarely on to the Indian leadership. India’s tourism industry and business confidence, 
both so critical to the country’s new-found economic success and positive global image 
projection, were shaken and in no time the Indian government was under pressure from 
its business houses to consider the economic fallout of a lingering crisis.261 The logic for 
India’s provocative behavior had fallen flat once it was clear that the advisories were 
causing significant domestic commotion.  
Furthermore, even if the intent of the advisories was not as Machiavellian as the 
Indians believed, the third party did not shy away from using it to further the de-
escalation agenda. Before they were publicly issued, U.S. interlocutors had conveyed to 
the Pakistanis that the advisories would go into effect and should have a numbing effect 
on India –262 the implication being that the third party was about to create a potent reason 
for Pakistan to reconsider its resolute actions and signaling at the time. 
The second defining moment came a week later with U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage’s visit. The days before his visit had seen a number of important 
developments. Musharraf had been lectured to publicly, the travel advisories had put 
India on the back foot, and India had given the U.S. space to get Musharraf to deliver on 
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Pakistan while keeping its military formations mobilized. A day before Armitage arrived 
in Pakistan on June 6, President Bush talked to the Indian and Pakistani leaders and the 
White House issued a statement reiterating U.S.’s well-rehearsed position as a prelude to 
Armitage’s mission. The statement said: “The [U.S.] president reiterated [to] President 
Musharraf that the United States expects Pakistan to live up to the commitment Pakistan 
has made to end all support for terrorism. The president emphasized to Prime Minister 
Vajpayee the need for India to respond with de-escalatory steps.”263 President Bush also 
hinted at American willingness to resolve the “many underlying issues” between India 
and Pakistan.264 Perfectly worded, the phrase suited the U.S. interest to keep both sides 
expectant of positive results from the Deputy Secretary of State’s visit; it could have been 
interpreted as a promise of support against terrorism to India and a signal of U.S. 
willingness to involve itself in Kashmir politically to Pakistan.265  
Armitage’s astute diplomacy over the next three days surpassed expectations. 
During his meeting with Musharraf, he walked away confident that he had received an 
assurance from the Pakistani President that he would curb militancy once and for all.266 
At least in Musharraf’s view, Armitage had also given an assurance that the U.S. would 
help get India to negotiate on the Kashmir dispute.267 In India, Armitage told his 
counterparts that he had got an unequivocal promise from Musharraf that infiltration 
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would stop permanently and that Musharraf was sincere.268 But by also emphasizing that 
the Musharraf government was not capable of stopping all infiltration of militants into 
India –269 the same point was echoed by Rumsfeld when he arrived shortly 
afterwards270 – Armitage had signaled Washington’s tacit acceptance of plausible 
deniability on Pakistan’s part and dodged the need for a firm, measurable commitment 
as a guarantor of Pakistani promises.271 This was identical to what Colin Powell had 
managed in phase I. 
The Indians, already under intense pressure from international actors and their 
software industry, accepted this explanation.272 However, they still needed to show that 
their compellence strategy had worked. A private message was not enough to achieve that. 
They therefore demanded that Armitage make this information public. He did, though in 
a formulation that would have irked Musharraf. In what is perhaps the most widely 
quoted statement credited for finally beginning the de-escalation process in the 2001-02 
standoff, Armitage stated: “The commitment to the United States of President 
Musharraf was to end permanently cross-border, cross-LoC infiltration.”273 “The 
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President of Pakistan has made it very clear that nothing is happening across the Line of 
Control.” “We’re looking for that to hold in the longer term.”274 Armitage had focused 
on what the Indians wanted to hear. He had left out what Pakistan thought was the real 
deal: his pledge of a U.S. role in getting India to talk Kashmir.275 Equally though, 
Armitage needed a visible gesture from India to compensate Musharraf and convince him 
that his ploy had worked. This came in the form of India’s agreement to call some of its 
ships away from Pakistan. The move allowed Armitage to tell Musharraf that India was 
responding positively.276 Within the week, Colin Powell affirmed that Musharraf has 
promised that ceasing infiltration will be followed by “other activities that had to do with 
the dismantling of the camps that led to the capacity to conduct these kinds of [terrorist] 
operations.” 277 
Interestingly, given the experience of phase I, U.S. interlocutors knew that India 
would not take Pakistan’s pledge at face value. However, they also realized that by 
acting as Musharraf’s guarantors and promising and visibly applying more serious 
pressure on Pakistan than in phase I, they would make it difficult for India to reject 
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their plea.278 This was despite the fact that most in Washington saw Musharraf’s 
promise as mere expediency.279 It points to the tactical nature in which Washington was 
approaching its role; it needed de-escalation first and foremost and was willing to 
subordinate the actual implementability of its assurances to this objective.  
The crisis had all but subsided by the end of June 2002 even as Indian 
mobilization remained intact. A few weeks later the U.S. also lifted its travel 
advisories.280 Thereafter, Washington would continue its balancing act but with a broader 
strategic horizon in mind. It called on India to de-mobilize troops and formally end the 
crisis; stated its preference for both sides to initiate dialogue to resolve their differences 
without firmly pressuring India to do so; it simultaneously reiterated India’s importance 
for the U.S. and continued discussions with India on sales of advanced technology 
equipment for special forces to bolster its counterterrorism capacity along with other 
efforts to expand bilateral ties;281 and it pushed Pakistan to refocus energies on the 
western border and periodically praised Musharraf for his pledges against terrorism to 
signal a move away from its rather blunt attitude with him at the peak of phase II.  
The U.S. ended the crisis believing that its diplomacy had prevented India and 
Pakistan from going to war.282 Interestingly, its limitations were far less visible in phase 
II. This was perhaps a function of India and Pakistan’s more explicit outreach to the third 
party to help mitigate the crisis. There was a natural congruence between India’s 
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recognition of lack of support for war and Pakistan’s quest to prevent Indian aggression. 
That said, ultimately both principals maintained their autonomy on a number of issues. 
India did so most notably by dragging out its troop mobilization and Pakistan by refusing 
to bolster its military presence on the western border despite U.S. demands and by 
allowing infiltration to ratchet up after the summer.  
C. Phase III: The Tail End 
Once India had demobilized, it was time for the two conflicting parties to try 
and portray their decision making autonomy and dispel impressions – even though they 
were based on reality – that both sides had ultimately remained extremely sensitive to 
third party preferences. The propensity in New Delhi and Islamabad to declare victory 
in the crisis ought to be seen in this light. Indian statements that pointed to the fact that 
its compellence strategy had worked, both before and after de-mobilization fall in this 
category. Vajpayee’s earlier-cited statement of June 17, 2002 that war was averted only 
because Pakistan had agreed to end infiltration is a case in point. Defense Minister 
Fernandez claimed after the crisis that there was “no reason to attack.” Indian forces 
“stayed mobilized to make the point that another [terrorist] attack would result in an 
immediate response…Those that should have gotten the message got the message….”283 
In the same vein, Brajesh Mishra argued: “….if you look at the situation from January 
2002 onwards, a significant change has come. [Coercive diplomacy] was a big factor. 
Musharraf knew that if something like this happened again, India was not going to 
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tolerate it.”284 In reality, this outlook was an effort at face saving. So was Musharraf’s 
boasting on December 30, 2002 that “we have defeated our enemy without going into 
war.”285  
The space to present these face savers as ‘victory’ was provided by the third party. 
For one, even as the third party played a major role in ensuring de-escalation, it never 
cast any judgments on who had come out ahead in the crisis. It simply allowed India to 
shift the onus of forcing Pakistan to deliver on infiltration on to the third party and let 
Pakistan’s deterrent capability take the credit for India’s de-mobilization.  
The abrupt change in the signaling tone of the principal antagonists in phase III 
also occurred with the same aim of establishing decision making autonomy in mind. It 
can be explained through the reputational argument in bargaining. Both sides would have 
felt a real need to stamp their resolve to impact the adversary’s behavior in the next crisis 
since neither had emerged from the crisis with an ideal outcome. For India, its failure to 
act upon its threat to initiate a conventional attack against Pakistan after the December 13, 
2001 and May 14, 2002 incidents reinforced the impression that it is a soft state. Pakistan 
was clearly under international watch throughout. Moreover, its leadership did have to 
confess a role in supporting militants and was forced to make promises, at least in 
rhetoric, of revising its strategy. Even though the outcome could have been worse, 
Pakistan still ended the crisis maligned for its links with militancy in Kashmir. In essence, 
both antagonists had reason to believe that their restraint had conveyed weakness or 
                                              
284 Interview of Brajesh Mishra, May 2005, as reported by Ibid., 137-38. 
285 Jarrett Murphy, “Pakistan Backs Off Nuclear Assertion,” CBS News, December 30, 2002, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-backs-off-nuclear-assertion/. 
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excessive sensitivity to third party demands. Therefore, it made sense for them to try 
and exit the crisis with a more resolute face.286  
The third party, on its part, was careful not to allow either side to upset the 
delicate balance. It showed little reaction to the aggressive rhetoric at the tail end of the 
crisis, thereby letting both principal actors address their reputational concerns at a time 
when war was no longer on the cards. However, in response to Indian efforts to tie its 
situation with the principle of preemption, Washington strongly cautioned against 
drawing parallels between Kashmir and Iraq, where the U.S. had justified its 
preemptive strike against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003.287 Towards Pakistan, its 
statements were more congenial – a function of its fixation on Afghanistan – but it did 
not let up the pressure in terms of ensuring that Pakistan took its nuclear responsibility 
seriously. Moreover, neither did it punish Pakistan for letting infiltration rise again, nor 
did it force India to sincerely negotiate on Kashmir as Pakistan had hoped. It did 
continue to push both sides to initiate bilateral dialogue however. In the final outcome, 
the third party had achieved de-escalation without alienating either of the two 
antagonists and was now seeking to focus on larger strategic priorities with each of 
them respectively.  
                                              
286 The logic is captured by Daryl Press’s “Past Actions Theory” which holds that a state’s track 
record on keeping its commitments ought to be used to determine whether it is likely to carry out 
its threats in any present (and future) scenario. Press, Calculating Credibility, 11-20.  
287 “Linkage Politics,” Indian Express, April 18, 2003, 
http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/columnists/full_column.php?content_id=22197. 
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IV. SOUTH ASIA’S SECOND ATTEMPT AT BROKERED BARGAINING: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2001-02 STANDOFF 
The 2001-02 standoff ended without major escalation. Brokered bargaining 
remained central in shaping India, Pakistan and the third party’s behavior in ways that 
conformed with the predictions of our model. Even more so than Kargil, the dynamic 
nature of the three-cornered interaction was operative here. India and Pakistan competed 
in coercing and cajoling the third party to back their respective crisis objectives while the 
third party played down the middle in the hope of ensuring de-escalation but without 
completely alienating either of the conflicting parties. Each actor had significant 
influence on the behavior of the other two but the serious limits on this influence were 
also starkly obvious. Their complex, dynamic, and recursive relationship within the three-
cornered bargaining framework ultimately dictated their crisis choices and decisions.  
1. Inter-Crisis Developments and their Impact on the 2001-02 Standoff 
As far as the specific crisis objectives were concerned, the 2001-02 standoff 
represented an India seeking to end the crisis having changed the status quo ante marked 
by Pakistan’s pro-militancy Kashmir policy while Pakistan’s primary objective was 
simply to revert to the pre-crisis situation. Notwithstanding the opposite reality in 
strategic terms where Pakistan’s territorial preferences in Kashmir are revisionist, India 
was behaving as the revisionist party strictly in terms of its tactical goals in the twin 
peaks crisis.  This led it to a relatively more provocative crisis approach, including bold 
efforts to coerce and court the third party, a strategy that ended up challenging the 
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conventional wisdom that it is Pakistan that often deliberately exhibits provocative 
behavior to attract the U.S.’s attention and benefits from it.288  
If India’s proactive efforts to engage the third party were strong substantiation for 
our model at Kargil, Pakistan was an equally unlikely case to operate within the trilateral 
framework in the twin peaks affair. Virtually isolated after Kargil, deeply suspicious of 
the U.S. designs in South Asia, and having had to reverse the pro-Taliban policy under 
duress just months before the standoff, it would not have been unreasonable to expect the 
Pakistani military regime to chart a more autonomous path during the crisis.289 Even if 
one factored in Pakistan’s crucial role in the U.S.’s campaign in Afghanistan, it could not 
have completely overshadowed the deep mistrust both sides had towards each other at the 
time and Pakistan’s growing belief that the U.S. was beginning to favor India over it. Yet, 
even though New Delhi led the way in attracting third party attention by initiating the 
brinkmanship exercise, Islamabad not only sought to outmaneuver the Indians in seeking 
third party backing but it also consciously used the crisis to receive positive evaluation 
from the external actors. The sensitivity Pakistanis showed to U.S. preferences despite 
the unfavorable context of the inter-crisis period points to the serious limitations and 
costs a middle power faces in ignoring powerful third party actors in nuclear crises.  
                                              
288 This argument is widely accepted in literature. See for example, Sumit Ganguly and R. 
Harrison Wagner, “India and Pakistan, “Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 27, 3 (2004): 499; Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.  
289 This was especially so as one of the lessons Pakistan seems to have learnt from Kargil was that 
it could not trust the U.S. as an external balancer. Feroz H. Khan, “Pakistan Nuclear Force 
Posture and the 2001-2002 Military Standoff,” in The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis 
and Escalation in South Asia, ed. Zachary S. Davis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 137. 
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The U.S.’s Kargil experience had only convinced it further of the need to 
intervene diplomatically in South Asian crises. Additionally, with the 9/11 attacks having 
thrust South Asia into the limelight, Washington now had vital interests in the region. 
The nuclear dimension and Washington’s direct involvement in South Asia made it an 
eager entrant into the fray – even more so than at Kargil.  
2. Brokered Bargaining and the Escalation-De-escalation Dynamic 
The 2001-02 crisis was not free of escalatory potential. The conventional military 
deployments on war footing, missile deployments close to the border, concentration of 
nuclear capable aircraft on bases near borders, increased activity near missile and nuclear 
warhead storage sites, and hawkish offensive and deterrent signaling all increased the 
“critical risk” of escalation during the crisis.290 Possibilities of misunderstandings were 
also present, as in the case of mismatch of perceptions in phase II whereby the Indian 
military had planned for an all-out offensive while the Pakistani military reportedly put 
more faith in its conventional deterrent than in phase I and believed that India could not 
go beyond surgical strikes or limited operations in this period.291  
Ultimately however, none of the potential paths to escalation were able to 
dominate the crisis’s trajectory. Like Kargil, Indian, Pakistani, and U.S. priorities and 
                                              
290 Thies and Hellmuth, “Critical Risk,” 7. Thies and Hellmuth use Daniel Ellsberg’s terminology 
of ‘critical risk’ to identify an actor’s incentives to preempt during a crisis. Critical risk is defined 
as “the subjective probability of a rival’s first strike that, for a given set of payoffs, would render 
the potential target indifferent between waiting and striking first. Therefore, the lower the critical 
risk, the greater the danger of preemption appearing as a rational approach.” Thies and Hellmuth, 
“Critical Risk,” 5. Also see, Daniel Ellsberg, “The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices,” in 
Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey, ed., John E. 
Mueller (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1969), 288-94. 
291 Smith, “The 2001-2002 Standoff,” 201-202.  
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constrains aligned to load the dice in favor of de-escalation. What one ended up 
witnessing during the 2001-02 standoff was choreographed behavior from the three 
actors in line with the predictions laid out in our propositions in chapter two. While 
India and Pakistan took a number of autonomous decisions to the disliking of the third 
party, neither antagonist let third party preferences be completely overwhelmed by their 
desire to achieve their ideal crisis outcomes. Devoid of brokered bargaining, the third 
party’s signaling would risk appearing schizophrenic as it constantly switched between 
appreciating and pressuring India and Pakistan and between the need to get both sides 
to climb down from their aggressive posturing but without undermining its respective 
bilateral relationships with them. It was exactly this ‘schizophrenic signaling’ that 
allowed the third party to help ensure de-escalation.  
Perhaps most significant for the de-escalation agenda were Indian concerns for 
third party preferences which created a number of paradoxical choices for it and 
ultimately contributed to a peaceful outcome. In as far as India’s initial mobilization and 
saber-rattling were driven by the need to activate the third party prong of the three-
cornered exercise and Pakistan’s counter-mobilization was a response to this, India’s 
mindset at the time seems to have increased the risks of escalation. At the same time 
however, its extreme concern about positive evaluation imposed the opposite pressure on 
the crisis trajectory. Ironically, if India’s growing warmth with the U.S. and its improving 
global image led to its confidence that it could compel Pakistan to change its Kashmir 
policy, the need to maintain this positive image was also responsible for holding it back 
from defying third party preferences beyond a point. In essence, India’s threat 
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manipulation for the benefit of the third party and its desire to maintain its image of a 
responsible nuclear power were inherently contradictory. As soon as India employed a 
combination of aggressive military posturing and belligerent rhetoric, its characterization 
as a mature actor in competition with the traditionally more reckless Pakistan was 
challenged. In fact, by transmitting prudence signals in phase I, Pakistan came across as 
the more restrained of the two. In such circumstances, an Indian military attack on 
Pakistan may well have invited condemnation similar to what Pakistan had received at 
Kargil. This would have severely dented India’s newly-cemented strategic relationship 
with the U.S.292 New Delhi’s sensitivity on this count was obvious from its concessions at 
the critical junctures in phase I and its eagerness to shift the onus of achieving its 
objectives on to the third party rather than taking on Pakistan directly in phase II.  
New Delhi’s dilemma was especially acute because Pakistan’s propensity to bank 
on plausible deniability fared better in 2001-02 than it had at Kargil. There was no 
incontrovertible evidence of Pakistani state’s complicity in the December 13 attacks. 
Moreover, while the de-escalation agenda benefited by calling out Pakistan at Kargil, this 
time the third party’s interest was served better by accepting Islamabad’s denial of any 
association. In fact, U.S signaling in phase I including statements like the one on 
December 21, 2001 suggesting that the parliament attack was aimed at undermining the 
Pakistan-U.S. relationship essentially painted Islamabad as the victim rather than a 
                                              
292 In analyzing the 2001-02 standoff, Kampani highlights the Indian concern that upsetting U.S. 
interlocutors could have damaged India’s regional goals and its bilateral strategic partnership. 
Kampani, “Placing the Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff in Perspective,” 18.  
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complicit party. Pakistan’s efforts to portray itself as the defender against potential Indian 
aggression would have strengthened this depiction further.  
As it turned out, the desire to maintain a positive global image and keep its larger 
U.S. partnership intact – read concern for positive evaluation from the third party – was 
strong enough to push Indian planners to even compromise on the reputational concerns 
as far as the credibility of their offensive and deterrent threats were concerned. New 
Delhi had entered the crisis adamant to reverse its reputational deficit in terms of being 
self-deterred and its behavior had all the markings of a country set to act upon its resolve. 
Yet,  India ended the crisis having reconfirmed its problematic image. Its audience costs 
would have been especially high given that overwhelming majority of its resolve-
inducing commitments before and during the crisis were made through public channels in 
a democratic context where the political forces were also backing government action 
against Pakistan.293 An indication of the severity of the political costs is provided by 
influential Indian writer Brahma Chellaney’s (2002) post-crisis observation about New 
Delhi’s performance: “….when a nation enjoys credibility, it can usually achieve its 
objectives with a mere threat to use force. However, when there are serious credibility 
problems, even modest objectives are difficult to accomplish. Vajpayee ended up 
                                              
293 Public signals in a democratic context are believed to be more credible given the higher 
audience costs associated with such signaling. The signaler is thus more likely to adhere to the 
commitment. See Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” 
The American Political Science Review 92, 4 (December, 1998); and James Fearon, “Domestic 
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science 
Review 88, 3 (September, 1994).  
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practicing coercive non-diplomacy.”294 Nonetheless, India preferred to walk away with 
positive evaluation in as far as it did not aggress and its constant signaling to the 
international community had reemphasized Pakistan’s troubling link with militant outfits 
exporting terrorism to India.295 It seems to have concluded that it had to be seen seeking 
peace, not war, to maintain its positive global image.  
Pakistan’s crisis objectives and outlook vis-à-vis the third party further enhanced 
the possibility of a peaceful outcome. Islamabad’s contrasting behavior from Kargil was 
made possible by its tactical preference for the status quo ante. Pakistan’s need to merely 
blunt India’s crisis strategy rather than take the offensive lent itself to a measured 
approach. Complementing this would have been Islamabad’s inherent advantage in terms 
of being viewed as a resolute power that flows from the Pakistani military’s image of a 
relatively belligerent outfit, reinforced as it was due to the Kargil operation. Its reputation 
demands that it reassure the world of its maturity to offset these concerns; it can do so 
without worrying about losing the well-established credibility of its resolve. In 2001-02, 
even as Pakistani actions and signaling played on the fear of war,  its preference for a 
return to the pre-crisis situation explains why it could afford restrained nuclear signaling 
in phase I and why Musharraf’s efforts to continue conveying calm in phase II to balance 
out the deterrent threats from his team did not weaken the credibility of Islamabad’s 
resolve.296 Pakistan’s behavior during the standoff also challenges the conventional 
                                              
294 Brahma Chellaney, “Perils of Crying Wolf,” Hindustan Times, November 27, 2002, 
http://teleradproviders.com/nbn/editorialstory.php?id=NTk5Ng==. 
295 Raghavan, “A Coercive Triangle,” 254. 
296 Our finding that Pakistan was not necessarily the consistently more belligerent party in 2001-
02 and did not always initiate aggressive rhetoric runs contrary to some of the prominent previous 
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wisdom that military decision makers are more likely to support committal tactics to 
establish resolve at all costs and thus are liable to force themselves into a commitment 
trap.297 It was the Indian political leadership more than Pakistan’s military one that 
seemed to have over-committed itself by instantly mobilizing troops and backing it up 
with display of political resolve as soon as the crisis got underway. 
The third party held the key to pulling the two sides back. In line with our 
conceptual framework, the nuclear environment caused the ‘manipulator’ to focus on de-
escalation even though it would have been more natural for it to back India – a victim of 
terrorism with whom it enjoyed growing warmth. The focus on de-escalation neatly 
overlapped with, and was thus reinforced by, the U.S. interest in preventing any 
development that undermined its Afghanistan campaign. 
The third party’s behavior was marked by a persistent effort to play down the 
middle without revealing its intentions fully to either side. While this pushed the principal 
actors to exercise greater degree of autonomy to force the U.S. to divulge more 
information – and the third party had to accept a number of Indian and Pakistani moves 
that ran counter to its interest at the time –, it also had them working the third party 
channel throughout in the hope of obtaining the external actors’ backing (and preventing 
its opposition). This kept India and Pakistan sensitive to third party preferences and in 
turn forced them to subjugate their autonomy to it at the critical junctures.  
                                                                                                                                      
examinations of signaling during the crisis. See for instance, Rahul Roy-Chaudary, “Nuclear 
Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control,” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear 
Option in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider (Washington, 
D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 101-118. 
297 See Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and 
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, 4, (Spring 1994): 66-107. 
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In a classic balancing act, the U.S. accorded India sympathy but did not support 
aggression; it forced Pakistan to tackle terrorism and reminded it of the U.S.’s ability to 
use the alignment card if needed through private and public signaling but did not box it in 
completely by setting strict deadlines to ensure cessation of cross-border infiltration. All 
along, it kept conveying to both sides that it was making headway in pleading their 
respective cases to the other. Washington’s ability to have Musharraf acknowledge a 
need to put his own house in order, not to back India’s claim that it had the right to tackle 
Pakistan-based militants directly and pressure it through moves such as issuance of travel 
advisories, and to offer India inducements in terms military sales all contributed to the 
overall objective of avoiding war. Moreover, the U.S. managed to produce potent face 
savers.298  Both Musharraf’s speeches provided India the justification for deferring a 
military option. In phase II, Armitage’s public statement confirming Musharraf’s pledge 
to end infiltration was key for the Indian leadership. Moreover, the third party’s 
inclination to play along as India tied its de-mobilization to the October 2002 elections in 
Jammu and Kashmir and to ultimately endorse the elections provided it a domestically 
palatable way of withdrawing from the crisis.299 As for Pakistan, India’s inability to 
aggress was Musharraf’s opening. Even though he had to admit that infiltration was 
taking place from Pakistani soil, he had an obvious anchor to extract himself with from 
the crisis. The ability of both sides to have enough on offer to claim victory softened the 
blow.  
                                              
298 The role of a “face saver” is well-established in literature on bargaining games. See Dean G. 
Pruitt and Douglas F. Johnson, “Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 14, 3 (1970): 239-46. 
299 Joshi, “Practice of Coercive Diplomacy,” 103.  
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 Throughout the crisis, there was an interesting dynamic between crisis 
management objectives and larger strategic goals for each of the three sides. One could 
argue that even as crisis management objectives reigned supreme, the larger interests 
formed tools for second order coercion. Pakistan’s long standing wish for a negotiated 
settlement to Kashmir was often on the table as a quid pro quo for its deference to third 
party preferences. Indian attempts to portray Pakistan as a terror-sponsoring state could 
be seen as its second order interest in as much as it was an end in itself beyond its utility 
in enhancing the chances of third party backing for India’s crisis objectives. The third 
party itself was deeply interested in its larger strategic relationship with India and it had 
no option but to continue engaging Pakistan given its importance on the Afghanistan 
front.  Ultimately, the third party prioritized the crisis management goals all along. Indian 
and Pakistani behavior suggests that they too did not wish to hold the crisis outcome 
hostage to their second order interests even as they raised these repeatedly during the 
crisis.  
3. Competing Explanations for Crisis Behavior and Outcomes 
The analysis in this chapter ought to have made the centrality of the brokered 
bargaining model in shaping behavior of the three involved parties clear. Without 
factoring in the primacy of the three-cornered bargaining framework, Indian and 
Pakistani actions seem to fit well with classic brinkmanship. There was plenty of saber-
rattling and aggressive intent, rhetoric, and actions on display; the crisis exhibited 
conventional deployment, missile tests, and signaling offensives.  
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Viewed through a classic lens, a plausible explanation for India’s decision not to 
use force could be that its effort at compellence worked. After all, Musharraf did give a 
commitment to stop cross-border infiltration from Pakistan’s soil and also took measures 
to this effect in both phases of the crisis. Pakistan’s link with militants also remained in 
the limelight throughout. The  ‘blow hot blow cold’ tendency of Indian and Pakistani 
signaling could find reason in the need to balance between conveying resolve to the 
adversary but avoiding overcooking such rhetoric so as not to force the opposition into a 
‘use them or lose them’ mindset. As we have discussed earlier however, this is a weak 
argument given that the end result of the crisis fell considerably short of Indian objectives 
and its leadership’s propensity to claim victory was driven more by the compulsion to 
save face than by a genuine belief that they had come out ahead of Pakistan in the crisis.  
 Others have argued that conventional and nuclear deterrence held firm and were 
eventually responsible for preventing escalation. Some have argued that Pakistan’s 
shorter internal lines of communication had allowed it to take away any element of 
surprise from India even in December 2001.300 Indeed, India’s mobilization was guided 
by its “Sundarji doctrine” that provisioned for a full-scale mobilization from peacetime 
locations deep inside India.301 Therefore, when the Indian military was fully prepared to 
aggress along the international border in the first week of January, Pakistani forces had 
                                              
300 For a discussion of this Indian problem, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars: 
The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, 3 (Winter 2007/8): 
159-163. 
301 The “Sundarji doctrine” envisioned delivering “deep sledgehammer blows” to Pakistan by 
employing India’s full military might. The peace time locations of India’s strike corps however 
were hundreds of kilometers from the Pakistani border, implying that India’s full mobilization 
would take nearly three weeks or so. Ibid., 159-61. 
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long been in place to intercept any such attack. In phase II, the Indian military’s plans of 
a full-scale attack were partly driven by the fact that even a pretense of surprising 
Pakistani defenses could no longer hold.302 All this said, Pakistan’s conventional 
deterrent held in as much as it could defend against an Indian attack in a short war that 
lasted only a few days. A prolonged war however would still have given the stronger 
party a decisive advantage. 303 Rajagopalan (2005) correctly affirms that Pakistan may be 
able to “walk on the edge of war, but an actual war is something that Pakistan can ill-
afford.”304  
Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), among others, have focused on nuclear deterrence 
and reached the conclusion that war was ultimately avoided as all Indian military plans, 
despite having the requisite military force, risked escalation.305 This would have been 
especially true for phase II where the plans were “so audacious that they had never been 
war-gamed before.”306 As some Indians, including Brajesh Mishra subsequently 
acknowledged, Pakistan had no interest to cooperate with India to keep the crisis limited 
in the absence of any mutual understanding on the concept of “limited war.”307 Surely, 
                                              
302 One serving Indian general reflected on the loss of surprise later: “our strengths and 
weaknesses, equipment and formations were exposed. Luckily, there was no war towards the end 
of the deployment or we’d have found the going tough.” Chander Suta Dogra and Murali 
Krishnan, “Burden of Peace,” Outlook, May 19, 2003, 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?220161.  
303 For an analysis of the 2001-02 crisis that dismisses conventional deterrence as the driver of 
Indian and Pakistan crisis choices and the crisis’s outcome, see Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful 
Symmetry, 167-86.  
304 Rajesh Rajagopalan, Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia (New Delhi: 
Viking, 2005), 47.  
305 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 167-86. 
306 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 82. 
307 Quoted in Ganguly and Kraig, “The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” 311. 
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from a classic brinkmanship perspective, it would have suited Islamabad to keep raising 
the bar and threatening unlimited escalation to force India to blink. 308  
As already discussed, the restraining influence of nuclear weapons is endogenous 
to our model. It would have undoubtedly played on the minds of the decision makers 
when making crisis choices. However, we have also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence 
alone is inadequate in terms of understanding the mechanisms shaping crisis behavior.  
A number of observations support this proposition. First, the developments in the 
inter-crisis period suggest that India was serious about employing its limited war doctrine 
against Pakistan. It was desperate to end Pakistan’s impunity in employing sub-
conventional warfare.309 If so, in formulating this doctrine it would have already 
internalized both Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear deterrent capabilities and the 
expected support of the third party in a crisis in concluding that space for limited war 
existed under the nuclear umbrella. During the crisis, Pakistan’s deterrent strength and 
doctrine remain unchanged from the inter-crisis period; it was the unequivocal support 
from the third party that did not come through as India had hoped. The third party strand 
of the resolve-prudence trade-off for the antagonists then would have affected India’s 
decision not to take the fight to Pakistan.  
Second, Indian and Pakistani behavior was anomalous for two nascent nuclear 
powers seeking to demonstrate a survivable and operational deterrent to the opposition. 
Pakistan, threatened by conventional aggression and maintaining a First Use posture, 
should have considered a move towards formal alerting of its arsenal when war seemed 
                                              
308 Ganguly and Kraig, “The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” 311. 
309 Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism,” 39-56. 
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imminent. This is especially so given that Pakistan’s arsenal was de-mated and separately 
stored and thus it would have needed extended preparation time to have its arsenal in a 
launchable state. India’s conventional compellence strategy equally required it to credibly 
demonstrate its second strike capability.  The fact that both parties seemed satisfied with 
“non-traditional deterrence” 310 suggests that they viewed the third party’s presence as the 
first, and a sufficient, line of defense against escalation. The belief that the U.S. is central 
to the crisis dynamic then forces classic nuclear deterrence into the background (its 
influence feeds into the process that underpins our model) as brokered bargaining takes 
center stage. At the very least, the dynamic seems to delay – courtesy of sensitivity to 
third party preferences – moves such as deployment of the nuclear arsenal and thereby is 
stability-inducing. At the same time, given that third parties are endogenous to our model, 
it does not hold that absent the third party, escalation would have taken place. The crisis 
outlook, expectations, strategies, and decisions of the antagonists would have been 
fundamentally different in that – strictly incomparable – context.  
We must also tackle the contention that India was never serious about launching 
an attack and that it was bluffing throughout the crisis solely to compel the third party to 
back its case.311 After all, the Indian political leadership never managed to give a clear 
objective and mission to the military even as it kept it mobilized for ten months.312 There 
are a number of reasons to be skeptical about this view. The sheer scale and length of the 
                                              
310 Basrur (2006) uses the term to refer to some of the stable aspects of the South Asian 
deterrence equation, including the absence of nuclear deployment. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, 
182. Ganguly and Hagerty (2005) call Indian and Pakistani postures “non-deployment non-
weaponization.” Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 193.  
311 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 179. 
312 Swami, “A War to End a War,” 150. 
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Indian mobilization and the cost of nearly US $1.3 billion associated with it is an obvious 
one.313 Moreover, even if the actual desire was to bluff, it no longer remained the case 
once India had upped the ante to the point that it could have stumbled into war without 
necessarily wanting to do so.314 Our analysis makes us more sympathetic to the view that 
India miscalculated the third party’s response and thus had not accurately factored in the 
implications of its provocativeness, let alone aggression, for positive evaluation. Its 
compellence strategy was premised on unflinching U.S. support;315 it pulled back when it 
was clear that the only option to achieve its crisis objectives was to aggress against 
Pakistan without the third party’s blessings. 
Nonetheless, if the view that India’s entire effort during the standoff was an 
attempt at theatrics is taken at face value, it actually ends up reinforcing our argument 
that the third party was central to India’s thinking. In as much as India’s behavior 
alarmed the third party, it only helped to reinforce brokered bargaining.  As our model 
would predict, the third party’s presence was inevitable, as was its decision not to back 
Indian designs for aggression.  
                                              
313 Mistry, “Tampering Optimism,” 176; Joshi, “Practice of Coercive Diplomacy,” 92-94.  
314 Indeed, as Pakistani officials saw the situation in December 2001, India had at least put “itself 
into a corner where it would be difficult for them to now back off.” Keith Jones, “India and 
Pakistan on Threshold of War,” World Socialist Website, December 29, 2001, 
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/12/ind-d29.html.   
315 General Ashok Mehta’s remarks at an Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies’ seminar on the 
Parakram operation. “Coercive Diplomacy: Operation Parakram: An Evaluation,” Institute of 
Peace & Conflict Studies, Indo-Pak Seminar Report No. 88, August 30, 2003, 
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577.html.  
333 
 
CHAPTER 6: INDIA’S 9/11: THE MUMBAI CRISIS 2008 
“India’s 9/11” was triggered by a series of simultaneous terrorist attacks in the 
Indian metropolis of Mumbai. It thrust the two South Asian nuclear powers into their 
third major crisis within a decade of overt nuclearization. The episode was an audacious 
display of violence by 10 militants who managed to hold India’s financial heart hostage 
for more than two days. It was easily the greatest provocation in the history of anti-India 
terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil. India’s largest city and within it select targets 
frequented by foreigners and the city’s elite were struck and images of brutal killings and 
the state’s lackluster response were beamed live on television. Puzzlingly however, 
despite the provocativeness of the trigger event, the crisis never escalated to the level of 
Kargil or the standoff. While the fear of escalation existed, ultimately neither were armed 
forces mobilized extensively, nor were there any skirmishes. Nuclear signaling was also 
all but absent. 
This chapter examines behavior of the key actors during the 2008 Mumbai crisis. 
It focuses as much on explaining their relatively restrained behavior as it does on 
developments that induced instability into the equation. The centrality of brokered 
bargaining in shaping behavior will once again be obvious from our analysis. Consistent 
with the previous two case study chapters, we begin by providing a brief background of 
the crisis. This is followed by a discussion of the major developments between the 
2001-02 standoff and Mumbai (the inter-crisis period) that influenced the crisis outlook 
and objectives of the  principal antagonists and the third party. The following section 
analyzes Indian and Pakistani actions and signals without entertaining the presence of 
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the third party. We subsequently reevaluate their behavior in light of the third party 
factor. The final section expounds on the implications of this analysis for the theory of 
brokered bargaining and for crisis stability, and examines alternate explanations for 
crisis behavior and outcomes. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE MUMBAI CRISIS 
On November 26, 2008, 10 terrorists entered Mumbai and launched multiple 
simultaneous attacks in spectacular fashion.1 By the time the last shot was fired on 
November 29, 2008, the attack had become the longest terrorist incident in India’s 
history.2 It left 174 people dead, including 26 foreigners, and 311 injured.3 These attacks 
were especially untimely given that India and Pakistan had engaged in the most 
successful effort at normalization of bilateral ties in their sixty-one year history in the 
inter-crisis period. Terrorism and cross-border infiltration into Kashmir had continued 
since the standoff but nowhere near the levels experienced before 2001.  
The terrorists entered India via the sea route.4 They split into four groups and 
between them targeted high profile destinations frequented by foreigners. Key targets 
                                              
1 For a complete chronology of the Mumbai attacks, see John Wilson et al., “Mumbai Attacks: 
Response and Lessons,” Observer Research Foundation, [undated], 11-15, 
http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/report/attachments/Mumbai%20attack_1
230552332507.pdf. 
2 Arabinda Acharya, Sujoyini Mandal, and Akanksha Mehta, “Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai: 
Picking Up the Pieces,” International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 
Nanyang Technological University, 2009, 6, 
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GlobalAnalysis/Analysis%20of%20the%20November%202008%20Mu
mbai%20Terror%20Attacks.pdf. 
3 Ibid., 21-22. Foreign nationals killed in the attacks belonged to the U.S., U.K., Israel, France, 
Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Italy, Thailand, and Singapore, among others.  
4 The terrorists had left from the Pakistani port city of Karachi three days before arriving on 
November 26, 2008. They traveled on a sea-faring vessel, the Al-Husseini, till they hijacked an 
Indian vessel to prevent detection by Indian maritime law enforcement agencies. They ultimately 
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included the Leopold Café, the Taj Palace hotel, the Oberoi-Trident hotel, Mumbai’s 
Jewish center, the Nariman house, and the Mumbai train station.5 In the pair that went to 
the train station was Ajmal Kasab, the young Pakistani from Faridkot in Punjab who was 
the only terrorist to be captured alive and whose confession confirmed the Pakistani link 
to the attacks.6 
Unlike Kargil and the standoff, the Mumbai iteration had two distinct aspects: 
domestic; and bilateral between India and Pakistan. The domestic aspect centered on the 
abject failure of Indian law enforcement and intelligence to prevent such a spectacular 
attack and to subdue it quickly.7 The Indian public opinion was incensed at the state’s 
failure. The fact that the Indian intelligence had received prior information of these 
attacks did not help.8 
                                                                                                                                      
shifted to a rubber dingy and reached Mumbai’s shore at around 21:00 hours on November 26. 
Each of them was carrying eight grenades, one TT pistol, 10 to 12 extra magazines, several hand 
grenades, 18 pounds of military grade explosive, a gas lighter, a dry fruit packet weighing 500 
grams, one mobile phone with an Indian SIM card, high resolution maps, and fake ID cards and 
they employed sophisticated technology like Voice over Internet protocols and Global 
Positioning System handsets. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Terrorists Attacks in Mumbai, India, and 
Implications for U.S. Interests,” in Mumbai, India and Terrorism, ed. Elena N. Popov (New York: 
Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 4; Tushar Srivastava, “I was Being Trained in Pak, Reveals 
Kasab,” Hindustan Times, December 4, 2008, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/i-was-
being-trained-in-pak-reveals-kasab/article1-356053.aspx; Prem Mahadevan, “The November 
2008 Fidayeen Attack in Mumbai,” Research Institute for European and American Studies, 
Research Paper No. 127, January 2009. 
5 For a detailed account of the places targeted and a blow-by-blow account of how the attacks 
unfolded, see Acharya, Mandal, and Mehta, “Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai.” 
6Srivastava, “I was Being Trained in Pak.”  
7 Ten armed men had embarrassed the Indian security apparatus by first entering Mumbai 
undetected and then holding the entire city and its elite locations hostage for 60 hours. The state’s 
subsequent response was embarrassing. By the time the crisis ended, the Indian state had engaged 
477 National Security Guards, its premier commando unit, one unit of marine commandos, six 
columns of the Army, and 400 Mumbai police.  
K. Jaishankar, “India's 26/11: From Communal Violence to Communal Terrorism to Terrorism,” 
International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 2, 2 (2008): 5-11. 
8 The Mumbai attack was originally planned for September 27 and Indian intelligence had 
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The bilateral dimension of the crisis did not take long to erupt. Within hours of 
the attacks, the Indian media was pointing fingers at Pakistan. The Indian officialdom 
followed soon with the Indian government, now led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
of the left-of-center Congress party, hinting at a Pakistani role and law enforcement 
officials confirming a Pakistani link based on information provided by Ajmal Kasab. 
Indeed, as it turned out, the attack was conceived, planned, and executed by the LeT. 
Many in the Indian media drew parallels between ‘26/11,’ as the Mumbai attacks were 
called, and 9/11 and advocated a muscular response similar to the U.S.’s in Afghanistan.9 
The Indian government ultimately showed restraint: while the crisis featured resolve 
signals and limited force demonstrations, the battle was truly fought on the diplomatic 
front. The crisis gradually faded away as both sides launched investigations into the 
attacks and Pakistan took some action against the perpetrators. India had held back yet 
again in the face of terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil. 
                                                                                                                                      
received some information on September 18 and 24. The CIA suggested the possibility of the 
attackers arriving by sea and targeting luxury hotels. The Indian security apparatus however stood 
down its heightened alert once the original threat in September passed uneventfully.  Mahadevan, 
“Fidayeen Attack,” 12. Next, on November 18, Indian intelligence  intercepted a conversation 
from Al Husseini which said a ‘consignment’ was on its way to Mumbai. The Indian Coast Guard 
launched day-long hunt on November 20 but did not follow this up in the coming days. Praveen 
Swami, “Mumbai: The Road to Maximum Terror,” Diplomaatia No. 65/66 (January-February 
2009), http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/mumbai-the-road-to-maximum-terror/.  
9 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “After the Mumbai Tragedy,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, 51 
(December 20-26, 2008): 8. Also see Sukumar Muralidharan, “Mumbai, Militarism and the 
Media,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, 49 (December 6-12, 2008): 15-18.  
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II. FROM TWINS PEAKS TO MUMBAI:  STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC 
OUTLOOK OF THE THREE ACTORS 
This section recounts the relevant strategic and diplomatic developments in the 
inter-crisis period. They remain important in as much as they influenced the crisis 
outlook and objectives of the antagonists as well as the third party.   
1. India 
India was somewhat torn on the Pakistan question during the inter-crisis period. 
On the one hand, it had exited the 2001-02 crisis with significant reputational damage to 
the credibility of its deterrent capability. Inaction in case of a repeat of the parliament-
type attack was considered self-defeating.10 U.S. strategist Neil Joeck (2009) captured 
this virtually universal consensus among the Indian strategic elite just months before the 
Mumbai crisis: “Another attack on an important symbol or with significant loss of life 
may force New Delhi to act.”11 “A violent action even two steps removed from ISID 
[Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence Directorate] may be enough to compel India to go 
after the source rather than the immediate perpetrator of a terror attack.”12  
Reflecting India’s desperation to create realistic options to punish Pakistan 
following a major provocation, the Indian military floated a new limited war-fighting 
doctrine in the inter-crisis period.  Popularly dubbed “Cold Start,” the new approach 
                                              
10 This thinking was in line with “Never Again Theory” whereby actors believe that a poor past 
track record of a state would make it even more costly for it to back down under a present 
situation. They can therefore be expected to exhibit resolve to repair reputational losses in past 
instances. Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 29. 
11 Neil Joeck, “The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: Lessons from the Past, Contingencies 
for the Future,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Reining in the Risk, ed. Henry Sokolski, (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 39-40. 
12 Ibid., 40. 
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sought to inflict swift and limited punishment on Pakistan.13 Interestingly, it not only 
aimed to defeat Pakistani mobilization in terms of speed – something the Sundarji 
doctrine had failed to do in 2001-02 –14 but it also sought to undercut the international 
community’s ability to pressure India to back off by reducing mobilization and execution 
times drastically. As Kapur (2007) quotes an unnamed U.S. official, Indians believed that 
“they can fight three or four days, and [then] the international community will stop it [the 
war].”15 Even though Cold Start was not operationally ready on the eve of the Mumbai 
terrorist attacks,16 this was not entirely clear at the time. There were therefore fears that 
                                              
13 The Cold Start doctrine was floated informally in 2004. It was inherently offensive and 
envisioned an Indian capability to capture chunks of Pakistani territory no further than 50-80 
kilometers across the border as tactical bargaining chips to be swapped for Pakistani concessions 
in post-conflict negotiations. It relied on agile Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that would ensure 
the element of surprise that had been lacking in India’s traditional military strategy against 
Pakistan. For details of Cold Start and the thinking behind the Doctrine, see Walter C. Ladwig III, 
“A Cold Start for Hot Wars: The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International 
Security 32, 3 (Winter 2007/8):163-67; Subhash Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine 
Strategically Reviewed,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 991, May 4, 2004, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper991. 
14 The starkest lesson for the Indian army from the twin peaks crisis was that the ‘Sundarji 
doctrine,’ with its full-scale mobilization entailing movement of strike corps from peacetime 
locations deep within India, was untenable under the nuclear umbrella. Given that Pakistan’s 
peacetime locations were within 50 kilometers from their initial war-fighting positions, the 
excessive mobilization times needed by the Indian army gave its Pakistani counterpart a 
significant advantage and all but ruled out the element of surprise so crucial for a short burst of 
aggression below the nuclear threshold. On the subject, see Ladwig, “Cold Start for Hot Wars,” 
159-63. 
15 S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33, 2 
(Fall 2008): 91. 
16 When the Mumbai attacks took place, the Indian Army had conducted six major exercises to 
validate the concept. These were Divya Astra (2004), Vajra Shakti (2005), Desert Strike (2005), 
Sanghe Shakti (2006), Ashwamedh (2007), and Brazen Chariots (2008). A new South-Western 
Command was also created to execute the multi-pronged strategy. Much of the infrastructure 
development to house the IBGs and equipment closer to the frontlines and reorganization of the 
strike corps however was still work in progress. Moeed Yusuf, “India’s ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine: 
Explaining Pakistan’s Silence” (paper presented at conference on ‘Cold Start: India’s New 
Strategic Doctrine and its Implications,’ Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, May 
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India may attempt to employ it.17 Regardless, murmurs of India’s move to this new war-
fighting strategy only helped reinforce predictions that India would not hold back if faced 
with a provocation comparable to the December 13, 2001 parliament attack.  
Working to mitigate this hawkish strand of policy thinking was the India-Pakistan 
bid to normalize ties. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “Hand of Friendship” speech in 
April 2003 had initiated a sustained ‘composite dialogue’ between the two sides. While 
the process led to tangible gains in terms of increased trade and people-to-people contacts 
as well as narrowing down of possible solutions for Kashmir and other territorial disputes, 
it also impacted cross-border terrorism, and more importantly, India’s patience 
threshold.18 Pakistani efforts to check anti-India terrorism after the 2001-02 crisis led to a 
                                                                                                                                      
29-30, 2008). For a detailed discussion of India’s progress towards operationalizing Cold Start 
between 2004-2008, see Ladwig, “Cold Start for Hot Wars,” 175-190.  
17 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management After The 
2008 Mumbai Attacks,” Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2012, 27. 
18 The ‘composite dialogue’ covered Kashmir, Peace and Security, Siachen, Sir Creek, the Wullar 
Barrage dispute, terrorism and drug trafficking, trade, and promotion of friendly relations. It 
delivered major gains for the bilateral relationship across various sectors. The most unexpected, 
and indeed, consequential development was the forward movement on Kashmir. Pakistani 
President Parvez Musharraf floated a four-point formula which envisioned maximum autonomy 
for Kashmir without a final territorial settlement. The two sides are believed to have been 
extremely close to an agreement along these lines when the process stalled in 2007 due to internal 
political troubles for the Musharraf government in Pakistan. For details of the formula, see Khalid 
Mahmud, “Peace Process with India: A Pakistani Perspective,” in Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2014 [forthcoming]), ch. 3. 
Other gains included increase in trade volumes from a mere $161 million in 2001 to more than $ 
1 billion by 2006. “India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilizing a Cold Peace,” International Crisis 
Group, Asia Briefing No. 51, June 15, 2006, 4. A formal ceasefire was also maintained along the 
LoC after 2003. A number of other Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) aimed at easing travel 
and trade across the LoC were also instituted. Finally, a number of steps to improve 
communication and reduce the possibility of conflict were also undertaken. For a list of CBMs 
concluded during this period, see “South Asia Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) Timeline,” 
Henry L. Stimson Center, September 20, 2012, http://www.stimson.org/data-sets/south-asia-
confidence-building-measures-cbm-timeline/. 
340 
 
significant dip in cross-border militant movement momentarily.19 But even as modest 
activity picked up again from 2005 and India kept reminding interlocutors like the U.S. 
that the Pakistani state had not completely reversed its support to militant groups, it 
continued to give leeway to the Pakistani government in the hope that it would come 
good on its promises to control even these reduced levels of cross-border terrorism.20  
The Indian government avoided creating a crisis situation in response to terrorist 
incidents between 2005 and 2007.  It even held off after what was undoubtedly the most 
damaging incident from the perspective of India-Pakistan relations in the inter-crisis 
period to that point: on July 7, 2008, a car bomb at the Indian embassy in Kabul killed 58 
people including India’s defense attaché. India blamed the ISI for being directly involved 
                                              
19 Remarkably, the 2003-05 period saw an absence of any major terrorist incidents on mainland 
India that were attributable to Pakistan. Cross-LoC infiltration also decreased. B. Raman, Mumbai 
26/11: A Day of Infamy (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2009), 62; Anit Mukherjee, “A Brand 
New Day or Back to the Future? The Dynamics of India-Pakistan Relations,” India Review 8, 4 
(October-December 2009): 422-23. 
20 LeT alone was suspected for its role in terrorist attacks in New Delhi in October 2005, in 
Bangalore in December 2005, and in Varanasi in March 2006, in Nagpur in June 2006 and in 
Bombay in July 2007. 
Ashley J. Tellis, “Lessons from Mumbai- Part II,” Testimony Before the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affair Committees, January 28, 2009, in Mumbai, India and 
Terrorism, ed. Elena N. Popov (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 78. Cross-LoC 
infiltration also increased again. However, Indian officials did not necessarily attribute this to “a 
change in the Pakistani approach” and instead presented this as the work of “random” militants. 
Robert O. Blake, NSA Narayanan Presses for Action against LET, Welcomes Exchange on Nepal, 
WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks: 05NEWDELHI3717, May, 17, 2005, 
https://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/05/05NEWDELHI3717.html. Moreover, even after significant 
incidents in mainland India like the July 2006 train bombings in Bombay that killed nearly 200 
people, the Indian government suspended the dialogue with Pakistan only momentarily. It 
reengaged two months later, also agreeing to set up a joint anti-terrorism mechanism and to 
insulate the peace process from such terrorist attacks. 
K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2008, 
18,  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109486.pdf. For a list of terrorist attacks in India 
between 2005 and 2008 and their impact on India-Pakistan relations see Mukherjee, “Brand New 
Day,” 426. 
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and third parties like the U.S. subsequently concluded that the allegations were credible.21 
Yet, India defied calls to put an end to the bilateral composite dialogue process even as 
the Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon made it clear that the normalization 
bid was at its lowest ebb and “under stress.”22 By this time, the Indian leadership also had 
to consider that a decade of military and quasi-military rule under Parvez Musharraf had 
given way to a new but weak civilian government in Pakistan in early-200823 and it was 
struggling to rebalance the civil-military equation while dealing with acute internal 
economic and law and order instability – acute enough for some to consider it an 
existential threat to Pakistan. While traditional hawks in India may have seen Pakistan’s 
weakness as an opportunity to squeeze it further, there was now also talk of Pakistan’s 
further destabilization spilling over into India and beyond.   
 The preference of the Indian leadership to continue investing in improving ties 
with Pakistan over the need to reverse its continuing failure to put a permanent end to 
anti-India terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil seemed to have been finally undone by 
the Mumbai carnage. The attacks were far more massive and egregious than the red lines 
                                              
21 Bill Roggio, “41 Killed in Kabul Suicide Strike at Indian Embassy,” Long War Journal, July 7, 
2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/41_killed_in_kabul_s.php; “Report: U.S. 
Officials Say Pakistan Helped Plan Indian Embassy Blast,” Fox News, August 1, 2008, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/08/01/report-us-officials-say-pakistan-helped-plan-indian-
embassy-blast/.  
22 Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” 11. 
23 The Pakistani President Musharraf had been challenged by a “lawyer’s movement” seeking 
restoration of the judiciary that Musharraf had suspended. The movement ultimately forced 
Musharraf to hold elections. General elections took place in February 2008 and produced a weak, 
coalition government that faced a crisis of credibility from the very beginning. For a basic 
summary of the lawyer’s movement, see Jordyn Phelps, “Pakistan’s Lawyers Movement (2007-
2009),” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, August 2009, http://www.nonviolent-
conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-
summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=30. 
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envisioned by those predicting an end to Indian restraint in a future crisis situation during 
the inter-crisis period.  Indeed, as soon as the attacks took place, the hawkish strand of 
inter-crisis thinking in India suddenly seemed intuitively reasonable. This was even more 
so since Prime Minister Singh’s left-of-center government was already under the scanner 
for soft-peddling on terrorism when the incident took place and Indian elections were just 
months away. Indeed, as observed by noted American author George Friedman, it was 
“very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this 
attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.”24 Inaction, he argued, 
would potentially lead to a fall of the Congress government and therefore predicted that 
India may ignore U.S. calls for restraint this time round.25 Not to mention, absence of a 
resolute response in the face of such massive provocation also entailed reputational losses 
for the Indian deterrent – far greater than it had incurred in the previous two crises 
examined here.  
Also influencing India at the time would have been its expedient international rise 
in the inter-crisis years. Economic and defense ties between India and key third parties 
had grown exponentially.26 The attractiveness of Indian markets had compelled global 
                                              
24 George Friedman, “Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack,” Geopolitical Weekly 12, 18 
(December 1, 2008), 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081201_strategic_motivations_mumbai_attack.  
25 Ibid.  
26 India was emerging as an economic powerhouse at the behest of high technology sectors and as 
an outsourcing hub for global services. In 2006, at 8.5 percent, it was the second fastest growing 
of the 20 largest economies of the world. It followed up with a nine-plus percent growth rate in 
the next two years. Inward investment flows rose to $17.5 billion in 2006 from a mere $74 
million $ in 1991. Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” 53, 55. India was also well on its way to 
becoming the world’s largest defense buyer, with its defense budget rising more than 60 percent 
from $13.81 billion to $22.1 billion between 2001 and 2006. Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability,” 
91, fn. 62. In 2005, India and the U.S. also signed a ten-year defense framework agreement to 
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powers to maintain good relations with New Delhi. The single most consequential 
development with direct implications for Pakistan’s strategic outlook was the flagship 
Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal that broke global norms to allow a non-member of the 
NPT to receive dual-use technology from the U.S.27   
Interestingly, despite this growing warmth, New Delhi and Washington still did 
not necessarily see eye-to-eye on the Pakistan question. From the Indian perspective, 
continued U.S. support and partnership with Pakistan during the inter-crisis years, and the 
fact that the U.S. had prevented India from acting against Pakistan during previous crises, 
was seen as emboldening the Pakistani security establishment to continue its policy of 
sub-conventional warfare.28 Indians were therefore not convinced of outright U.S. 
support in a crisis with Pakistan. Rather than perceiving India’s international stature as 
according it greater space to undo its image of a soft nuclear state lacking resolve to act 
on its threats, leaders in New Delhi were more predisposed to seeing the U.S. as a 
constraining factor. After all, the experience of the 2001-02 crisis had also suggested that 
while India’s positive image may get it global sympathy, it was no guarantee for 
complete third party support for its crisis objectives. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
expand security cooperation including defense trade and joint production. Kronstadt, “India-U.S. 
Relations,” 46.  
27 The nuclear deal required a change in the U.S.’s “Hyde Act” and in the regulations of the 
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group that otherwise prohibited supply of dual use nuclear technology to non-
NPT members. For a background and various Indian perspectives on the implications of the deal, 
see P. R. Chari ed., Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism (New Delhi: 
Routledge, 2009). 
28 Raman, Mumbai 26/11, 107. 
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2. Pakistan 
Pakistan’s strategic outlook during the inter-crisis period was dictated largely by 
internal security considerations that consumed much of its policy makers’ energy and 
attention. Originally triggered by vociferous opposition to Pakistani President 
Musharraf’s decision to support the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11, the 
Pakistani state was facing a raging insurgency and terrorism that had challenged its writ 
across the country when the Mumbai crisis erupted.29    
                                              
29 Initially limited to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, the militant violence gradually spread much beyond. The state’s law 
enforcement and intelligence structure was gradually but unmistakably overwhelmed as old and 
new foreign and indigenous militant groups with markedly different objectives established formal 
and informal strategic partnerships to counter the newly emerging “near enemy,” the Pakistani 
state. Some of these included the traditionally anti-India outfits or their splinters. For an analysis 
of the transformation of the Pakistani militant landscape during the inter-crisis period, see Moeed 
Yusuf (with contributions from Megan Neville, Ayesha Chugh, and Stephanie Flamenbaum), 
“Pakistan’s Militancy Challenge: From Where, to What,” in Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism 
As India’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective:  
 To punish Pakistan for its failure to prevent anti-India terrorism on the 
Indian mainland (and in Kashmir) but not in a manner that would lead to a 
political or security meltdown in Pakistan 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Employ offensive threats to compel Pakistan to alter its pro-militancy policy 
 Use favorable international sentiment to build up additional pressure on 
Pakistan to comply with Indian demands 
 If needed, punish Pakistan through quick and limited use of force    
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 The metastasis of Pakistan-based militant outfits in the inter-crisis years and the 
state’s obvious inability to stem the tide of rising terrorist violence altered the tenor of the 
debate on Pakistan’s India policy to a large extent. The Pakistani state acknowledged that 
some slippage of militants may still be occurring but it blamed lack of ‘capacity’ rather 
than lack of ‘will’ for this.30 While the international community had noted Musharraf’s 
efforts to crackdown on anti-India groups after the 2001-02 standoff and the reduced 
incidences of cross-border terrorism as a result,31 the Pakistani argument did not sit well 
with external interlocutors as it meant continued infiltration of militants, even if at a lower 
level. The U.S. and other third parties did however become genuinely concerned that an 
overly aggressive anti-militant approach, especially in the Punjab province (see figure 1) 
which is home to nearly 60 percent of the country’s population and where most of the 
anti-India groups were based, could cause an implosion of Pakistan’s heartland. This 
risked not only taking Pakistan’s attention away from the still-ongoing U.S. campaign in 
Afghanistan but it could also make the Pakistani domestic security situation impossible to 
control.  
India remained uncomfortable with this take. Notwithstanding its dovish attitude 
during the inter-crisis period, it never accepted the reduction of cross-border episodes as 
                                                                                                                                      
Challenge, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014 
[forthcoming]), ch.1. 
30 For more on this debate, see Ibid.  
31 During and after the 2001-02 crisis, Musharraf had taken and communicated to relevant 
Pakistani government functionaries his decision to ensure that anti-India militants were not 
allowed to operate across the border. Author’s interview [by phone] of Ambassador Aziz Ahmed 
Khan, Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India, July 2003- Nov 2006, February 6, 2014. It 
remains a matter of intense and divisive debate whether the continued incidences of terrorism 
thereafter are attributable to the state’s lack of capacity or to lack of conviction to implement 
Musharraf’s orders among those tasked to do so.  
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sufficient. It saw the case of LeT – the perpetrator of the Mumbai attacks – as most 
problematic, and for good reason. The outfit was allowed to maintain its training camps 
and to operate relatively openly.32 The ISI reportedly maintained links with its leadership 
and continued to provide them succor as well.33  
 Pakistan also worried the international community in other ways. For one, its loss 
of control over the militant landscape did not seem to affect its resolve to retain a credible 
war-fighting machinery against India, including a robust nuclear deterrent. As discussed 
in chapter two, the Pakistani nuclear establishment chose to accelerate the pace of 
development of its arsenal in the inter-crisis period. While this was Pakistan’s antidote to 
its ever-growing conventional disparity with India,  such developments amidst internal 
chaos only added to the world’s long-standing worries about the safety and security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.34  
Ironically, Pakistan’s continuing status as the frontline U.S. ally in the campaign 
in Afghanistan did not provide it much reassurance. On the one hand, Pakistan remained 
the West’s indispensable partner and one of the largest recipients of monetary assistance 
                                              
32 Pakistan had formally banned LeT after the 2001-02 crisis but most of its cadres who were 
rounded up during the standoff and the several crackdowns after it were let go. Tony Karon, 
“After Mumbai, Can the US Cool India-Pakistan Tension?” Time, December 4, 2008, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1863908,00.html. Organizationally too, LeT 
escaped the crackdowns as it got enough time to move and conceal its funds and instantly began 
operating under its alias, Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD), that had existed as a registered charity 
organization since the 1980s. See  
Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” The International Center for the 
Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, April-May 2009. 
33 Tellis, “Lessons from Mumbai,” 81. 
34 For some of these concerns, as the West sees them, saw Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, 
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research 
Service, March 19, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf. 
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globally.35 On the other hand however, the significant trust deficit between Pakistan and 
the U.S. that had lingered since the beginning of the post-9/11 partnership only increased. 
While there were deep tensions on the Afghanistan front – Islamabad was widely reviled 
for playing a ‘double game’ by simultaneously supporting the U.S. and encouraging anti-
U.S. Afghan insurgent operations from its soil –,36 no other issue was more disconcerting 
for Pakistanis than their perception of the U.S. attitude towards India. Already 
dissatisfied with absence of sufficient U.S. pressure on India to compromise on Kashmir, 
Pakistanis saw U.S.’s India policy as having totally upset the regional strategic balance.37 
                                              
35 In recognition of Pakistan’s indispensability in Afghanistan and to reward its partnership, U.S. 
President George Bush accorded Pakistan the status of a “Major Non-NATO Ally” in 2004. In 
2006, during what was the first visit to Pakistan by a U.S. President since President Clinton’s 
forgettable ‘stopover’ in 2000, the two sides agreed to upgrade their ties and initiate a strategic 
dialogue. A number of high level exchanges and fresh commitments of furthering the “strategic 
partnership” followed. The U.S. government also revived military sales to Pakistan, with 
agreements between 2002-2008 amounting to $4.9 billion. Overall, between 2001 and 2008, the 
U.S. poured in over $15 billion in security and economic assistance and Coalition Support Funds 
(CSF) which directly reimbursed Pakistani military’s costs for fighting the war against terrorism 
in partnership with the U.S. CSF authorizations or appropriations alone amounting to $8.3 billion 
between 2002 and 2009. For details of U.S. assistance to Pakistan during this period, see K. Alan 
Kronstadt,  “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, July 1, 2009, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/127297.pdf. 
36 For an American perspective of Pakistan’s role in the inter-crisis years (and beyond) which 
hones in on this argument, see Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured 
Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 105-168. 
37 Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Preserve Incentives, and the US-Pakistan 
Partnership in Post-9/11,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 2, 1 (Spring 2009): 22, 25-26. The 
Indo-U.S. nuclear deal was perhaps the single most important factor behind such Pakistani 
thinking. Pakistani nationalists argued that courtesy of the deal, India could use fissile material 
from the eight fast-breeder reactors outside the safeguards envisioned in the agreement to produce 
weapons. Moreover, the provision for guaranteed fuel supply to India implies that its domestic 
uranium will be freed up for use in the weapons program. For a nationalistic Pakistani take on the 
nuclear deal, see Zahid A. Khan, “Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser,” 
South Asian Studies 28, 1 (January-June 2013): 241-257. Also see Adil Sultan Muhammad, 
“Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications on South Asian Security 
Environment,” Henry L. Stimson Centre, July 2006, 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/AdilSultan.pdf. Matters were made worse 
by the U.S. refusal to consider a similar deal for Pakistan despite its desperate pleas. In an 
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Even as New Delhi remained uneasy about U.S.’s support to Pakistan, Pakistan 
considered conventional wisdom the view that the U.S. was deeply committed to a long-
term strategic partnership with India – at Pakistan’s expense. As Pakistan entered the 
Mumbai crisis then, it did not trust the U.S. to be supportive during any confrontation 
with India. Such was the state of the relationship between the world’s only superpower 
and its ally of allies. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
obvious reference to the nuclear proliferation scandal involving the father of the Pakistani bomb, 
A.Q. Khan (reported in chapter three), Washington contended that “Pakistan and India are 
different countries with different needs and different histories.” Elisabeth Bumiller and Carlotta 
Gall, “Bush Rules Out a Nuclear Deal with Pakistanis,” New York Times, March 5, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/international/asia/05prexy.html?ex=1299214800&en=731c1
bdcb9951a6e&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&_r=0. 
As Pakistan’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective:   
 To deter any Indian use of force 
 To prevent India from using its foreign partnerships to isolate Pakistan 
diplomatically, or worse yet, to sanction Indian aggression against it 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Threaten retaliation in case of Indian aggression 
 Highlight the loss for the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan due to an 
India-Pakistan confrontation 
 Stress on Pakistan’s inability to control militants completely as a means of 
escaping direct punishment 
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3. The Third Party: U.S.’s Crisis Outlook  
The U.S. had learnt its own lessons from the 2001-02 standoff. Its crisis managers 
were convinced that their role had been central to de-escalation. U.S. interlocutors must 
have also realized that India and Pakistan had exited the crisis with different lessons.38 
Moreover, the sudden spikes in levels of tension during the 2001-02 episode would have 
highlighted the non-linear and unpredictable trajectory of South Asian crises39 and further 
lowered Washington’s confidence in New Delhi and Islamabad’s ability to curtail 
escalation on their own. 
Notwithstanding the impressive bilateral normalization bid between the two South 
Asian rivals, the inter-crisis developments would have only reinforced the U.S.’s belief 
that its role was pivotal to successful crisis management. On the one hand was India 
which wanted to shut out the third party in a crisis till it had punished Pakistan. On the 
other hand, it was quite obvious that Pakistan would likely respond to any Indian 
aggression, even if it was limited in line with its Cold Start doctrine. Not doing so would 
be politically suicidal and amount to India calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.  
Further adding to the third party’s conundrum was the question of whether India 
and Pakistan would be comfortable with a U.S. role in the crisis. Both sides had left the 
2001-02 iteration dissatisfied and believed that the U.S. had fallen short of its promises 
– getting Pakistan to cease cross-border infiltration permanently and India to negotiate 
                                              
38 Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management,” 45-46. 
39 Zachary S. Davis, “Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Unlearned,” in The India-Pakistan 
Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation In South Asia, ed. Zachary S. Davis (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 230. 
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Kashmir with a genuine spirit of compromise.40 And neither had fundamentally altered 
this belief despite their bilateral progress in the inter-crisis years. In fact, the U.S. was 
aware that India did not see its policy towards Pakistan as helpful. Indeed, when Mumbai 
occurred, some within India’s policy enclave drew a link between what they saw as 
Pakistani state’s continued use of terrorism as an instrument of policy and U.S. 
reluctance to confront Pakistan’s security establishment on this issue. In terms of crisis 
management then, the U.S. could not have been sure of Indian sensitivity to its 
demands even though it knew that the much improved Indo-U.S. relationship could not 
but weigh on Indian minds.  
With Pakistan, the situation was much worse. Pakistanis would agree with 
Mohan’s (2008) view that the U.S. was so taken by India’s potential that it sought to 
help it become a major global power of the 21st century “without an expectation of 
immediate returns and automatic reciprocity.”41 Pakistan, on the other hand, was seen 
akin to “taking care of a critically ill patient.”42 This meant two things. On the one hand, 
the U.S. would keep pushing ahead with India on a positive track irrespective of 
Pakistani concerns. At the same time however, the U.S. was desperate to help stabilize 
Pakistan since its continued decline was seen as detrimental to regional and global 
security, and to Pakistan’s ability to support the U.S.’s immediate interests in 
                                              
40 David Smith, “The 2001-2002 Standoff: A Real-Time View from Islamabad,” in The India-
Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation In South Asia, ed. Zachary S. Davis (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 210.  
41 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Quest for Continuity in the Face of Change,” The Washington 
Quarterly 31, 4 (Autumn 2008): 144. 
42 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (London: Simon 
and Schuster, 2011), 128. 
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Afghanistan.43 Nonetheless, as far as the India question was concerned, U.S. policies 
had added to Pakistan’s paranoia and created a sense that Washington had chosen to 
back India over Pakistan. Also, on the nuclear question, the constant U.S. concerns about 
the safety and security of Pakistan’s arsenal kept alive longstanding Pakistani suspicions 
about U.S. designs to forcibly neutralize its capability.44 In essence, the U.S. had to be 
aware that Pakistan would not trust it in a crisis situation.  
Finally, the U.S.’s regional security interests were as immediate as they were 
during the 2001-02 crisis. The war in Afghanistan had lingered and the U.S. had since 
also gotten embroiled in a fresh military campaign in Iraq.45 Preoccupied with these 
engagements, neither of which was proving easy, Washington could ill-afford any 
major distractions. Moreover, Pakistan was still indispensable on the Afghanistan front. 
Equally though, India had become the lynchpin of the U.S.’s broader South Asia policy, 
making any reversal of bilateral gains extremely costs for Washington. The third party 
actors then had the unenviable task of working towards a peaceful end to the Mumbai 
crisis under heavy odds. The U.S. leadership could not be certain that either India or 
                                              
43 Ashley Tellis explains this logic of “de-hyphenation” of U.S. policy towards India and 
Pakistan: “First, the recognition that India was a rising power and hence merited not only far 
greater attention than in the past but also a concentrated focus unconnected to any issues 
involving Pakistan; and second, a stipulation that Pakistan be recognized not as a peer of India 
but as an especially vulnerable entity that must be nursed back to health because its decay or 
failure would be detrimental to ‘the peace of the region’.” Ashley J. Tellis, “The Merits of 
Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan,” The Washington 
Quarterly 31, 4 (Autumn 2008): 24.   
44 For an insight into the line of thinking in the U.S. that fuels Pakistani concerns, see Frederick 
W. Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, “Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” New York Times, 
November 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html.  
45 For interactive timelines of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, see, respectively, the Council on 
Foreign Relations presentations at http://www.cfr.org/iraq/timeline-iraq-war/p18876; and 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-
afghanistan/p20018?gclid=CKj_sLmotbwCFdShtAodAG4Acw. 
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Pakistan would show sensitivity to third party preferences, much less depend on its 
diplomacy to attain their crisis objectives, despite extensive ties and close personal 
relationships with the leaderships on both sides. As the Mumbai attacks unfolded, the 
chatter was consumed by predictions of India shedding restraint and Pakistan 
responding in kind.  
 
III. AS THE MUMBAI CRISIS UNFOLDED: CLASSIC NUCLEAR CRISIS 
BEHAVIOR VERSUS BROKERED BARGAINING 
The Mumbai affair was surprising because the fears associated with the ‘next’ 
major India-Pakistan crisis iteration after the 2001-02 standoff never materialized. 
As the third party’s pre-crisis outlook would predict its crisis objective: 
 To prevent escalation of the crisis to the nuclear level 
 To avoid any development that negatively affected Pakistan’s ability to 
continue focusing on its western border 
 To ensure that the strengthening U.S.-India relationship was not 
undermined 
Instrumentalization of objective: 
 Engage immediately to ensure that hostilities did not commence, or if they 
did, they were brought to a swift end 
 Calibrate crisis diplomacy to ensure that both India and Pakistan 
entertained third party demands without undermining U.S. regional 
interests in South Asia 
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Mumbai transpired more as a crisis at the rhetorical level rather than one that entailed 
significant military escalation. To be sure, there were elements of crisis behavior in terms 
of the messaging and sparing military moves from both sides that fit well with the classic 
characterization of coercive diplomacy. However, the defining attribute of the crisis was 
the overall restraint exhibited by both parties. Moreover, the nuclear angle was largely 
absent from developments throughout the crisis. It is the prudence – not belligerence – 
exhibited at Mumbai that presents the real puzzle.  
 The following section examines the Mumbai crisis in this light, explicating on 
Indian and Pakistani actions and signals and how these made Mumbai the least 
threatening of the three crisis iterations studied here. As in the previous two chapters, the 
discussion below examines Indian and Pakistani behavior through a classic bilateral lens 
and subsequently reevaluates the analysis through our trilateral framework to allow a 
comparison between the two approaches and to assess the role of brokered bargaining in 
shaping crisis behavior. Perhaps even more than the two crises examined thus far, the 
Mumbai iteration plainly establishes that the mechanisms underpinning crisis behavior of 
the principal antagonists and the third party cannot be comprehended unless crisis 
dynamics are examined through the brokered bargaining prism. 
1. Mumbai through a Classic Bilateral Lens 
A. India’s Relative Restraint 
The Mumbai crisis was the least advanced of our three cases in terms of credible 
threats of and preparations for use of force. Indian behavior was marked by a mix of 
aggressive signaling, relatively subdued military behavior, and a fair amount of 
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introspection about its internal failures. India held back despite the fact that it had 
concluded even before the attacks were over that the carnage bore Pakistani fingerprints. 
Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving attacker had confirmed the LeT connection during 
preliminary investigations.46 Moreover, since India had long seen the LeT as a direct ISI 
proxy, the Indian leadership was convinced that some elements of the Pakistani state 
machinery were involved. This belief was widespread and has held to this day.47 India’s 
response was puzzling enough for the likes of Sanghvi (2009) to retort: “I can think of 
few societies where an attack – clearly planned and launched by a hostile neighbor – 
should not result in a desire for war….”48  
The initial period after the attacks saw tensions rise due to the belligerent rhetoric 
emanating from New Delhi, especially from the public and opposition parties. Large 
sections of the media were constantly drawing parallels between Mumbai and the 9/11 
attacks in the U.S. and asking for a hard hitting response. The Asian Age’s editorial on 
November 30 captured the outlook succinctly: “If this is our 9/11, let’s fight it like the 
U.S.”49 As evidence of the Pakistani link to the attacks piled up in early-December, there 
was a sense that soft options will not deliver – an “enough is enough” attitude was 
                                              
46 Folmsbee, Clean-up Continues At Taj; City Begins To Return To Normal, WikiLeaks, 
WikiLeaks: 08MUMBAI553, November 29, 2008, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08MUMBAI553.html.  
47 Author’s interviews with ex-Indian officials and Indian strategic experts leave little doubt that 
New Delhi remains convinced that the Pakistani state was involved in the Mumbai affair. There is 
no consensus however on the extent of its alleged role.  
48 Vir Sanghvi, “Introduction,” in 26/11: The Attack on Mumbai (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 
2009), vi. 
49 Quoted in Folmsbee, Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, Sitrep #9: Return To Normalcy Continues 
After Indian Tragedy, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks: 08MUMBAI554, November 30, 2008, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08MUMBAI554.html. 
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discernible.50 The Indian officialdom also upped the ante by pointing to Pakistan as the 
culprit. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh  promised his nation immediately after 
the attacks that “we will go after these individuals and organizations and make sure that 
every perpetrator, organizer and supporter of terror, whatever his affiliation or religion 
may be, pays a heavy price.”51  
In reality however, the most intriguing aspect of New Delhi’s behavior during the 
initial days was the restraint of the Indian leadership when it came to the question of 
employing force.  While India put its Air Force on alert immediately after the attacks52 
and the CCS contemplated surgical strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan (among 
other options), a decision on taking the military course was deferred.53 Significantly, even 
as Pakistan continued to worry about a surprise Indian attack, India had all but made its 
intent not to wrest the initiative in undertaking swift action against Pakistan – the 
principal worry in the inter-crisis period – known early on. The Indian leadership had 
“decided that we [it] will collate all the information, piece together the picture and then 
act” and officials were saying as much by the first week of December.54Although diluted 
                                              
50 Uyangoda, “After the Mumbai Tragedy,” 8. For a typical representation of this sentiment at the 
time, see the editorial, “Dealing with the Neighbor,” Hindustan Times, December 2, 2008.  
51 Nandini R. Iyer, “PM: Our Neighbours Will Have to Pay If…,” Hindustan Times, November 
27, 2008, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-our-neighbours-will-have-to-pay-
if/article1-354537.aspx.  
52 Barbara Starr, “U.S.: India’s Air Force ‘On Alert’ after Mumbai Attacks,” CNN, December 15, 
2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/15/india.pakistan.tension/index.html?PHPSESSI
D=06810a8ebc61a05b90667f03206b7f0c. 
53 Author’s interview of senior Pakistani official. 
54 “India Serves Demarche on Pakistan,” The Hindu, December 2, 2008, 
http://www.thehindu.com/todayspaper/indiaservesdemarcheonpakistan/article1387058.ece. 
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by clarifications by unnamed officials suggesting that the military option was open,55 
India’s External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee nonetheless confirmed publicly after 
a December 2 CCS meeting: “Nobody is talking about military action.” “We will await 
the response of Pakistan.” 56 Within ten days of this statement, he again reiterated, “I am 
making it quite clear that it [war] is not a solution.”57 
The initial period passed without any military confrontation. Tensions remained 
but war clouds seemed to have moved on. They were to return rather abruptly towards the 
middle of December. The tensest period of the crisis followed for the next two weeks as 
talk of war-fighting and limited military preparedness and force demonstrations were 
undertaken by both sides. It started with Pakistan alleging that Indian jets had intruded its 
airspace in Pakistani Kashmir and over Lahore on December 12 and 13.58 India promptly 
denied the allegation and Defense Minister A. K. Antony emphasized on December 16 
that India did “not plan to take any military action.”59 Two days later however, it angrily 
dismissed Pakistan’s claims about the IAF intrusion a ‘disinformation campaign’60 and 
Pranab Mukherjee now said that India was considering “the entire range of options” to 
                                              
55 Rajesh Basrur et al., “The 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks: Strategic Fallout,” S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, Monograph No. 17, 2009, 18.  
56 “No Military Action against Pakistan: Mukherjee,” Dawn, December 2, 2008, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/906489/no-military-action-against-pakistan-mukherjee.   
57  “War with Pakistan Not a Solution: India,” Dawn, December 11, 2008, 
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/90639. 
58 “Indian Envoy Summoned Over Airspace Violation,” Dawn, December 18, 2008, 
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/143563; “IAF Denies Pak Claims of Airspace Violation,” 
Times of India, December 15, 2008,  
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-12-15/india/27941729_1_airspace-violation-
indian-fighter-jets-wing-commander-mahesh-upasani. 
59 Jawed Naqvi, “War Not an Option, says India,” Dawn, December 17, 2008,  
http://www.dawn.com/news/334646/war-not-an-option-says-india. 
60 “Disinformation Campaign, says India,” The Hindu, December 19, 2008,  
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/disinformation-campaign-says-india/article1397980.ece. 
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protect itself from terrorism.61 On December 22, he stated that India was prepared to 
“take all measures necessary, as we deem fit, to deal with the situation.”62 
Meanwhile, Stratfor, a U.S.-based private intelligence firm revealed in an 
unverified but highly impactful report that India had set a one-month deadline at the onset 
of the crisis for Pakistan to take significant action against militants and that “Indian 
military operations against targets in Pakistan have in fact been prepared and await the 
signal to go forward.”63 Pakistani media reported Indian troop movement along the 
international border and beefed-up security around Indian defense airstrips; India also 
subsequently put its Border Security Force (BSF) on alert; it warned villagers in the 
bordering regions to be prepared for war; and it declared travel of Indian citizens to 
Pakistan unsafe.64 During this period, Prime Minister Singh also held meetings with his 
                                              
61 “India to Consider all Options, Warns Pranab,” The News, December 20, 2008, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=19078&Cat=13&dt=12/20/2008.  
62 Jawed Naqvi, “India Threatens to Act if World Doesn’t,” Dawn, December 23, 2008, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/335474/india-threatens-to-act-if-world-doesn-t.  
63 “India, Pakistan: Signs of a Coming War,” Stratfor, December 24, 2008; “Geopolitical Diary: 
Countdown to a Crisis on the Subcontinent,” Stratfor, December 22, 2008; “India May Still 
Strike at Pakistan: US Report,” Times of India, December 19, 2008, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-12-19/india/27914474_1_awami-national-party-
pakistan-satyabrata-pal-stratfor. Stratfor’s report (“Geopolitical Diary”) itself acknowledged that 
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having conveyed any such ultimatum. Jawed Naqvi, “India Denies Issuing Ultimatum; DGMOs 
Hold Talks,” Dawn, December 29, 2008,  http://www.dawn.com/news/853416/india-denies-
issuing-ultimatum-dgmos-hold-talks.  
64 “India, Pakistan,” Stratfor; Ramesh Vinayak, “India Amassing Troops on Rajasthan Border, 
Claims Pak Portal,” India Today, December 22, 2008, 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/India+amassing+troops+on+Rajasthan+border,+claims+Pak+po
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India, December 27, 2008,  http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-12-
27/india/27925702_1_pakistani-authorities-indian-spy-indian-nationals.  
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military services chiefs and of the Nuclear Command Authority to “discuss all the 
options available” to India.65  
Despite this second spike in tensions and genuine concern in some circles that the 
situation may escalate to an armed confrontation, the atmosphere was never tense enough 
to be comparable to the Kargil or twin peaks crises. Ultimately, no notable military 
movements – let alone full-scale mobilization – took place beyond sparing force 
demonstrations and contingencies for any eventualities. In an effort to convey maturity 
and restraint, India portrayed these limited movements as part of ongoing, routine 
military drills and exercises typical for the end-of-the-year period.66 When Pakistan 
demanded that India “de-activate its forward air bases” and “re-locate its ground forces to 
peace time positions”67 in late-December, New Delhi persisted with its stance that there 
was “no unusual troop movement” and that “these [steps] are not escalation and nobody 
is making any provocation….”68 Both sides also made conscious efforts to de-escalate 
tensions. Their respective DGMOs spoke to clarify concerns on December 28.69 India 
released 66 Pakistani fishermen as a goodwill gesture two days later.70  
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2008/indian-nca-discusses-all-available-options.  
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Tensions subsided after such contacts. The talk of war was all but over by the 
middle of January. Apart from intermittent statements from military officials stressing 
India’s readiness to deal with any eventuality, the military aspect of this crisis never 
resurfaced after this point. Hardly surprising in light of the above, the nuclear dimension 
was peripheral to the Mumbai crisis. Notwithstanding the Indian Nuclear Command 
Authority meeting mentioned above, there was no consideration of readying the arsenal; 
even nuclear signaling was absent.71  
The seeming averseness to authorizing military action on India’s part suggests 
that the focus of the Indian strategy was elsewhere. Indeed, while the world worried 
about an India-Pakistan war, the Indian leadership seemed to have been more interested 
in pursuing non-kinetic options from the outset. Its strategy was to employ aggressive and 
threatening rhetoric to gain concessions from Pakistan. Other than that, its focus was 
internal – it spent “time working out what went wrong and in looking for those who 
failed in their duty to protect our [India’s] cities and our [India’s] civilians.”72 This was 
important in as much as it prevented an exclusive focus on the bilateral equation. 73 
India’s demands from Pakistan were strikingly similar to those in 2001-02. It 
wanted Pakistani leaders to take decisive action against those involved in the Mumbai 
                                              
71 There is total consensus within policy circles in India, Pakistan, and the U.S. that neither side 
considered any nuclear movement during the Mumbai crisis. Author’s interviews conducted for 
this undertaking confirm this.  
72 Sanghvi, “Introduction,” vi. 
73 The deep-seated anger among the Indian public towards the government and counterterrorism 
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carnage and against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure more broadly. Specifically, India 
put forth three asks: (i) hand over for interrogation and prosecution the Pakistani ring 
leaders involved in Mumbai; (ii) like 2001-02, India produced a list of 20 fugitives – the 
list was later expanded to 40 –74 wanted by India in connection with pending terrorism 
related or other criminal cases against them. It also wanted them extradited; and (iii) 
permanent dismantling of the terror infrastructure of the LeT in Pakistan.75 This time 
however, the Indian government stressed, both through direct government channels and 
through public messaging that it would no longer be satisfied with token promises and 
must see tangible action if it is to persist with its posture of restraint. It kept hinting that 
its restraint was not unlimited but it never specified what its specific recourse would be if 
Pakistan remained dismissive of its demands. 
Unlike twin peaks, India and Pakistan kept their direct channels of 
communication open during Mumbai and these were used, at least initially, to transmit 
signals. Pranab Mukherjee indicated early on to his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mahmud 
Qureshi that Pakistan was leaving India “no choice but to go to war.”76 On December 1, 
India served two demarches to the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, formally 
laying out some of its above-mentioned demands. The first demarche accused “elements 
from Pakistan” for the attacks and asked Islamabad to “match its sentiments with deeds 
                                              
74 Nayak and Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis,” 49. 
75 Raman, Mumbai 26/11, 115. 
76 Rice, No Higher Honour, 720. Mukherjee followed up this message with a formal note to 
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by taking stern action against the groups that could have been involved in the attack.” 
The second demanded extradition of wanted militants and criminals including JeM chief 
Maulana Masood Azhar.77 
India also sought to build pressure on Pakistan by carrying out a messaging 
campaign through public channels. Within a week of the attacks, Mukherjee was calling 
out Pakistan for not having responded to India’s diplomatic protests or to its demand for 
extradition of the named individuals.78 On December 5, an unnamed Indian official 
declared that there was “clear and incontrovertible proof” of ISI support for the Mumbai 
attacks.79 Even as Pakistan seemed to be affected by India’s campaign and moved to 
crackdown on LeT (and its alias Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD)) members just days later, India 
kept up the pressure, with at least one government official calling the Pakistani 
crackdown “eyewash” that did not address the core concerns.80 Kronstadt (2010) 
observes that many Indian analysts genuinely saw Pakistani actions as a means of finding 
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“breathing space” to dilute the impact of New Delhi’s diplomatic onslaught.81 India 
wanted Islamabad to prove its sincerity by taking the crackdown to its logical conclusion.  
Despite the spike in tensions from mid-December onwards, the principal focus of 
the Indian strategy remained on pressing Pakistan by stressing on Pakistani links to and 
involvement in the attacks. A major part of the Indian effort was to prepare findings of its 
own investigation into the attack and share them with Pakistan, in addition to selectively 
using the information to reinforce its case through the public domain. On January 5, 2009, 
India handed over to Pakistan a 69-page dossier containing detailed information on the 
attacks and once again demanded that Pakistan take decisive action against the 
perpetrators based on the evidence contained therein.82 The Indian government also 
continued to stress its belief that the Pakistani state was involved in the attacks. Speaking 
at the Union Ministry meeting a day after the dossier was handed over to Pakistan, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh alleged that the LeT operatives must have had “the support of 
some official agencies” in carrying out attacks. He further accused Pakistan of using 
terrorism as an “instrument of state policy.” 83  Foreign Secretary Menon reiterated 
publicly hours after handing over the dossier: “Its hard to believe that something of this 
scale that took so long in preparation….could occur without anybody anywhere in the 
establishment knowing that this was happening.”84 These were perhaps the most explicit 
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accusations made during this crisis. The Indian objective to shame Pakistan and put it 
squarely on the back foot was obvious. 
 As the crisis subsided over the next month, India continued to accuse Pakistan of 
not doing enough to address its demands and peppered its criticism with various 
diplomatic threats intermittently. Even the most far reaching of these threats however 
suggest how unassuming this crisis was when compared to the nature and scale of the 
provocation that had triggered it.85  India had quite openly given Pakistan time to act 
against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage, predicating its ultimate recourse on 
Islamabad’s response. As Mukherjee argued while ruling out swift military strikes on 
January 11, 2009, “If they do not act on it, then what follow-up steps we will take and in 
what space of time it will take place, future course will decide.”86  
 By January 19, officials from the two governments were involved in a “friendly 
handshake.”87 While Indian pressure on Pakistan continued, the debate now revolved 
entirely around the technicalities of Indian and Pakistani investigations into the attacks, 
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Pakistan’s measures in response to India’s dossier, and the legal mechanisms to bring the 
perpetrators of the attacks to justice. On February 19, after Pakistan had shared findings 
of its own preliminary investigation with India and the press and in doing so, had finally 
acknowledged that the plan was hatched in Pakistan by Pakistanis, Mukherjee declared 
victory by suggesting that diplomacy had “prevailed” and that India would continue 
pressuring Pakistan to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in a “verifiable and credible” 
manner.88 In July, the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers met at Sharm al Sheikh in 
Egypt on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit and agreed for 
their Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries to meet later in the year. 89 The crisis 
mode was officially over even if Indian angst and resentment remained.  
In the final outcome, the Indian behavior at Mumbai was puzzling on multiple 
counts. Even if the Indian leadership was interested in normalizing ties with Pakistan, it 
had never believed that Pakistan had given up on sub-conventional use of force against it. 
If it had any hope that the normalization bid during the inter-crisis period would bring 
this about, it should have vanished with the multiple terrorist incidents it attributed to 
Pakistan between 2005 and 2008. And yet, it responded to a massive provocation linked 
to a Pakistani outfit it believed was directly supported by the ISI with inaction. Better yet, 
it went public with its intention not to wrest the initiative and conduct retribution strikes 
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as was feared in the inter-crisis years. Moreover, its diplomatic demands were ones it had 
been making for years without much success. Well aware of the history of reversals of 
Pakistani promises and lack of seriousness on investigating terrorist incidents – most 
recently the July bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul –,90 it had little reason to 
believe that the Pakistani response at Mumbai would be any more determined. The Indian 
government absorbed the political and reputational costs but it continued to pursue a 
course that was never likely to deliver decisive gains. The Indian leadership all but 
acknowledged the failure of its crisis strategy to force an end to anti-India terrorism from 
Pakistan when it publicly admitted in October 2009 that Indian security forces needed to 
“be prepared to face onslaughts” in light of “regular intelligence reports of imminent 
[terrorist] attacks” in India.91 Strangely, the government did not even attempt to shift the 
focus of the post-attack debate in India away from the domestic counterterrorism failure 
by encouraging an outright emphasis on the bilateral dimension. We will return with a 
fuller explanation of this puzzling Indian behavior when we introduce the third party’s 
role in the analysis.  
B. Pakistan’s Predictable Response 
Pakistani decision makers perceived the possibility of Indian military aggression 
to be high after the Mumbai attacks. Retired General Mahmud Durrani, then Pakistani 
NSA, recalled that the Pakistani leadership felt there was a “50-60 percent chance Indians 
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would do something militarily.”92 ISI chief General Ahmed Shuja Pasha also 
acknowledged later: “At first we thought there would be a military reaction…as the 
Indians, after the attacks, were deeply offended and furious….”93 For the Pakistani 
President Asif Ali Zardari, this belief almost turned into reality when he received a hoax 
call wrongly attributed to Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee on 
November 28.94 Zardari took the caller’s ultimatum of an impending Indian military 
attack as imminent and immediately requested his military leadership to take adequate 
measures.95 
 Pakistan’s demeanor in responding to the Mumbai attacks was in keeping with the 
trend set in previous crises. Pakistan reacted with a combination of sympathy and 
promises of support to India, denial of any involvement, and signals of resolve and force 
demonstrations to deter any Indian aggression. All along, Islamabad sought a way to 
wiggle out of the crisis without making a radical departure from its traditional stance on 
the presence of non-state militant actors. This time, its hesitance to do so was reinforced 
by its concern that it lacked the capacity to tackle anti-India militants without facing 
excessive backlash. In terms of crisis behavior however, this meant that Pakistan’s exit 
plan was similar to that in the two crises examined earlier. 
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Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari took the lead in condemning the attacks and 
conveying Pakistan’s intent to support India in investigating them.96 He and his team 
reiterated this conviction on numerous occasions in the days and weeks following the 
attacks.97 Perhaps most noted was the symbolically crucial promise (ultimately rescinded) 
by Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani to send the ISI chief General Pasha to India 
immediately after the attacks.98  
Pakistani officials also spent considerable time and energy attempting to distance 
themselves from the attacks. This was crucial given India’s allegations of Pakistani links 
to the carnage and Ajmal Kasab’s confession confirming this. In a statement 
representative of Pakistan’s stance, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmud Qureshi reiterated on 
November 29 that Pakistan’s “hands are clean, we have nothing to hide, we have nothing 
to be ashamed of.”99 Simultaneously, official statements from Islamabad hinted at the 
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need to investigate local assistance to the attackers from within India and accused India 
of raising “the convenient Pakistan bogey.”100  
Even after India had confirmed a Pakistani connection and served formal 
demarches on December 1, Islamabad simply continued to deny that any Pakistanis were 
involved in the attack or that the plan was hatched on its soil.101 Pakistan would 
deliberately maintain this stance well beyond the peak of the crisis even though the ISI 
knew in no time that LeT had masterminded and executed the carnage102 and despite the 
fact that Pakistani and international media had revealed by the second week of December 
that Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani.103 Nonetheless, Islamabad seemed to be missing better 
alternatives and chose to depend on the strategy that had facilitated its escape to some 
extent in the twin peaks crisis.  
The Pakistani state’s crackdown on LeT and JuD presence in Punjab in the face of 
Indian demands for action against militant outfits was an obvious contradiction of its 
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public denial of any Pakistani links to the attacks. Starting from December 7, Pakistan 
made multiple arrests including that of Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the Mumbai episode’s 
mastermind, and sealed a number of LeT/JuD offices.104 Hafiz Saeed, the outfits’ leader 
was put under house arrest on December 11 and JuD was formally banned on December 
13.105 Even as Indians dismissed Pakistani efforts and despite the fact that JuD would 
begin operating under a new alias, the Tehrik-w-Tahafuz Qibla Awal in no time,106 
Pakistan was undertaking its crackdown with enough vigor to prompt the U.S. embassy 
in Islamabad to report in its diplomatic cable that “the continued police round-ups in 
Pakistan of persons even tangentially connected to the Mumbai attacks have generated 
much puzzlement about the country’s sweeping ability to use preventive detention 
remedies.”107 
Notwithstanding, the Indian position that Pakistan was not serious about taking 
these actions against militants to their logical conclusion would be vindicated for the 
most part in the weeks to come. On the one hand, Pakistan continued to investigate the 
Mumbai attacks internally and in fact bought considerable time and space by showing 
some results once the crisis had passed its peak. Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman 
Malik’s January 15 announcement regarding setting up of a task force to conduct a 
formal investigation of the attacks and his claim that Pakistan had shut down five JuD 
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camps and detained as many as 124 accused terrorists helped Pakistan’s case.108 Further, 
when Pakistan shared the salient findings of its detailed investigation in mid-February 
and followed it up with some of the promised actions in terms of formally initiating legal 
proceedings against the accused, it found more respite.109  
 In reality however, Pakistan was only doing enough to avoid a break in Indian 
restraint. In parallel to efforts at investigation, Pakistan dragged its feet, only managing to 
obfuscate the issue enough to keep neutral observers from fully accepting India’s version 
of the situation. As the crisis went on, Pakistan’s position became increasingly tied to the 
legal hurdles that were ostensibly preventing it from moving swiftly against potential 
suspects. The Pakistani leadership was persistent in reiterating that India had provided 
only “information,” not “evidence,” through its dossier110 and in other exchanges. By the 
spring of 2009, the well-rehearsed pattern of accused terrorists being rounded up and later 
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released by the Pakistani security agencies or courts was being repeated.111 Court trials of 
the accused are still far from complete today – in some cases, actual trials are still to 
begin –, much to India’s dismay. All India could achieve by forcing Pakistan to 
investigate the matter was a Pakistani confession that the plan was masterminded by LeT 
on Pakistani soil and that it was executed by Pakistanis.    
Complementing Pakistan’s messages of support to India, denial of its involvement 
in the attacks, and partial action against the accused militants, were signals and force 
demonstrations meant to convey resolve and caution India against any use of force. 
Overall, as with India, this aspect of Pakistan’s behavior was rather subdued – certainly 
in comparison to the Kargil and 2001-02 episodes. The genuine concern about Indian 
aggression at the onset of the crisis simply led Pakistan, in the words of its Foreign 
Minister, to “hope for the best, and plan for the worst.”112 It did take precautionary 
measures in the immediate aftermath of the hoax call by alerting its Air Force and 
employing force demonstrations by patrolling the skies over Islamabad with live 
ammunition.113  That said, even as the Pakistani civilian and military principals met 
repeatedly during the early days to assess the situation and Pakistani options, they 
simultaneously attempted to convey calm, even vouching for India’s prudent behavior in 
the process. The Pakistani military spokesperson confirmed on November 30 that “no 
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unusual [Indian military] activity has been witnessed so far [on the international 
border].”114 The army also maintained that the LoC “ceasefire is holding”115 and 
therefore Pakistani military mobilization would be premature given the absence of the 
same on the Indian side. This was quite different from the aggressive brinkmanship 
employed by both sides during the previous iterations.  
 Inaction and restraint in terms of military preparations meant that the initial days 
passed rather uneventfully. Pakistan’s rhetoric hardened in the wake of the IAF 
incursions into Pakistani territory however. While the Pakistani government tried to 
publicly downplay the incursions, with Information Minister Sherry Rehman confirming 
that her government had accepted India’s version that the violations were “inadvertent” 
and suggesting that “there is no need to hype the issue further than this,”116 it was also 
categorical in noting that incursions 2-4 kilometers deep into Pakistani territory did take 
place.117  It saw them as a deliberate signal from the Indians and the Pakistan Air Force 
(PAF) spokesperson cautioned that his service was “fully alive to the situation and 
capable of giving a befitting reply in case of a misadventure.”118 
 A war of words ensued over the next fortnight. Pakistan’s consistent message was 
that it would not initiate hostilities but that it was ready to react should India use force. 
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The Indian External Affairs Minister’s suggestion during this period that India was 
keeping all options on the table elicited a flurry of responses from Pakistan which 
essentially suggested that it did not want war but “will be compelled to respond” if India 
aggressed in any manner.119 Such signals continued as talk of possible Indian surgical 
strikes grew in the press and media. The Pakistani Army Chief warned that Pakistan 
would respond “within minutes” to any such Indian provocation.120 Leader of the House 
in the Senate, Raza Rabbani emphasized that the Pakistani government would consider an 
Indian surgical strike an act of war and “give a befitting response if war is thrust on it.”121  
 Pakistan’s resolute rhetoric during this period was backed by sparing military 
moves. Mukherjee’s provocation hinting at the military option being open to 
consideration led the PAF to mount patrols over several major cities on December 22. 122 
Within the week, Pakistan was to put its navy, air force and army on “red alert,”123 cancel 
leaves of its military personnel, and deploy more troops on its border with India.124 As 
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India warned its citizens not to travel to Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minister consulted 
his service chiefs on options, reports surfaced that Pakistan had begun redeploying some 
of its forces from the western border.125  
 Tensions cooled off shortly afterwards as the Indian and Pakistani DGMOs met to 
clear the air and the Pakistani civilian and military leadership signaled prudence even 
amidst their resolute rhetoric by stressing that they wanted dialogue, not war.126 In this 
sense, the behavior of the Pakistani decision makers was identical to that of the Indian 
leadership. While Pakistan asked India to stand down its force demonstrations, it also 
kept promising that it would “try its best to get to the bottom of the thing [Mumbai 
attacks].”127 Some aggressive rhetoric warning India not to aggress against Pakistan 
continued thereafter but the worst was over by the early part of January 2009.  
While the risks associated with the visibly tense period in mid-to-late December 
2008 ought not to be ignored, it is fair to say that neither Pakistan nor India raised the 
stakes to match the escalatory potential of the Kargil or twin peaks crises. Conventional 
military preparations were largely precautionary and had an obvious element of restraint 
associated with them. Full-scale mobilization was never contemplated on either side. 
Also, matching the absence of any serious deterrent signaling on the Indian side, the 
Pakistani top brass also avoided exploiting the nuclear dimension during the crisis. 
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Nuclear signaling was absent and no National Command Authority meetings were called 
on the Pakistani side.128 Pakistan’s caution would have emanated from its rather 
indefensible position and its immediate goal of emerging from the crisis unharmed by 
India. It understandably saw little interest in provoking New Delhi when it seemed 
surprisingly content with exhibiting prudence. That said, Pakistan’s apparent confidence 
that it could exit the crisis safely by banking on plausible deniability and dragging its feet 
on the investigation while making minimal military preparations despite pre-crisis fears 
that India’s patience had run out demands a deeper look. We will revisit Pakistani 
behavior in light of the third party factor to rationalize its crisis choices in the following 
discussion.   
2. Enter the Third Party: Brokered Bargaining at Play 
This section reexamines crisis developments by incorporating the third party’s 
presence into the calculus. We demonstrate that the three-cornered bargaining framework 
explains the relevant facts about Indian and Pakistani behavior more accurately than the 
foregoing discussion. The Mumbai episode exhibited learned behavior on the part of the 
principal antagonists: they used the third party dynamic far more explicitly and boldly in 
pursuit of their respective crisis objectives than they had during Kargil or in 2001-02. 
Equally, the third party incorporated its past experiences as it employed crisis diplomacy 
proactively to ensure absence of an armed conflict between India and Pakistan. 
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A. India’s Focus on the Third Party 
The bewildering aspects of Indian behavior at Mumbai are rationalized once the 
brokered bargaining model is factored into its decision making calculus. The major 
difference between Mumbai and the other two cases examined here was the rather 
automatic recourse to the trilateral dynamic – as if it was understood that the ‘crisis game’ 
will inevitably feature three-cornered bargaining. All sides seemed to settle into the 
trilateral framework instantly, even to the point that the antagonists all but discounted the 
utility of proactive threat manipulation vis-à-vis the third party. India neither made any 
pretense of resisting third party involvement, nor of the fact that it was willing to opt out 
of classic brinkmanship in favor of using third party support to achieve its crisis 
objectives. In the words of a U.S. diplomat, “India’s Plan A, B, and C was to rely on the 
US.”129 As surprising as this choice was in light of its reputational concerns so central to 
traditional deterrence models, Indian leaders seem to have felt that utilizing the existing 
goodwill of the international community may be their best bet in achieving their crisis 
objectives and that this may be undermined if India led with manipulating the fear of war 
for the consumption of the third party actors. If so, this speaks to the importance New 
Delhi attached to the third party dynamic even though it could easily have acted upon the 
troubling lessons the world feared it had drawn from the previous crises and the inter-
crisis period leading up to Mumbai and aggressed against Pakistan. 
India went in with a three-pronged strategy, the principal aspect of which was to 
galvanize the international sentiment to deal sternly and unequivocally with the 
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“epicenter of terrorism….located in Pakistan.” 130 The other two entailed adopting a 
resolute stance against Pakistan and addressing internal security failures. 131A number of 
official Indian statements and much of the expert writings made little effort to finesse 
India’s propensity to use U.S. interlocutors to its advantage throughout the Mumbai crisis. 
India’s message to the third party was threefold: (i) get Pakistan to permanently wipe out 
anti-India terrorism from its soil; (ii) Pakistan was a deliberate sponsor of terrorism and 
untrustworthy when it came to its promises to tackle militants and thus pressure needs to 
be kept up on leaders in Islamabad; and (iii) given intense domestic pressure, India would 
not be able to restrain itself in the event of another attack. The first two messages are in 
line with the expected behavior of a principal antagonist seeking to lure third party 
support for its stance. The last however is rather interesting: instead of shifting attention 
to ‘another’ (next) attack, one would have expected Indian leaders to forcefully signal to 
the third party that they were itching to shed their restraint and would do so if the U.S. 
was unable to get Pakistan to act against terrorism sincerely, tangibly, and immediately. 
In reality, Indian leaders did so only implicitly by pointing to the tremendous public 
pressure India was under – this was a constant theme – but they avoided explicit and 
specific threats of military action. Instead, their private messages to third parties were 
quite categorical about their desire to avoid any use of force and their choice to give 
Pakistan time to act against militants before deciding their future course – at most 
described as potentially doing “something” against Pakistan if it did not act against 
militants. 
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Immediately after the attacks, India’s first demand from the U.S. was to get 
Pakistan to ensure that no copycat attacks were in the making. Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh was upfront about his desperation with U.S. interlocutors; the message was that he 
needed help from Pakistan as one could not be sure that “this isn’t the first of a series.”132 
Otherwise, the signaling from Indian officials was calming for U.S. interlocutors who 
obviously harbored pre-crisis concerns that India might preempt third party calls for 
prudence by taking swift action against Pakistan. Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon 
and NSA M. K. Narayanan both confided in David Mulford, the U.S. Ambassador in 
New Delhi in separate meetings in the days following the attacks that India did not intend 
to take military action against Pakistan.133 Narayanan even suggested that doing so would 
“let Pakistanis off the hook.”134 The accompanying message was as clear: India was 
“sitting mum” despite the fact that “public anger is already growing, with people saying 
that if Pakistan was linked to the attacks we should say so clearly and take action.”135  
Indian messaging remained remarkably consistent throughout the crisis. The 
punch line was communicated regularly to visiting third party interlocutors as well as 
during trips by Indian officials to key capitals. Foreign Secretary Menon traveled to the 
U.S. in the first week of December on a preplanned trip and goaded U.S. State 
Department officials to continue pressuring Pakistan to arrest those involved in the 
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Mumbai attacks and eliminate anti-India terrorist infrastructure from its soil. Menon also 
pushed India’s claim that it had evidence that the ISI was involved in the episode – again 
in a bid to get Washington to tighten the noose around Pakistan.136 
Nayak and Krepon (2012)’s reflection on the Indian message to U.S. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice during her December 3 visit to India aptly sums up the essence of 
this strand of Indian messaging to visiting delegates during the crisis:  “Look at the 
pressures we are facing. We don’t want to take military action; we don’t want escalation. 
Do something that will help us satisfy the considerable blood lust that’s out there. You 
need to pressure Pakistan to take actions.”137 In addition, Indian leaders pointed to the 
sophistication of the Mumbai attacks and ISI’s past involvement in terrorism to convince 
visiting third party dignitaries of Pakistani state involvement in Mumbai.138  
India also kept up public pressure on third party actors. For one, India’s public 
claims of ISI involvement were aimed at raising the stakes for the third party, and in turn, 
increasing pressure on Pakistan. More generally, Prime Minister Singh encapsulated 
India’s messaging designed to pressure third parties on December 12. He dismissed the 
assurances of third party actors and argued that “the political will of the international 
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community must be translated into concrete and sustained action on the ground.”139 On 
occasion, Indian leaders also nudged third party actors by suggesting in public that their 
patience was not unlimited. Amidst heightened tensions, on December 22, External 
Affairs Minister Mukherjee acknowledged India’s dependence on the third party for 
crisis diplomacy but also hinted at its frustration: “We have so far acted with utmost 
restraint and are hopeful that the international community will use its influence to urge 
Pakistani government to take effective action. While we continue to persuade the 
international community and Pakistan, we are also clear that ultimately it is we who have 
to deal with this problem.”140 This is where Mukherjee made his rather provocative 
remark: “We will take all measures necessary, as we deem fit, to deal with the 
situation.”141 Coming at a time when a military confrontation was being feared, this was 
perhaps the most obvious public effort at risk manipulation vis-à-vis the third party on 
New Delhi’s part. 
India’s efforts to paint Pakistan’s anti-militant actions as insufficient and 
unsatisfactory were also directed at third parties who were being asked to keep pressing 
Pakistan. After the initiation of the crackdown on December 7, India publicly called for 
JuD to be designated a terrorist organization and reminded third party interlocutors that 
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Pakistan had a history of detaining accused militants merely to buy time.142 To strengthen 
its case further, the Indian leadership also emphasized to third party counterparts the 
absence of any legal prosecutions in the days immediately following Pakistan’s 
crackdown and lack of Pakistani response to India’s December 1 demarches except a 
statement that that they were “considering it and taking it seriously.”143 Indian lobbying 
efforts in world capitals like Washington were also paying off. The U.S. House of 
Representatives passed a resolution shortly after Pakistan initiated its crackdown that 
expressed support for the people of India and called on Pakistan to cooperate fully with 
New Delhi and to prevent its territory from “serving as a safe-haven and training ground 
for terrorists.”144  
Some of India’s military maneuvers can also be seen as an attempt to test its 
limits with the third party. The IAF incursions into Pakistani airspace would have had a 
dual purpose: to test the thresholds of the adversary; and to assess whether the third 
party’s support to India would translate into leniency in allowing it to flex its military 
muscle beyond force demonstrations. Moreover, if Stratfor’s report that India had given 
Pakistan a one-month deadline (till December 26) to act against its militant proxies or 
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face military action is to be taken at face value, it would be another example of India 
preferring to use the third party channel to communicate a specific threat despite 
availability of direct communication channels. This is so since India reportedly conveyed 
the message through the U.S. 145 This communication would have been an obvious 
attempt by India to force the third party to increase pressure on Pakistan rather than an 
actual ultimatum of war (which could have been more effectively conveyed directly or 
publicly). India’s force demonstrations and limited military movements that took place in 
the run up to December 26 can then be characterized as an attempt to further accentuate 
this pressure to force the third party to draw results from Pakistan.  
India’s efforts to manipulate third party actors to extract concessions from 
Pakistan were truly epitomized in the days leading up to and following the finalization of 
the Indian dossier. In the run up to the January 5 handover of the dossier to Pakistan, 
Indian leaders reminded the U.S. that tangible results from its intercession with 
Islamabad were still awaited.146As the focus of the crisis became legalistic, the Indian 
Prime Minister and senior cabinet members repeatedly called on the international 
community to pressure Pakistan to take action based on the evidence acquired by India 
and third party actors through the investigations.147 India’s insistence on utilizing the 
evidence was natural, and inherently linked to the third party angle, as much of it was 
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collected as a result of close law enforcement cooperation between New Delhi and a 
number of third party capitals.148  
The Indian government also initiated a major public diplomatic offensive against 
Pakistan after presenting its dossier. Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon shared 
details of the dossier with Ambassadors of 15 countries, including all whose citizens had 
died in the attack.149 A larger group of 50 envoys was then briefed about the evidence in a 
detailed presentation which clearly insinuated a Pakistani link even if it stopped short of 
implicating the Pakistani state in the affair.150 Menon’s message was clear enough for the 
U.S. attendees of the briefing to report back to Washington that “today’s diplomatic 
effort appears designed to maximize international pressure on Pakistan, as India seeks to 
enlist support from those nations who lost citizens in November’s attacks in Mumbai.”151 
Menon ruled out ‘business as usual’ with Pakistan unless it followed up on the evidence 
provided by India – enough to test Pakistan’s sincerity according to him – and let out a 
veiled threat characteristic of India’s relatively subtle signaling during the crisis when he 
stated: “so far the more sensible counsel has prevailed, but continued lack of action and 
denial from Pakistan cannot be tolerated forever.”152 He also stated publicly after the 
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briefing: “We are no longer interested in words, but in actual action. The answer is not to 
scrap this or tinker with that or form this.”153 
Home Minister Chidambaram also traveled to the U.S. during this period “armed 
with evidence about involvement of Pakistan-based terrorists in the Mumbai attacks”154 
“as part of efforts ‘to drum up international pressure for nailing Islamabad’s lies’.”155 His 
statement before embarking on the U.S. trip and its reiteration by Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh in his candid accusation a day after the dossier was handed over to 
Pakistan during the Union Ministry meeting that elements of the Pakistani state must 
have been involved in the attack ought to be seen as part of India’s pressure-building 
campaign. 
Given India’s decision to work the third party channel as its principal crisis 
strategy, the Mumbai crisis never produced circumstances that could test India’s 
sensitivity to third party preferences as obviously as the Kargil and 2001-02 episodes did. 
For instance, since it never threatened imminent military action, the third party was never 
put in a position to force New Delhi to back off. The above notwithstanding, hints of 
India’s concern about positive evaluation were still discernible during the Mumbai 
episode. India’s malleability on its public demand for extradition is one example. Even as 
India continued to call for extradition of the Mumbai accused, it had communicated its 
willingness to settle for less to U.S. interlocutors as early as mid-December. Home 
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Minister Chidambaram had let it be known that India would at least expect Pakistan to 
guarantee that it would stop the export of terrorism to India over the next 6-12 months.156  
The importance of the timeline were the upcoming Indian elections and the compulsion 
of the Congress government to avoid any fresh attacks before that. Ultimately, the Indian 
government also took a U-turn publicly by stating that it would be satisfied with trials of 
the Mumbai accused in Pakistan.157 This flexibility was driven in large part by the U.S.’s 
and other third parties’ lack of interest in backing India’s plea for extradition.158 
Chidambaram’s exchange points to India’s focus on warding off domestic pressure and 
merely moving past the crisis but oddly enough, it also hints at Indian resignation to the 
fact that a permanent end to terrorism from Pakistan was unlikely.  
                                              
156  Mulford, Pakistan Must Act: Senator Kerry Hears from Home Minister Chidambaram, 
WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks: 08NEWDELHI3164, December 16, 2008, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08NEWDELHI3164.html. Prior to this, External Affairs 
Minister Mukherjee had also suggested to Senator John Kerry that India would be satisfied if 
Pakistan tried the accused sincerely. He limited the extradition demand to Indian citizens (no 
Indian citizens had been implicated in Mumbai). Mulford, EAM Mukherjee Tells Codel Kerry He 
Doubts Pakistan can Deliver, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks: 08NEWDELHI3163, December 16, 2008, 
https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08NEWDELHI3163.html.  
157 Siddarth Varadarajan, “India does U-turn on Extradition of Mumbai Suspects,” January 16, 
2009, http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2009/01/india-does-u-turn-on-extradition-of.html; White, 
Indian Skepticism of Pakistan.  
158 In nudging India to keep its expectations and demands from Pakistan realistic, third party 
interlocutors had remained on message to try and convince Indian officials that putting the 
extradition demand in the absence of a bilateral treaty and in light of Pakistan’s guaranteed 
reluctance would set them up for failure. Apart from a tangential public suggestion from British 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown in support of extradition of Indian citizens during his visit to India 
in mid-December, third party messaging continued to nudge India to settle for a sincere Pakistani 
legal effort and to consider Pakistan’s proposal of sending a delegation headed by Foreign 
Minister Qureshi along with a Director-level ISI official to cooperate on the investigation. 
Mulford, Indian Foreign Minister. India remained reluctant, arguing that any delegation without 
the ISI chief would be meaningless. Mulford, Mumbai Attacks Update. For Gordon Brown’s 
statement, see “‘Pak State not Behind Mumbai Attacks’,” Hindustan Times, January 14, 2008, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pak-state-not-behind-mumbai-attacks/article1-
366377.aspx. 
386 
 
Next, when third party actors pushed India to tone down its rhetoric during the 
tensest period in December, it was quick to point to its overall restraint and inaction as far 
as the military option was concerned. It never sought to defy third party actors openly. 
The Indian message was crystallized in one of Menon’s statements to the U.S. 
Ambassador in New Delhi: “Please be sure to remind all those who accuse us of stirring 
things up of all the dogs that have not barked in the night, the whole series of things that 
could have happened.”159 Likewise, even when India took autonomous decisions like the 
IAF incursions into Pakistani airspace, it chose to deny them rather than confront the 
third party when Indian leaders were approached with concerns about India’s move.160  
Indeed, far from defying the third party, India was comfortable in openly 
acknowledging its strategy to bank on the third party prong of the resolve-prudence trade-
off. It was explicit in conveying to American officials that it could “count on our [India’s] 
pressure on you [U.S.] to help you do it [pressure Pakistan].161 At times, the candor was 
even accompanied by uncharacteristic acknowledgement of helplessness on India’s part. 
In a statement representative of this sentiment, External Affairs Minister Mukherjee told 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte in an official meeting on December 12: 
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“we deeply appreciate the efforts you are taking” noting that “what little steps [Pakistan] 
is taking is because of you.”162 Three days later, Indian NSA Narayanan told Senator 
John Kerry that India’s pressure on Pakistan was unlikely to work and that “the U.S. and 
UK can help since they provided much of it [evidence].”163 
The most significant area of third party influence relevant to the Mumbai crisis 
came after the active crisis was over. It is to be found in India’s decision to contemplate 
reinitiating dialogue with Pakistan in the summer of 2009 even though Pakistan had once 
again disappointed the world by dragging its feet on the terrorism issue and key accused 
had been released from house arrests. U.S. pressure on India to soften its “unhelpful rigid 
stand” had undoubtedly impacted India’s decision-making calculus as it began conveying 
to the U.S. privately by June that it was reconsidering its ‘no-dialogue’ stance.164 
Thereafter, India continued to call on the U.S. to pressure Pakistan, both publicly and 
privately, and kept working closely with U.S. law enforcement but it had deferred to U.S. 
requests to begin looking beyond the crisis and reengage with Pakistan. 
B. Pakistan’s Bid to Maximize Third Party Leverage 
Pakistan’s situation at Mumbai was not necessarily conducive to working through 
the trilateral framework. Already widely blamed for playing a ‘double game’ on terrorism 
and resentful of the global support to India’s rise, Pakistani leaders could not have taken 
third party neutrality for granted. The fact that foreign nationals had died in the Mumbai 
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carnage and that countries like the U.S. had a legal responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute those responsible for deaths of its citizens coupled with the early discovery of a 
Pakistani link to the attacks would have confirmed to Pakistani leaders that their 
government will bear the brunt of third party pressure. 
In reality, Pakistan’s use of the third party during the Mumbai crisis matched 
India’s in its candor and vigor. Islamabad readily got involved in exploiting the third 
party prong of its resolve-prudence tradeoff as it sought to wiggle out of the crisis 
unharmed. Mirroring India’s outreach, Pakistan saw the third party as the principal 
channel of communication and influence despite the availability of direct access to the 
Indian leadership. Islamabad’s principal preoccupation in the crisis was to get the U.S. to 
prevent India from launching any offensive entailing use of force.165As the crisis panned 
out, Pakistan ended up managing to do just enough to get the third party to weigh in to 
prevent an India-Pakistan confrontation while avoiding Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation. 
Islamabad employed a combination of direct pleas – both private and public – to 
third parties; its efforts to distance the Pakistani state from the perpetrators of Mumbai 
were also largely aimed at the third party; it manipulated the threat vis-à-vis the third 
party; and perhaps most consequentially, it emphasized rhetoric and actions that signaled 
its sensitivity to demands echoed by third party actors.  
The Pakistani leadership reached out to the third party immediately after the 
attacks. The U.S., China, Turkey, European countries, Gulf States and other partners 
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were approached to convey a set of talking points.166 The gist of these is aptly summed 
up by then NSA Mahmud Durrani’s message to Washington while the attacks were still 
ongoing: Pakistan is sorry about the attacks; both India and Pakistan have terrorist threats 
and need to fight them together; they should avoid being dragged into furthering the 
militants’ agenda; Pakistani leaders had spoken to their Indian counterparts and extended 
their support; and the Pakistani leadership had agreed to send ISI officers to India to 
move the investigation along.167 The goal: to convince the third party that Pakistan was 
willing to cooperate and thus immediate Indian aggression was not warranted.  
Given that Pakistani officials felt that an Indian attack was likely in the initial 
days of the crisis, there was an obvious sense of desperation in this outreach. Indian 
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s hoax call alarmed the Pakistani president 
enough for him to alert his Army chief but his real effort to stall the supposed Indian 
design was targeted at third party actors. The Pakistani leadership conducted phone 
diplomacy to sensitize all key world capitals about the urgency of the situation.168 The 
message was consistent: Pakistan will cooperate sincerely but India must be prevented 
from using force.  
A major saving grace for Pakistan was that its attempt at plausible deniability 
seemed to work despite the fact that Kasab had divulged his origins early on and third 
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party intelligence had confirmed a LeT role in Mumbai.169 Pakistan’s tact to distance the 
state from non-state actors and argue that the attack took place without any official 
knowledge, let alone sanction, was one of its central messages to the third party. While it 
could not challenge India’s universal characterization as the victim, it aimed to keep itself 
from being declared the aggressor. Working in Pakistan’s favor was the fact that Western 
intelligence sources had not uncovered any evidence of direct ISI authorization of the 
attacks even though it suspected involvement of rogue ISI personnel.170 Ironically, 
playing to ISI’s advantage was the irrationality attached to any Pakistani state decision to 
target and kill foreigners in a sanctioned operation. There is some evidence that third 
parties took this argument at face value, with the U.S. embassy in Islamabad conveying 
to Washington that this Pakistani view was entirely logical and believable.171 
The Pakistani intelligence leadership was also quick to share basic facts about the 
attacks that suggested the absence of any ISI direction or role.172 This outreach was 
interesting since it amounted to an acknowledgement that Pakistani citizens were 
involved in the attacks and that the Pakistani intelligence apparatus had failed to identify 
and prevent them.173 In essence, Pakistan was pledging incompetence and inability to 
control militants as its defense. This was meant to play to Pakistan’s advantage: in as 
much as it confirmed the acute weakness of the Pakistani state, it would have 
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170 Author’s interview of relevant U.S. official; Rice, No Higher Honour, 721. 
171 Author’s interview of relevant U.S. official. 
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underscored the third party’s desire to avoid developments that could accentuate internal 
instability within Pakistan. Nonetheless, to further buffer against the Indian diplomatic 
onslaught seeking to pin the blame on ISI, Pakistani officials also impressed upon U.S. 
intelligence – successfully – in the immediate aftermath of the attacks to make public the 
fact that no direct ISI role had been identified in the attacks.174 Shortly thereafter, and to 
India’s dismay, a U.S. affirmation showed up in the press and was reiterated in an official 
White House statement.175 Taking advantage, President Zardari triumphantly declared in 
a much-publicized interview to Larry King Live on CNN that “the state of Pakistan is, of 
course, not involved.” “Even the White House and the American CIA have said that 
today….we are part of the victims….”176 These efforts helped both to put the Pakistani 
state in the clear and also signaled to India that key third parties were not likely to gang 
up against and totally isolate Pakistan.  
The two most important aspects of Pakistan’s strategy vis-à-vis the third party 
were threat manipulation and accommodation of its demands, the latter being relatively 
more pronounced. In terms of raising the costs for the third party, Pakistan’s trump card 
was an obvious one: continuing U.S. need for Pakistani troop presence and 
counterterrorism support on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Islamabad used this very 
early on – hardly surprising given its genuine fear of Indian use of force during the initial 
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days. A day after the attacks ended, even as Pakistan was showing understanding for 
India’s predicament and promising cooperation, Pakistani media reported that the U.S. 
had been informed that continuing tensions on the eastern front would force Pakistan to 
divert its attention from the western border.177 An unnamed defense official was quoted 
widely the next day suggesting that India had put its air force on high alert and that 
Pakistan would move its forces from the west to this “more immediate threat” if the 
situation persisted.178 Security officials also let it be known during a background press 
briefing that Pakistan could move troops within 72 hours after such a decision was 
taken.179 President Zardari was quoted by the Financial Times on November 30 
reiterating that “as we have these people on the run along our western border, our 
attention is being diverted at this critical time.”180 Moreover, during his early-December 
trip to Pakistan, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen also 
received explicit ultimatums from the civilian and military leadership that Pakistan would 
move troops from the western border, and that the Indian threat would take precedence 
over the War on Terror.181 Pakistan would raise the specter of relocation of its troops 
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again when tensions seemed to be reaching the tipping point in late-December. The press 
quoted Pakistani officials to affirm that Pakistan had actually begun to pull its troops 
from the western border, supposedly because of “new intelligence suggesting that India 
might launch an attack inside Pakistan …..”182 Krepon and Nayak (2012) rightly observe 
that this move was “guaranteed to focus US as well as Indian attention...”183  
The other aspect of Islamabad’s threat manipulation vis-à-vis the third party was 
to signal its resolve to respond with force to any Indian provocation. On December 2, the 
Pakistani Foreign Office arranged a briefing for ambassadors of key capitals in 
Islamabad.184 The goal quite obviously was to push third party actors to impress upon 
India to avoid any military action. The message was that Pakistan would respond in kind 
to any Indian aggression even at the cost of escalating the war. Typical of Pakistani 
diplomacy during Mumbai however, to a larger diplomatic audience in a companion 
meeting, Foreign Minister Qureshi compensated for the threats by reiterating Pakistan’s 
willingness to work with India, including a formal offer of a joint investigation led by the 
two NSAs.185  
Pakistan’s efforts at manipulating the risk of war for the consumption of the third 
party were to return in the period of heightened tensions later in December. First, the IAF 
incursions into Pakistani air space in mid-December were dealt with sternly through 
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private third party channels even as they were downplayed in public. Pakistani NSA 
Durrani reached out to his U.S. counterpart Stephen Hadley immediately with a pointed 
message: India had violated Pakistani air space; Pakistan had absorbed this as a threat; if 
India attacks, no Pakistani government would be able to survive inaction and it will 
therefore respond with force; and that Pakistan would do so even at the cost of an 
expansion of conflict.186 In an interview to the author, he confirmed that the goal was to 
make a veiled threat to the third party and through it to the adversary.187 
A week later, just as both India and Pakistan ratcheted up rhetoric in public, 
Pakistan also stood firm in the face of Indian demands to ‘do more’ by signaling its 
resolve to third party actors. When Admiral Mike Mullen returned to the region in the 
third week of December to help lower the temperature and echo India’s demand for 
greater action against those accused of involvement in Mumbai, he was greeted by PAF 
sorties over major cities.188 These were undoubtedly meant as a direct signal to India, but 
equally their timing reflected a conscious decision to ensure that Mullen took note. So 
were Pakistan’s signals in response to unconfirmed rumors that Mullen had arrived with a 
proposal that would allow India to carry out a symbolic surgical strike in Pakistan so that 
it could let off steam and quickly ratchet down tensions.189 Army Chief Kayani and 
House Leader Raza Rabbani’s statements that Islamabad would treat such a strike as an 
act of war ought to be recast in this light.  The Pakistani parliament also came out 
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backing a strong Pakistani response if India undertook such action.190 By making this a 
public debate, the Pakistani leadership was able to portray itself as hostage to public 
opinion and to convince third parties of the political compulsions it would face in 
choosing its course in response to such Indian adventurism.  
Pakistan’s effort to exhibit resolve vis-à-vis the third party notwithstanding, what 
ultimately allowed it enough wiggle room to escape the crisis relatively unharmed was its 
sensitivity to third party demands. Even when Pakistan undertook threat manipulation at 
Mumbai, it was cautious not to portray outright belligerence. Its tenor always suggested 
that the Pakistani leadership was hamstrung by various pressures, principally its domestic 
public opinion. This was hardly surprising given the circumstances. Squarely on the back 
foot, Islamabad would have felt that inflexibility and intransigence would force the third 
party actors’ hand to lean heavily in India’s favor. It therefore needed to signal its 
seriousness and readiness to cooperate sincerely even as it signaled resolve; positive 
evaluation was crucial for Pakistan to avoid a disastrous crisis outcome.  
All Pakistani leaders were in sync throughout in confirming their commitment to 
attend to the third party’s principal demand: pursue non-state actors, and more 
specifically, follow up by investigating the Mumbai attacks. Islamabad also took tangible 
actions at key moments to ease the otherwise relentless pressure it faced from third party 
actors. By the first week of December, Pakistan was beginning to apprise third party 
interlocutors of its plans and actions to oblige the third party. U.S. Senator John 
McCain’s Congressional delegation heard from the Pakistani Prime Minister during their 
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trip in early-December that Pakistan had begun the process of trying to arrest individuals 
specified by Secretary of State Rice in her meetings in Islamabad earlier in the week.191 
He was also candid about the fact that Pakistan had lifted its objection to designating 
LeT/JuD members as terrorists under the UNSC resolution 1267 process as proof of its 
sincerity.192 Soon, Pakistan would also have progress to report on arresting some of those 
accused by India and the third parties of being involved in Mumbai. It was no 
coincidence then that the Pakistani crackdown against these groups coincided with the 
U.N.’s move to put specific JuD/LeT members on its blacklist.  
The third party dynamic was central to Pakistan’s stance and actions on the legal 
front as well. It was U.S. pressure that led Pakistan to acknowledge for the first time 
towards the end of December that one of the arrested militants, Zarrar Shah had 
confessed to his role in planning the Mumbai attacks.193 The U.S. had also provided taped 
conversations between Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Mumbai’s mastermind, and the terrorists 
who executed the operation.194 The Pakistani leadership acknowledged his role as well 
but defended its public denial by telling third party interlocutors that they wanted to 
release such information slowly so that their accomplices did not disappear before they 
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were apprehended.195 The U.S. was also instrumental in creating a secret arrangement for 
information sharing on the Mumbai case, keeping itself at the center.196 Pakistan was 
sharing ‘tearline’ information197 about the Mumbai attacks through this mechanism by 
early-January 2009. 198 This Pakistani move came on the heels of the tensest period of the 
crisis in December 2008 and was seen by Washington as a gesture of goodwill and an 
indication of its seriousness to cooperate.199American interlocutors were also told that 
Pakistan was willing to act on information provided by India in its dossier and by U.S. 
intelligence sources.  
Pakistan’s efforts to investigate developments surrounding Mumbai and produce 
findings in January and February 2009 were also driven by third party pressure to a large 
extent. While Indian leaders took exception to Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman 
Malik’s decision to announce the setting up of a task force and to provide details of the 
progress on the investigation for the first time in mid-January through the media,200 the 
move was well calibrated on Pakistan’s part. Going public with the information meant 
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that Pakistan could change the public discourse about its insincerity and more effectively 
buy time, thereby alleviating some of the pressure coming from India and the third 
parties.201 Much the same was the rationale behind Malik’s February 12 press release 
detailing the salient findings from Pakistan’s investigation. It was a signal to the world 
that “Pakistan means business.”202  
There were signs that Islamabad’s efforts to convince the third party of the 
seriousness of its efforts were working. A U.S. embassy cable to Washington after the 
initial January 15 announcement of the task force noted: “Malik….is trying to produce 
concrete results every day for the international community. At the same time, he is trying 
to build domestic support by framing the process in a way that makes the GOP 
[Government of Pakistan] (not India or the U.S.) appear to be the demandeur.”203 The 
U.S. embassy in Islamabad was reporting its appreciation of Pakistan’s efforts to 
investigate Mumbai again before key findings were released in February. It also 
rehearsed the Pakistani talking point of lack of evidence from the Indians holding up 
further progress in its assessments to Washington.204 
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While Pakistani authorities signaled their sensitivity to third parties through these 
actions, much like the previous crises, they never went beyond what they felt was 
necessary to let the crisis pass. For one, Pakistani authorities never fully acquiesced U.S. 
demands for direct access to suspects accused of involvement in the Mumbai affair. They 
only did so piecemeal, just enough to show sensitivity to U.S. preferences but without 
giving up their decision making autonomy completely. Interior Minister Malik agreed to 
allow the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) access to the investigation 
immediately after India handed over the dossier under the promise that the arrangement 
would be kept discreet.205 He would later bank on domestic political sensitivities to refuse 
FBI access to suspects identified during the Pakistani investigation but would also 
compensate for it by sharing the findings of his investigation a fortnight before they were 
made public and promising to send his team to Washington to share all relevant 
information with U.S. officials.206 
While promises of continued support and sensitivity to third party demands 
persisted, actual delivery on Pakistan’s part gradually declined as the crisis subsided. As 
the legal prosecution stalled and the all too familiar pattern of militants’ releases repeated 
itself in the summer of 2009, Pakistani authorities blamed lack of evidence and legal 
lacunas without doing much to fix them.207 They calculated, rightly, that they could take 
this liberty once the threat of Indian aggression or Pakistani isolation had waned.  
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In the final outcome, the Pakistani leadership had done enough on the legal front 
and shown sufficient restraint in its signaling and military movements to avoid being 
blamed by the third parties for insincerity or belligerence. In as much as its narrowly 
defined objective of avoiding war and diplomatic isolation drove Pakistan’s efforts, it 
kept the third party at the center of its strategy and ultimately managed to escape the 
crisis by utilizing the three-cornered bargaining exercise to its advantage. 
C. The Third Party: Perfecting the Brokered Bargaining Game 
At one level, the context in which Mumbai took place lent itself to highly 
coercive third party outreach to Pakistan. A number of countries with influence in the 
region had lost citizens in the carnage and India, the undoubted victim, had already 
proven its immense importance to the world. Moreover, well-known Pakistani links 
between the ISI and LeT, suspicion of involvement of rogue ISI elements in Mumbai, and 
the fact that key third party actors were convinced of a direct ISI role in the July 2008 
bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul meant that the third party could easily have used 
the opportunity to pin the blame on the Pakistani state and isolate it. However, the 
combination of the third party’s structural compulsions to ensure de-escalation present in 
any nuclear crisis and U.S.’s regional security interests ensured that there was never a 
thought of ganging up against Pakistan.208  
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The magnitude of the Mumbai attacks brought the U.S. role as an honest broker 
seeking to play down the middle into sharp focus. To ensure calm, the U.S. had to “seek 
to persuade India not to employ military options” and “to get the Pakistanis to cough up 
people and clamp down.”209 Achieving this implied a need to convince the Pakistani 
government of the seriousness of India’s resolve to act and to create a situation whereby 
Indian leaders could be seen domestically as somehow responding effectively to the 
Mumbai attacks. Simply put, India needed an “excuse to back down.”210  
There was a fairly obvious lessons learnt component to third party diplomacy at 
Mumbai. U.S. officials have talked of having operated from a notional “playbook” during 
Mumbai that had benefited from past crisis experiences and was meant to guide U.S. 
actions to de-escalate South Asian crises.211 During the Mumbai iteration, U.S. principals 
decided on a very clear game plan and choreographed messages, phone calls, and visits, 
all of which took place regularly throughout the episode.212  Visiting U.S. officials 
worked off a set messaging script.213 Even U.S. legislators who visited the region during 
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the crisis were well briefed by U.S. administration officials and remained on message.214 
As in the previous two crises, Washington also coordinated its interventions with other 
third party actors.  
Mumbai was interesting in terms of the U.S. outlook towards the possibility of 
escalation. Most accounts of the crisis seem to suggest that a number of decision makers 
in Washington never saw the crisis headed for war and were confident that with the right 
amount of pressure, both sides would back down. While such views seem warranted 
given how Mumbai played out, the fact is that these are retrospective reflections on the 
episode and fairly misleading in terms of the third party’s outlook at the time. In reality, 
the Mumbai attacks worried third party interlocutors immediately. Their initial reactions 
compared Mumbai to 2001-02 and they quickly concluded that this was likely to be a 
more dangerous situation with a greater likelihood of escalation.215 In Washington, 
neither was the thinking within the Indian officialdom in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks clear, nor was there full confidence in the U.S.’s own leverage to force both sides 
to end the crisis before it escalated. Washington’s crisis managers wondered whether 
Pakistan would see the U.S. as an honest broker despite deaths of American citizens in 
the Mumbai attacks and U.S.-Pakistani tensions over the campaign in Afghanistan. Or 
would it still view U.S. dependence on Pakistan as an insurance against Indian aggression 
and exhibit complacency? On the other hand, would India accept this logic or would it 
attack Pakistan regardless, thereby discrediting the U.S.’s third party role in the process? 
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Even as the Mumbai attacks were unfolding, there were concerns that Indians 
might believe that they could not have taken place without official Pakistani state 
involvement and that any such evidence would cross New Delhi’s red line.216 The initial 
messages from the U.S. mission in New Delhi highlighted the “war fever” in India and 
explained that it was difficult for the Indian “Prime Minister…..[to]..hold out” since 
“everyone knows that the terrorists came from Pakistan.”217 Pakistan, on its part, had also 
stated that it would respond to an Indian attack without fail. 218  Some even worried that 
Pakistan may try to preempt any Indian effort to employ force.219  
The extent of third party concerns at the time are reflected in the swiftness with 
which Washington’s interlocutors got involved in the crisis despite the fact that the 
attacks took place at a time when virtually all relevant U.S. decision makers were 
distracted by the major Thanks Giving national holiday.220 India and Pakistan had to 
make little effort to goad the third party to intervene in the crisis; U.S. intervention was 
marked by an effort to “get out in front of events.”221 The principal antagonists were left 
to compete to lure this rather instant third party involvement to their side.  
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The third party’s task was cut out to effectively balance Indian and Pakistani 
demands while ensuring de-escalation. As the U.S. attempted to decipher basic facts 
about the attacks, it also triggered its highly consistent diplomatic approach to the crisis. 
It led with messages of outright sympathy for India and pushed Pakistan to issue 
statements and take steps that would help lower the temperature of the crisis.222 Various 
third party official statements condemned the attacks. Even when the U.S. was forced to 
make choices that were likely to worry India, it took New Delhi into confidence and 
sought its consent in advance. For instance, in stark contrast to the 2001-02 crisis where 
the controversial travel advisories for Western citizens upset India immensely, at Mumbai, 
the Indian leadership was forewarned and promised that while the U.S. had an obligation 
to its citizens to put out an advisory, it would do so as “sensitively as possible.”223 The 
advisory, put out on November 27 without any real hype, only asked U.S. citizens to 
defer travel for 48-72 hours.224  
Equally important, messages were simultaneously being sent to India “to not take 
precipitous action” 225  and instead to first determine all facts surrounding the event. The 
goal was to soften up India’s resolve to act and to buy time and allow tensions to subside. 
Other third parties joined in to reinforce U.S. messages in this initial period.  
The first occasion where the crisis seemed to be slipping out of control was the 
hoax call attributed to Pranab Mukherjee. As a U.S. National Security Council official 
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commented: “The fake phone call recounted by Pak officials changed everything – risked 
having all spin out of control.”226 The third party reinforced its efforts to clear the air. 
While Mukherjee plainly denied making any such call to Secretary Rice and the U.S. 
promptly communicated this to Islamabad to pacify the Pakistanis, the situation was 
deemed to be dangerous enough for the U.S. President to dispatch Rice to the region in 
the first week of December to help calm tensions.227  
Rice’s visit, closely coordinated with British interlocutors,228 encapsulated the 
third party signals conveyed to India and Pakistan throughout the crisis. To India, her trip 
was introduced as a “further demonstration of the United States’ commitment to stand in 
solidarity with the people of India as we all work together to hold these extremists 
accountable.”229 Working of a preset script, she assured India during her trip that Pakistan 
was being pressured to act against those involved in Mumbai. Publicly too, she came 
down hard on Pakistan and affirmed that Pakistan had a “special responsibility” and 
needed to take “direct and tough” action since “non-state actors remain a matter of 
responsibility if it’s in your [Pakistan’s] territory.”230At the same time however, she was 
insistent on Indian restraint. Her recounting of her first encounter with a visibly perturbed 
Indian NSA, M.K. Narayanan is telling: she offered sympathy by drawing parallels 
between 9/11 and the Mumbai attacks but then quickly advised that India needed to 
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“concentrate on preventing the next attack” rather than contemplating aggression at the 
time.231 Coming from a top U.S. official on a special trip to signal her country’s 
preferences, this was a clear message that a gang up option against Pakistan was off the 
table. She also warned of “unintended consequences” of any Indian aggression in her 
public statements.232 Overall, the visit was successful: the Indians saw it as “helpful [and] 
timely;”233 she had managed to convince the Indian leadership of the merit of holding 
back and relying on U.S. crisis diplomacy.  
U.S. and other third party diplomatic presence in New Delhi and third party 
interlocutors that showed up in India on the heels of Secretary Rice’s visit reiterated her 
messages. Senator John McCain was perhaps most explicit in assuring his Indian hosts 
that the U.S. was “one-thousand percent behind India” and that he would carry direct and 
tough messages to Pakistan.234 Interestingly however, and even though McCain would go 
on to Pakistan and suggest that an Indian attack was highly likely, he was categorical in 
opposing any Indian action modeled on the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.235 Neither 
did the U.S. bite when India later attempted to find a common enemy in the ISI by 
emphasizing that it was not blaming the Pakistani civilian government for the attacks, but 
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only its military establishment.236 As in the 2001-02 standoff, the Pakistani state’s 
plausible deniability suited third party crisis objectives. 
In addition to the third party’s diplomatic outreach, one of the key levers of the 
U.S.’s crisis diplomacy at Mumbai was its use of the “information provision” as a 
mediator.237 This aspect was far more important than in previous crisis iterations given 
the importance of information exchange relating to the legal investigation of the Mumbai 
affair. Interestingly, it was a conscious choice on the part of U.S. and other third party 
decision makers to push the law enforcement angle of the crisis to the fore. Washington 
saw the legal intervention and its initial offer of FBI assistance as a means of moving the 
crisis away from the political arena where tempers were more likely to boil over. Apart 
from its investigative value, the FBI’s work was also seen as serving a crisis management 
function: it provided space for cooling down the temperature and “slowing down the 
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decision making process in Delhi.”238 While the law enforcement/legal aspect of the 
crisis remained important throughout, the third parties managed to ensure a ‘law 
enforcement/legal-only’ focus by early-to-mid-January 2009. The U.S. and other third 
parties engaged in constant conversations and meetings on the legal investigation with 
their Indian and Pakistani counterparts and discouraged political discussions that would 
reignite the potential for an armed conflict. Their success in maintaining a 
disproportionate amount of focus on the law enforcement/ legal aspect proved to be 
crucial to their diplomacy at Mumbai. 
The third party’s engagement with India in the law enforcement/legal sphere was 
characterized by pleas for greater information sharing with Pakistan. The ‘law 
enforcement/legal-only’ phase was also marked by U.S. praises for Indian efforts in 
compiling the information dossier and sharing it with Islamabad. U.S. Ambassador 
Mulford declared the information contained in the dossier as “credible” enough to put 
pressure on Pakistan and promised that the U.S. “will pursue this matter to its 
conclusion.”239 Simultaneously however, India was also asked to give Pakistan time to 
act upon the evidence. Once again, the third party was drawing a perfect balance between 
expressing support for India and buying time by prompting it to continue banking on 
third party diplomacy to achieve its crisis objectives.  
 Once the active crisis subsided, the discussion focused almost exclusively on 
Pakistan’s prosecution efforts. Even as Pakistan’s delivery faded, the U.S. chose to stress 
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upon the progress it had made in law enforcement cooperation with India and in forcing 
Pakistan to accept its links to the attacks. Indian complaints of dwindling prosecution 
prospects in Pakistan were met with understanding and promises of continued and even 
increased pressure on Pakistan.240 In reality however, U.S. demands from Pakistan began 
losing their earlier vigor and desperation. It would not be unreasonable to state that the 
third party ultimately bought Pakistan’s explanations for tardy progress in the courts at 
least in part because the crisis was long past its peak and threat of escalation was low. 
Finally, the U.S. keenly pushed India (and Pakistan) to reinitiate dialogue on bilateral 
issues at the earliest despite India’s dissatisfaction with Pakistan. It ultimately prevailed 
upon New Delhi, as evidenced by the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers’ July 2009 
meeting on the sidelines of the NAM summit. 
 The third party’s crisis diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan was built around getting it to 
say and do the right things that could then be carried back to India as proof of progress 
and reason enough for it to keep trusting the third party. Intermittently, demands for 
action were peppered with platitudes that sought to signal third party confidence in 
Pakistan’s sincerity and to avoid any sense among Pakistani decision makers that a gang 
up against their country may be a consideration. Also playing on the minds of third party 
interlocutors must have been their concern about Pakistan’s fragility and the possibility of 
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pushing it over the edge. Nonetheless, while it may have prevented an even harsher 
stance against Pakistan, this worry does not seem to have forced the third party to 
compromise on its immediate goal of getting Pakistan to do enough to avoid escalation of 
the crisis. Indeed, Islamabad was constantly warned of Indian anger and the potential 
consequences of its defiance.241 
The U.S. collated India’s demands, avoided what could cause misunderstandings 
or was deemed to be unrealistic, and then confronted Pakistan with a list of asks as its 
starting bargaining position. U.S. outreach to Pakistan ultimately boiled down to a list of 
seven demands, most of which echoed what India wanted from Pakistan as proof of its 
sincerity. These included prevention of repeat attacks; sincere investigation of the 
Mumbai affair; arrests and prosecution of those involved, including LeT chief Hafiz 
Saeed; access to verifiable information for the FBI; information sharing with India; 
assurance that Pakistan would not escalate tensions; and crackdown on terrorism 
overall.242 Throughout, “phenomenal pressure” was kept up on Pakistan to deliver on 
these.243 
Washington started by asking Pakistan to crackdown urgently on any individuals 
who could potentially execute another attack. Some U.S. crisis managers believed that a 
second attack on India could dissolve restraint and “undo the whole [US diplomatic] ball 
game.”244 Simultaneously, Washington built pressure on Pakistan to demonstrate its 
willingness to cooperate with India within 24 hours of the attack by urging it to send ISI 
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chief General Pasha to India.245 It saw this as a move that would prevent India from 
crossing the precipice. As Pakistan first obliged and then backtracked, with the Pakistani 
President blaming his military for vetoing the decision, pressure was kept up – 
unsuccessfully – to follow through on the promise. U.S. interlocutors cautioned 
Pakistanis that not doing so would signal lack of sincerity and make it harder for the U.S. 
to restrain India.246 
Hard hitting messages hinting that the third party would not tolerate Pakistani 
inaction continued to pour in privately to Pakistani leaders even as the U.S. obliged 
Islamabad by publicly absolving the ISI of involvement in the attacks. A slew of visitors 
were to arrive in Pakistan from the first week of December onwards. Admiral Mike 
Mullen brought a clear message to prevent any repeat attacks and reign in LeT.247 U.S. 
Secretary of State Rice followed with pointed demands to act against those connected to 
Mumbai and suggested that the U.S. stood with India and needed Pakistan to provide it 
enough reason to maintain restraint.248 The Pakistani leadership was also asked not try 
blocking the U.N. effort to blacklist individuals connected to Mumbai through the UNSC 
resolution 1267 process.249 Washington’s success in pushing through the UNSC listing of 
four JuD members for targeted sanctions and addition of JuD as an LeT alias and of two 
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other Islamic charity fronts – Al Rashid Trust and Al Akhtar trust – being run under this 
garb was a major step that helped increase India’s confidence in U.S. diplomacy.250  
The foreign visitors and their messages proved to be key in softening up Pakistan. 
A classic example of the third party’s threat manipulation was provided by Senator John 
McCain’s messaging when he arrived from India in the first week of December. McCain 
reached Pakistan to tell Anne Patterson, the U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad that “this is 
the biggest international crisis since the Cuban missile crisis.”251 In a bid to jolt the 
Pakistanis into anti-terrorist action, he kept up this tone during this trip, conveying that an 
Indian military action was imminent if Pakistan did not act against the terrorists. He even 
went to the point of affirming that the Indian Prime Minister had told him that “he will 
act within days” and that “we are in a race against time.”252As a U.S. diplomat recounted, 
McCain “over-dramatized the degree of Indian upset, which was useful. He got their 
[Pakistan’s] attention.”253 
The initial period of the Mumbai crisis also saw a significant Chinese role. China 
was helpful in publicly setting the tone of neutrality early on. It called upon both India 
and Pakistan to talk and cooperate to ensure regional peace.254 More importantly, China, 
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on U.S. prompting, communicated to Pakistan its unwillingness to veto the UNSC listing 
and sanctioning of militants under the 1267 process and pressed Pakistan hard to arrest 
the Mumbai accused.255 China’s understanding with Pakistan was interesting: while it 
obliged the U.S. on the demand not to veto the effort and thus give India reason to 
maintain restraint, it also seems to have decided not to ignore Pakistan’s preference 
completely by placing objections on the process later on under the pretext that India had 
not provided enough information to justify this action.256 The decision is revealing in that 
it was carefully calibrated to satisfy the immediate crisis objective of de-escalation in a 
period of high tensions but also to address perceived broader foreign policy interests once 
the goal of crisis de-escalation had been all but achieved. The two did not overlap in this 
case. 
The Pakistani crackdown against LeT/JuD operatives that was initiated during this 
time was critical to meeting New Delhi’s concerns, and to lessening the risk of repeat 
attacks at the time. The third party pressured Pakistan into acting against militants and 
then expectedly, and in keeping with its constant balancing act, quickly greeted the 
crackdown with much private and public praise.257 The first spike of the Mumbai crisis 
had been managed effectively.  
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Foreign visitors continued to pour in and persisted in their calls for Pakistan to act 
against militants throughout December. Along the way, the third party had to deal with 
the second spike in tensions in the latter half of December. Representing India’s ability to 
autonomously up the ante despite third party concerns, the U.S. worried that the 
brinkmanship marked by the IAF incursions could quickly slip out of control.258 The 
situation was dealt with swiftly by questioning Indian denial of the incursions privately 
and thereby signaling that the U.S. was opposed to any risky behavior on the part of New 
Delhi.259 More importantly, the U.S. NSA Stephen Hadley promptly acted upon his 
Pakistani counterpart’s “veiled threat” by confirming from Indian and independent U.S. 
sources that no Indian aggression was imminent and conveyed it back to Islamabad with 
a message urging calm and restraint.260 
As tensions continued to rise nonetheless, with tit-for-tat rhetoric and limited 
military movements from both sides, the third party played a rather interesting role. Part 
of its demeanor was expected. U.S. interlocutors pointed fingers at Pakistan publicly and 
asked for greater acceptance of Pakistani links and action against the Mumbai accused, 
perhaps to signal to India their determination to keep pursuing the case on its behalf. In 
the third week of December, Secretary Rice implored Pakistan in a statement 
representative of this effort by reiterating, “You need to deal with the terrorism problem. 
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And it’s not enough to say these are non-state actors. If they’re operating from Pakistani 
territory, then they have to be dealt with.” 261  
Simultaneously, both sides were urged not to take actions that risked increasing 
the already high tensions.262 Pakistan’s claim in late-December that it had begun to move 
forces from its western border also seems to have worked as U.S. calls for restraint 
intensified immediately after this development. The U.S. President was on the phone 
urging both sides to avoid escalatory moves and building pressure by making public that 
“all three leaders... agreed that no one wanted to take any steps that unnecessarily raise 
tensions.”263 India was also subsequently asked to tone down its war rhetoric while the 
U.S. assured it that it was “not giving them [Pakistanis] any breaks.”264 
Other third party actors reinforced these messages constantly, especially the 
Chinese and British interlocutors who both urged restraint but also weighed in heavily to 
convince Pakistan to provide something tangible to help ratchet down tensions. The 
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister He Yafei was dispatched to Islamabad in late-
December to conduct crisis diplomacy; the Pakistani military leadership believed that 
Beijing was acting on U.S.’s request.265 Chinese influence seems to have had an effect 
again as Pakistan issued statements assuring calm, including importantly one by Army 
Chief General Kayani immediately after his meeting with He Yafei in Islamabad on 
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December 29.266 Other Pakistani allies like Saudi Arabia had been sufficiently sensitized 
by New Delhi and were also active in pushing Pakistan to act against those involved in 
Mumbai.267 
The other aspect of third party diplomacy during this high-tension period was 
marked by the rather outrageous proposal to allow India a signature strike. The proposal, 
if indeed accurately reported, would have been a function of a belief on the third party’s 
part that India was preparing for military action – the view may have been reinforced by 
the supposed Indian deadline of December 26 for Pakistan – and thus a choreographed 
single strike followed by de-escalation would be the best available option to avoid a full-
scale confrontation. In any case, Pakistan’s blatant public refusal laid this supposed U.S. 
effort to rest.  
By mid-January, the fundamental objective of third party diplomacy had been 
achieved. The imminent danger of a military confrontation had lapsed and the third party 
actors had succeeded in pushing the engagement squarely into the law enforcement/legal 
domain. During the ‘law enforcement/legal only’ phase, third party interventions were 
about continuing to push Pakistan to thoroughly investigate, build a strong case for 
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prosecutions, and share all relevant information with India sincerely. As Pakistan began 
to provide information, third parties praised it and used this to pressure India to do the 
same.268 To Pakistan, the message continued to be that it needed to do more to allow New 
Delhi to justify its restraint. The gist of the messaging in this period is captured by British 
Foreign Secretary David Miliband’s public statement in early-February: “The absolute 
priority is for the Pakistani government to go further and faster in turning the detention of 
those who they believe were associated with the Mumbai bombings into prosecutions, 
and then if they’re found guilty, punishment.”269 
These third party messages persisted but as the crisis subsided and Pakistan 
slowly drifted in its commitment to prosecute and punish the Mumbai accused, the third 
party did little more than continue to reiterate its demands. The frequency and vigor of 
these requests decreased appreciably; the focus began shifting back to priorities on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This meant that the U.S. did little to push Pakistan to ensure 
a permanent end to anti-India militancy from its soil. It however did maintain a close eye 
on ensuring the absence of any further attacks in India. With confirmed intelligence 
pointing to the potential of fresh incidents in the summer of 2009, it renewed calls on 
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Pakistan and rehearsed India’s ultimatums that the “the people of India will expect us [the 
Indian government] to respond” if another attack took place.270 
The U.S. ended the Mumbai crisis even more satisfied with its performance than 
the previous crisis iterations. For the third crisis running, U.S. crisis managers believed 
Washington had played a crucial role as a “broker, an interlocutor, a validator.”271 They 
saw themselves as having effectively balanced between the principal antagonists; they 
had refrained from doing either’s bidding but absorbed messages from both and used 
elements that furthered the interest of de-escalation without damaging their broader 
foreign policy interests.  
IV. BROKERED BARGAINING IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
MUMBAI CRISIS 
The Mumbai crisis was sparked by a provocation far more spectacular and 
psychologically damaging for India than the ones that triggered the Kargil and 2001-02 
crises. Yet, the crisis ended up being the most subdued of the three. Brokered bargaining 
was central in shaping crisis behavior. The seamless manner in which the three sides 
engaged in the three-cornered bargaining exercise suggests that they considered it a fait 
accompli. They exhibited a greater sense of familiarity with the opportunities and 
limitations associated with the trilateral framework and seemed much more confident in 
operating within the model.  
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1. The Use of Brokered Bargaining in the Mumbai Crisis 
The Mumbai crisis exhibited all aspects of the brokered bargaining framework. 
India and Pakistan utilized both strands of the resolve-prudence trade-off. The relatively 
hawkish rhetoric from India at the outset, the tit-for-tat signaling by both antagonists 
during the latter part of December 2008, and limited military movements during the crisis 
are examples of resolve-inducing behavior. This was more than offset by the remarkable 
restraint and prudence both antagonists showed in avoiding a brinkmanship exercise of 
the kind witnessed in 2001-02 even though a number of factors at play could have easily 
propelled them in that direction. At the same time, India and Pakistan competed for the 
third party’s support. India relied largely on direct pleas and willingness to defer to the 
role of the third party as the principal crisis manager while banking on an implicit threat 
of shedding restraint in case of the third party’s indifference. Pakistan presented a 
somewhat more even mix of explicit threat manipulation, strategic autonomy in decision 
making, and deference to third party preferences but it also prioritized positive evaluation 
above all else. The third party, on its part, put up a repeat performance of brokering the 
crisis as an umpire in pursuit of the de-escalation goal; it promised both antagonists it 
would deliver for them but ultimately managed to get them to settle for partial successes 
accompanied by face savers.  
The Indian propensity to invest effort and hope in the third party’s diplomacy as 
its principal crisis management strategy was surprising given the nature of the Mumbai 
attack, the fact that the Indo-Pak normalization bid in the inter-crisis years had failed to 
prevent anti-India terrorism from Pakistan completely, Indian leaders had to contend with 
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the post-attack anger, and that India had significant reputational costs at stake given its 
previous crisis performances. In reality, Indian leaders not only banked on the third party 
but were fairly candid in acknowledging this strategy. India’s demeanor strengthens our 
claim that the three-cornered interaction will be adopted despite one (or both) of the 
antagonists having plausible reasons to play outside it.  
 Pakistan’s restraint was driven by its rather indefensible position and the realistic 
prospect of international isolation, or worse yet, a gang up scenario against it in case it 
stuck to a belligerent stance.  In that sense, preference for prudent behavior on Pakistan’s 
part, both in terms of sparing use of resolve signals and force demonstrations and 
relatively greater emphasis on restraint, and its sensitivity to third party preferences are 
not altogether surprising. However, as already discussed, Pakistan’s eagerness to reach 
out to Western partners was not a natural choice in light of its distrust vis-à-vis the U.S. 
and the facts surrounding the Mumbai attacks. Its propensity to do so regardless is best 
explained by the compulsion to avoid the self-defeating alternative of leaving an 
uncontested playing field for the adversary to elicit support of the third party. Ultimately, 
Pakistan engaged the third party and obliged it sufficiently to wiggle out of the crisis with 
the status quo ante largely intact.  
The third party’s response to the crisis manifests its cumulative lessons drawn 
from developments during previous crises and in the inter-crisis period. The notional 
“playbook” it worked off and choreographed its interventions from was a product of its 
past experiences. Perhaps the most consequential lesson was reflected in the decisiveness 
and swiftness with which it engaged the antagonists. It entered the fray instantly, 
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reflecting its extreme worry and concern about the dangers associated with the situation. 
The fact that the Mumbai episode’s timing coincided with the Thanks Giving vacation in 
the U.S. also provided a good opportunity to determine whether suboptimal situations in 
terms of crisis response coordination possibilities affect the desire and decision for crisis 
intervention on the part of the third party. The virtually automatic U.S. intervention at 
Mumbai suggested otherwise. 
 The U.S. was at the forefront, once again playing the role of a broker and 
separator in conjunction with other third party actors. Neither the deaths of U.S. citizens 
at Mumbai nor the fact that the world’s reflexive outpouring of sympathy for India and 
finger pointing at Pakistan forced the U.S. to waver in its focus on de-escalation and 
crisis termination. As expected, it positioned itself down the middle, urging Indian 
restraint and demanding tangible action from Pakistan. Arguably the most innovative 
aspect of third party crisis diplomacy was the deliberate effort to push the crisis into the 
law enforcement/legal domain. This helped lower the temperature and allowed the U.S. 
and Pakistan to buy time.  
 Finally, the third party’s de-escalation agenda was strongly reinforced by some of 
the situational factors at Mumbai. U.S. foreign policy interests in Afghanistan and its 
concern about Pakistan’s internal weakness dovetailed nicely with the U.S.’s principal 
crisis objective. That said, the fact that the third party’s crisis management remained 
tactically focused on de-escalation in line with our model’s prediction meant that its 
broader regional security concerns remained in the background: Afghanistan was hardly 
422 
 
discussed in meetings among U.S. principals that focused on the Mumbai crisis.272 
Similarly, any concerns that may have clashed with the immediate goal at hand were 
ignored. For instance, the tenor of U.S. relations with India could have conceivably 
pushed Washington to take a far more supportive line towards New Delhi but there is no 
indication that U.S. crisis managers contemplated using the crisis as an opportunity to 
prioritize the Indo-U.S. relationship over the more urgent de-escalation goal. Remarkably, 
there was also no thought that the deaths of U.S. citizens in Mumbai should lead to 
harsher measures against the involved non-state actors residing in Pakistan. As one U.S. 
official recounted, “We wouldn’t have done anything different even if U.S. citizens 
weren’t killed.” “This wasn’t about Afghanistan….It was solely for de-escalation.”273  Of 
course, this is not to overlook the fact that Washington was working arduously to 
minimize any negative implications of the crisis for its Afghanistan campaign throughout 
the Mumbai episode. Expectedly, Afghanistan and the broader Indo-U.S. relationship 
would also return as the U.S.’s primary focus after the crisis was over. Once again 
however, Washington showed little inclination for deeper post-crisis involvement to 
address the root causes behind recurring India-Pakistan crises. 
2. Brokered Bargaining and the Escalation-De-escalation Dynamic 
The Mumbai crisis presented a rather interesting case of predominantly prudent 
behavior and absence of escalation. It is however not difficult to imagine a very different 
trajectory of the crisis. Given the nature and context of the Mumbai attacks, India could 
have felt justified to take a more resolute stance against Pakistan. It could have easily 
                                              
272 Author’s interview of relevant U.S. official. 
273 Author’s interview of relevant U.S. official. 
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convinced itself that its improved ties with the world’s powers, the West’s annoyance 
with Pakistan over the situation in Afghanistan, and its uncontested position as the victim 
in Mumbai would allow it to undertake limited retribution against Pakistan without 
undermining its positive evaluation. Pakistan would likely have responded in kind and it 
would possibly have also refused to cooperate or act against militants. A brinkmanship 
exercise would have ensued. The dynamic would have injected all the possibilities of 
misunderstandings and miscalculations by the principal antagonists or the third party 
actors emphasized by deterrence pessimists and added to in our discussion in chapters 
one and two, and thus raised the prospect of unintended escalation.  
 None of these concerns played out at Mumbai. The crisis was heavily dominated 
by a happy convergence between structural and situational factors that built up de-
escalatory pressures and kept the crisis largely under control. To begin with, there was no 
evidence of belligerence aimed at attracting third party actors at the outset on the part of 
either antagonist. The escalatory pressures generated through such attention-seeking 
moves by Pakistan at Kargil and India in 2001-02 were therefore largely absent at 
Mumbai. At the same time, the relatively automatic induction of the U.S.-led third party’s 
role and India and Pakistan’s expectation of the same reinforced downward pressure on 
escalation as it had in the past crises.  
The logic of largely prudent Indian behavior can be found in the compulsions 
inherent in the brokered bargaining framework and situational factors surrounding 
Mumbai. Notwithstanding India’s inter-crisis thinking embodied in the Cold Start 
doctrine, the crisis environment seems to have prompted leaders in New Delhi to pay 
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heed to a key lesson from the previous crisis iterations: undertaking excessively resolve-
inducing steps such as military mobilization or even preparing for limited use of force is 
futile in an environment where positive evaluation concerns cannot be wished away. 
India also had to be cognizant that even if it were to aggress against Pakistan, its recourse 
to de-escalation after doing so would still have been through the third party. However, 
having ridiculed third party preferences by initiating combat in the first place, it would 
not only have undermined the universal appreciation of its ‘victim’ status but it would 
also have strengthened Pakistan’s hand in the three-cornered exercise. Also, New Delhi’s 
leaders must have realized that unless they were willing to ignore the third party 
completely, upping the ante only to back down later would cause greater reputational 
damage than exhibiting prudence from the get go. Finally, the paradox of positive image 
of an antagonist –  it allows greater leeway to the actor to show resolve on the one hand 
but the need to retain its stature and goodwill limits its ability for strategic autonomy in 
the face of third party demands – seems to have been potent enough to hold India back 
again. 
Indeed, India’s global rise during the inter-crisis period would suggest a 
commensurate increase in its costs of defying the third party. One arena where this could 
have played out negatively was the potential economic fallout from the crisis. India’s 
management of this aspect at Mumbai points to the lessons it had drawn from the 
business pressure it felt during the 2001-02 standoff and to its heightened sensitivity to its 
tag as a favored investment destination. At Mumbai, India moved to assuage business 
concerns within 24 hours of the attacks. Indian intelligence and FBI jointly prepared a 
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situation report and disseminated it among government and private sector circles.274 A 
consolidated intelligence report was shared with the private sector organizations shortly 
thereafter and they were also brought in for classified and unclassified briefings in the 
early days of the crisis to prevent panic among their ranks.275 India’s economic concerns 
were at play even if they were not as visible as in 2001-02. They would have helped to 
check any urge for excessive resolve in its demeanor. 
India also had good reason to believe that the circumstances surrounding Mumbai 
would force the third parties to tilt heavily in its favor and against Pakistan. Foreign 
nationals had died in the attacks which legally compelled countries like the U.S. to 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators. The instant sympathy and understanding India 
received from the world would have further confirmed the wisdom in utilizing third party 
goodwill to make gains rather than employ the relatively risky direct options. These 
situational factors would have only reinforced New Delhi’s preference for prudence.  
India’s restraint at Mumbai notwithstanding, the fact that its crisis positioning did 
include implicit threat manipulation vis-à-vis the third party and periodic show of resolve 
against Pakistan cannot be ignored. Interestingly, the explanation for India’s resolute 
behavior starting from the mid-December IAF incursions till the end of the month also 
lies in the earlier-mentioned paradox created by international support. At Mumbai, this 
paradox played out differently than it had previously. For instance, at Kargil, third party 
support for India’s stance had emboldened New Delhi to exhibit resolve. At Mumbai, for 
reasons discussed above, India chose to act prudently and allow the third party to do its 
                                              
274 Raman, Mumbai 26/11, 213-14. 
275 Ibid. 
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crisis bidding in the hope that the third party would put its weight behind New Delhi’s 
position unequivocally. It was the third party’s propensity to play down the middle in the 
initial days of the crisis that disappointed India and was partly behind its decision to 
change tact and employ resolve in the latter half of December. It would have been a 
reminder that India still meant business and was holding the third party to its promise to 
deliver tangible concessions from Pakistan. Once again however, the need to avoid 
denting the goodwill meant that the paradox encouraged limiting displays of resolve and 
an eventual return to prudent behavior.  
Pakistan deserves equal credit for avoiding escalatory steps during the crisis. Its 
restraint and prudence is more easily explained given that it was in a rather indefensible 
position. With its back against the wall, outright defiance of third party demands could 
only have pushed the external interlocutors closer to India. Already wary of U.S.’s tilt 
towards its adversary, it made perfect sense for Pakistan to calibrate its strategy carefully 
to avoid coming across as the belligerent party. Pakistan’s dependence on plausible 
deniability and constant offers of cooperation to India ought to be seen in this light. The 
alternative was to risk international isolation at a time when Pakistan’s internal situation 
was already delicate. Also eliminating the need for unprovoked belligerence was the fact 
that, like in the standoff, Pakistan was only seeking to end the crisis with the status quo 
ante intact. The precarious situation from its perspective meant that there was little room 
for it to press the larger Kashmir issue; the best it could hope at Mumbai was to exit the 
crisis unharmed, and do so in the shortest possible period of time. This required a mix of 
promises, some delivery on the Indian and third party demands, and delaying tactics but 
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not belligerence and brinkmanship or emphasis on the need to see Mumbai through a 
broader Kashmir prism.  
The only resolve signals and actions Pakistan took were either in response to 
alleged or perceived Indian measures to up the ante or aimed at threating escalation in 
response to any Indian aggression. Virtually all these moves were painted as compulsions 
by the Pakistani leadership. Much the same was the reasoning forwarded when Pakistan 
chose autonomy over deference to third party demands in the legal domain.  
The real architect of de-escalation at Mumbai was the third party. The absence of 
early competition among the antagonists in displaying resolve to attract third party 
attention was primarily a function of the third party’s instantaneous and unsolicited entry 
into the fray. Its decisiveness would also have undercut any serious contemplation in 
India of operationalizing its pre-crisis urge to punish Pakistan through quick and limited 
use of force. Such inter-crisis thinking on India’s part only seems to have heightened the 
third party’s sensitivity to the possibility of a nuclear crisis getting out of control and may 
have led it to try and offset it by its immediate involvement and instant promises of 
support to New Delhi. 
The third party’s work was cut out to restrain India in a situation where U.S.’s 
own stance against terrorism should have pushed it to back New Delhi’s view 
unequivocally. Leveraging its improved ties with India however, the U.S. relied almost 
exclusively on promises and arguments that presented restraint as a better alternative to 
aggression in light of India’s crisis objectives. The third party’s rationale throughout was 
to buy time and let the tensest moments pass uneventfully.  
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The more coercive elements of the third party’s strategy were employed against 
Pakistan. It constantly maintained that the third party would be unable to prevent Indian 
aggression – read, it would gang up – if Pakistan failed to deliver on its demands. It 
managed to get just enough from Pakistan to keep India from shedding restraint. That 
said, there were serious self-imposed limits to how far the third party could go. Chief 
among these was the international community’s deep concern about the Pakistani 
government’s weakness and the potential for an escalated crisis to lead to its collapse. 
This could have subsequently provided greater space to militants already challenging the 
writ of the state. As Jenkins (2009) notes, “Pakistan’s principal defense against external 
pressure is………its own political fragility— its government’s less-than-full cooperation 
is preferable to the country’s collapse and descent into chaos.”276 Moreover, an escalated 
crisis scenario was also seen as the most likely for the fear of ‘loose nukes’ in Pakistan to 
be realized.277 These worries militated strongly against pushing Pakistan too hard. 
Pakistan’s awareness of these must also have partly provided it confidence that it could 
get away with partial fulfilment of third party demands and periodic use of autonomous 
decision making. Pakistani leaders were in a happy position also because they could 
challenge these notions and emphasize that their arsenal was safe and secure without 
having any chance of diluting the near-obsession of the Western countries with these 
possibilities.  
                                              
276 Brian M. Jenkins, “Terrorists can Think Strategically: Lessons Learned from the Mumbai 
Attacks” (testimony presented before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, January 28, 2009, 3). 
277 For the logic behind this belief, see Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, 3 (Winter 2009-10): 73. 
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The third party’s real genius at Mumbai was to keep the crisis in the diplomatic – 
instead of the military – domain for the most part and even more specifically, to push it 
towards the law enforcement/legal framework. It used its role as the principal 
communication channel to great effect, utilizing the information it transmitted as a means 
to keep the antagonists apart. As the ‘separator,’ it altered the tenor of the debate, thereby 
keeping India’s attention on its internal failures and the need to investigate the episode 
professionally rather than thinking of creating a heightened bilateral nuclear crisis. It also 
incentivized Pakistan to show some tangible results as the obvious and surest way of 
escaping the situation unharmed. This strategy ultimately bought the third party enough 
time and space to ensure that neither antagonist could prize autonomous decisions over 
deference to its preferences. The U.S. approach was especially interesting given that it 
had otherwise strongly advocated and adopted a ‘war’ rather than law enforcement 
approach to countering terrorism in its engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.278 Its 
propensity to take a different line at Mumbai aligns with our model’s prediction that third 
party actors would make choices most suited to the immediate goal of crisis de-escalation 
when involved in middle power nuclear crises. In this instance, doing so meant that 
Washington ended up contradicting its global outlook on counterterrorism. 
Also crucial to the third party’s success was its role as a face saving outlet for the 
antagonists. To India, none would have been more important than Pakistan’s crackdown 
– even if halfhearted –, investigation, and initiation of legal proceedings against some of 
                                              
278 The ‘war’ approach lies at the heart of the George W. Bush administration’s doctrine of 
preemption that informed U.S. strategies in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. See National 
Security Council, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 
20, 2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html.   
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the Mumbai accused. The move to list JuD and individual militants through the UNSC 
1267 process was also a major pressure reliever delivered through third party efforts. The 
third party also played up the gains in Indo-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation courtesy of 
Mumbai and promised continued post-crisis support to India. Even though some of these 
Indian gains were more substantive than the mere promises of sincerity from Pakistan it 
managed in the twin peaks crisis, these also left much to be desired. The question as to 
“how effective is the implied quid pro quo [that] you, India, should not attack, and we, 
the US, will sort these Paks out” remained as pertinent for India after its Mumbai 
experience.279 It seemed though that just enough inducements had been provided for New 
Delhi to agree to maintain restraint during the crisis. For Pakistan, the third party’s 
refusal to accept India’s position that the ISI was involved in the Mumbai attacks, praise 
for Pakistan’s crackdown and investigation, and relative indifference to its decreasing 
commitment to prosecuting the accused militants as the crisis subsided were potent face 
savers that helped it escape the crisis without being seen as the outright loser.  
3. Competing Explanations for Crisis Behavior and Outcomes 
Save our explanation for crisis behavior rooted in the brokered bargaining 
framework, Mumbai could easily be construed as a traditional bilateral crisis of modest 
proportions. One could argue that India lacked interest in punishing Pakistan to begin 
with and thus was never serious about pursuing an aggressive policy. Indeed, the author’s 
interviews reveal a strong view among Indian strategic thinkers that Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh’s dovish outlook towards Pakistan – partly a function of Pakistan’s 
                                              
279 Nayak and Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis,” 56. 
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weakness – and natural inclination for peaceful diplomacy was a key reason for India’s 
restraint.280 Others have argued that even if India could have undertaken limited 
aggression, this would not have permanently ceased terrorism from Pakistani soil: there 
was a mismatch between Indian use of force options and its crisis goals. Finally, some 
argued that absence of escalation at Mumbai was ultimately driven by nuclear deterrence.  
Once again, we do not necessarily see any of these arguments as mutually 
exclusive to the dynamics elucidated by our model. Equally though, none of them 
undermine the efficacy of the three-cornered bargaining framework in explaining crisis 
behavior dynamics. In terms of India’s lack of interest in standing up to Pakistan, the 
rationale that such a move would have undermined the Pakistani civilian government or 
caused further instability in Pakistan is too simplistic. An all-out war may have done so 
but simply initiating a brinkmanship exercise or even limited use of force would have 
been unlikely to lead to such an outcome. To the contrary, a tit-for-tat Pakistani response 
to excessive Indian resolve may well have strengthened the nationalistic credentials of the 
government and forced the military to back it. More importantly however, even if one 
were to take at face value that India’s propensity to rely on diplomacy was a function of 
its lack of interest in contemplating use of force, this only amounts to accepting the 
centrality of the third party’s role – and by extension leverage – over the crisis. The 
observation is generalizable to any comparable context. It would only end up ensuring 
that brokered bargaining is in play each time. 
                                              
280 This continues to be a strong belief among Indian strategic elite as does the fact that had it not 
been for Prime Minister Singh, India would not have been nearly as restrained. Author’s 
interviews with ex-Indian officials and strategic experts. Davis (2011) also agrees with this 
reasoning. Davis, “Lessons Learned and Unlearned,” 232-33. 
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The argument that there was mismatch between realistic India military options 
and its goals holds some merit. Even if India had undertaken surgical strikes, goes the 
contention, it would not have forced a permanent end to anti-India terrorism from 
Pakistani soil. The risk of escalation entailed in such a strategy would therefore not be 
worth it. This line of reasoning would see an antagonist’s outreach to the third party as a 
function not of the inherent pull of the brokered bargaining framework but as an outlet of 
last resort. In other words, were military options commensurate with the crisis goals 
available, engaging the third party would no longer be necessary. Indeed, absence of a 
‘good’ military option may well have played a role in the Indian decision to forego the 
surgical strike option after deliberations in the CCS immediately following the attacks. 
Interestingly though, this argument also strengthens the centrality of three-cornered 
bargaining. It is hard to imagine any context involving nuclear weapons where ‘good’ 
military options free of any risk of escalation – and thereby unable to irk the sensitivities 
and concerns of third parties – would be available. The innate risk of escalation in any 
nuclear environment and the third party’s inherent concerns about middle power nuclear 
crises eliminate this possibility altogether.  
Finally, there is the role of classic nuclear deterrence. Former Indian Army Chief 
General Shankar Roy Chowdhury argued during the ‘law enforcement/legal only’ phase 
of the Mumbai crisis that India’s conventional strikes had been deterred by Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons.281 Indian-American political scientist Vipin Narang also contends that 
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http://www.thehindu.com/todayspaper/tpnational/pakistansnuclearweaponsdeterredindia/article32
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India was restrained partly due to the fear of uncontrolled escalation.282 While this would 
most likely have played on the minds of South Asian decision makers, India’s 
unwillingness even to establish resolve well below the nuclear threshold through resolute 
signaling despite the fact that its audience costs were significantly high remains a 
puzzle.283 Pakistan had shown no inclination to consider readying its nuclear arsenal and 
thus there was significant space for India to signal resolve before it had to worry about 
the nuclear equation. Classic explanations would find it even more difficult to rationalize 
India’s inaction in light of the fact that it had already suffered tremendous reputational 
damage in previous crises. Seen through this lens, inaction would confirm that the Indian 
nuclear (and for that matter conventional) deterrent remained impotent in the face of sub-
conventional provocations. 
As for Pakistan, its behavior can be explained easily through the classic 
deterrence framework. It was conventionally weaker, any use of nuclear weapons would 
ultimately be suicidal for it, the credibility of its resolve to employ the nuclear option was 
never in question in previous crises, and it simply wanted a return to the status quo ante. 
It therefore only sought to end the crisis with minimal damage and without inviting an 
internal militant backlash.  
                                              
282 Vipin Narang, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability,” Policy 
Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, January 2010, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19889/pakistans_nuclear_posture.html.  
283 For a discussion of audience costs and their relative importance in various political contexts, 
see Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” The American 
Political Science Review 92, 4 (December 1998); and James Fearon, “Domestic Political 
Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science Review 
88, 3 (September 1994).  
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Our response on this count is the same as it was for the other two cases: the 
restraining influence of nuclear weapons is already accounted for in our model. The 
model allows any weightage to the nuclear aspect (and others) to be fed into the process 
that underpins brokered bargaining, and therefore shapes crisis behavior (and in turn 
affects outcomes). Our argument does however preclude the classic contention that sees 
nuclear weapons as the standalone explanation for crisis behavior and outcomes. India’s 
deference to the third party during Mumbai was all too obvious and fairly candidly 
acknowledged. Pakistan’s actions against militants as well as its confidence that it could 
avoid Indian aggression despite only addressing its demands halfheartedly, and its 
relative preference for prudence over resolve overall were also driven by the concern 
about outcompeting India in the brokered bargaining framework. Ignoring this dynamic 
may still allow one to predict the crisis outcomes correctly but it would have 
misrepresented the mechanisms that shaped the behavior of the three parties involved. 
Equally, pointing to the third party as the reason for de-escalation without explicating on 
the three-cornered engagement as a process that allows the third party to play its role 
would be inaccurate, even if it is able to correctly predict a no-war outcome. 
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SECTION III: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
436 
 
CHAPTER 7: BROKERED BARGAINING: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS 
FOR SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND 
We had set out to explore whether nuclear crises among middle powers play out 
the same way they did between the Cold War superpowers. Our goal was to go beyond 
simply establishing the differences between the traditional understanding of nuclear crisis 
behavior and the dynamics underpinning crises between second age nuclear powers. We 
sought to explicate on why these differences arise and how they manifest themselves. In 
doing so, we have proposed a new model and a deductive theory to understand middle 
power nuclear crisis behavior.  
 The preceding chapters have examined the three main crises between India and 
Pakistan since their overt nuclearization in 1998 to answer the above-posed questions. 
These cases form the universe of nuclear crises between middle powers without extended 
deterrence guarantees from external patrons operating in a world with stronger hegemons. 
We can now turn our attention to drawing the main conclusions from the foregoing 
analysis and dilating upon their implications for nuclear crisis behavior in South Asia and 
beyond. The chapter begins by emphasizing the key findings from our case studies and 
the implications of brokered bargaining for crisis stability. It then highlights the varying 
situational factors under which the three-cornered bargaining exercise played out in 
South Asia to indicate its applicability across changing contexts. The final section 
examines the validity of our framework for future crisis scenarios in South Asia and for 
crises between other nuclear dyads around the world.  
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I. THE SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE WITH BROKERED BARGAINING 
Our analysis has opened up the black box of crisis behavior in South Asia beyond 
attention to strategic stability issues. The empirical evidence from the case studies 
confirms our posited need to fundamentally alter the prevailing understanding of crisis 
behavior between middle power nuclear states nested in an overall global order consisting 
of stronger hegemons. Our findings hold up the primacy of brokered bargaining. The 
framework provides a fresh explanation for the drivers of nuclear crisis behavior of the 
principal antagonists and the integral and endogenous role of the third party actors that 
radically departs from the prevailing tendency of examining third party involvement 
through two-actor bargaining models. Pitched at the structural level in as much as the 
global distribution of power underpins the framework, we have used brokered bargaining 
to present an elaborate and intricate explanation of the processes shaping nuclear crisis 
behavior in the South Asian context.  
In examining the Kargil, 2001-02, and Mumbai crises, we have process-traced 
crisis events in great detail to observe the linkage between the choices made by the 
principal antagonists and the demands put on them by the third party actors, as well as the 
effect the antagonists’ behavior had on the third party’s crisis decisions. As the model 
predicts, all three parties entered the crises with different objectives but the three-
cornered bargaining exercise ended up influencing each’s expectations, incentives, and 
strategies through a recursive and dynamic process that ultimately shaped crisis behavior, 
and in turn affected the trajectory and outcomes of the crises. At the heart of brokered 
bargaining lies the constant tension between the principal antagonists’ incentives to 
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maximize autonomy without denting their ‘evaluation’ by the third party on the one hand 
and the third party’s efforts to heighten the antagonists’ sensitivity to its preferences 
without backing either’s stance at the cost of alienating the other completely.  
The model is triggered by a combination of the antagonists’ decision to create or 
engage in a crisis in pursuit of their respective objectives and the third party’s deep-
seated concerns about the potential risks of escalation in any nuclear context involving 
second age nuclear powers. As discussed in chapters two and three, the third party’s 
worries about second age nuclear crisis management exist quite irrespective of any 
obvious efforts by the antagonists to draw it into the crisis. Equally though, the 
prohibitive costs of nuclear war incentivize the principal antagonists’ outreach to the third 
party actors rather than opting for direct confrontation. This dynamic makes the presence 
of an operational nuclear capability central to our model’s validity but also virtually 
guarantees that brokered bargaining will play out every time middle powers are locked in 
a nuclear crisis.  
In each of our case studies, the extreme worry about escalatory potential on the 
part of U.S. decision makers forced the U.S.-led third party to intervene without much 
hesitation. While attention-seeking efforts like Pakistan’s propensity to create a 
demonstration crisis at Kargil and India’s belligerence at the front end of the 2001-02 
standoff reinforced the third party’s desire to influence these crises, the U.S.’s 
intervention across the three iterations – this was most obviously the case for Mumbai – 
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was unsolicited for the most part.1 U.S. policy makers were cognizant that this created a 
moral hazard problem2 but the costs of addressing it – read, not showing up – were 
deemed to be too high to opt out of the trilateral engagement altogether. Indeed, even 
though Kargil had seen the moral hazard problem play out empirically courtesy of 
Pakistan’s deliberate instigation of the crisis, the U.S. only grew more concerned about 
crisis stability in South Asia and was therefore even more eager to intervene in the 2001-
02 and 2008 iterations. 3 
The conflicting parties are compelled to operate through the trilateral framework 
even in cases they do not actively seek third party intervention, primarily because of the 
potential losses entailed in leaving the field open for their opponent to seek concessions 
                                              
1 This pattern is certain to hold in other contexts as well. The author confirmed through his 
interviews an almost inviolable belief among U.S. policy makers and practitioners that the U.S. 
ought to intervene even if it is convinced that nuclear antagonists in a particular crisis are 
unwilling to fight a war. The worries about inadvertence or accidental use of nuclear weapons 
were repeatedly mentioned as sufficient to trigger U.S. intervention.  
2 The concept of moral hazard refers to a situation where an actor can decide on how much risk to 
take in any given decision but the negative consequences of his decisions are partly borne by 
another actor. As used here, the moral hazard refers to the incentive repeated U.S. interventions 
create for any crisis provoker by confirming that it is willing to intervene to manage escalation. 
Moral hazard was a subject of intense examination in debates on alliances during the Cold War. 
The concern about restraining allies/protégés who could potentially feel emboldened due to the 
superpower patron’s support preoccupied many theorists and practitioners. While much of this 
literature is still conceptualized within a defender-protégé-challenger framework, the presence of 
moral hazard in situations devoid of formal alliances is also recognized. Yet, the key puzzle was 
to identify what type of defender was most likely to intervene and under what circumstances, and 
what affect this had on the behavior of the protégé. See Timothy W. Crawford, “The Endurance 
of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy,” in Complex 
Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, eds. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 291-94. The inevitability of third party 
intervention in our model accentuates the moral hazard problem.  
3 The author’s interviews with U.S. crisis managers during the Mumbai crisis revealed that they 
were deeply cognizant of the moral hazard U.S. interventions of the past had created but they 
remained convinced that this was an acceptable cost given their lack of confidence in Indian and 
Pakistani ability to manage crisis escalation on their own and their belief that no other country 
was suited to the role of the lead third party. This was reflected in the instant U.S. intervention at 
Mumbai.  
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from the external interveners. Indeed, the dual characteristic of the “resolve-prudence 
tradeoff” intrinsic to the bargaining exercise played out vividly in each of our case studies. 
Both sides balanced resolve and prudence vis-à-vis the other and simultaneously 
competed in seeking the third party’s backing. To varying degrees across the three crisis 
iterations, both antagonists manipulated the threat vis-à-vis the third party by exhibiting 
resolve and reached out with direct pleas for support in hopes of extracting concessions in 
line with their crisis objectives. Throughout, they were careful not to signal either to the 
adversary or the third party that they were willing to stand down completely. In fact, the 
limitations of third party leverage were constantly exposed, for instance through Pakistani 
decisions to redeploy its troops from the western border during the 2001-02 and Mumbai 
crises and India’s prolonged full-scale mobilization during the 2001-02 episode.  
What the principal antagonists ultimately prioritized however was their sensitivity 
to the third party’s ‘evaluation’ potential. This led them to consistently pull back from the 
brink at critical junctures at the third party’s prodding, if not stay well short of these high-
risk moments to begin with. Even when they indulged in threat manipulation vis-à-vis the 
third party, they never openly defied it. Instead, such moves were portrayed as 
compulsions or options of last resort in the face of the adversary’s behavior, which they 
inevitably characterized as provocative and aggressive.  
The need for positive evaluation also proved to be strong enough for both 
antagonists to settle for partial fulfillment of their tactical crisis objectives. In the process, 
they even accepted significant political and material costs, and in India’s case, also 
overbearing reputational losses. The Indian decision not to cross the LoC at Kargil 
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despite incurring additional casualties, its decision to defer plans of aggressing against 
Pakistan in early-January 2002 in phase I and between May 21 and June 8, 2002 in phase 
II of the twin peaks crisis and even its choice to virtually ‘contract out’ its crisis 
diplomacy to the U.S. during Mumbai were primarily driven by evaluation concerns. So 
were Pakistan’s choices to accept the terms of crisis termination at Kargil and to make 
public promises and take action against militant outfits – however halfheartedly – in 
2001-02 and at Mumbai. Moreover, Indian and Pakistani behavior across the three crises 
also suggests a reluctance to hold the crisis outcome hostage to pushing their larger 
foreign policy interests – negotiations on Kashmir for Pakistan and a permanent end to 
state or non-state-led sub-conventional provocations for India. Each time, they ended the 
crisis with little concrete in hand on these counts.  
The three-cornered bargaining relationship depicted by the brokered bargaining 
model is completed by the third party actors who enter the crisis seeking to alter the 
preferences of the antagonists. The overwhelming concern about the risks involved in 
crisis situations cements de-escalation and swift crisis termination as the primary 
intervention objectives. As we reported in each of three case studies, U.S. policy makers 
were categorical in stating and pursuing the de-escalation agenda, prioritizing this over 
all prior preferences.  
The third party’s role in the South Asian context fell squarely within the “power 
mediation” domain. Third party actors limited their “reward-punishment leverage” to 
non-military sanctions in the diplomatic and economic realms and combined these with 
positive inducements as incentives and quid pro quos for the antagonists’ deference to 
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their preferences. There is no evidence of the third party giving any serious consideration 
to direct coercion, let alone compellence.  
Specifically, the third party’s strategy comprised of two complimentary aspects of 
behavior that combined to maximize the possibility of de-escalation in each crisis: 
playing the role of a “balancer” and that of a “face saver.” These amounted to the third 
party attempting to let the tensest moments in the crisis pass uneventfully by buying time 
and constantly working to ‘separate’ India and Pakistan while pushing for crisis 
termination.  
As a balancer, the U.S.-led third party managed to avoid overtly siding with either 
side. Instead, it attempted to provide each with an impression that it stood by it as long as 
it agreed to descend down the escalation ladder. Without revealing its intentions fully to 
either side, the U.S. absorbed and conveyed signals from and to both sides through public 
and private channels, selectively shared crucial intelligence information at critical 
junctures, and made commitments as a guarantor on behalf of one or the other antagonist 
but none that were fixed and time bound such that they could bring into question its 
leverage or suggest to either antagonist that the third party was backing the opponent and 
contemplating ganging up on its side. U.S.’s propensity to act as a guarantor of Pakistan’s 
promises to end cross-border infiltration in phases I and II of the twin peaks crisis 
provide the most vivid illustration of this aspect of third party brokering. The third 
party’s demeanor held even in contexts such as Mumbai where the instant wave of 
international sympathy for India and the death of third party citizens quite obviously 
begged much stronger backing for New Delhi’s position. Doing so however risked 
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emboldening India to exhibit greater resolve and in turn, enticing Pakistan into a 
brinkmanship exercise. 
As a face saver, the third party allowed both sides to shift the onus of their sub-
optimal outcomes to the U.S.4 Face saving opportunities were on offer for both sides as 
and when demanded by the de-escalation agenda. Pakistan received these in the form of 
President Clinton’s ‘promise’ of assistance in supporting an India-Pakistan dialogue on 
Kashmir at Kargil and through praise for its crackdown against militants in 2001-02 and 
Mumbai. India managed to save face in 2001-02 when the third party played along with 
its tact to tie its de-mobilization with the October 2002 elections in Jammu and Kashmir 
and courtesy of the third party’s success in forcing Pakistan to conduct and publicize a 
serious enough investigation into the Mumbai attacks for India to declare victory.  
The third party’s “punishment” leverage flowed from its ability to lean heavily in 
favor of the opponent, a structural reality born out of its power differential vis-à-vis the 
antagonists. Even though there are limits to how far the third party can go in employing 
its leverage without forcing the antagonists to consider relying on self-help – the risks in 
doing so in a nuclear environment constrain the third party much more than in 
conventional contexts –, played right, it can force the conflicting parties to constantly 
worry about losing the third party’s backing. The ‘alignment card’ is a potent third party 
tool in this regard. It was most prominent in U.S.’s dealings with Pakistan at Kargil and 
                                              
4 The role of a face saver is well-established in literature on bargaining games, wherein 
“mediation provides the negotiator with a face-saving device whereby he can retreat without 
feeling that he has capitulated. Presumably, this face-saving results from throwing the blame for 
one’s own concessions onto the mediator.” Dean G. Pruitt and Douglas F. Johnson, “Mediation as 
an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14, 3 
(1970): 246. 
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Mumbai where the third party constantly signaled its inability to prevent Indian 
aggression if Pakistan failed to be responsive to third party demands. India was subjected 
to it in 2001-02 and even at Kargil in as much as U.S. backing for its stance was 
implicitly presented as a quid pro quo for its measured behavior. In addition, the third 
party’s economic leverage over both sides was also on display, most obviously in the 
threat to hold up a much needed $100 million IMF loan to Pakistan during Kargil and 
through the travel advisories that directly affected India’s crisis calculations in 2001-02.   
 The above-depicted three-cornered bargaining exercise ultimately shaped Indian 
and Pakistani behavior in their crises in the overt nuclearization phase. In explaining the 
factors that led these crises to play out in a trilateral framework and detailing how this 
interaction took place, we have not only added substantially to the existing understanding 
of middle power nuclear crises but have also highlighted the fundamentally different 
mechanisms that shape crisis behavior in these contexts versus those predicted by classic 
two-actor bargaining models that have otherwise informed the world’s understanding of 
nuclear crisis behavior for the most part.  
1. The Quest for De-Escalation: Brokered Bargaining and Crisis Stability 
The three-cornered bargaining exercise depicted here offers direct implications 
for crisis stability. The third party’s need to play down the middle creates an incentive for 
the principal antagonists to exercise greater degree of autonomy to force the third party to 
divulge more information about its intensions – read support their respective stances 
further. At the same time, the ‘balancer’s’ compulsion to retain its influence over the 
conflicting parties imposes limits on its freedom of action to punish such behavior by the 
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antagonists. The third party then faces an interesting paradoxical constraint: its need to 
retain leverage reduces its space to limit the decision making autonomy of the antagonists 
which is the precisely what the leverage is supposed to allow it to do in the first place. It 
is no coincidence then that the third party did not broach outright coercion in any of the 
crises even though it could easily have made a case to do so against Pakistan at Kargil 
and Mumbai and perhaps even against India in 2001-02. On the other hand, the U.S. was 
forced to allow autonomous decisions like the Pakistani troop re-deployment and India’s 
prolonged mobilization in 2001-02 even as these developments went against its 
immediate regional interests.  
The antagonists’ agreement to ultimately reverse these autonomous decisions and 
the numerous other occasions when they deferred to third party preferences at the cost of 
their crisis objectives is explained by their overbearing need to outdo their adversary in 
attaining positive evaluation. Our model predicts that they will shy away from excessive 
autonomy that could force the third party’s hand into stauncher support of the adversary. 
Indeed, we identified cause and effect between a number of key Indian and Pakistani 
decisions to forego autonomy and the third party’s “reward-punishment leverage” in our 
case study chapters.  
Moreover, the third party’s maneuvering space to ensure de-escalation is 
increased by another finding from our South Asian case studies: the antagonists’ 
sensitivity to third parties seems to hold irrespective of their international stature. Both 
good and bad international images seem to make states more sensitive to the quest for 
positive evaluation. For India, if global sympathy opened up space to exhibit autonomy 
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and eliminated the compulsion for it to soften its position at Kargil and during 2001-02, 
the need for keeping the international community’s empathetic outlook simultaneously 
acted as a restraining factor. As India’s stature rose and its substantive interaction with 
the U.S. increased, it found itself even more sensitive to its demands during crises. In fact, 
the Indian case provides a vivid example of how a country’s economic rise can make it 
more concerned about its evaluation by third party actors. New Delhi’s eagerness to shift 
the onus of achieving its objectives to the third party in phase II of the 2001-02 standoff 
was in no small part driven by this factor, as were its efforts to preempt any economic 
fallout during Mumbai by reassuring the private sector at the very outset of the crisis. In 
Pakistan’s case, its image as a reckless, military dominated state deemed to be capable of 
exhibiting immaturity during crisis situations seems to have forced it to feel the need to 
negate that impression, especially after the Kargil experience. Its image also meant that it 
needed to do little to convince its adversary or the third party of the credibility of its 
resolve to employ force in any eventuality – another calming influence on its crisis 
posturing.  
In South Asia, these factors ensured that escalatory pressures were overridden by 
the incentives for restraint and crisis termination. In as much as our three-cornered 
framework provides an alternative route of diplomatic bargaining ahead of classic 
behavior prizing firm resolve to extract concessions from the adversary, it acts as a potent 
stability-inducing factor. That said, we must also highlight a number of structural factors 
and behavior patterns that are likely to keep de-escalation from becoming an over-
determined outcome in contexts exhibiting brokered bargaining. Interestingly, the 
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potentially instability-inducing forces are also generated by the opportunities and 
limitations inherent in the brokered bargaining framework.   
First, the brokered bargaining calculus may leave incentives for crises to recur 
courtesy of the earlier-mentioned moral hazard problem that incentivizes creation of 
demonstration crises.5 The fact that each South Asian crisis terminated with the status 
quo ante intact reinforces this possibility. This is despite the fact that status quo outcomes 
ought to deter revisionism and the urge to employ extraordinarily provocative behavior 
that often accompanies it. Cessation of crises at the status quo ante point implied that the 
provoker – be it the state of Pakistan or non-state actors operating from its soil – managed 
to escape relatively unharmed. The situation most obviously suits a provoker seeking to 
create a demonstration crisis without any immediate revisionist goals in mind. Non-state 
actors behind the 2001-02 and 2008 crises may consider themselves winners in this stead: 
they managed to grab the limelight by causing an international crisis that sucked in the 
world’s powers. By the same token, if the Pakistani security establishment deems these 
attacks to be serving, or at least doing no harm to, their country’s foreign policy interests, 
as is often alleged, its incentives to curb the activities of these non-state actors ought to 
be rather low.  
Moreover, each time a demonstration crisis occurs or when an antagonist exhibits 
provocativeness to lure the third party to intervene, it makes the crisis more threatening 
even as the subsequent third party intervention plays a pacifying role.6 Kargil is perhaps 
                                              
5 Dinshaw Mistry, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” Security 
Studies, 18, 1 (2009): 180-81. 
6 Ibid., 181. 
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the most obvious example where absent Pakistan’s desire for the demonstration effect, 
the crisis – and therefore concerns of escalation – would never have occurred. At the 
same time however, the third party’s involvement and the sensitivity of the antagonists to 
its preferences helped keep the crisis limited. India’s initial mobilization and saber-
rattling was responsible for the paradox in 2001-02. The ideal scenario from the de-
escalation perspective played out at Mumbai: use of belligerence to attract the third party 
was sparing but the relatively automatic induction of the U.S.-led third party’s role 
reinforced downward pressure on escalation nonetheless.   
The South Asian experience also points to a mixed track record in terms of India 
and Pakistan honoring their confidence building and risk reduction commitments aimed 
at strengthening crisis stability. While they did proceed to honor bilateral arrangements 
like the agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities and exchange lists of 
civilian installations on January 1 each year –7 this occurred during phase I of the 
standoff and during Mumbai –, they have tended to discard far more consequential 
protocols. Arguably the most important of these was their commitment to using direct 
communication channels during crises. 
Despite presence of hotlines between civilian and military officials, India and 
Pakistan have primarily relied on the third party to communicate with one another, and 
increasingly so over time.8 In as far as the experiences in the past crises do not seem to 
                                              
7 The “Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities” was 
signed on December 31, 1988 and came into force in 1990. The full text of the agreement is 
available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/nucl.htm. 
8 As discussed in the case studies, India and Pakistan made a backchannel effort to solve the 
Kargil crisis even as they simultaneously used the third party to signal to each other and India 
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have left either antagonist visibly discontent with the use of indirect communication 
channels – the author’s interviews suggest a continuing preference for these over direct 
outreach given the mutual mistrust between the antagonists –, their desire to keep 
working the third party channel may in fact have been reinforced. This implies that a 
mode of communication known to be suboptimal and to carry significantly higher risks of 
creating misperceptions and misunderstandings will continue to be preferred. The lesson 
here is that securing bilateral risk reduction and crisis management protocols is not 
enough; requisite conditions and incentives to ensure their use hold the key.  
Interestingly, playing the go-between allows the third party greater control over 
the crisis dynamics. While the third party’s utilization of the information provision was 
undoubtedly a positive factor in our case studies, its centrality as the communicator puts a 
high premium on its ability to play this role without giving either antagonist a reason to 
misperceive the situation or panic. The provision of private information also makes 
accurate intelligence and an ability to use it with discretion to further the de-escalation 
agenda a crucial aspect of the third party’s crisis diplomacy. The third party’s failure on 
this count could easily inject instability into the calculus and create circumstances that 
make escalation more likely.  
Perhaps the biggest potential challenge to crisis stability in South Asia however 
has come from inter-crisis behavior. The crisis experiences of the three parties molded 
their post-crisis preferences in disturbing directions. One troubling implication comes 
                                                                                                                                      
ultimately may have prioritized the indirect channel over its direct parlays with Pakistan. The 
twin peaks episode saw a complete and voluntary breakdown of communication channels. While 
Mumbai saw sparing use of direct channels, in reality, both sides preferred to utilize the U.S.’s 
services as the principal communication conduit for any messages of substance. 
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from the fact that brokered bargaining plays out solely as a tactical crisis management 
tool. The third party’s propensity to relegate its own and the antagonists’ strategic foreign 
policy priorities to the background in each of the case studies was a function of its need 
to simplify its crisis diplomacy and to give itself the best chance of success. This is what 
causes it to leave the deeper root causes of crises unaddressed. The third party’s post-
crisis demeanor however quickly reverts to focusing on its own regional priorities; this 
could translate into reluctance to undertake proactive dispute resolution between the 
antagonists unless the third party’s regional interests align perfectly with the dispute 
resolution agenda. By leaving deeper tensions unresolved, this dynamic complements the 
moral hazard problem in making recurrence of crises more likely.   
In South Asia, the U.S. left unfinished business in terms of the deeper Indian and 
Pakistani asks in each of three crisis iterations. During the crisis, it offered hope to both 
that it would help address their strategic concerns, partly as a quid pro quo for them going 
along with the immediate de-escalation and crisis termination goal. Post-crisis however, 
it did little to follow up in earnest in pushing India on Kashmir or Pakistan on anti-India 
terrorism.  
Not only that, but the specific U.S. foreign policy choices in the post-crisis 
periods ended up adding to challenges of its role as crisis manager in the next crisis 
iteration. The U.S. focused on building its relations with India between Kargil and 
Mumbai. In doing so, it entered areas of cooperation, most notably the civilian nuclear 
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deal and broader support to India’s defense modernization,9 which  prompted Pakistan to 
expand its own efforts at conventional and nuclear upgradation. In cementing its ties with 
one of the antagonists then, the third party had made an arms race and the other 
antagonist’s greater reliance on nuclear weapons more likely. Pakistan’s paranoia about 
U.S. intentions also increased commensurately.  
To be sure, the observation that the third party shies away from addressing root 
causes of crises and that its policies can make future crises tougher to manage is only 
partially generalizable. It would hold in other contexts to the extent that there are inherent 
limitations to how hard any outsider can push a nuclear power to compromise on stances 
related to disputes considered central to its national security interests. Theoretically 
though, a manipulative mediator is known to be able to extract commitments of 
enforcement of agreements during crises by credibly promising to offer rewards or 
threatening future costs in case the antagonist in question reneges.10 It is entirely 
conceivable to imagine a tougher U.S. stance against Pakistan to challenge its inability to 
curb anti-India terrorism or a more proactive effort on Kashmir in a different post-9/11 
context in the region. A different set of inter-crisis choices can produce positive spinoffs 
on other counts as well. For instance, the third party’s ability to punish the provoker of a 
                                              
9 Apart from the nuclear deal, the U.S. followed through on inducements like military sales and 
closer counterterrorism cooperation offered during the 2001-02 and Mumbai crisis iterations 
respectively. It also provided assistance to India’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program and 
in the space arena. For a brief discussion of the Indo-U.S. nuclear and security cooperation during 
this period, see K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 
August 12, 2008, 36-51, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109486.pdf. Specifically on 
BMD, see Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-India Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging 
Strategic Relationship,” International Security 30, 4 (Spring 2006): 113-51. 
10 Kyle C. Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50, 1 (February 2006): 64-65. 
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previous crisis could discourage repeat attempts and thus tackle the moral hazard problem, 
at least as far as state-led provocations are concerned. By the same token, its efforts to 
resolve disputes could incentivize continued investment in the dispute resolution process 
by the antagonists rather than recourse to fresh crises. The U.S.’s regional interests in 
South Asia unfortunately pushed it in less desirable directions.  
India and Pakistan’s demeanor during the inter-crisis periods was even more 
destabilizing. They remained fixated on the need to reposition themselves to ‘win’ the 
next crisis iteration. Their inter-crisis choices confirm our proposition that behavior of 
antagonists in these intervening periods will be relatively more autonomous and aimed 
at undoing weaknesses exposed in previous crises. Absent the acute focus of the third 
party on their choices and the antagonists’ heightened need for positive evaluation 
associated with crisis situations, India went on making relentless promises of teaching 
Pakistan a lesson in the inter-crisis periods. It enunciated a limited war doctrine after 
Kargil and invented Cold Start after Operation Parakram’s failure. The common 
denominator was the desire to find autonomous options that could punish Pakistan 
without crossing its nuclear red lines, and in Cold Start’s case, to do so while keeping the 
third party at bay.  
 Pakistan on its part continued to enhance its nuclear capability to offset India’s 
growing conventional superiority and firmly stood behind its nuclear First-Use policy. It 
also constantly reiterated its resolve to respond with force to any Indian aggression in a 
crisis situation. Moreover, in reaction to India’s Cold Start doctrine, it accelerated its 
quest for a battlefield nuclear weapon capability. The result was Nasr, Pakistan’s tactical 
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delivery system that, by its very nature, will end up greatly weakening crisis stability in 
South Asia.11  
These factors exacerbate the underlying risks of escalation born out of the 
possibility of misperceptions, misunderstandings, and rational inconsistency problems 
associated with the trilateral framework. We highlighted these theoretical possibilities in 
chapter two and pointed to their empirical evidence in each of the case studies. 
Admittedly, the fact that crises in South Asia ultimately ended without uncontrolled 
escalation despite these pressures suggests the potency of the incentives and compulsions 
to de-escalate inherent in the brokered bargaining exercise. However, it would be a 
mistake to ignore the instability-inducing factors simply because of the relatively 
peaceful outcomes of the case studies examined here. De-escalation must not be 
considered over-determined in any comparable situation.  
II. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ‘CONFOUNDING VARIABLES’ 
That the crisis behavior at Kargil, 2001-02, and Mumbai confirmed to the 
attributes of the trilateral framework underpinning brokered bargaining has been 
established. Our depiction calls into question the efficacy of traditional nuclear crisis 
                                              
11 Nasr’s pursuit was not known when Mumbai occurred but it has since been unveiled. For a 
discussion of Nasr and its likely impact on India-Pakistan deterrence and crisis stability, see 
Rajaram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan and Adit Malhotra, “Hatf-IX/Nasr- Pakistan’s Tactical 
Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak Deterrence,” International Strategic and Security 
Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, July 2013, 
http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/R17-2013_NASR_Final.pdf. For a scorching critique 
of Pakistan’s decision to develop and test Nasr, see Ejaz Haider, “Stupidity Gone Nuclear-I,” 
Express Tribune, April 25, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/156311/stupidity-goes-nuclear--i/; 
Ejaz Haider, “Stupidity Gone Nuclear-II,” Express Tribune, April 26, 2011, 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/157064/stupidity-goes-nuclear--ii/. For the opposing view, see 
Mansoor Ahmed, “Why Pakistan Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Weekly Pulse, May 6, 2011, 
http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=563&storylist=9. 
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behavior models set in bilateral contexts as explanations for behavior of the conflicting 
parties. We now turn to tackling one other alternative explanation that seems to have 
been accepted as conventional wisdom without much inquiry: that situational factors 
specific to particular crises provide the best explanation for crisis behavior.  
Virtually all analyses since Kargil warning that the pattern of successful de-
escalation may not repeat itself in a future crisis tend to highlight changing situational 
factors to make their case. Context-specific developments in the run up to a crisis, the 
respective relations of the three parties with each other, their broader regional interests, 
the internal conditions within these countries, global priorities at the time of a crisis, 
among other such factors are seen to be driving crisis choices more than any structural 
drivers of behavior shaped through processes such as our three-cornered bargaining 
framework. The author’s interviews with Indian, Pakistani, and third party strategic 
experts confirmed the popularity of these situational factors as explanations for crisis 
behavior. 
To be sure, brokered bargaining does not stand in mutual exclusivity from these 
and other situational factors. Indeed, they are certain to influence crisis related choices 
and calculations. However, since our three-cornered bargaining exercise is envisioned as 
the primary dynamic shaping crisis behavior, if a change in any situational factor forces 
the actors to opt out of our posited framework or fundamentally alters the way the 
trilateral engagement plays out, our core argument will stand falsified. On the other hand, 
the argument will be substantiated further if we find that behavior continued to conform 
to the predictions of the model despite variance in the situational factors. We would then 
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most accurately describe situational factors as feeding into the specific crisis choices by 
the three actors but never in a manner that fundamentally alters the behavior patterns 
associated with brokered bargaining.  
Our South Asian cases spanned a decade that entailed significant variation in 
virtually all the key situational variables that could be held up as potential rival 
explanations. Moreover, our temporal examination of the same rivalry has allowed us to 
minimize background ‘noise’ and control for these ‘confounding variables’ as we 
establish the validity of our core contention in the South Asian context between 1999 and 
2009. Table 5 summarizes the variances across the situational factors we were able to 
examine. Based on these, we can reasonably conclude that brokered bargaining held 
despite varying values on the situational factors and crisis-specific contexts across our 
three case studies.
  
Table 5: Variance in Situational Factors: From Kargil to Mumbai 
Variable INDIA PAKISTAN U.S. Kargil 2001-02 Mumbai Kargil 2001-02 Mumbai Kargil 2001-02 Mumbai 
Immediate 
U.S. foreign 
policy 
interests in 
South Asia 
      Weak Very strong Very strong 
U.S. relations 
with India 
and Pakistan 
Tense Improving Very good Tense Close ally but tense 
Close ally but 
tense    
India’s pre-
crisis mindset 
Nuclear 
weapons 
seen as 
providing it 
escalation 
dominance 
Nuclear 
weapons seen 
as providing it 
escalation 
dominance but 
also seeking 
limited war 
options against 
Pakistan 
Seeking 
limited war 
options for 
swift 
retribution 
against 
Pakistan 
      
Type of 
government 
Right-of-
center 
civilian 
Right-of-
center civilian 
Left-of-
center 
civilian 
Right-of-
center 
civilian 
Military Left-of-center civilian 
Left-of-
center 
civilian 
Neo-
conserva
-tive 
civilian 
Neo-
conservat-
ive civilian 
“Issue 
competition” 
for third party 
      Modest Very high Very High  
Status of 
government 
Caretaker/ 
elections 
imminent 
Secure Anticipating election 
Ostensibly 
secure Secure 
Weak but 
secure Secure Secure Lame duck 
State of civil-
military 
relations in 
Pakistan 
   Very tense Military dominated Complementary    
Head of 
government  
Same as 
previous crisis 
Different 
from  
Different 
from 
Different from 
previous crisis  
Different 
from 
Same as 
previous 456 
  
Variable INDIA PAKISTAN U.S. Kargil 2001-02 Mumbai Kargil 2001-02 Mumbai Kargil 2001-02 Mumbai 
previous 
crisis 
previous 
crisis 
previous 
crisis 
crisis 
Third party’s 
concern about 
internal 
weakness of 
the state 
Low None None Medium Medium Very high    
State of the 
economy Average Improving Very strong Poor Improving Poor    
Pakistan’s 
effort to 
distance itself 
from the 
crisis trigger 
   Failed Succeeded Succeeded    
Level of 
satisfaction 
with brokered 
bargaining in 
the crisis 
High Low Low Low Modest Modest High High High 
 KARGIL 2001-02 MUMBAI 
Type of crisis 
trigger 
Major provocation in remote area with 
disputed possession Significant provocation in ‘core’ Huge provocation in ‘core’ 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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The third party intervened with an identical objective in all three crises even 
though the decade from Kargil to Mumbai saw a massive change in direct U.S. policy 
interests in the South Asian region. The U.S. involved itself as a ‘power mediator’ at a 
time when its policy of ambivalence towards South Asia was still largely intact as well as 
after the region had become one of, if not the, principal foreign policy concerns for it. 
The swiftness with which it involved itself increased with every crisis but this is 
attributable more to the lessons it learnt in terms of the importance of its presence at the 
front end of crises than to the changing nature of its involvement in the region.  
The model also holds the test of variance in terms of the state of U.S’s bilateral 
relations with the antagonists. It intervened to affect de-escalation at a time when its 
relations with Islamabad were all but non-existent (Kargil) and when it was ostensibly a 
frontline ally (2001-02 and Mumbai). U.S. relations with India also underwent a sea 
change after 9/11. India was still invested in its “fetish of bilateralism”12 when Kargil 
erupted but there had been a significant increase in mutual trust between the two sides by 
the time Mumbai occurred. The U.S.’s demeanor across the three crisis iterations 
however remained decidedly focused on de-escalation.  
The role of other third parties in support of the U.S. is also instructive. Crisis 
diplomacy featured third party actors with good ties with both antagonists as well as 
those who clearly preferred one conflicting party over the other. Arguably the most 
revealing was China’s neutrality despite its considerably partisan stance on the India-
Pakistan rivalry. Its position at Kargil was especially unexpected given that its ties with 
                                              
12 P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: 
American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 218. 
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India were extremely strained at the time. While everyone expected it to take Pakistan’s 
side, in reality, the fundamentally different set of compulsions for third party actors in 
middle power nuclear crises forced it to play the middle.13 Equally, few would have 
expected China to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the U.S.14 in its crisis management 
efforts through the decade under study despite its positional competition with 
Washington and opposition to U.S. ingress into its South Asian backyard. The crisis 
intervention of other third parties also remained fixated on the de-escalation agenda 
across the three crises irrespective of the nature of their relationships with India, Pakistan, 
and the U.S.  
Decision making dominated by regional interest or state of bilateral relations 
could easily have led the U.S. to adopt a much less favorable stance towards India at 
Kargil and an outright supportive one at Mumbai. Similarly, Pakistan’s inability to 
extract greater benefits in 2001-02 despite its pivotal role in Afghanistan cannot be easily 
explained through a typical foreign policy lens. To be sure, the U.S. was consumed by 
trying to dovetail its regional interests with the de-escalation objective during the twin 
peaks and Mumbai crises – we have noted U.S. policy makers’ constant concern about 
the fallout of Indian and Pakistani crisis behavior on the Afghanistan situation – but these 
concerns were never pursued at the cost of the most immediate objective of de-escalation. 
                                              
13 Kargil being the first nuclear crisis since the end of the Cold War, initial concerns, even in 
Washington, related to Pakistan’s propensity to reach out to China and other patrons like the Gulf 
states to seek support to offset possible Indian outreach to Russia and Israel. Bruce Riedel, 
“American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced 
Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002, 3-4.  
14 Michael Krepon, “Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences,” in Crises in 
South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences, eds., Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn 
(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2011), 21. 
460 
 
As illustrated in the case studies, the fact that the Indo-U.S. relationship gained 
tremendously from the Kargil experience, that their law enforcement cooperation 
blossomed courtesy of the Mumbai experience, or that Pakistan was consistently allowed 
to escape crises with insignificant or partial retribution were collateral spinoffs from 
Washington’s crisis diplomacy and not primary concerns during the crisis itself. 
In terms of broader foreign policy asks of the principal antagonists, the third 
party’s approach was equally consistent. Its inherent inability to back one or the other 
side at the cost of their adversary’s isolation led it to appease both sides on these deeper 
concerns during crises but just enough to further the de-escalation agenda. Ultimately, 
neither did the U.S. back Pakistan’s revisionist position on Kashmir in any crisis nor did 
it second India’s contention that Pakistan’s support to terrorism justified unilateral Indian 
action or Pakistan’s total diplomatic isolation. Instead, the U.S. soothed Pakistan by 
promising to nudge India to initiate dialogue on Kashmir at Kargil and 2001-02 and 
promised India in each crisis that it would keep pressuring Pakistan to permanently cease 
anti-India terrorism. While it wished for both to occur, it was unable to invest in either 
with any sense of urgency once the immediate crisis at hand was over. 
India and Pakistan’s own inclinations to engage in the trilateral framework also 
seem unaffected by their relationship with the U.S. or their experience with brokered 
bargaining in the previous crisis iterations. For Pakistan to continue engaging a third 
party that is seen as a potential aggressor against its nuclear assets, both at a time when 
bilateral ties were all but nonexistent and when it was ostensibly a front line ally, is 
counterintuitive to say the least. It can only be attributed to the compulsion of a second 
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age nuclear power embroiled in a crisis situation not to ignore the presence of the global 
hegemon. India’s outreach to the third party at Kargil when it was strictly wedded to a 
bilateral approach vis-à-vis Pakistan and when the distrust in the U.S. was significantly 
higher than in later years was equally surprising.  
To be sure, our case studies have highlighted India and Pakistan’s acute 
awareness of the leverage situational factors accorded them in the studied crises. Both 
sought to use it relentlessly. For Pakistan, this meant threatening to divert its attention 
from its western border in 2001-02 and Mumbai. Indian efforts were signified by 
attempts to tie anti-India militancy emanating from Pakistan to the War on Terror during 
the standoff and Mumbai and to leverage its improved relations with the U.S. during 
these crises. In no instance however did either side allow these attempts to undermine 
their quest for positive evaluation, much less force the third party’s hand to side with 
their adversary.   
Moreover, the third party’s propensity to force the antagonists to exit the crisis 
with their objectives only partially fulfilled meant that neither of them left any of the 
three crises fully satisfied. Pakistan exited Kargil seething with discontent. It was India’s 
turn to be relatively more disappointed in 2001-02 although Pakistan was not fully 
satisfied either. Yet, neither side showed any hesitance to engage the U.S. in the crises 
that followed. Not only that but India shed its pre-crisis resolve to undo Pakistan’s  
ability to go unpunished each time, even incurring significant reputational costs in the 
process. As puzzling as it is from a classic nuclear crisis behavior prism, India continued 
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to prize positive evaluation over establishing the credibility of its deterrent and of its 
resolve to employ force.  
Next, there were significant changes within India and Pakistan and in their 
respective global statures between 1999 and 2008. There was variation in the political 
factors potentially relevant to crisis decision making. India saw a nationalist, right wing 
BJP lead it during the Kargil and 2001-02 crises and a left-of-center Congress 
government do so during Mumbai. Moreover, in two of the three crisis iterations, national 
elections were scheduled within a few months of the crisis’s onset. In fact, at Kargil, the 
Vajpayee government was acting as a de facto caretaker set up.15 In Pakistan, we saw 
both civilian and military-led regimes at the helm across the three crises and within the 
civilian enclave, a right-of-center Nawaz Sharif government with a secure mandate ruled 
during Kargil while a considerably weaker left-of-center Zardari-led coalition was in 
power during the Mumbai crisis. The contrast in the state of civil-military relations in 
Pakistan from crisis to crisis was also stark: an active civil-military tussle colored Kargil; 
the civilian domain was completely irrelevant during 2001-02; and the civilian and 
military enclaves adopted a more or less complementary stance during the 2008 iteration.  
None of these variations seem to have affected India and Pakistan’s propensity to 
engage in the three-cornered framework or their crisis decisions fundamentally. This is 
despite the fact that these factors are expected to induce different levels of sensitivity to 
audience costs, and in turn, affect the inclination of actors to engage third parties which 
                                              
15 Prime Minister Vajpayee’s government had lost a vote of confidence in the parliament shortly 
before Kargil and was thus bound to hold elections in the coming months. “Vajpayee Loses 
Confidence Vote by 1 Vote,” Rediff, April 17, 1999, 
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/apr/17vote.htm. 
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force them to recalibrate the balance between resolve and prudence in their crisis 
behavior.16 For instance, a civilian government seeking re-election or one seen as dovish 
on foreign policy is likely to be far more concerned about satisfying public pressure than 
say a military government or a civilian government with established nationalist 
credentials. Indeed, this makes Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s restraint at 
Mumbai that much more remarkable. Interestingly, it was so surprising that many policy 
experts in India and even in the U.S. attributed New Delhi’s behavior primarily to his 
personality.17 In essence, the argument prizes leaders’ qualities and inclinations over 
constraints imposed on their choices by the brokered bargaining framework.18 While 
Prime Minister Singh’s personal attributes must have played a role, the fact that India 
engaged in the posited crisis behavior despite the very different personalities and 
constituency requirements of Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Singh suggests that 
leadership alone cannot explain crisis dynamics across the three case studies. In reality, 
evidence from South Asia suggests that all leaders have tended to see domestic audience 
costs similarly. They have pointed to the compulsions domestic pressures create primarily 
                                              
16 For more discussion of audience costs and their relative importance in various political contexts, 
see Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” The American 
Political Science Review 92, 4 (December 1998): 829-44. Also see James D. Fearon, “Domestic 
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science 
Review 88, 3 (September 1994): 577-92. 
17 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management After The 
2008 Mumbai Attacks,” Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2012, 66; author’s discussions with 
Indian interviewees. 
18 The debate about the influence of individual leaders on international politics is an old one. The 
prevalent view prizes situational constraints on individuals with decision making authority to 
downplay the difference a particular leader can make. For a discussion on the influence of 
leaders, see Robert Jervis, “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know,” Security Studies, 22, 
2 (2013): 153-79. There have however been significant challenges to the dominant view on this 
issue. See for example, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: 
Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, 4 (Spring 2001): 107-46. 
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as a tool to attract greater third party support and to let off steam by raising the rhetoric 
but ultimately they have had little trouble in overcoming them to pursue choices that 
valued positive evaluation vis-à-vis the third party ahead of satisfying domestic 
evaluation concerns.   
Political factors also varied in the U.S. during the period in question. Washington 
had a relatively secure Democratic President during Kargil and a neo-conservative 
Republican President during the next two crises. Moreover, while relatively new to office 
during the 2001-02 standoff, President Bush had been at the helm for eight years when 
Mumbai occurred. However, he was also a ‘lame duck’ President at the time given that 
his successor had been elected and was to take office less than two months after the crisis 
erupted.19 As crisis managers, the Clinton and Bush administrations also had to deal 
with different kinds of competing global and domestic priorities like the Balkans war and 
U.N. sanctions on Iraq in 1999, the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan in 2001-02, and the 
ongoing Afghanistan and Iraq wars internationally and the Thanks Giving break 
domestically during Mumbai. The U.S. administrations’ propensity to involve themselves 
as a key ingredient of crisis management with de-escalation as the primary objective 
despite these variations lends further credence to our thesis. It also points to the 
consistency in third party roles irrespective of “issue competition.”20  
                                              
19 U.S. elections were held on November 4, 2008 and Barack Obama was set to take over the 
Presidency of the United States in January 2009. Mumbai therefore occurred at a period of 
Presidential transition in the U.S. Nayak and Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis,” 2. 
20 The term “issue competition” has been used by Nayak and Krepon (2012) to highlighting the 
possible pressure of competing priorities on U.S. policy makers when a crisis erupts in South 
Asia. Ibid., 64. 
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The widely divergent and changing internal trajectories of India and Pakistan 
between Kargil and Mumbai also eliminate domestic security and economic health as 
primary explanations for crisis behavior. Both countries transformed on these counts. 
India exhibited greater control over its internal situation and became one of the world’s 
fastest growing economies deeply engaged in expanding business and economic ties with 
the world’s powers. Pakistan, on the other hand, went from being a relatively peaceful 
state to an excessively violent one that worried the world about its potential collapse. Its 
weakness also meant much greater dependence on external economic support. 
Interestingly, both India’s rise and growing integration in the global economy and 
Pakistan’s economic weakness and consequent need for foreign assistance made them 
more sensitive to third party preferences. The costs of defying the third party seem to be 
directly proportional to the dependence on global economic relationships and both good 
performance and a weak economy tend to increase this. On the other hand, Pakistan’s 
growing political and institutional weakness and global concern about the safety and 
security of its nuclear arsenal may have forced the third parties (or for that matter even 
India) to take a relatively softer approach towards it at Mumbai. As ought to be clear 
from the Mumbai case study however, there is no indication that this undermined the 
primacy of the three-cornered bargaining engagement.  
There were also marked differences in the specific circumstances surrounding 
each of the three crises. We are able to confirm the framework’s relevance across 
situations where the crisis trigger is a major provocation in the victim’s heartland versus 
instigation in a peripheral region with disputed possession. Pakistan’s ability to bank on 
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plausible deniability also varied: it was much more successful at holding it up during the 
2001-02 standoff and Mumbai than at Kargil. This is an important observation since the 
validity of our suggested framework transcends situations involving non-state actors or 
other circumstances that may allow a state to distance itself from a crisis-triggering event. 
Even though the fact that the U.S. came down hard on Pakistan at Kargil and less so in 
the other two crises could conceivably be seen as a function of Pakistan’s clear 
identification as the aggressor in the 1999 iteration, our analysis of the case studies has 
clearly established that the third party used Pakistan’s plausible deniability to further the 
de-escalation agenda in 2001-02 and Mumbai. Otherwise, the third party could easily 
have used circumstantial evidence, particularly at Mumbai, to corner Pakistan. The U.S. 
chose not to do so given that it would logically have forced it to back India firmly, 
thereby risking emboldening it and/or panicking Pakistani decision makers.  
The South Asian experience with brokered bargaining ultimately shows that once 
a crisis is triggered, the dynamic process underpinning the posited framework forces the 
interaction among the three parties to play out in a rather predictable manner. Specific 
crisis choices may depend on a number of structural and situational factors but the 
limitations imposed by the process forces the actors to make rational choices that lead to 
expected behavior patterns irrespective of the particular context of the crisis. 
Finally, one relevant, cross-cutting argument often made in Indian strategic circles 
merits a response: that India was never serious about aggressing against Pakistan in the 
two crises that saw no armed confrontation, twin peaks and Mumbai. Four types of 
arguments are forwarded to justify this: India lacked political will on both occasions; it 
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did not have military options that could ensure a permanent end to sub-conventional 
provocations from Pakistan and thus aggression was not worth the risk; it had gained 
tremendously in terms of stature by showing restraint and painting Pakistan as the 
reckless party in the previous crisis; and specifically at Mumbai, its worry about 
Pakistan’s weakness and the possibility of its civilian government’s collapse held it 
back.21 In as much as these are a function of leadership qualities, options for punishment 
available in a particular situation, perceived gains from past crisis experiences, and the 
level of internal stability in the adversary’s country, they are relevant to the foregoing 
discussion.   
Some of these arguments are more easily dismissed than others based on evidence 
presented in our case studies. The more important point to note however is that even if 
taken at face value, this line of thinking only strengthens our core contention. If an 
antagonist is voluntarily resorting to diplomacy – whether due to lack of will, because it 
finds it rewarding, or it is concerned about the implications of escalation for the 
adversary’s internal health – over functions of force, it implies a de facto triggering of our 
three-cornered bargaining framework. As for not having military options commensurate 
with crisis objectives that are insulated from risks of escalation to the nuclear level, it is 
hard to imagine any nuclear context fulfilling this benchmark. As illustrated by the U.S.’s 
virtually unsolicited interventions in South Asian crises studied here, the third party’s 
preexisting concerns about nuclear crisis management among middle powers imply an 
extremely low risk threshold for it to feel compelled to intervene. Any crisis in a nuclear 
                                              
21 Author’s summation based on his interviews with Indian interviewees.  
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environment with plausible use of force options and even a modest possibility of their 
employment is likely to satisfy this condition and thereby trigger brokered bargaining.  
III. THE FUTURE OF BROKERED BARGAINING:  SOUTH ASIA AND 
BEYOND 
Having established brokered bargaining as the primary crisis behavior dynamic in 
the first decade of overt nuclearization in South Asia, we now turn to examining the 
potential for the model to predict future behavior, both in the India-Pakistan context and 
beyond.  
1. The Next India-Pakistan Crisis: Will Brokered Bargaining Hold? 
There is little to suggest that India-Pakistan crises are a thing of the past. For 
India, Mumbai is still unfinished business. The trials of the Mumbai accused in Pakistan 
are nowhere near completion and Indian leaders firmly believe that the Pakistani state is 
deliberately stalling the process to let its militant proxies off the hook.22  By the same 
token, Kashmir remains unresolved. There has been no major breakthrough on the issue 
since Mumbai. The potential for the two sides to fall into a fresh crisis was all too evident 
in two separate episodes in January and August 2013. Both were triggered by incidents 
involving killings of Indian and Pakistani soldiers on the LoC.  Expectedly, the two sides 
blamed each other for the events. Hawkish statements and media hype in both countries 
                                              
22 Suhasini Haider, “26/11 Mumbai Attacks: 5 Years on, Trial in Pakistan has Barely Moved,” 
IBN Live, November 26, 2013, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/2611-mumbai-attacks-5-years-on-trial-
in-pakistan-has-barely-moved/436165-3-237.html; Daniel Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-
Pakistani Escalation,” Council on Foreign Relations, Contingency Planning Memorandum 6, 
January 2010, 1. For a classic Indian nationalist view on Pakistan’s outlook towards India at 
present, see Radha Kumar, “Renewing an India-Pakistan Peace Process?” The Hindu, November 
16, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/renewing-an-indiapakistan-peace-
process/article5355247.ece. 
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quickly ratcheted up tensions.23 The situation was diffused by some ardent statesmanship 
in each case but it left observers with little confidence that a repeat will not land these 
two rivals in a major crisis. Not to mention, the threat of non-state actors succeeding in 
carrying out another Mumbai-type attack cannot be ruled out. Nor for that matter can the 
possibility of a Hindu-extremist outfit avenging their Pakistani nemesis’ past actions by 
targeting Pakistani territory.  
Will brokered bargaining characterize crisis behavior next time? Commentaries 
and analyses since Mumbai are overwhelmingly skeptical.24 The feeling is that India tried 
the indirect diplomatic route in Mumbai but yet again, it failed to achieve any permanent 
gains.25 It may therefore resort to its “Proactive Defense Strategy” – a new name for Cold 
Start – or conduct surgical air strikes on terrorist camps to inflict quick and limited pain 
on Pakistan before the third party can intervene.26 The burden of reputational costs, both 
due to domestic political pressure and the accumulated history of India’s inability to 
establish the credibility of its deterrent will be too huge to ignore next time, goes the 
argument. The author certainly found this view to be prevalent during his interviews with 
                                              
23 Baqir S. Syed and Jawed Naqvi, “India Accused of Levelling Allegation to Cover Up its 
Violation of LoC,” Dawn, January 9, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/news/777340/india-accused-
of-levelling-allegation-to-cover-up-its-violation-of-loc; Anwar Iqbal, “US Conducted ‘Intensive 
Counseling’ during LoC Crisis,” Dawn, February 3, 2013, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/783359/us-conducted-intensive-counselling-during-loc-crisis; 
“Unnecessary Indian Allegations to Undermine Peace Efforts: Nisar,” The News, August 7, 2013, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-112794-Unnecessary-Indian-allegations-to-undermine-peace-
efforts:-Nisar; “Army Officers in Hotline Contact to Ease Tension,” Dawn, August 8, 2013, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/1034786/army-officers-in-hotline-contact-to-ease-tension. 
24 For a brief discussion of factors that may make the next crisis different, see Nayak and Krepon, 
“The Unfinished Crisis,” 63- 69. 
25 Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,” 2. 
26 Vinod A. Kumar, “A Cold Start: India’s Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict,” 
Strategic Analysis 33, 2 (2009): 326. 
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the Indian strategic elite. Indeed, the acute Indian discontent with the third party’s role in 
crisis management was quite striking for a country whose ties with the U.S. have 
otherwise blossomed in recent years. Third party interlocutors also tend to agree. A U.S. 
diplomat’s statement quoted by Nayak and Krepon (2012) captures the sentiment aptly: 
“Back then, the Indians thought that we had some influence. They don’t think that 
anymore.”27 Interestingly, some key former officials in Pakistan also believe they will see 
Indian aggression next time irrespective of the third party’s preferences.28  
In terms of how the crisis will progress, escalation is considered likelier than in 
the past.29 A number of simulation exercises have been conducted in recent years, 
virtually all of which predict an escalated India-Pakistan war and a readying of nuclear 
forces during the crisis.30 An Indian act of aggression is believed to be likely to see a 
Pakistani response in kind.31 The precise reaction could entail proportional or 
disproportional use of force;32 its goal would be to force the third party’s hand to seek 
immediate cessation of hostilities. In either case, a brinkmanship exercise involving full-
fledged mobilization could ensue.   
                                              
27 Nayak and Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis,” 67. 
28 This seemed to be a near consensus in the author’s interviews with former Pakistani military 
officials and diplomats. 
29 Krepon, “Crises in South Asia,” 22-24; Nayak and Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis;” Markey, 
“Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation.” For one scenario of what the next crisis may look 
like,  see Moeed Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider: Implications for Escalation Control in South 
Asia,” Arms Control Today 41, 5 (June 2011): 23-25. 
30 For one example of a recent simulation exercise commissioned by the U.S. government and 
conducted under the auspices of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, see Feroz 
H. Khan and Ryan W. French, “South Asian Stability Workshop: A Crisis Simulation Exercise,” 
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD, Report No. 2013-008, October 
2013. 
31 Srinath Raghavan, “Terror, Force and Diplomacy,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, 49 
December 6-12, 2008): 10. 
32 Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,” 2. 
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Even if taken as an accurate description of the next crisis, none of these concerns 
fundamentally alter the necessary conditions for our trilateral bargaining framework to be 
able to shape crisis dynamics. For one, perhaps the biggest contribution of such 
predictions and concerns is to heighten the third party’s worries even further. Relevant 
U.S. agencies regularly sponsor crisis simulations to map possible trajectories of future 
India-Pakistan crises; their grim results can only reinforce the number one lesson 
Washington has drawn from its experience with South Asian nuclear crises to date: the 
environment remains highly unstable and prone to escalation and that this makes the third 
party’s role absolutely crucial. If anything, the third party may now be prompted to 
intervene with even more conviction to trigger brokered bargaining. A glimpse of its 
future response was provided by its immediate involvement in the January and August 
2013 episodes even though tension levels were modest at best. The U.S. was reported to 
have been engaged in “intensive counseling” of both antagonists;33 U.S. officials were 
busy building pressure on India to “ratchet down tensions with Pakistan;”34 and the U.S. 
was once again seen shying away from backing Indian allegations that the Pakistani 
military had deliberately instigated the killings of its soldiers on the LoC.35  
As for India, the very same compulsions that led it to engage in the bargaining 
exercise in past crises will be at play again. Moreover, despite the operationalization of 
the Proactive Defense Strategy, no Indian military option is either totally free of 
                                              
33 Iqbal, “US Conducted ‘Intensive Counselling’.” 
34 Anurag Kotoky and Katherine Houreld, “Indian Government Under Fire Over Handling of 
Border Attack,” Reuters, August 7, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/uk-india-
pakistan-idUKBRE97608G20130807. 
35 Anwar Iqbal, “US Avoids Blaming Pakistan for LoC Flare-up,” Dawn, August 8, 2013, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/1034803/us-avoids-blaming-pakistan-for-loc-flare-up. 
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escalatory potential or commensurate with its goal of compelling Pakistan to permanently 
cease activities of anti-India militants operating from its soil. The first implies 
disapproval of the third party and the second takes away the utility of aggressing – much 
the same story as Mumbai.  
For the sake of argument however, let us examine the case believed to be most 
likely to undermine brokered bargaining. Assume that India-U.S. relations have taken 
another quantum leap by the time the next crisis erupts and U.S.-Pakistan ties have 
deteriorated further. India therefore takes heart from this fact, assumes that the U.S. will 
now be willing to back its case, and that therefore the marginal loss to its ‘evaluation’ 
will not be significant if it inflicts quick and limited retribution on Pakistan before the 
third party can intervene.  
Let us play the scenario out. India conducts a surgical strike against Pakistan. 
Pakistan will quickly declare itself the ‘victim’ for the third party’s consumption and 
immediately prepare to launch a response shot. Indian leaders will have little control over 
Pakistan’s decision at this point. Their obvious recourse will be to threaten massive 
retaliation and prepare for escalation and simultaneously plead with the third party to 
intervene to prevent Pakistan’s use of force. Three-cornered bargaining would have been 
triggered, albeit now leaving a much tougher crisis management challenge for the third 
party.36  
Ironically, even though our posited framework would hold its explanatory power 
if India fired the first shot at Pakistan, there are strong disincentives for the actors to 
                                              
36 For a more detailed discussion of this scenario, see Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider,” 23-25.  
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allow this scenario to play out. Washington’s knowledge of this dangerous dynamic will 
force it to go to lengths to convince New Delhi that it will not condone Indian aggression 
in a crisis with Pakistan. Without guaranteed U.S. support, Indian leaders will be left in a 
quandary since the success of their aggression in this hypothetical crisis will be 
predicated on the third party’s ability to prevent a Pakistani response in kind. As soon as 
Pakistan reacts to an Indian strike, the equation will be back to square one from India’s 
perspective. The Indian effort to prove that its military option has not been foreclosed by 
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and that it could compel Pakistan to act against anti-India 
militants present on its soil would stand neutralized. In fact, the credibility of the Indian 
deterrent would take a greater hit than in the previous crises as Pakistan would have 
demonstrated that it retains the upper hand even in a one-shot (or for that matter any 
configuration which ends with equal number of tit-for-tat strikes) confrontation. 37As a 
result, Indian threats of a surgical strike in the next crisis ought to ring hollow unless 
decision makers in New Delhi are willing to escalate the crisis further. This will require 
outright defiance of the third party irrespective of the state of Indo-U.S. bilateral relations. 
These are much the same calculations that led Indian leaders to contract out its crisis 
diplomacy to the U.S. at Mumbai. 
2. Conventional and Nuclear Modernization and the Future of Brokered 
Bargaining in South Asia 
One other aspect with regard to the applicability of brokered bargaining in South 
Asia merits attention. This relates to the framework’s temporal validity, specifically the 
                                              
37 Ibid., 24. 
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potential implications of induction of new technologies and continued modernization of 
South Asian conventional and nuclear arsenals for the nature of crises and crisis 
behavior.38  
Experts examining the future remain rightly concerned about negative trends in 
strategic stability as India and Pakistan amass larger arsenals and platforms that will 
affect their doctrines, postures, and thresholds. The most likely trend will see Pakistan 
lose further ground to India in the conventional military realm. This may raise its 
insecurities and force it to rely more heavily on its nuclear capability.39 A plausible 
scenario entails Pakistan’s move from a ‘recessed’ to mated or even launch-on-warning 
posture. If reaction times get further compressed in crisis time, it may even consider pre-
delegation of launch authority to field commanders.40 Moreover, both countries are 
already pursuing triads.41 The sea-based deterrent’s operationalization will amount to 
permanent deployment of the arsenal by both sides. India’s interest in developing a 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability will leave Pakistan at an even greater 
disadvantage and force it to strengthen its own offensive capabilities.42 The command 
                                              
38 For a brief discussion of induction of new technologies in South Asia and its impact on 
deterrence and crisis stability, see Moeed Yusuf, “Deterrence and Crisis Stability: Current 
Prognosis and Future Prospects,” Center on Contemporary Conflict, January 2012, 7-11, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142893. 
39 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 198; Vipin Narang, “Posturing 
for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, 3 
(Winter 2009-10): 73-76. 
40 Narang, “Posturing for Peace?” 75; Feroz H. Khan and Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan: The 
Dilemma of Nuclear Deterrence,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st 
Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 228. 
41 Yusuf, “Deterrence and Crisis Stability,” 10. 
42 For a pessimist take on implications of BMD for Pakistan, see Moeed Yusuf and Khalid 
Banuri, “India’s Quest for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Slippery Slope,” in South Asia at a 
Crossroads: Conflict or Cooperation in the Age of Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Space 
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and control and safety and security challenges will increase astronomically for both sides. 
Further instability will be introduced as counter-force targeting enters the mix43 and 
cruise missiles with precision capabilities become the norm in an environment with 
extremely short flight times.44 Any gains from the likely improvement in the 
dependability and safety of the next generation of weapon systems, the lesser concerns 
about preemption associated with larger arsenals, assured second strike capabilities 
through sea-based platforms, and any potential progress in instituting bilateral escalation 
control mechanisms will be more than offset by these worrying trends.  
Two observations are pertinent with regard to the efficacy of brokered bargaining 
in crisis situations in this transformed environment. First, in as far as these developments 
will exacerbate risks, there will be a commensurate increase in third party concerns. This 
will make them even more adamant to intervene in crises. Incidentally, it will be true not 
only for the U.S. but even more so for actors like China with contiguity to India and 
Pakistan.45 Second, deployed arsenals will make the third party’s task far more 
challenging: the time available to external actors to intervene before the capability of 
using nuclear weapons is readied will now equal zero. This will be a radical departure 
                                                                                                                                      
Rivalries, eds. Subrata Ghoshroy and Gotz Neuneck (Hamburg: Nomos, 2010), 103-10. Also see 
Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in 
South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 87-91. 
43 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 88. 
44 Rajesh M. Basrur, South Asia’s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Contemporary 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2008), 73. 
45 As discussed in our case studies, China’s crisis diplomacy during the overt nuclearization phase 
in South Asia has increasingly been fixated on ensuring the stability of nuclear deterrence 
between India and Pakistan to ensure the absence of crisis escalation above all else. Swaran 
Singh, “The China Factor in South Asia’s Nuclear Deterrence,” in The India-Pakistan Nuclear 
Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, ed. E. Sridharan (New Delhi: 
Routledge, 2007), 298-99. With contiguity to both India and Pakistan, this is certain to be a 
permanent policy preference for Beijing. 
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from the current situation where the escalation ladder is elongated courtesy of recessed 
nuclear postures. The risks entailed in misperceptions and miscalculations about the third 
party’s intentions by the antagonists or vice versa will be astronomically higher in this 
futuristic scenario. If anything, brokered bargaining will be further cemented at the core 
of South Asian nuclear crisis behavior. Incidentally, our model’s applicability to this 
scenario points to its validity in situations where some semblance of conventional 
deterrence holds – this represents the India-Pakistan equation to date –46 as well in 
contexts where the conventional disparity is acute and one of the adversaries is forced to 
rely heavily on its nuclear capability as its frontline deterrent. 
3. Looking Beyond South Asia 
We noted that brokered bargaining continued to shape crisis behavior despite 
variance in situational factors that could otherwise be seen as drivers of crisis choices 
across the three South Asian case studies. We have now also established its continued 
applicability to a much transformed South Asia in the years ahead. Next, we turn to 
examining the validity of the framework in other contexts. What cases beyond the India-
Pakistan dyad may replicate crisis behavior dynamics typical of brokered bargaining?  
                                              
46 India and Pakistan represent a pair where both sides have treated their conventional deterrents 
as their first line of defense. Pakistan’s ardent struggle to maintain a robust conventional defense 
capability has been driven solely by this goal. In recent years, India’s advantages have grown 
tremendously but the force structures, postures, and terrain advantages have still left the Pakistani 
conventional deterrent strong enough to make an Indian military victory extremely costly. 
Pakistani forces are likely to be able to hold their own in a short war and even gain advantage at 
strategic points of vulnerability for India but there is little doubt that it would be decisively 
defeated in a full-scale conventional war. S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 50-53. Also 
see Christopher Clary, “Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South 
Asia,” in Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon and 
Julia Thompson (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2013), 135-60.  
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The South Asian crises have played out in a context where non-state actors have 
been active in triggering crises, where this fact has allowed Pakistan to seek to establish 
plausible deniability in every crisis, and where the real concern has been unwanted 
escalation from the sub-conventional to the conventional and on to the nuclear levels.47 
None of these are however necessary conditions for crisis behavior to conform to the 
three-cornered bargaining framework. The model will hold irrespective of whether non-
state actors are present or whether plausible deniability is attempted in a crisis situation. 
Similarly, as long as a crisis is deemed to have escalatory potential by the antagonists and 
key third party actors, the trilateral framework would be triggered regardless of the 
anticipated path of escalation.  
Our trilateral framework applies to middle powers that have recognized nuclear 
capabilities and are nested within an intentional structure with stronger hegemons who 
intervene in crisis situations with non-competitive goals. There is no existing nuclear pair 
among second age nuclear powers apart from India and Pakistan that fully meets the 
delimitations of our model. A number of potential future rivalries however make this 
undertaking valuable beyond just the India-Pakistan dyad.  
The prospects for horizontal nuclear proliferation are unfortunately not unrealistic. 
The “nth country” proliferation problem has always remained a matter of concern for the 
pioneer nuclear states and their worries have only grown since the end of the Cold War. 
While testifying to the U.S. Senate in 2003, CIA Director George Tenet aptly summed up 
                                              
47 On the possibilities of escalation in South Asian crises and the centrality of escalation control, 
see Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, eds., Escalation Control and the 
Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004). 
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the sentiment that pervades Western policy thinking on the issue: “Additional countries 
may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional 
rivals are doing so. The ‘domino theory’ of the 21st century may well be nuclear.”48 
The author has previously catalogued predictions about horizontal proliferation 
since the beginning of the atomic age and found the domino effect thesis to be extremely 
potent, even if exaggerated.49 A number of chain scenarios have been sketched.50 A 
Middle Eastern chain is most often cited whereby Iranian nuclearization would prompt its 
Arab neighbors, principally Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to follow suit. Israel would 
potentially declare its hitherto covert nuclear status at this point. An Eastern chain 
including North Korea, Japan and South Korea is also considered plausible. In addition, a 
third domino chain could be triggered by a tit-for-tat India-Pakistan arms race that could 
force China to proliferate vertically and for Iran to reconsider its position, in turn leading 
the Middle Eastern powers and Taiwan to reconsider their stances.  
Another recent concern is the weakness of the global non-proliferation regime.51 
The U.S.’s move to set the precedent for supplying dual-use technology to NPT non-
members has not only opened avenues for India to acquire nuclear technology from 
multiple suppliers but countries like Pakistan have also intensified their efforts to seek 
                                              
48 Senate Select Intelligence Committee, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the 
United States: Hearing Before the Committee on Intelligence,” Senate Hearing 108-161, 108th 
Congress, 1 Session, February 11, 2003, 28.  
49 See Moeed Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of Future of Nuclear Weapons,” The 
Brookings Institution, Policy Paper 11, January 2009. 
50 Ibid., 36-41; Joseph Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” Foreign Policy 118 
(Spring 2000): 120-36. 
51 Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: 
Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2004), 23-24. 
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assistance from their patrons – in this case China.52 A number of other countries 
including energy-rich Middle Eastern states have shown surprisingly high interest in 
nuclear energy.53 This has raised grave concerns given that civilian nuclear power 
generation capacity can produce positive spinoffs for weapons programs; for some, the 
supply of these sensitive nuclear materials puts states a “screwdriver’s turn” away from 
converting the knowhow into a weapons capability.54  
Alagappa (2008) notes that nuclear weapons are already becoming a central 
element of national security of a number of Asian states, even to tackle weak and isolated 
adversaries in limited crisis situations.55 North Korea has already crossed the Rubicon; 
states like Iran are alleged to be pursuing a capability;56 its rivals like Saudi Arabia are 
                                              
52 Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation,” 43; Chris Buckley, “Behind the Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear 
Deal,” The New York Times, November 27, 2013, 
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/behind-the-chinese-pakistani-nuclear-
deal/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2. For an excellent analysis of the dangers of the Indo-U.S. 
nuclear deal, see George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Policy 
Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2005, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf. Also see “Issues and Questions on 
July 18 Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India” (letter to Members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, November 18, 2005), 
http://www.nci.org/06nci/04/20051118_India_Ltr_Congress.pdf. 
53 Just in 2007, when Iran’s nuclear program was being hotly debated, as many as 13 Middle 
Eastern/North African states expressed interest in pursuing nuclear energy. While the official 
rationale was a quest for peaceful nuclear energy production, most suspected that the move was 
driven due to fears of a maturing Iranian nuclear capability, and thus with an eventual intent of 
developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Dan Murphy, “Middle East Racing to 
Nuclear Power,” The Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 2007, 
http://www.scmonitor.com/2007/1101/p01s03-wome.html. 
54 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 107. 
55 Muthiah Alagappa, “Nuclear Weapons and National Security: Far-Reaching Influence and 
Deterrence Dominance,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century 
Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 484. 
56 For a collection of articles on Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon and the international 
community’s engagement on the issue, see Gideon Rose and Jonathan Tepperman, eds., Iran and 
the Bomb: Solving the Persian Puzzle (New York.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). 
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rumored to be seeking assistance from Pakistan;57 and others like U.S.’s North East Asian 
allies have long-existed under its formal extended deterrence security umbrellas. 
Our model will have implications for adversaries in each of the three domino 
‘chains’ mentioned above – Middle East, South Asia-China-Middle East; and East Asia – 
to varying degrees. Each of these also represents a different prototype in terms of the 
relations between the antagonists in question and the hegemonic third party. Below, we 
examine each in turn.  
A. Prototype 1: Crisis Between two Friends of the Principal Third Party 
The Middle Eastern chain is considered most likely to materialize. There are two 
types of nuclear adversaries likely to emerge from the region. The best fit for our model 
are potential crises between states with relatively positive relations with the U.S.: Saudi 
Arabia and Israel; Turkey and Israel; Egypt and Israel; or any other less likely pairings 
among them. The other type of pair will involve a friend of the U.S. – Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, or Egypt – versus Iran. 
Nuclear crisis behavior between Middle Eastern states friendly to the U.S. can be 
expected to exhibit dynamics similar to those experienced by India and Pakistan. In fact, 
the compulsion for the third party to intervene will be even stronger and the antagonists 
will also feel compelled to outmaneuver the opponent in seeking third party support to 
meet their respective crisis objectives. The normative reasons for the third party’s 
intervention posited in chapter two would remain the same except that the challenge for 
                                              
57 Thomas Lynch, “Confronting Reality: The Saudi-Pakistani Nuclear Nexus,” War on the Rocks, 
December 30, 2013, http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/confronting-reality-the-saudi-pakistani-
nuclear-nexus/. 
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the third party to maintain hegemonic stability and thereby avoid a nuclear catastrophe 
under its watch would be greater in a world with a larger number of nuclear powers. In as 
much as horizontal proliferation is associated with increased dangers, the third party 
ought to be even more concerned about nuclear crises and adamant in terms of playing its 
de-escalatory role.  
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that Middle Eastern countries will be able 
to avoid exhibiting the instability-inducing attributes that have kept Western policy 
makers skeptical about the ability of second age nuclear powers to manage their 
capabilities.58 Situational factors in the Middle East will further incentivize third party 
intervention. Israel is likely to remain the cornerstone of U.S.’s Middle East policy for 
the foreseeable future. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have also been 
crucial for U.S.’s regional security and economic interests for decades.59 Finally, the U.S. 
                                              
58 Like South Asia, the Middle Eastern region suffers from a weak security culture, secretive 
defense establishments, Israel is the only liberal democracy in the region, some of the potential 
dyads are geographically contiguous, when competing with Israel, the rivalries of Muslim-
majority countries are likely to have religious undertones, and the region is infested with Islamist 
militant outfits opposed to Israel’s existence. Moreover, Israel’s adversaries will be operating 
from a position of conventional military inferiority like Pakistan has in South Asia. Also, their 
presumably small arsenals in the initial years would raise the attendant safety and security and 
preemption concerns. Unlike South Asia however, both the weaker competitors and Israel are 
likely to maintain a First-Use policy owing to Israel’s small geographical expanse that makes it 
more vulnerable to a first strike from an adversary, and therefore incentivizes the adversary to 
adopt such a stance.  
59 For accounts of U.S. foreign policy and ties with Middle Eastern countries over the decades, 
see David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas, eds., The Middle East and the United States: History, 
Politics, and Ideologies (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012).  For a brief discussion of current U.S. 
security relations in the region, see Cato Handbook for Policymakers, Seventh Edition 
(Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2009), 523-29, 539-47. 
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maintains military bases in and around the region which, as long as they continue, will 
keep its forces directly in harm’s way in case of a nuclear catastrophe in the vicinity.60  
The propensity of the Middle Eastern rivals to engage in brokered bargaining 
during a crisis will mirror that of India and Pakistan. The long standing ties between these 
states and their Western patrons imply a strong military and economic relationship which 
should make them highly sensitive to the third party’s evaluative potential. Moreover, the 
antagonists will feel even more compelled not to leave the field open to their opponent 
who, in this scenario, would also be a friend of the U.S. familiar with working 
Washington’s channels and thus as well positioned to extract concessions from the 
outside actor.  
B. Prototype 2: Crisis between a Friend and Foe of the Principal Third Party  
The most imminent of the future middle power nuclear rivalries involves a U.S. 
partner in Israel and Iran, a state with no diplomatic ties with Washington. Iran and Israel 
do not have formal diplomatic relations either. In fact, Iran refuses to recognize Israel’s 
right to exist.61 This dyad will feature deep emotive undertones and a theocracy in Tehran 
                                              
60 The Middle East and its surrounding regions and international waters feature some of the most 
important overseas U.S. military presence. Historically, the region’s rich oil reserves have been a 
major driver of this presence. Mapped out, it shows how closely the U.S. bases encircle Iran. At 
the end of 2011, there were about 125,000 U.S. troops in close proximity to Iran. Around 90,000 
were deployed in relation to the war in Afghanistan, 20,000 or so were deployed ashore in other 
parts of the Middle Eastern region, and a variable 15,000-20,000 remained on U.S. naval vessels 
in the region.  Ben Piven, “Map: US Bases Encircle Iran,” Aljazeera, May 1, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/04/2012417131242767298.html. For an 
interactive map of bases in the Middle East and elsewhere, see Simon Rogers, “US Military 
Deployments Overseas Mapped: How Have They Changed Under Obama?” The Guardian, 
October 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2012/oct/23/us-
military-deployments-overseas.  
61 Iran’s stance on Israel is deeply embedded in its nationalist discourse. Even relatively moderate 
Iranian leaders have held up this official position. For instance, the current Iranian President 
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often painted in the West as ideologically driven and capable of irrational decision 
making. Certain to be further sanctioned once it goes nuclear, Iran will also likely be 
increasingly resource constrained. This will accentuate concerns about its nuclear 
command and control, safety and security, organizational discipline, and the like. 
Moreover, Iran may further destabilize the equation if it follows Pakistan’s path in 
employing or allowing non-state proxies to operate under the nuclear umbrella.62 The 
already paranoid outlook of the global hegemon towards Iran will be further reinforced. It 
will be convinced of extreme dangers in any crisis situation involving Tehran.  
For the antagonists as well, the calculus will be much different than the South 
Asian one. Even though the U.S. does not extend a formal deterrence guarantee to 
Israel,63 given its extremely close ties with Tel Aviv and history of support to it in any 
                                                                                                                                      
Hassan Rouhani, considered to be a moderate and one whom the West has seen with some hope, 
managed to spark off a controversy by making statements to this effect against Israel even before 
he had taken office. Thomas Erdbrink and Jodi Rudoren, “Iran’s President-Elect Provokes Furor 
Abroad with Remarks on Israel,” New York Times, August 2, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/world/middleeast/iran-israel.html. 
62 Iran is already an active user of non-state actors as tools of its foreign policy. For a discussion 
of Iran’s use of non-state actors, see James M. O’Brien, “Exporting Jihad: Iran’s Use of Non-
State Armed Groups,” The Fletcher School, Tufts University, March 2006. For a broader 
discussion of the dangers of a nuclear Iran, including an emboldening effect on its foreign policy, 
see Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., and Evan B. Montgomery, “The Dangers of a 
Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs 90, 1 (January/February 2011): 66-81; 
Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs 
91, 1 (January/February 2012): 76-86; and Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, 165-67. For a rebuttal 
and a view that Iran’s nuclear capability will enhance regional stability, see Kenneth N. Waltz, 
“Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 91, 4 (July/August 2012): 2-5. 
63 The U.S. does not extend a security umbrella to Israel under any formal defense treaty. 
However, Israel has been U.S.’s closest ally in the Middle East and the two have a host of 
bilateral agreements including the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1952 that all but 
ensures provision of U.S. military equipment to Israel. Israel also remains the largest recipient of 
U.S. assistance and has extremely intense security cooperation with Washington. Jim Zanotti, 
“Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, November 1, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf, 24; Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to 
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crisis scenario, and given its estrangement with Tehran, Washington will naturally be 
expected to intervene squarely on Israel’s side. Indeed, not only will Israel expect full 
U.S. support but Iran will certainly assume that the U.S. will oblige. The Iranian 
leadership will therefore remain distrustful of U.S. intentions and be reluctant to allow it 
to influence the crisis.  
The situation presents an acute dilemma for the third party. On the one hand, 
ganging up against Iran will heighten Tehran’s fears of joint aggression against it and of 
an assured outright loss in such an eventuality. Its recourse would likely be belligerence 
and greater reliance on its deterrent capability. All the attendant dangers associated with 
this mindset and on-ground preparations that go along with it would take effect. Worse 
yet, an actual act of aggression by the U.S.-Israel combine may end up flirting with Iran’s 
red lines and bringing deliberate nuclear use into play. On the other hand however, the 
third party’s reputation as a credible ally will be on the line if it shies away from backing 
Israel, with its attendant effects on U.S. partnerships worldwide.   
The third party will most likely escape this dilemma by prioritizing de-escalation 
and in the process naturally trigger brokered bargaining. It can be expected to play two 
roles simultaneously: that of an antagonist; and that of a third party. As a direct 
antagonist to Iran, the U.S. will exhibit tactics more akin to classic coercive diplomacy 
and/or compellence at the front end of its intervention. Depending on the severity of the 
crisis, reputational concerns may drive it to bring military maneuvering and direct threats 
                                                                                                                                      
Israel,” Congressional Research Service, April 11, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf.  
 
485 
 
into the mix early on as it puts its weight behind Israel through its signals and actions. As 
a third party on the other hand, the U.S. would seek to affect de-escalation by pursuing a 
parallel course by involving partner third parties with leverage over Iran. The situation 
would amount to a ‘collective actor’ effort where other third parties take the lead role in 
employing the reward-punishment leverage as power mediators vis-à-vis Tehran. As the 
situation stands today, countries like Russia and China would be most suited to spearhead 
the effort. Meanwhile, the U.S. would utilize its own leverage vis-à-vis Israel to nudge it 
to exercise restraint and allow the U.S.’s crisis diplomacy to deliver results.  
The goal of the third party efforts towards both antagonists would be the same as 
in South Asia: to alter their preferences and incentivize crisis termination without 
complete fulfillment of their objectives. Collectively, the third party partners will still end 
up playing the role of “balancers” and “face savers.”64 As for the principal antagonists, 
Israel’s sensitivity to third party preferences would ironically be heightened by its desire 
to ensure U.S. support. Defiance would quickly dash any hopes of outright backing, a 
goal Israel would consider realistic at the outset of the crisis. Iran’s compulsions vis-à-vis 
the third party interlocutors dealing with it would not be much different than those faced 
by India and Pakistan either. It may engage in a brinkmanship exercise and threaten to 
cross the Rubicon in the face of the U.S-Israeli show of resolve but its need to avoid 
                                              
64 The role of the collective third party keeps their engagement within the bounds of power 
mediation in the depicted scenario. While the U.S. may employ extreme coercion in its role as an 
antagonist, it is the third party strand as the de-escalator that our model speaks to and this role 
will ultimately dominate the third party’s crisis diplomacy here as well. It therefore qualifies as a 
power mediator seeking non-military means to de-escalate the crisis. 
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losing its interlocutors and forcing their hand to sympathize with the U.S. – thereby 
facing a united global front against it during the crisis – ought to hold it back .  
The U.S. would want to side with Israel to protect its relationship and to appease 
it both due to reputational concerns and also because it genuinely feels that Iran is a 
danger to regional and global security.65 However, its inability to back Israel to fight what 
could potentially end up being a nuclear war will prevent it from seriously jeopardizing 
escalation control.66 A successful end to the crisis will inevitably leave Israel dismayed at 
U.S.’s performance. Unlike South Asia however, the nature of U.S. ties with Iran will 
provide it ample space to take tangible steps to redress Israel’s dissatisfaction by 
punishing Tehran diplomatically, economically, or in other non-military ways in the post-
crisis period.67  
                                              
65 In this case, there will also be extreme pressure on any U.S. government to back Israel from the 
all-too-powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington. On the power of this lobby, see John J. 
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
66 There is a parallel to be drawn with the 1973 Middle East crisis where Egypt instigated a 
demonstration crisis to lure in the Cold War superpowers. Cairo wanted Washington to pressure 
Israel to reconsider its stubborn position on the status quo in the Sanai peninsula which was under 
its occupation at the time. The U.S. eventually obliged to avoid the risk of the Soviet Union 
intervening on Egypt’s side in an escalated crisis. It nudged Israel to restrain itself in the crisis 
and eventually brokered a compromise deal which allowed Egypt to take repossession of Sanai. 
Russell J. Leng, “Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan 
Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
118. In the scenario under consideration here, the U.S. concern about escalation to the nuclear 
level will be much higher given the direct possession of nuclear weapons by the regional rivals 
and its view of Iran as a reckless, if not irrational, actor.  
67 We assume here that a direct military intervention against Iran even in the post-crisis period 
will be ruled out due to the presence of Iran’s nuclear weapons. This assumption is generalizable 
to all cases where middle powers have a demonstrated nuclear capability.  
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C. Prototype 3: Crisis between a Friend and a Potential Hegemonic Rival of the 
Principal Third Party 
The chain involving the South Asian rivals extends to China and the dyad of 
interest not covered in the other chains or elsewhere in this undertaking is China and 
India. China’s military and economic strength leaves it with attributes more akin to a 
global rather than a middle power comparable to India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, in as 
much as it does not qualify as a superpower able to directly compete with the U.S. at the 
global level yet, our posited crisis behavior can be expected to have implications for this 
dyad.  
A Sino-Indian crisis is not out of the question. Despite the unmistakable 
improvement in their bilateral ties over the past decade, a large section of the Indian 
strategic elite still considers China as the most immediate, and in some cases, imminent 
threat.68 The superior Chinese military might has also been India’s primary justification 
for its fast paced military modernization in recent years. Indeed, as recently as May 2013, 
the two sides were locked in a public spat over their disputed Tibet-Ladakh border 
allegedly triggered by a Chinese army platoon’s intrusion into Indian territory.69 While 
the situation was diffused without any noticeable crisis, this and similar previous 
incidents highlight the underlying bilateral tensions when it comes to questions of 
territory.   
                                              
68 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 219.  For one prominent view 
that highlights the Chinese military threat to India, see Pravin Sawhney, The Defense Makeover: 
10 Myths that Shape India’s Image (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), 19-97. 
69 Deepal Jayasekera, “Tensions Rise in India-China border Stand-off,” World Socialist Website, 
May 4, 2013, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/05/04/indi-m04.html. 
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A Sino-Indian crisis that threatened to escalate would worry the U.S. as expected. 
Apart from the normative concerns, this crisis would feature two of the world’s largest 
economies with over one-third of the world’s population. The implications of an 
expanded conflict between them, let alone one approaching the nuclear level, will be dire. 
Moreover, even though the fact that both China and India maintain a NFU doctrine 
reduces the possibility of nuclear weapons use, the residual concerns about crisis stability 
associated with any nuclear crisis will still exist. Concerns about India’s ability to cope 
with a Chinese threat and the destabilizing attributes of the South Asian context discussed 
as part of the India-Pakistan case studies earlier will also hold.  
The above said, China’s strength and positional competition with the U.S. implies 
a relatively more constrained U.S. role in crisis diplomacy. Washington’s intervention 
with Beijing will likely be limited to inducements in combination with mild use of 
economic and diplomatic “punishment leverage.” Banking excessively on threats against 
a country increasingly posing as a competitor to the principal third party would risk its 
outright defiance and loss of the already limited leverage over it.  
In fact, intuitively, China may seem to be a strong enough party to hold its own 
without involvement of any third party actor. It will also not be enthused by the prospect 
of greater U.S. ingress in its affairs.  That said, the nuclear environment will dampen 
China’s advantage over India. China would therefore gain little by defying the U.S. and 
leaving the field open for India to curry favor with it. On the other hand, engaging the 
third party seeking an end to the crisis but unable to threaten China to any noticeable 
degree would provide an excellent opportunity to extract concessions from India as a 
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quid pro quo for de-escalation. As for the weaker antagonist, it would be keen to elicit 
U.S. support to offset China’s advantage. Yet, it will be at a distinct disadvantage in this 
situation despite its better relations with the third party; the U.S. will almost certainly 
have to provide greater inducements to the stronger antagonist to incentivize quick crisis 
termination. Nonetheless, the fundamental crisis dynamic whereby the third party works 
to secure de-escalation without isolating either antagonist completely and the antagonists 
feel compelled not to defy it outright will still remain valid in this case.  
D. Prototype 4: Crisis between a Foe of the Principal Third Party and a Friend 
under its Nuclear Umbrella 
Finally, the East Asian case features a now-nuclear North Korea and two U.S. 
allies in Japan and South Korea who are formally protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 
While this technically leaves the context invalid for our consideration, we relax our ‘no 
formal extended deterrence guarantees’ delimitation to highlight how our posited 
framework may also effect the global hegemon’s calculations in such an environment.  
The fact that the U.S. has joint defense plans with its East Asian allies and its 
troops are stationed in South Korea and Japan makes it a direct party to any conflict with 
North Korea.70 With its reputation at stake, it can be expected to behave as the ‘defender’ 
                                              
70 For a basic and brief background of the U.S. alliance with Japan and South Korea, see, 
respectively, Beina Xu, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” Backgrounder, Council on Foreign 
Relations, December 3, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437; and 
Jayshree Bajoria and Youkyung Lee, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” Backgrounder, Council 
on Foreign Relations, October 13, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/us-south-korea-
alliance/p11459. For a detailed discussion of the changing nature of the alliance with South 
Korea, see Scott Snyder, ed., The US-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New security Challenges 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012). For a slightly older but still current substantive analysis of the 
alliance with Japan, see Ted Osius, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to 
Strengthen it (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 
490 
 
backing its ‘protégés’ in a crisis situation reminiscent of classic Cold War contexts with 
extended deterrence guarantees. At the same time however, normative concerns and the 
U.S.’s global sheriff role should place limits on how far it can go in behaving as an 
antagonist to North Korea. There will be a parallel compulsion to seek de-escalation even 
though it will have to prepare to defend its allies in an eventuality. Once again, it can be 
expected to seek means for crisis termination without allowing its own or its protégé’s 
behavior to land them into an expanded confrontation with the challenger.71 The third 
party will likely exhibit even greater caution in this case given the recklessness associated 
with the North Korean leadership. In the final outcome however, the U.S.’s dual role as 
antagonist and third party ought to place limits on its ability to operate as a classic 
defender supporting its ally to force the challenger to back down. 
The U.S.’s recourse is likely to be identical to that predicted for the Israel-Iran 
case, albeit with even greater public support for its allies and if needed, force 
demonstrations against North Korea. The obvious third party partner for the U.S. in East 
Asia would be China, the country with unique leverage over North Korea given the 
latter’s excessive diplomatic and economic dependence on Beijing. The situation would 
likely force the U.S. to employ its leverage vis-à-vis its allies – a relatively easier task 
given their formal dependence on it for protection – while China forces Pyongyang to 
                                              
71 The role of a defender in constraining its own protégé is well recognized in extended deterrence 
literature. See Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence,” 277-303. In fact, the history 
of the Cold War was dominated by the superpowers seeking to prevent their regional allies from 
pulling them into a direct confrontation with their rival hegemon. See Roy Allison and Phil 
Williams “Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World,” in Superpower 
Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World, eds. Roy Allison and Phil Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1-25.  
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prize positive evaluation over increasing the autonomous risk of all-out war. The Chinese 
compulsions to play such a role will be identical to those that led it to do so in the South 
Asian crises examined here. 
Interestingly, glimpses of U.S. behavior reflective of the need for it to play this 
dual role can be found in its past behavior on the Korean peninsula. In periods of tension, 
the U.S. has been prompt in issuing resolve signals highlighting its commitment to its 
allies. But a simultaneous outreach to China with requests for its assistance in reigning in 
North Korea to diffuse tensions has also been a constant feature of its engagement.  
The most recent example was the U.S.’s behavior during the spring 2013 crisis on 
the Korean peninsula that was triggered by a North Korean rocket test in December 2012 
followed by its nuclear test in February 2013.72 The situation was a classic display of 
North Korean brinkmanship, this time extending far enough to include a threat of nuclear 
war and movement of its missiles to its eastern borders, thereby signaling intent to target 
the U.S. directly.73 The U.S. entered the fray as a defender of its allies. A tit-for-tat 
brinkmanship exercise ensued with the U.S. issuing resolve signals and undertaking 
rather provocative joint military exercises with South Korea.74 Throughout however, the 
                                              
72 “US Vows to Defend Itself, Allies Amid North Korea Threats,” ABC News, April 3, 2013, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-03/un-calls-for-end-to-nuclear-games/4606482. 
73 Jethro Mullen, “North Korea Warns that U.S. Bases in Guam, Japan are Within Range,” CNN, 
March 22, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/20/world/asia/north-korea-threats/; Matt Smith, 
“North Korea Warns ‘Moment of Explosion’ Nears,” CNN, April 4, 2013, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/03/world/asia/koreas-tensions/; Malcolm Moore, “North Korea 
Moves Missiles to East Coast amid Threats of Attack on US Bases,” The Telegraph, April 4, 
2013,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9970631/North-Korea-
moves-missile-to-east-coast-amid-threats-of-attack-on-US-bases.html. 
74 Thom Shanker, “U.S. Runs Practice Sortie in South Korea,” New York Times, March 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/world/asia/us-begins-stealth-bombing-runs-over-south-
korea.html?_r=0; “S. Korea Hails New Military Pact with U.S.,” Japan Times, March 26, 2013, 
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U.S. reached out to China with private and public demands to help restrain North 
Korea.75 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the point person conducting shuttle 
diplomacy with Beijing, pushed China to “play a more active role” in restraining North 
Korea and publicly acknowledged: “it’s clear to everybody in the world that no country 
in the world has as close a relationship or as significant an impact on the DPRK (North 
Korea) than China.”76 The U.S. also built public pressure on China by demanding that it 
“put some teeth” into efforts to force North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.77 A 
number of Western capitals complemented U.S. efforts to persuade China, successfully it 
seems, to pressure the North Korean leadership.78   
We have now examined the validity of our core argument across four cases 
outside South Asia. Three-cornered bargaining remains relevant to each of the depicted 
prototypes. Observations drawn from the South Asian case will be wholly applicable to 
crises between states friendly to the hegemon. The validity will also hold when a friend 
and an estranged actor are locked in a crisis but the dynamic would play out somewhat 
differently, with the hegemon having to join hands with partner third parties to influence 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/26/asia-pacific/s-korea-hails-new-military-pact-with-
u-s/; Foster Klug, “U.S., South Korean Military Drills Inspire North Korea’s Anger,” The World 
Post, November 4, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/u-s-south-korea-military-
drills-north-korea_n_3060577.html; Arshad Mohammad and Jack Jim, “U.S. Tells North Korea 
New Missile Launch would be ‘Huge Mistake’,” Reuters, April 12, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/us-korea-north-idUSBRE93408020130412. 
75 Jill Dougherty, Jethro Mullen, and Laura Smith, “China, United States to Work Together to 
Calm Down North Korea,” CNN, April 14, 2013, 
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76 “What’s Behind John Kerry’s East Asian Tour,” April 17, 2013, People’s Daily Online, 
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the estranged antagonist. The framework will apply even when one of the antagonists is 
not strictly a middle power as long as it cannot be characterized as a true peer competitor 
to the global hegemon. Finally, while extended deterrence situations are strictly 
incomparable to contexts where such guarantees are absent, our model is relevant in that 
it predicts additional constraints on the freedom of defenders to back their protégés.  
The common denominator across the four prototypes is the global hegemon’s 
compulsion to seek de-escalation as its principal crisis objective. In each case, the U.S.’s 
role as the third party would generate a pull towards a peaceful outcome. Chances of 
miscalculations and misperceptions emanating from the trilateral framework will remain 
however. They will perhaps be greatest in Iran-Israel type scenarios where the friendly 
country will be most susceptible to feeling wrongly emboldened while the estranged 
party may be hypersensitive to situations that resemble gang up scenarios. The multiple 
audience problem would also be more pronounced, with the third party relying solely on 
partners to communicate with the estranged actor and having to transmit very different 
messages in its respective roles as antagonist and third party. The extended deterrence 
contexts examined here will also suffer from these risks although the hegemon ought to 
have an easier time exercising its leverage over its protégés than over an independently 
nuclear ally like Israel.  
This chapter has drawn major observations and conclusions from our three South 
Asian case studies. In doing so, it has summarized answers to the research questions 
posed in chapter two. It has highlighted the overwhelming evidence substantiating the 
primacy of the brokered bargaining model in shaping crisis behavior between India, 
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Pakistan, and the third party actors in each case. It has thereby established that middle 
power nuclear crises are likely to play out fundamentally differently than nuclear crises 
between the Cold War superpowers. Moreover, we have explained why this is so and how 
the three-cornered engagement under brokered bargaining is triggered and proceeds 
through the life of a crisis. The foregoing discussion has also highlighted the validity of 
our model across varying situational factors in South Asia, as well as the compulsions of 
the third party and the antagonists to engage in the three-cornered exercise in future crisis 
scenarios in the region and across other wholly or partially comparable contexts beyond 
South Asia. The implications of brokered bargaining for crisis stability were also 
discussed to emphasize the potent pressures for de-escalation felt by the involved actors 
but equally to caution against perceiving de-escalation as an over-determined outcome in 
contexts exhibiting the three-cornered bargaining framework.  
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CHAPTER 8: BROKERED BARGAINING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
AND PRAXIS 
We are only left to reflect upon the theoretical and policy implications of the 
crisis dynamics depicted by the brokered bargaining model. This chapter deals with these 
two aspects in turn. It highlights the contribution our analysis and theory development 
exercise makes to existing literature and expounds upon the opportunities and challenges 
our framework offers crisis managers of India, Pakistan, the potential antagonists 
discussed in the futuristic crisis scenarios, and those belonging to third party actors.  
I. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This research has theorized de facto third party involvement in nuclear crises 
between middle powers without extended deterrence protection from powerful patrons. In 
doing so, it has added significant value to an otherwise neglected aspect in literature on 
nuclear crisis behavior, and on nuclear deterrence more broadly.  
Two strands of existing scholarship address nuclear crisis behavior: (i) classic 
deterrence literature that was situated in the Cold War context and remained preoccupied 
with examining the superpower rivalry and its extensions through two-actor bargaining 
models; and (ii) more recent literature on the India-Pakistan rivalry that acknowledges the 
presence and influence of the U.S. on crisis outcomes but lacks systematic theorizing of 
why and how crisis dynamics are affected by this third party’s inclusion. Our core 
argument challenges and/or adds to these analyses.   
Most substantively, our argument forces a departure from the bilateral 
understanding of crisis behavior in nuclear contexts. Our theory is premised on a trilateral 
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framework underpinned by a process that entails recursive interplay of the perceptions, 
expectations, incentives, strategies, and choices among the three parties involved. This 
process however cannot be parsed to resemble the more familiar two-actor or two-
against-one actor models. Brokered bargaining then finds itself standing besides truly 
three-actor bargaining frameworks. This is an extremely thinly populated space in 
relevant scholarship.1  
By setting up each of our case studies as comparisons between two-actor and 
three-actor explanations for India and Pakistan’s behavior, we have provided evidence of 
the redundancy of two-actor models in understanding the crisis mechanisms and choices 
of the antagonists. Traditional explanations of nuclear crisis behavior overlook the dual 
attribute of the “resolve-prudence trade-off” inherent in brokered bargaining.  In this 
three-cornered framework, theories of classic brinkmanship and all behavioral 
characteristics encompassed by them as well as the inherent caution associated with 
nuclear contexts remain relevant and continue to be exercised but actors employ these 
with very different audiences and motives in mind. Our core contention therefore 
demands a much deeper understanding of the antagonists’ behavior, directed 
simultaneously towards the adversary and third party actors and constrained by the desire 
to attain positive evaluation, and the interplay between this dynamic and the third party’s 
use of its reward-punishment leverage. Traditional explanations rooted in the stability-
instability paradox (or for that matter even non-nuclear explanatory factors like 
                                              
1 For a discussion of the existing bias towards analyzing trilateral relationships through two-actor 
or two-against-one actor models, see Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party 
Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 15-19. 
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conventional deterrence) may seem to provide plausible answers for absence of major 
wars and uncontrolled escalation in South Asia but they are unable to accurately explain 
the processes and mechanisms that shape behavior and ultimately affect these outcomes.  
In our case studies, we noted aspects of Indian and Pakistani behavior that 
explanations grounded in traditional models would find puzzling. India’s propensity to 
hold back from crossing the LoC at Kargil despite taking additional casualties; absence of 
any effort on its part to establish the credibility of its newly declared deterrent more 
forcefully through resolute signaling during the crisis; or to credibly demonstrate its 
second strike capability despite pursuing a compellence strategy in the 2001-02 standoff; 
and its seeming contentment with restraint at Mumbai despite the huge reputational losses 
involved have all been discussed. Pakistan’s decision to abandon its troops and its loss of 
face caused by standing down to the Indian response at Kargil; and the absence of any 
thought to ready its nuclear arsenal in 2001-02 despite facing the imminent threat of an 
all-out Indian attack, among other seemingly perplexing actions and signals have also 
been recounted. The antagonists’ concern about positive evaluation helps rationalize 
these crisis decisions; prioritization of third party preferences over choices that would 
have satisfied traditional explanations grounded in bilateral deterrence models drove 
Indian and Pakistani behavior.   
Incidentally, crisis behavior explanations based on brokered bargaining also 
depart from Cold War cases which entertained third party involvement in crises between 
middle powers without extended deterrence guarantees. This was marked by superpower 
intervention in regional conflicts in the periphery where the U.S.’s and Soviet Union’s 
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presence ostensibly introduced a nuclear dimension to these contests.  South Asia’s own 
experience during the Cold War, discussed in detail in chapter three, can be used as a 
benchmark. The most obvious commonality between these Cold War crises and the ones 
we are most interested in is the irrationality of nuclear war. However, the real concern in 
post-Cold War contexts under study here is a nuclear confrontation between the regional 
rivals, not the superpowers. This implies that the third party no longer intervenes to 
satisfy its positional competition with rival hegemons, it cannot afford to be a bystander 
as regional nuclear crises escalate – much less a facilitator of wars between regional 
antagonists as the superpowers sometimes were during the Cold War (including in South 
Asia) –, the inclination to consider direct third party military intervention is redundant, 
and the aim of exploiting great power tensions as a key point of leverage for the 
antagonists is also no longer relevant. Simply put, the two contexts are incomparable, as 
are the models predicting crisis behavior in each of these situations.  
To be sure, as a theory of crisis behavior, brokered bargaining does not pose to be 
a direct competitor to nuclear deterrence theory. The presence of nuclear weapons is 
central to triggering our posited framework; the propensity of each of the three actors to 
engage in the trilateral bargaining exercise is hugely influenced by the compulsion to 
avoid nuclear war. However, given that brokered bargaining is the primary crisis 
behavior mechanism at play, theories that posit the dynamics of bilateral nuclear 
deterrence as the principal drivers of de-escalation must be rejected. On the other hand, 
while a non-nuclear factor – the third party – is central to the de-escalation dynamic, we 
add a new variant to literature by arguing that it is the process that underpins brokered 
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bargaining and not the role of the third party per se that is causally linked to crisis 
behavior. We therefore question deterrence pessimists who seek to argue that absent the 
U.S. role in crises like Kargil and 2001-02, escalation would have been highly likely.2 
Such analyses tend to view the third party as exogenous to the bilateral interaction 
between the antagonists. They therefore suffer from an endogeneity problem. Since third 
party roles are in reality endogenous to the crisis outlook and decision making of the 
principal antagonists, the situation does not lend itself to any neat counterfactual 
conclusion of the type these analyses tend to reach. If crisis behavior is dictated by 
brokered bargaining, the answer to whether classic nuclear deterrence would have held in 
the absence of this trilateral framework must remain indeterminate. 
As for literature specific to South Asia, it does recognize the third party dynamic, 
but remains devoid of attempts to theorize. The sparing effort made within the conceptual 
realm largely consists of propositions that have not undergone any systematic 
examination or theory development. Among this strand of literature, our analysis 
validates propositions like Khan’s (2003) independence-dependence paradox or its more 
generalizable version, the non-proliferation hypothesis of the theory of nuclear 
revolution,3 and Chakma’s (2012) ‘three-dimensional deterrence system’ thesis that point 
                                              
2 See, for example, Dinshaw Mistry, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South 
Asia,” Security Studies 18, 1 (2009), 148-82; Bhumitra Chakma, “Escalation Control, Deterrence 
Diplomacy and America’s Role in South Asia’s Nuclear Crises,” Contemporary Security Policy 
33, 3 (2012), 554-76; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and 
Conflict in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
3 Feroz H. Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia,” 
Arms Control Today 33, 8 (October 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Khan_10; 
Peter R. Lavoy, “Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare in 
South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29. 
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to third parties limiting India and Pakistan’s decision making autonomy during crises.4 
Our analysis builds on the deductive logic of these propositions to explain how the third 
party role is triggered and how it plays out to limit the autonomy of the antagonists in a 
crisis situation. In the process, we also challenge the prevalent understanding of U.S. 
involvement in South Asian crises, and of third party involvement in comparable contexts 
in general.  
Absent to date, we have explained the trigger of the three-actor interaction as a 
function of the mutually reinforcing dynamic involving the third party’s concerns about 
dangers of uncontrolled escalation and either the antagonists’ desire to proactively lure 
the third party or their compulsion not to ignore it as it enters unsolicited. Since our 
argument points to the inevitability of third party involvement independent – but not 
mutually exclusive – of the desire of the conflicting parties, we end up ascribing agency 
to the third party actors. This is contrary to the “inside-out” orientation of formulations 
like the independence-dependence paradox which see the antagonists demonstrating to 
lure third parties into the fray.5 Moreover, when the conflicting parties do compete for 
third party attention and exhibit provocativeness in the process, this is driven by their 
prior knowledge of the third party’s compulsion to enter the fray and the potential costs 
of allowing the opponent the first mover’s advantage. The uncertainty about third party 
behavior in brokered bargaining that keeps the antagonists sensitive to its preferences 
exists in terms of the specific choices the third party actor may make as it engages the 
                                              
4 Bhumitra Chakma, “South Asia’s Nuclear Deterrence and the USA,” in The Politics of Nuclear 
Weapons in South Asia, ed. Bhumitra Chakma (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 134-35.  
5 Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox.”  
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crisis but not in terms of whether it will intervene. The virtual assurance of third party 
intervention also eliminates the concern about its absence commonly cited as a potential 
inducer of instability in contexts where antagonists expect an outsider’s role.6  
This inevitability of third party involvement also suggests that the antagonists will 
not necessarily be pulled towards outcompeting each other in show of provocativeness. 
As analyzed in the discussion on crisis stability in the previous chapter, our evidence 
suggests that the antagonists’ desire for positive evaluation is a potent force that keeps 
them sensitive to third party preferences, and therefore injects restraint in their behavior. 
In each of the three cases studied, both antagonists competed for third party support just 
as the third party sought to avoid ganging up against either of them. At Kargil and 2001-
02, this entailed brinkmanship partly aimed at the third party but at Mumbai, the 
antagonists seemed to compete in outdoing each other in restraint more than in resolve as 
a means of attaining third party sympathy (India) or of preventing its outright opposition 
(Pakistan).  
The pattern of South Asian crisis behavior between 1999 and 2008 goes against 
predictions of ‘realpolitik experimental learning.’ One strand of this literature suggests 
that recurring crises over disputes between the same parties make war more likely.7 
Another argues that immediate deterrent threats are less likely to succeed between 
                                              
6 Neil Joeck, “The Kargil War and Nuclear Deterrence,” in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: 
Crisis Behavior and the Bomb, eds., Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 138-39; Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox;” Polly Nayak and Michael 
Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management After The 2008 Mumbai Attacks,” 
Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2012. 
7 Russell Leng, “When Will they Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 27, 3 (September 1983): 379-419.  
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adversaries who have faced each other in previous conflicts.8 Successive episodes are 
believed to raise reputational concerns that lead conflicting parties to prize resolve over 
prudence; coercive bargaining, sabre rattling, and brinkmanship tend to become self-
fulfilling prophecies.9   
India and Pakistan’s learning curves have been to the contrary. Their last major 
crisis was the most restrained even though it was triggered by a spectacular provocation 
and Indian restraint meant fresh reputational costs to add to those accumulated in the 
previous crises. By the time Mumbai occurred, the antagonists seemed to have learnt a 
key lesson: the initiator of the brinkmanship exercise – Pakistan at Kargil and India in 
2001-02 – had lost out in both previous iterations.  Meanwhile, the propensity of the third 
party to adjust its calculations and enter the fray more swiftly with each passing crisis 
helped to further restrict the window of possible aggression for the antagonists. 
Realpolitik experimental learning, on the other hand, would have predicted Mumbai to 
exhibit the most resolute behavior. In the same vein, classic deterrence-based arguments 
would also have a hard time explaining India’s decision to continue taking a hit in terms 
of its reputation for resolve – a key element of nuclear crisis behavior according to classic 
thinking –10 but still act in a highly restrained manner in the third crisis iteration within a 
decade. Brokered bargaining highlights how rational calculations and choices can lead an 
                                              
8 James D. Fearon, “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a 
Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, 2 (June 1994): 236-69. 
9 Russell J. Leng, “Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan 
Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
103-127. 
10 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, 
and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 185-
95, 457. 
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antagonist to prefer positive evaluation vis-à-vis the third party over traditional 
reputational concerns.    
Moreover, the South Asian experience also suggests that when antagonists do 
proactively seek to attract third parties, it is not correlated with the type of state in 
question. We differ from formulations like the ‘instability-instability paradox’ that see the 
desire for third party intervention as necessarily associated with the weaker, revisionist 
(in terms of territorial preferences) state.11 Existing literature on South Asia reaches this 
conclusion based on one questionable assumption: that the Pakistani state was involved in 
the terrorist attacks that triggered the 2001-02 and 2008 crises.12 Those suggesting that 
the three post-1998 crises have been triggered by the ‘revisionist state’ must assume this 
in order to substantiate their case. Indeed, if the perpetrators of the December 2001 
parliament and the November 2008 Mumbai attacks were acting on the Pakistani state’s 
orders, the weaker, revisionist state had created a crisis. On the other hand however, if 
non-state actors were operating autonomously, the crises were created independent of – 
or perhaps even in opposition to – the state’s wish. If the non-state actors are seen 
separately from the Pakistani state, Pakistan would still stand out as the antagonist keener 
to attract the third party at Kargil. However, India, the state with the status quo territorial 
                                              
11 This is the central thesis of Paul Kapur’s ‘instability-instability paradox’ situated in the South 
Asian context.  See Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent. 
12 In reality, this issue is hotly debated, with Pakistan constantly denying its role in cross-border 
terrorism in India even if its support to the Kashmiri insurgency during the 1990s is now 
considered conventional wisdom and is well documented. Indian writers tend to equally 
deterministically see a Pakistani state role in anti-India terrorism from across the border and most 
commentaries emanating from India take this for granted. For a brief discussion highlighting the 
difficulty in determining just which version is correct, see Moeed Yusuf (with contributions from 
Megan Neville, Ayesha Chugh, and Stephanie Flamenbaum), “Pakistan’s Military Challenge: 
From Where, to What,” in Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Challenge, ed. Moeed Yusuf 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014 [forthcoming]), ch.1. 
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preference and stronger military capabilities was more eager in seeking third party 
support at the front end of the 2001-02 crisis.  
Our confidence that the compulsions of the three actors will lead them to engage 
in brokered bargaining in all crisis situations comparable to the South Asian ones 
examined here also downplays the importance of the specific crisis triggers. The nature of 
the triggering event will have implications for the maneuvering space available to the 
three parties involved and their specific crisis choices but not in determining whether the 
bargaining exercise plays out. As long as the trigger creates a standoff with a threat of 
escalation, the predicted behavior patterns should hold. This reemphasizes the fact that 
our framework’s validity is not limited to situations where crisis triggers are clandestine 
encroachments of territory or acts by non-state actors – the type of triggers that caused 
the three South Asian crises we have analyzed. It also implies that typical unitary states 
as well as those whose lack of control over non-state actors operating from their territory 
may characterize them as ‘non-unitary’ will be as likely to engage the trilateral 
framework.13  
 Successful de-escalation of the South Asian crises examined here notwithstanding, 
we have already emphasized that none of the crisis outcomes were over-determined. One 
of the contributions of our analysis is precisely to highlight how escalation could occur 
quite apart from the organizational, technological, or perceptual and psychological biases 
that form the core of classic deterrence pessimism literature. The posited bargaining 
                                              
13 For an original analysis of this problem focused on South Asia, see George Perkovich, “The 
Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,” in Deterrence Stability and 
Escalation Control in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington, D.C.: 
Henry L. Stimson Center, 2013), 21-40. 
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exercise adds another layer of potential risks emanating from the interaction between the 
three parties. The most worrisome space within our posited framework is that of 
psychological biases that can cause misperceptions and misreading of contexts, rational 
consistency problems, and the concerns associated with the provision of asymmetric 
information in crisis situations.14 We have highlighted how the principal antagonists 
could misperceive third party behavior to consider actions that can trigger an escalatory 
chain; principal antagonists can also be thrown off due to each other’s moves that may 
have been driven by a misunderstanding of the third party’s preferences; and the third 
party itself can mismanage its role or misperceive the intentions or behavior of the 
antagonists and end up triggering an unwanted escalatory dynamic.  
These and the many other ‘new’ implications for crisis stability hinted at in our 
case studies need much deeper exploration. The analysis conducted here highlights the 
need for deterrence optimists and pessimists to broaden the scope of their inquiries to 
tackle three-cornered bargaining exercises much more centrally with a view of 
mainstreaming their stabilizing and de-stabilizing influences on crisis situations. 
Pessimists could continue holding on to their traditional concerns about inadvertence but 
their focus should expand to examining how brokered bargaining adds another set of 
possible routes to inadvertence born out of the potential for misunderstandings and 
misperceptions inherent in this trilateral framework.  
                                              
14 On the dangers emanating due to these factors, see Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Robert 
Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985); and James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations of War,” 
International Organization 49, 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414. 
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Optimists on the other hand must comprehend the characteristics of the 
framework that explain drivers of de-escalation and potential for escalation quite apart 
from the urge for nuclear states to avoid conflict solely because of the presence of nuclear 
weapons. For instance, just how much of the de-escalation pressures inherent in the three-
cornered bargaining framework are attributable to nuclear weapons and how does this 
effect traditional optimist positions on nuclear deterrence? Moreover, in as much as 
nuclear weapons are a necessary condition for our framework to play out, does the fact 
that brokered bargaining adds an additional buffer against escalation support the 
optimists’ position? Or are some of the pessimists right in considering third parties as 
non-nuclear factors necessarily in contradiction to the optimists’ take on nuclear crisis 
dynamics?  
There is room for a new sub-strand of literature focused on the three-cornered 
framework and its impact on the optimism-pessimism debate to emerge from our core 
arguments. From the South Asian experience, deterrence theorists ought to examine how 
traditional judgments on “instrumental rationality” are affected by the brokered 
bargaining framework; whether force demonstrations and preparations for military 
conflict such as in 1999 and 2001-02 now hold the same meaning as they did in 
traditional understanding of crisis behavior; whether belligerence to attract third party 
attention is as worrying as one seeking to exhibit resolve vis-à-vis the opponent; whether 
the link between deterrence and compellence as force functions employed in tandem in a 
crisis needs a fresh perspective in light of the fact that they seemed inseparable at times 
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during the South Asian cases;15 whether the multiple audience problem plays out as 
expected traditionally or was the extremely deliberate use of signals by India and 
Pakistan aimed at satisfying the demand of both strands of the resolve-prudence trade-off 
an indication of a trend that will hold in comparable contexts; whether audience costs will 
continue to be used primarily as levers for the antagonists to increase pressure on the 
third parties as was the case in South Asia; whether realpolitik learning in crisis 
management and the role of reputation within it still holds in the same stead as it did 
traditionally; whether aggressive inter-crisis moves will always be overshadowed by the 
need to ensure de-escalation during crises; and whether these and a number of other 
relevant concerns lead to different conclusions on the strength of arguments of the 
optimist and pessimist camps than is currently believed?  
Our analysis has also engaged aspects of literature beyond the nuclear realm. The 
third party’s role as ‘power mediator’ has allowed us to test the efficacy of mediation in a 
context typically consumed by coercive bargaining. We have argued that the caution 
induced by presence of nuclear weapons and the fact that successful crisis management 
makes the third party ‘dependent’ on the antagonists’ propensity to seek positive 
                                              
15 Traditional thinking on the issue suggests that deterrence trumps compellence when two 
nuclear weapon states are involved. Rajesh M. Basrur, “Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear 
Environment: The December 13 Crisis,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, eds. Rafiq Dossani 
and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 319. Our analysis however 
suggests that it is very difficult to distinguish between the two strategies of the antagonists in 
crisis-time as both play out in parallel. For example, at Kargil, Pakistan wanted to ‘compel’ India 
to give up territory while India was seeking to ‘compel’ Pakistan to vacate the occupied heights at 
Kargil. The most obvious conclusion we can draw from our analysis is that de-escalation 
ultimately coincided with returning to the status quo ante. At Kargil, this meant Indian success at 
‘compelling’ Pakistan to withdraw forces while in the 2001-02 standoff and at Mumbai, it meant 
‘deterring’ India from aggressing while ‘compelling’ Pakistan to act against militants. The 
analysis does not lend itself to an assertion that either deterrence or compellence necessarily 
trumps the other.   
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evaluation limits the external actor’s freedom of action despite its preponderant position. 
Indeed, in the South Asian crises, the third party actors carefully manipulated their 
reward-punishment leverage within the bounds of behavior expected of a power mediator. 
This compulsion on the part of these actors is generalizable and draws a critical 
distinction between our understanding of third party roles and that of theories like pivotal 
deterrence where the outside actor’s ability to employ direct coercion is central to conflict 
outcomes.  
While we provide no definitive answers for the debate on the characteristics of an 
effective mediator, we do underscore the partial efficacy of power mediation as a 
technique in environments typically believed to be ripe for coercive interventions. The 
U.S.-led third party proved to be ‘effective’ in South Asia in as much as it prevented 
escalation and achieved crisis termination but not in terms of ensuring resolution of the 
disputes underpinning the crises it managed to de-escalate.16 In fact, as Beardsley (2008) 
argues, by forcing an agreement or consent to end immediate tensions, mediation makes 
it more likely that the unsatisfied party will later rescind on its commitments.17 In South 
Asia, Pakistan has repeatedly pulled back from its crisis-time promises to put a 
permanent end to anti-India militancy. Nonetheless, our analysis aligns most closely with 
Rauchhaus’s (2006) view that an “impartial” mediator who cares about the nature of the 
                                              
16 These two benchmarks of effectiveness are taken from Dixon (1996). In evaluating third party 
management techniques in international conflicts, Dixon uses two criteria to determine the 
effectiveness of the third parties: (i) assessing whether the presence of particular management 
efforts prevented further escalation of a conflict; and (ii) whether those efforts tended to promote 
peaceful settlements. William J. Dixon, “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict 
Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization 50, 4 (Autumn 
1996): 653-81.  
17 Kyle Beardsley, “Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency 
Problems,” American Journal of Political Science 52, 4 (October 2008): 723-740. 
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outcome of the crisis but also does not want to back the maximum ask of either side is 
most likely to ensure cessation of immediate tensions.18  
Evidence gleaned from the case studies also confirms the centrality of private 
information in allowing the third party to play its role as de-escalator successfully.19 In 
each of the crises examined, the U.S.’s ability to buy time, to force the antagonists’ to 
climb down from maximalist demands, to convince them that they would be better off 
allowing the third party to do their bidding than contemplating unilateral action, and to 
prevent misunderstandings or inadvertent escalation was driven in no small part by its 
role as the transmitter of messages and its use of information obtained from its superior 
intelligence capabilities.20  
The power differential between the third party and the antagonists and the 
leverage this provides the mediator to ‘manipulate’ the situation also stand out as key 
attributes that benefited the de-escalation agenda in the South Asian cases. Our evidence 
also suggests that manipulative leverage trumps the need for credibility and trust in the 
mediator. Both Pakistan and India remained suspicious of the U.S. to varying degrees 
throughout the period under study but still engaged in the trilateral framework. We have 
predicted however that the mediator may not be able to play its role in situations marked 
                                              
18 Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management,” 
World Politics 58, 2 (January 2006): 207-241.  
19 This approximates the rather original argument in the international relations field by Kydd 
(2003) who attributes mediator effectiveness solely to private information. Andrew Kydd, 
“Which Side are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” American Journal of Political 
Science 47, 4 (October 2003): 597-611. 
20 This particular task of acting as the information conduit is also known as “informational 
mediation” and is well-recognized – as an effective tool for the most part. Beardsley, “Agreement 
without Peace?” 726-27. 
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by outright antagonism between it and one of the conflicting parties. It would need to 
conduct crisis diplomacy through third party partners in such contexts.  
Next, our analysis comes out supporting unipolarity theory, one of the most 
underdeveloped theoretical paradigms in international relations literature.21 We focus the 
theory’s application on the nuclear realm to argue that nuclear proliferation adds to the 
demands on the unipole and epitomizes its compulsion to employ a “forward engagement” 
policy to ensure absence of a nuclear catastrophe. It reinforces the hegemon’s direct 
interest and responsibility in protecting the international structure and norms that affect 
its position in the system. By adding the element of compulsion to the unipole’s decision 
to intervene in a nuclear crisis, our argument questions post-Cold War notions hinting at 
greater leeway for the unipole to pick and choose its involvement in regional crises.22 The 
findings also stress that the unipole’s interventions will be dictated by the de-escalation 
objective above any regional balancing concerns typical of the Cold War.  
The dynamic implies rather consequentially that the hegemon will be constrained 
to back allies outright even where it may have offered extended nuclear security 
guarantees. This may dampen concerns about ambitious protégés aggressing against the 
wishes of the defender in a crisis situation. But protégés may now be more likely to resort 
to self-help during crises or challengers may seek to take advantage of the defender’s 
                                              
21 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis: In The 
Shadow Of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 8. 
22 Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand 
Strategy After the Cold War,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold 
War, eds. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 144; I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold 
War Era,” in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. 
Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 1996), 448. 
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predicament by exhibiting provocative behavior to force it to reveal its intentions. 
Moreover, the hegemon’s reputation as a credible guarantor of security of allies would be 
under threat, with its attendant implications for horizontal proliferation down the road. 
Existing literature already points to credibility problems for U.S. extended deterrence in 
the post-Cold War era. However, the reasoning is lack of strategic interest to intervene on 
behalf of the protégé in a context where the U.S. no longer has to worry about competing 
Soviet intervention.23 We argue instead that the hegemon’s acute interest to prevent a 
nuclear catastrophe under its global watch will force it to intervene. Its credibility to back 
the protégé fully will still be suspect but due to its compulsion to play defender and third 
party simultaneously. For reputation-conscious hegemons like the U.S. then, the dynamic 
leaves it to make up for any loss of credibility by imposing costs on the challenger in the 
post-crisis period.  
Finally, we also point to the likely complementarily between a unipole’s 
engagement in a nuclear crisis and collective actor deterrence whereby a number of third 
party actors are elicited to back the unipole’s efforts to ensure de-escalation. We saw the 
U.S. being supported by a number of world capitals in South Asian crisis management. 
We have also argued that the role of multiple third parties will likely be even more 
crucial in situations where one of the antagonists has estranged ties with the hegemon. In 
as much as our argument highlights the role of collective actor involvement in affecting 
de-escalation, our analysis substantiates the utility of Morgan’s (2003; 2009) collective 
                                              
23 Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence,” 286-88. 
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actor framework in post-Cold War nuclear contexts.24 Interestingly however, our model 
predicts maximum utility for the “international-hegemony model,” one of the 
organizational options for collective-actor security management that Morgan (2009) 
dismisses as largely theoretical under the pretext that a hegemon would be unlikely to 
allow a collective actor to play a consequential role in crises.25 It is precisely this type of 
collective involvement that middle power nuclear crises are most likely to experience.26 
II. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Conventional wisdom holds that bilateral crisis management mechanisms remain 
the most robust way of dealing with nuclear crises. The focus of past policy interventions 
and existing policy prescriptions has therefore been to nudge this process along in South 
Asia. The U.S. role is seen as both a blessing and a curse but the consensus is to seek 
ways to eliminate the need for Washington’s intervention in South Asian crisis 
management.  
The desire to see India and Pakistan manage their crises bilaterally is 
unexceptionable. However, it may not be the most realistic. Not only India and Pakistan, 
but more generally new nuclear dyads – involved in intense emotive rivalries marked by 
deep distrust and possessing limited technological capabilities as most of them would be 
                                              
24 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 172-
202; Patrick M. Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” in T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and 
James J. Wirtz, eds. Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2009), 158-81. 
25 Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” 163-64. 
26 Our envisioned scenario is closer to Haass’s view of “foreign policy by posse” where he 
advocates U.S. forward engagement through informal coalitions/partnerships on specific global 
tasks as the most effective means for the U.S. to “regulate” global affairs. Richard N. Haass, The 
Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1997).  
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– are unlikely to be able to easily overcome challenges to their bilateral deterrence and 
crisis stability regimes. It is safe to assume that third party involvement in most middle 
power crises will take place in contexts marked by weak bilateral crisis management 
protocols, at least in the initial years and decades of their rivalry. As practitioners work to 
strengthen bilateral crisis mechanisms then, they ought not to ignore the value of the third 
party’s pacifying role. The plea is not to dismiss the importance of robust bilateral 
understanding on crisis management. Rather, it is that efforts to maximize the possibility 
of de-escalation through brokered bargaining must complement those aimed at bolstering 
bilateral protocols. The inevitability of the three-cornered engagement playing out in 
middle power nuclear crises makes this all the more crucial.  
We therefore see little value in seconding existing recommendations suggesting 
that the third party should signal its reluctance to enter crisis situations to the antagonists. 
Challenging India and Pakistan’s beliefs that third party actors will ‘save’ them every 
time is seen as a vehicle to get them to institute stronger bilateral crisis stability 
measures.27 While this could help address the earlier-identified moral hazard problem to 
some extent, the proposition would be incredible. Since any crisis situation will call the 
third party’s bluff, it will set it up to incur reputational costs unnecessarily. More 
importantly, the argument that stronger bilateral regimes would be the natural recourse in 
the absence of third party presence needs some rethinking. Instead of forcing the 
antagonists to focus on strengthening bilateral mechanisms, the situation could easily lead 
                                              
27 P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Working 
Paper 1.0, Henry L. Stimson Center, August 2003, 25, 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/escalation_chari_1.pdf. 
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them into self-help mode or force the antagonist keener to attract the third party in a 
particular crisis situation to exhibit extraordinary behavior, with its attendant implications 
for crisis stability.  
Relevant third party policy makers would instead be well advised to internalize 
their role in middle power nuclear crisis management and focus on three key tasks: crisis 
prevention; efforts to ensure that antagonists prefer utilizing third party crisis diplomacy 
ahead of employing force unilaterally in a crisis; and efforts to minimize the potency of 
instability-inducing factors that make escalation likelier in any given crisis situation.  
The most assured way of eliminating crises is dispute resolution. Since the third 
party is likely to be hamstrung during a crisis given its compulsion to pursue the tactical 
objective of de-escalation above all else, it must prioritize deeper strategic engagement to 
incentivize and assist dispute resolution efforts of the antagonists during the inter-crisis 
periods. In the South Asian context, Kashmir dwarfs all other reasons for tensions. Even 
the underlying motivations for anti-India terrorism from Pakistani soil are to be found in 
the outstanding nature of this dispute. Irrespective of India’s reluctance to allow outside 
involvement then, the U.S. must take advantage of its improved ties with New Delhi by 
considering a more active role in facilitating an uninterrupted India-Pakistan dialogue on 
Kashmir. The goal should be to force India to make a sincere bilateral effort at resolving 
the dispute.  
In parallel, third parties should work to eliminate incentives for any actor to 
provoke crises. Both crisis diplomacy and inter-crisis choices can help achieve this. 
Every time the de-escalation agenda in a crisis coincides with the third party’s opposition 
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to the provoker’s stance, the right message is conveyed. Kargil, for instance, was an 
obvious disapproval of an effort by a nuclear state to revise territorial boundaries through 
crisis-creation. It is no coincidence that the Pakistani military has not attempted a repeat 
performance since. In fact, the South Asian experience also lends itself to a broader 
message: the initiator of the brinkmanship exercise is likely to fail in achieving its crisis 
objectives but it will incur reputational costs in attempting to do so nonetheless. The 
Mumbai crisis also holds up restraint and prudence of the antagonists as a viable 
alternative to threat manipulation in order to lure third party support.  
The third party must also consider post-crisis actions to raise the costs for 
provokers while providing inducements to the victims. The provoker must be left feeling 
that it lost out eventually even if it had managed to escape the crisis with a face saver; the 
victim must believe that its engagement with the third party paid off in the grand scheme 
despite the fact that it may have exited the crisis with its objectives only partially fulfilled.  
The precise calibration of the balance between inducements and punishments 
would depend on the antagonists in question, the regional interests of the third party, and 
the reputational pressure on it. Its task would be easiest where the provoker is clearly 
identifiable and it is a foe situated in a region where the third party is not hamstrung in 
meting out punishment due to any immediate regional interests. A plausible scenario 
would be the U.S. imposing post-crisis costs on a nuclear Iran for provoking a crisis with 
Israel. The third party’s role would become far more challenging in situations where its 
partner or ally happens to be the provoker. In the above-cited example, an Israeli crisis-
triggering provocation would require the third party to punish it in the inter-crisis period 
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after having already disappointed it by playing down the middle in the crisis. 
Washington’s reputation as a credible ally will be pulling it in the opposite direction in 
this scenario.    
U.S. efforts in the South Asian context were complicated by the presence of an 
amorphous non-state provoker in 2001-02 and 2008. Pakistan’s importance in 
Afghanistan further added to the complexity. Washington has therefore been unable to 
push Pakistan to make sincere efforts to eliminate anti-India terrorism from its soil. While 
India has clearly gained diplomatically after every crisis at Pakistan’s expense, absence 
of a tougher third party stance has still left many in India less than certain of the benefits 
their country has accrued by engaging in the three-cornered bargaining exercise. A more 
stringent stance against Pakistan after Mumbai for instance would have reduced the 
prevalent concerns about India’s inclination to consider an independent crisis strategy in 
the next iteration. One could argue that a more forceful insistence on fast-tracking the 
legal cases of the Mumbai-accused was permissible for Washington despite Pakistan’s 
crucial role in Afghanistan. The fact that U.S. citizens had died in the attacks provided an 
obvious rationale to push for Islamabad’s sincere efforts to prosecute the accused quite 
irrespective of pressure from India. 
Nonetheless, with its immediate military engagement in Afghanistan winding 
down in 2014, the U.S. will have a fresh opportunity to adopt a harsher position on this 
issue. It could raise Pakistan’s diplomatic costs for non-compliance by signaling that it 
would continue to be branded as an irresponsible state unless it manages to control its 
517 
 
entire territory.28 It could even threaten, and consider, direct targeted operations against 
the anti-India militant groups present in Pakistan29 although Pakistan’s internal weakness 
and a possible implosion triggered by such a move make this a high-risk option.  
Equally important however is the need for India and Pakistan to work together in 
defeating the terrorist menace. Absent a synergetic, or in fact a joint, approach non-state 
actors are likely to continue finding terrorism an attractive proposition. For Islamist 
terrorists, the end goal may well be to land a ‘Muslim Pakistan’ in war with a ‘Hindu 
India’ to galvanize the global Muslim sentiment to stand up against the ‘infidels’ while 
creating enough instability within Pakistan to engineer an Islamist takeover of the country. 
This would be catastrophic, not only for Pakistan but also for India and the rest of the 
world. Arguably the most potent way to undermine any such design is for India and 
Pakistan to honor their bilateral commitment to insulate their broader relationship from 
terrorist attacks.30 If they can avoid upping the ante in the face of a terrorist strike, crises 
will be avoided and the non-state actors will sooner or later be forced to question the very 
rationale for such attacks. To a large extent, India had managed this between the twin 
peaks and Mumbai crises. Had it continued with its policy of restraint, an uninterrupted 
dialogue between the two sides may eventually have led them to a breakthrough.   
Of course, with Mumbai in the backdrop now, such a policy could quickly 
become suicidal for any government in New Delhi unless it is supplemented by close and 
                                              
28 Perkovich, “The Non-Unitary Model,” 34.  
29 Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,” 4. 
30 This commitment was formalized in a joint statement of the Pakistani and Indian leaders issued 
after their meeting on the sidelines of the NAM summit in Egypt in July 2009. Minu Jain, “India, 
Pakistan Delink Terrorism from Dialogue,” Indian Express, July 16, 2009, 
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/article95466.ece. 
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sincere India-Pakistan cooperation on investigating and prosecuting all those found 
involved in any terrorist incident. Again, the existing joint India-Pakistan anti-terrorism 
mechanism31 can be vitalized to provide a formal institution for joint investigations and 
prosecutions in any terrorist incident. The scope of the collaboration could even be 
broadened to preventive intelligence sharing that helps thwart any terrorist designs. 
Incidentally, the U.S. has already contributed to improving India-Pakistan intelligence 
sharing by setting up an informal, trilateral mechanism for this purpose after the Mumbai 
crisis.32 The mechanism reportedly helped prevent possible attacks in India during the 
Commonwealth Games in 2010.33 In the same vein, the U.S. must continue enhancing its 
own counterterrorism cooperation with India with a view of improving New Delhi’s 
preventive capabilities. 
These inter-crisis tasks necessitate a significant level of third party leverage and 
influence over the antagonists during peacetime. The third party’s task would be easiest 
when dealing with mainstreamed states like India and Pakistan not totally opposed to 
                                              
31 The joint anti-terrorism mechanism was agreed upon in a meeting between the Indian and 
Pakistani leaders on the sidelines of the NAM summit in Cuba in September 2006. N. Ravi, 
“India, Pakistan to Set Up Anti-terrorism Mechanism,” The Hindu, September 17, 2006, 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/india-pakistan-to-set-up-antiterror-
mechanism/article3076728.ece. The mechanism was soon formalized and the designated officials 
met for the first time in March 2007. “On the first meeting of the India-Pakistan Anti- Terrorism 
Mechanism Held in Islamabad,” March 3, 2007, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/march07/india_pakistan_anti_terrorism.pdf. It 
has remained largely ineffectual since.  
32 As the mechanism was set up, it entailed Pakistani officials meeting U.S. counterparts, usually 
U.S. diplomatic staff based in Islamabad, and providing information on any leads that pointed to 
potential risk of terrorist attacks in India. The U.S. officials would then process the leads through 
their system without seeking any information on the sources of Pakistani information. The 
information would be sanitized and transmitted to India. Author’s interview of relevant U.S. 
official. 
33 Author’s interview of relevant U.S. official. 
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engaging with the global hegemon or its third party partners. Globally isolated states 
present the most difficult scenario for third parties, not only during crises but even in the 
inter-crisis periods. The policy implication is a significant one: once a state has crossed 
the nuclear Rubicon, the only sensible policy would be to keep it engaged in mainstream 
inter-state relations rather than cascading it.34 Forcing it into global isolation will only 
make it more difficult for third parties to influence its decisions.  
This leads us to a fairly loaded proposition. The world’s powers will be unable to 
punish horizontal proliferators as harshly as required to deter other aspirants from 
pursuing a nuclear capability. The examples of India, Pakistan, and North Korea are 
instructive. Even when sanctions were in effect in South Asia and the U.S. was actively 
demanding de-nuclearization of the region, it felt the need to engage both South Asian 
rivals. It has since only increased its engagement on nuclear issues with both sides. It has 
also hesitated to contemplate any form of preemption against North Korea. In fact, since 
Pyongyang’s first nuclear test in 2006, Washington has visibly shifted its focus to 
diplomacy, including contemplating security guarantees to North Korea’s regime through 
the six-party talks mechanism.35 Other aspirants may also find costs of crossing the 
Rubicon bearable. Indeed, this could partly explain Iran’s allegedly continued interest in 
pursuing a weapons capability.  
                                              
34 Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999), xiii; Muthiah Alagappa, “Reinforcing National Security and 
Regional Stability: The Implications of Nuclear Weapons and Strategies,” in The Long Shadow: 
Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008), 536-37. 
35 Alagappa,” Reinforcing National Security,” 515. 
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The conundrum ends up placing a high premium on prevention. Global powers 
need to pay far greater attention to raising the costs for aspiring states before they cross 
the nuclear threshold. The focus ought to be on plugging gaps in regimes aimed at 
curbing supply side of proliferation – this could include an expanded remit for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, sting operations, interdictions, arrests, surveillance 
and disruption, cyber-attacks, and even direct or indirect sabotage – and on policies 
seeking diplomatic isolation, stringent sanctions, and even direct preventive military 
strikes. These actions would have to be taken not only against states with estranged ties 
with the global hegemons but also against allies that may be dissatisfied with its patron’s 
support and choose to pursue an independent nuclear capability as a result. Moreover, at 
no cost should third party actors take steps that weaken the global non-proliferation 
regime and subsequently increase the possibility of proliferation. The Indo-U.S. nuclear 
deal stands out as a clear negative in this regard.  
In terms of reducing the potential risks of escalation associated with crisis 
situations, the first suggestion here also focuses on the inter-crisis period. No inter-crisis 
policy should incentivize either antagonist to adopt force structures, postures, or doctrines 
that weaken crisis stability. As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. defense and 
civilian nuclear cooperation with India has not only left Pakistan decidedly more 
paranoid about U.S. intentions but it has also forced it to upgrade its own military 
capability at an accelerated pace and to toy with systems such as tactical nuclear weapons 
that inject greater instability into the nuclear equation. As Pakistan’s conventional 
deterrent erodes in the years to come, its tendency to fall back on its nuclear capability 
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will only increase. While this may be inevitable, at least on its part, the U.S. needs to 
reassure Pakistan that its growing ties with India will not come at Pakistan’s expense. 
Washington should also consider limiting its defense cooperation with India to aspects 
that do not have obvious negative implications for South Asian strategic stability. U.S. 
backing of India’s BMD shield would be one avenue to reconsider. The third party 
equally needs to actively oppose post-crisis measures by the antagonists that make crisis 
stability tenuous and increase its crisis management challenges in future iterations. India 
and Pakistan’s ability to develop, respectively, Cold Start and Nasr largely unopposed 
speaks to the third party’s failure in doing so in South Asia.  
 Next, virtually all ingredients of the traditionally recommended toolkit for 
bilateral risk reduction and strategic stability measures would also help increase the 
likelihood of successful escalation control in contexts marked by brokered bargaining.36 
                                              
36 The most relevant measures include those aimed at enhancing mutual understanding between 
the antagonists, injecting some level of transparency in the nuclear policies, postures, and 
command and control protocols without compromising any operational details or the credibility 
of the deterrent, further strengthening of command and control procedures (including safety and 
security protocols), taking steps to reduce accidental crisis triggers, limiting  dual-use missiles, 
strengthening of pre-notification protocols, developing common understanding of notions of 
limited war while working to eliminate limited war options and deliberate exploitation of the sub-
conventional space along the conflict spectrum, and continuing bilateral discussions on nuclear 
doctrines and on measures to prevent unauthorized and unintended launch, among others. On 
these issues, see Krepon, Jones, and Haider, Escalation Control; Michael Krepon and Julia 
Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: 
Henry L. Stimson Center, 2013); Shaun Gregory and Maria Sultan, “Towards Strategic Stability 
in South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia 14, 2 (June 2005): 135-140 [and the collection of 
articles in Contemporary South Asia 14, 2 (June 2005)]; Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, 
eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. 
Stimson Center, 2013); “Confidence-building and Nuclear Arms Control,” in The Politics of 
Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, ed. Bhumitra Chakma (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), Part IV, 
155-229; Zachary S. Davis, “A Decade of Nuclear Learning: Ten Years After the South Asian 
Nuclear Test,” Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post Graduate School, Conference 
Report, February 12-13, 2009, 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Conferences/recent/NuclearLearningMar09_rpt.ht
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In addition, the South Asian experience and theoretical literature of the deterrence 
pessimism vein ought to be used to identify specific behavior patterns that may raise the 
chances of inadvertent escalation within the trilateral framework. We pointed to a number 
of critical junctures in our case studies where the risks had been heightened considerably 
and could easily have led the antagonists to stumble into war. These and other potential 
scenarios need to be mutually understood and behavior that tends to create them avoided 
by the three parties when they engage in brokered bargaining.   
The one area where our analysis demands a counterintuitive observation is in the 
signaling and communication realm. While there is universal consensus on the need to 
promote direct communication between India and Pakistan during crises, it is often 
overlooked that their propensity to ignore this most obvious communication channel has 
not been a function of absence of protocols.37 Rather, it flows from an environment 
marked by deep mistrust and credible commitment problems38 which lead the antagonists 
to prefer using third party actors as go-betweens. This is unlikely to change for the 
                                                                                                                                      
ml; Mario E. Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust 
Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 177-230; Moeed Yusuf, 
“Persevering Towards Nuclear Stability,” in Security and Nuclear Stabilization in South Asia, ed., 
Imtiaz Alam (Lahore: Free Media Foundation, 2006), 16-42; Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation 
Control; “Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider;” Neil Joeck, “Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South 
Asia,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 312, September 1997; and 
Feroz H. Khan, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Future: Reining in the Risk, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 63-
101. 
37 Bracken, Fire in the East, 90.  
38 “Credible Commitments” refer to arrangements where the included parties are assured that all 
those involved have strong enough incentives to adhere to them and, therefore, will not 
unilaterally back out of the understandings. Chalinda D. Weerasinghe, “From Postindependence 
Ethnic Tensions to Insurgency: Sri Lanka’s Many Missed Opportunities,” in Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014 [forthcoming]), ch. 8. 
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foreseeable future. Therefore, while the preference for direct communication over 
indirect channels may be theoretically sound, ignoring the need to push for a robust three-
way communication system may be ill-advised. This is especially so since the third 
party’s role as the main communication channel in South Asian crises has given it 
decisive leverage in terms of crisis management.  
As efforts to build trust and thereby make direct communication the natural 
recourse for India and Pakistan persist, the third party must at the same time remain 
prepared to continue playing its role as the chief crisis communicator. It is therefore not 
only important for India and Pakistan to develop a common lexicon of terms and generate 
a common understanding of signaling but the third party should be equally involved in 
absorbing this understanding and making the antagonists comfortable with its own 
signaling language and style. This would help reduce the dangers associated with the 
multiple audience problem inherent in such three-way communication. Moreover, 
relevant officials from the conflicting countries must have open and direct 
communication channels with third party capitals. Preexisting mechanisms and rapport 
would allow for relatively easier transition to crisis communication when the need arises. 
Once again, this points to the need to keep potential nuclear antagonists mainstreamed in 
the international arena and engaged in peacetime.  
Relevant third party actors must not underestimate the challenges involved in 
performing their role as the go-between. There is high premium on their ability to gather 
information from both antagonists, obtain timely private information from their own 
sources, and collate, sanitize, and utilize it with extreme discretion to further the crisis de-
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escalation agenda. While the third party managed to perform this role amicably in the 
three cases examined here, the history of crisis management is filled with conflicts 
attributed to faulty intelligence, misuse of the information provision available to third 
parties, and unintended miscommunication between the involved actors. Third parties 
would have to invest significantly in maintaining robust intelligence gathering 
capabilities in middle power nuclear states. They must also maintain deep regional 
expertise that allows their crisis managers to use their communication role in a manner 
that is sensitive to the norms, requirements, and limitations of the operative context. 
Deep third party expertise in geographical zones where nuclear rivalries exist or 
are likely to germinate in the future is also needed to be able to anticipate crises and 
prepare the most suitable crisis engagement strategies for these regions. Third parties also 
need to continue investing in simulations and contingency planning for various potential 
scenarios in these regions.39 Moreover, they need to establish mechanisms to retain 
institutional memory from their past crisis experiences. The current U.S. system is ad hoc 
and often leaves crisis managers learning as they go along rather than being able to fall 
back on individuals and best practices catalogued from previous efforts.40 Perhaps the 
notional U.S. “playbook” on India-Pakistan crises mentioned as part of the discussion on 
Mumbai should be converted into an actual, live document available to all crisis 
                                              
39 Nayak and Krepon, “The Unfinished Crisis,” 62.  
40 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” 
Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 57, September 2006, 41. Three of the author’s interviews of 
former U.S. officials confirmed this. One of them recorded the interviewee’s candid assertion that 
the interviewee’s knowledge of the Kargil and 2001-02 crises was almost entirely based on the 
scholarship on these episodes, and not on any official records. There is no requirement for U.S. 
officials to be well-versed in U.S. crisis diplomacy in the region before they are posted out. 
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managers. Finally, the U.S. should consider constituting third party contact groups 
consisting of countries with leverage over the particular antagonists in question.41 The 
groups ought to be prepared to spring into collective action as soon as a crisis situation is 
believed to be brewing.  
 These policy prescriptions should affect the incentives, and in turn, behavior of all 
relevant parties. They should make crises less likely. When crises do occur, they should 
be easier to manage for a third party that is better prepared and has managed to retain its 
leverage over both antagonists during the inter-crisis period. Moreover, conflicting 
parties ought to find little incentive to initiate brinkmanship exercises during crises. They 
should instead be attracted to the idea of outdoing the adversary in exhibiting restraint as 
a viable alternative to threat manipulation vis-à-vis the third party. Most importantly, 
collaboration between the antagonists on addressing the most likely crisis triggers 
(specific to the South Asian context, joint anti-terrorism and investigation efforts between 
India and Pakistan, with third party support when possible) ought to build greater 
resilience in bilateral contacts while a concerted effort towards dispute resolution 
simultaneously nudges them closer to normalization of ties.   
************************************************************************ 
This research has ended up introducing a fresh understanding of nuclear crisis 
behavior that is likely to dominate crisis situations among middle powers nested in an 
international structure with stronger hegemons. Brokered bargaining’s theoretical and 
                                              
41 The concept of informal partnerships created by the global sheriff to perform specific 
international tasks in today’s unipolar world is most elaborately discussed by Haass, The 
Reluctant Sheriff, 93-100. 
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policy implications ought to add significantly to our current understanding of nuclear 
crisis behavior and of means to strengthen crisis stability within the trilateral framework. 
While we sincerely hope that the world never experiences another nuclear crisis to see 
this framework play out again, relevant actors would we well advised to remain prepared 
for exactly this to happen.  
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